Explaining policy differences as a function of diverse governance institutions by Flowers, Jim David
   



























In Partial Fulfillment 
Of the Requirements for the Degree 















Copyright © Jim Flowers 2016 
   
 








Dr. John C. Thomas     Dr. Gordon Kingsley 
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies  School of Public Policy 
Georgia State University    Georgia Institute of Technology 
 
 
Dr. Christine Roch     Dr. Seymour E. Goodman 
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies  School of International Affairs 
Georgia State University    Georgia Institute of Technology 
 
 
Dr. Paul Baker 
School of Public Policy 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
 
 
Date Approved: 29 February 2016 
 
 





Just like the turtle on the fencepost, this work would not have happened without 
the support and assistance of others.  When Dr. Kingsley assigned a paper by Ostrom 
and Gardner (1995) explaining the concept of the Institutional Grammar Tool, he asked 
the class to “tell me what you think of this notion and whether it has value?”  I initially 
dismissed the paper as not relevant to my areas of interest.  Little did I know how deep 
into the study of institutional analysis those concepts would take me.  
I appreciate the patience and support of my committee members over the life of 
this project.  I thank my chair, Dr. John Thomas, for being both understanding and 
insistent in a way that never discouraged but helped me to stay on task.  I deeply 
appreciated Dr. Baker’s willingness to look at very early drafts of my proposal, and for 
his insistence that I stay away from “squishy” concepts and measures.  I thank Dr. Roche 
for patiently sitting through a number of trial presentations over the years as I struggled 
to find the most effective means of explaining what I did and why this project matters.  I 
thank Dr. Goodman for his body of work on the topic of information and cyber security 
policy that serves as a foundation for much of the context of the policies that served as 
the subject matter for this study.   
This project, like many, took on a life of its own. My friends and colleagues did 
their part to encourage and pester me to finish.  Tom Lewis, who has been a colleague 
for some time, once said that asking me when I would finish reminded him of the 
Bullwinkle cartoon where Bullwinkle attempts to pull a rabbit out of his hat.  No matter 
iv 
 
how hard Bullwinkle tried, that rabbit never appeared.  Similarly, this dissertation failed 
to appear as quickly as I, and my family and friends and committee members, would 
have liked.  I thank all of them for their continuous encouragement, and their consistent 
admonition to “finish it!” 
Family played a big role in the success of this project.  I thank my father-in-law 
for allowing me to turn his kitchen into my place to write.  I owe my youngest boys 
thanks for understanding that I could not always play on Saturdays and Sundays.  There 




   
v 
 
Table of Contents 
Acknowledgements .......................................................................................... iii 
List of Tables .................................................................................................... xi 
List of Figures .................................................................................................. xv 
List of Abbreviations....................................................................................... xvi 
Summary ....................................................................................................... xvii 
Chapter 1 - Introduction .................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Cyber Security Issues and the Higher Education Sector ...................................... 3 
1.1.1 Organizational Dimension .................................................................................. 6 
1.1.2 Human Dimension.............................................................................................. 9 
1.1.3 Technology Dimension ..................................................................................... 12 
1.2 Overview of Theoretical Framework .................................................................. 14 
1.3 USG IT Policy ....................................................................................................... 19 
1.4 Purpose and Plan of Research ............................................................................ 25 
 - Policy Processes, Governance, and Structure ................................. 28 
2.1 Governance – Institutions and Implementation Research ................................ 29 
2.1.1 Policy Governance ............................................................................................ 31 
2.1.2 Policy Networks and Governance .................................................................... 32 
2.1.3 Governance and Institutional Analysis and Development .............................. 37 
2.2 Mapping Governance Concepts with the IAD Framework ................................ 44 
2.2.1 Information Security: Governance, Frameworks and Models ......................... 45 
2.2.2 Cyber Security Policy Process: External and Internal Factors .......................... 48 
2.2.3 Governance in Higher Education ..................................................................... 50 
2.3 Mapping the Policy Process – A Research Model .............................................. 52 
2.4 Summary ............................................................................................................ 56 
Chapter 3 – Hypotheses ................................................................................... 58 
3.1 Conceptualizing Policy and Governance Structures as Networks ..................... 60 
vi 
 
3.1.1 Structural Components .................................................................................... 63 
3.1.2 Policy Components and Formality of Structure ............................................... 67 
3.2 Organizational Conditions – Relationship with Governance Structure ............. 70 
3.2.1 Top Management Support (TMS) .................................................................... 70 
3.2.2 Collaboration .................................................................................................... 73 
3.2.3 Autonomy......................................................................................................... 76 
3.3 Elements of Policy Structure .............................................................................. 78 
3.3.1 Components ..................................................................................................... 80 
3.3.2 Scope ................................................................................................................ 80 
3.3.3 Tailoring (Fit) .................................................................................................... 82 
3.3.4 Form ................................................................................................................. 84 
3.4 Summary ............................................................................................................ 85 
Chapter 4 – Research Design ........................................................................... 87 
4.1 Review of Logic Model ....................................................................................... 87 
4.2 Research Design – Multiple Case Study ............................................................. 92 
4.3 Case selection ..................................................................................................... 94 
4.3.1 Case Selection Criteria ..................................................................................... 95 
4.3.2 Case Selection: Data collected ......................................................................... 97 
4.3.3 Cases Selected .................................................................................................. 97 
4.4 Data Collection ................................................................................................... 99 
4.4.1 Case Summary Data ....................................................................................... 100 
4.4.2 Documents ..................................................................................................... 100 
4.4.3 Surveys ........................................................................................................... 100 
4.4.4 Interviews ....................................................................................................... 102 
4.4.5 Field Notes ..................................................................................................... 102 
4.5 Data Management ........................................................................................... 102 
4.6 Data Analysis .................................................................................................... 104 
4.6.1 Units of Analysis ............................................................................................. 104 
4.6.2 Data Coding .................................................................................................... 107 
4.6.3 Nested Analysis .............................................................................................. 112 
4.7 Interpreting Data .............................................................................................. 117 
4.7.1 Governance Structure .................................................................................... 117 
4.7.2 Policy Structure .............................................................................................. 121 
4.7.3 Structure as Networks ................................................................................... 123 
4.7.4 Case analysis .................................................................................................. 123 
4.8 Data Validity and Reliability ............................................................................. 125 
vii 
 
4.8.1 Construct Validity ........................................................................................... 126 
4.8.2 Internal Validity .............................................................................................. 126 
4.8.3 External Validity ............................................................................................. 127 
4.8.4 Selection Bias ................................................................................................. 127 
4.8.5 Reliability ........................................................................................................ 128 
4.9 Limitations ........................................................................................................ 129 
4.10 Ethics and Human Subjects Issues ................................................................... 131 
4.11 Summary .......................................................................................................... 131 
Chapter 5 –External Conditions and Constitutional Level Rules ...................... 132 
5.1 Interpreting the Data using IAD Descriptors .................................................... 132 
5.2 Discussion of External Standards ..................................................................... 137 
5.2.1 ACUPA ............................................................................................................ 140 
5.2.2 Agile ................................................................................................................ 144 
5.2.3 PCI .................................................................................................................. 146 
5.2.4 ISO 27002 ....................................................................................................... 147 
5.2.5 National Institute of Standards (NIST) Publication 800 ................................. 149 
5.3 Case Summaries ............................................................................................... 150 
5.3.1 Georgia Tech .................................................................................................. 153 
5.3.2 UGA ................................................................................................................ 155 
5.3.3 Georgia Southern ........................................................................................... 158 
5.3.4 GSU ................................................................................................................. 163 
5.4 Summary .......................................................................................................... 165 
Chapter 6 - Governance Structures ................................................................ 167 
6.1 Comparing Structures – Preliminary Analysis .................................................. 169 
6.1.1 Document Level Analysis ............................................................................... 170 
6.1.2 Measuring Structure –Categorizing Observations ......................................... 182 
6.1.3 Differences in Components ........................................................................... 187 
6.1.4 Dialing in Precision ......................................................................................... 190 
6.2 Organizational Conditions – Differences Compared ........................................ 192 
6.2.1 TMS ................................................................................................................ 192 
6.2.2 Collaboration and Autonomy ......................................................................... 201 
6.2.3 Autonomy....................................................................................................... 212 
6.3 Summary - How does the governance structure vary among the cases? ....... 214 
viii 
 
Chapter 7 –Policy Structures .......................................................................... 220 
7.1 Relating Governance Structure to Policy Structure ......................................... 221 
7.2 Elements of Policy Structure ............................................................................ 224 
7.2.1 Components ................................................................................................... 226 
7.2.2 Scope .............................................................................................................. 227 
7.2.3 Tailoring ......................................................................................................... 229 
7.2.4 Form ............................................................................................................... 240 
7.3 Summary .......................................................................................................... 241 
 – Discussion ................................................................................... 245 
8.1 Purpose of the Study ........................................................................................ 245 
8.2 Summary of Findings ........................................................................................ 248 
8.2.1 Structure ........................................................................................................ 253 
8.2.2 External Conditions ........................................................................................ 256 
8.2.3 Organizational Conditions .............................................................................. 258 
8.2.4 Elements of Policy Structure .......................................................................... 265 
8.3 Discussion Summary ........................................................................................ 268 
 - Conclusion ................................................................................... 276 
9.1 Contributions to Theory, Method, and Practice .............................................. 277 
9.1.1 Theory ............................................................................................................ 277 
9.1.2 Method........................................................................................................... 280 
9.1.3 Some thoughts regarding application of IGT ................................................. 281 
9.1.4 Policy and Practice ......................................................................................... 284 
9.2 Future Research ............................................................................................... 289 
9.2.1 Structure of Workflow and Support .............................................................. 291 
9.2.2 Well Structured Policy Systems ..................................................................... 291 
9.2.3 Mapping Key Features ................................................................................... 293 
9.2.4 Social Network Analysis ................................................................................. 294 
9.2.5 Towards “Big Data” Research ........................................................................ 295 
9.3 Limitations ........................................................................................................ 296 
9.4 Conclusions....................................................................................................... 298 
ix 
 
 Summary Case Data ........................................................... 301 
 Policy Inventory ................................................................. 302 
 Document Protocol ............................................................ 306 
 Data Dictionary – Case Summary Data ............................... 310 
 Document Summary – Meta-Data ...................................... 311 
 Survey Instrument ............................................................. 312 
 Interview Protocol ............................................................. 322 
 Institutional Analysis Protocol ........................................... 328 
 Source Documents for Meta Policy Observations ............... 343 
 Georgia State Collective Level Observations ....................... 348 
 GS Collective Level Observations ....................................... 355 
 Georgia Tech Collective Level Observations ....................... 360 
 UGA Collective Level Observations..................................... 366 
 “Conduct Analysis” ............................................................ 372 
 “Draft Policy” ..................................................................... 380 
Appendix P  “Get Approvals” ................................................................ 383 
 “Education (Awareness)” ................................................... 388 
 “Plan Maintenance” .......................................................... 390 
x 
 
 “Measurement and Compliance” ....................................... 397 
 Aggregation Rules .............................................................. 398 
 Get Approval Rules – Filtered ............................................. 401 
 Information Rules .............................................................. 403 
 Scope Rules ....................................................................... 410 
References .................................................................................................... 411 
 
   
xi 
 
List of Tables 
TABLE 1-1 DISTRIBUTION OF USG UNITS MEETING REQUIREMENTS PER CARNEGIE CLASS ........................ 21 
TABLE 2-1 SEMIOTIC FRAMEWORK FOR SECURITY RESEARCH ..................................................................... 47 
TABLE 2-2 FIVE MANAGEMENT THEORIES ADAPTED FROM HONG, ET AL 2003, P. 246 .............................. 48 
TABLE 2-3  RULE TYPES .................................................................................................................................. 56 
TABLE 3-1 POLICY STRUCTURE DEFINED AS NETWORK TYPES ...................................................................... 62 
TABLE 3-2 PRESENCE OF KNAPP PROCESS PER STRUCTURE TYPE ................................................................. 64 
TABLE 3-3 SECURITY POLICY COMPONENTS DEFINED .................................................................................. 65 
TABLE 3-4 USG BASELINE DOCUMENT STRUCTURE ...................................................................................... 81 
TABLE 3-5 COVERAGE AREAS – AUP .............................................................................................................. 84 
TABLE 3-6 STUDY HYPOTHESES ..................................................................................................................... 86 
TABLE 4-1 USG UNITS POLICY COMPLIANCE ................................................................................................. 98 
TABLE 4-2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR USG UNITS .................................................................................... 98 
TABLE 4-3 SELECTED CASES ........................................................................................................................... 99 
TABLE 4-4  RULE TYPES ................................................................................................................................ 106 
TABLE 4-5INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED ........................................................................................................... 108 
TABLE 4-6 STATEMENT VARIABLES ............................................................................................................. 112 
TABLE 4-7 NESTED ANALYSIS - EXAMPLE .................................................................................................... 114 
TABLE 4-8  ANALYSIS OF USG 11.3 .............................................................................................................. 116 
TABLE 4-9 COMPARING RULE CONFIGURATIONS ACROSS ORGS................................................................ 116 
TABLE 4-10  SAMPLE ANALYSIS OF STRUCTURE - ACTORS WITHIN ACTION SITUATIONS ........................... 118 
TABLE 4-11 RULE CONFIGURATIONS WITHIN ACUPA STEPS ....................................................................... 119 
TABLE 4-12 ACTORS AND THE BOUNDARY RULE TYPES .............................................................................. 120 
TABLE 4-13 CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING TYPE OF GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE ......................................... 121 
TABLE 4-14 SAMPLE - DISTRIBUTION OF POLICY COMPONENTS PER USG REQUIREMENT ........................ 121 
TABLE 4-15 ANALYSIS OF COMPONENTS WITH POLICY DOCUMENTS ........................................................ 122 
xii 
 
TABLE 4-16 CRITERIA TO DETERMINE POLICY STRUCTURE ......................................................................... 122 
TABLE 5-1 ACTION SITUATION COMPONENTS ............................................................................................ 135 
TABLE 5-2  RULE TYPES ................................................................................................................................ 136 
TABLE 5-3 ACUPA ACTION SETS .................................................................................................................. 142 
TABLE 5-4 USG METAPOLICIES ACROSS ACUPA ACTION SETS .................................................................... 143 
TABLE 5-5 COMPARISON AGILE AND IAD VALUES ...................................................................................... 144 
TABLE 5-6 AGILE INSTITUTIONS MAPPED INTO ACUPA ACTION STEPS ...................................................... 145 
TABLE 5-7 PCI DATA SECURITY CONTROLS - SOURCE ROWLINGSON AND WINSBORROW 2006) .............. 146 
TABLE 5-8 CASE DESCRIPTIVE DATA ............................................................................................................ 151 
TABLE 5-9 SUMMARY DATA - DISTRIBUTION OF META-POLICY OBSERVATIONS........................................ 152 
TABLE 6-1 CASE POLICY DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ....................................................................................... 171 
TABLE 6-2 - POLICY COMPONENTS .............................................................................................................. 174 
TABLE 6-3 POLICY STRUCTURE CRITERIA ..................................................................................................... 181 
TABLE 6-4 FREQUENCY ANALYSIS - OBSERVATIONS WITHIN KNAPP PROCESSES ....................................... 183 
TABLE 6-5 STRUCTURE DETERMINED BY PRESENCE OF KNAPP PROCESSES ............................................... 184 
TABLE 6-6 KNAPP PROCESS TALLIES ............................................................................................................ 185 
TABLE 6-7 OBSERVED KNAPP PROCESSES - RELATIVE STRENGTHS ............................................................. 186 
TABLE 6-8 DISTRIBUTION OF OBSERVATIONS AS COMPONENTS ............................................................... 188 
TABLE 6-9 RULES CONFIGURATIONS PER ACUPA STEP ............................................................................... 191 
TABLE 6-10  ATTRIBUTE CATEGORY BY CASE .............................................................................................. 194 
TABLE 6-11 BOUNDARY RULES ESTABLISHING TEAMS................................................................................ 195 
TABLE 6-12 COLLECTIVE LEVEL STRUCTURE ASSESSMENT .......................................................................... 199 
TABLE 6-13 EXAMPLE SYMMETRICAL AGGREGATION RULES ..................................................................... 208 
TABLE 6-14 SUMMARY FINDINGS ............................................................................................................... 216 
TABLE 7-1 CASE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES - DESCRIPTIVE DATA ............................................................ 223 
TABLE 7-2 POLICY STRUCTURE HYPOTHESES .............................................................................................. 224 
TABLE 7-3 AUP OPERATIONAL LEVEL STATEMENTS .................................................................................... 225 
xiii 
 
TABLE 7-4 DISTRIBUTION OF POLICY COMPONENTS WITHIN AUP OPERATIONAL LEVEL OBSERVATIONS. 227 
TABLE 7-5 CASE STATEMENTS PER REQUIREMENT (PROPORTION) ............................................................ 228 
TABLE 7-6 SUMMARY OF USG REQUIREMENTS MET .................................................................................. 229 
TABLE 7-7 AWARENESS - FIT OF POSITIONS AND ISSUES ............................................................................ 231 
TABLE 7-8 AUP AREA COVERAGE CRITERIA ................................................................................................. 232 
TABLE 7-9  ACCEPTABLE BEHAVIOR ............................................................................................................ 233 
TABLE 7-10 ACCESS MANAGEMENT ............................................................................................................ 234 
TABLE 7-11 LICENSING ................................................................................................................................ 235 
TABLE 7-12 POLICY MANAGEMENT............................................................................................................. 236 
TABLE 7-13 FITNESS TEST ............................................................................................................................ 239 
TABLE 7-14 FORM OF AUP POLICY .............................................................................................................. 241 
TABLE 7-15 FINDINGS SUMMARY ............................................................................................................... 242 
TABLE 8-1 HYPOTHESES EXPLORING TMS AND COLLABORATION .............................................................. 260 
TABLE 8-2 ELEMENTS OF POLICY STRUCTURE ............................................................................................. 265 
TABLE 9-1 EXAMPLE DECOMPOSED STATEMENT ....................................................................................... 287 
TABLE 9-2 EXAMPLE REDUCED STATEMENT ............................................................................................... 288 
TABLE C-1 DOCUMENT DATA TABLE LAYOUT ............................................................................................. 306 
TABLE C-2 META DATA VARIABLES .............................................................................................................. 307 
TABLE H-1 ATTRIBUTE CATEGORIES ............................................................................................................ 329 
TABLE H-2 POLICY COMPONENTS ............................................................................................................... 330 
TABLE H-3 DEONTIC CLASSIFICATION .......................................................................................................... 330 
TABLE H-4 ALIGNMENT OF ACUPA STEPS TO ACTION SITUATIONS ............................................................ 332 
TABLE H-5 INSTITUTIONAL STATEMENT COMPONENTS ............................................................................. 333 
TABLE H-6 STATEMENT TYPE DEFINITIONS ................................................................................................. 334 
TABLE H-7 SAMPLE ANALYSIS OF STATEMENT TYPES ................................................................................. 335 
TABLE H-8 SAMPLE DISPLAY OF INSTITUTIONAL STATEMENTS  ................................................................. 336 
TABLE H-9 RULE TYPE DEFINITIONS............................................................................................................. 337 
xiv 
 
TABLE H-10 KNAPP ACTION SITUATION DEFINITIONS ................................................................................ 338 
TABLE H-11 USG CYBER ACTION SITUATIONS DEFINITIONS ........................................................................ 339 
TABLE H-12 SAMPLE UGA RULE TYPES ........................................................................................................ 342 
 
 
   
xv 
 
List of Figures 
FIGURE 1-1 THEORETICAL FRAME ................................................................................................................. 14 
FIGURE 1-2 POLICY PROCESS MODEL ............................................................................................................ 17 
FIGURE 2-1 THREE LEVELS OF INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS .............................................................................. 42 
FIGURE 2-2 KNAPP GOVERNANCE MODEL AS NETWORKS OF ACTION SITUATIONS .................................... 53 
FIGURE 3-1 SAMPLE POLICY STRUCTURE TYPE ............................................................................................. 61 
FIGURE 3-2 ELEMENTS OF POLICY STRUCTURE ............................................................................................. 79 
FIGURE 4-1 THEORETICAL FRAME ................................................................................................................. 88 
FIGURE 4-2 RESEARCH FRAMEWORK ADAPTED FROM IAD .......................................................................... 89 
FIGURE 4-3 HIGH-LEVEL LOGIC MODEL – INTEGRATING KNAPP WITH IAD .................................................. 90 
FIGURE 4-4 ANALYSIS OF ACTION SITUATION STRUCTURE ........................................................................... 91 
FIGURE 4-5 CONFIGURATION INVENTORY (OSTROM AND BASURTO 2011, 328) ....................................... 115 
FIGURE 5-1 KNAPP SECURITY GOVERNANCE MODEL.................................................................................. 133 
FIGURE 5-2 INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF AN ACTION SITUATION (OSTROM 2001, 10) .................................. 133 
FIGURE 5-3 RULES AFFECTING ACTION SITUATION ..................................................................................... 136 
FIGURE 5-4 ACUPA PROCESS FLOW ............................................................................................................ 140 
FIGURE 5-5 PLAN-DO-CHECK-ACT ............................................................................................................... 147 
FIGURE 5-6 ISO 27002 SECURITY ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE ................................................................... 148 
FIGURE 6-1 GT POLICY STRUCTURE GRAPHIC ............................................................................................. 176 
FIGURE 6-2 GEORGIA SOUTHERN POLICY STRUCTURE GRAPHIC ................................................................ 177 
FIGURE 6-3 UGA POLICY STRUCTURE GRAPHIC .......................................................................................... 178 
FIGURE 6-4 GSU POLICY STRUCTURE GRAPHIC ........................................................................................... 179 
FIGURE 6-5 DISTRIBUTION OF COMPONENTS ............................................................................................. 189 
FIGURE 6-6 DISTRIBUTION OF STATEMENTS BY CASE (N=297) ................................................................... 190 
FIGURE 7-1 KNAPP MODEL .......................................................................................................................... 221 
FIGURE H-1 DATA ENTRY OF DISASSEMBLED STATEMENT ......................................................................... 328
   
xvi 
 
List of Abbreviations 
  
ACUPA Association of College and University Policy Administrators 
AGILE Not an acronym – references the philosophy for software development, as 
described in The Manifesto for Agile Software Development, where 
“requirements and solutions evolve through collaboration between self-
organizing, cross-functional teams”.  
BOR Board of Regents 
CIO Chief Information Officer – normally the top IT manager at the university 
CISO Chief Information Security Officer 
DHS Department of Homeland Security 
GS Georgia Southern 
GSU Georgia State University 
GT Georgia Tech 
ISO International Standards Organization 
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology 
UGA University of Georgia 
USG University System of Georgia 
 





This study asks the question: “How does the structure of cybersecurity policy 
relate to differences in structure of policy governance of universities and colleges?” The 
study has three objectives.  First, the study seeks to add to the body of knowledge 
concerning the relationship between the structure of cybersecurity policy processes and 
the security policies developed by those processes.  Second, the study seeks to 
demonstrate the usefulness of the Institutional Grammar Tool, Rules Configurations, 
and other methods employed to analyze institutional configurations. Third, the study 
seeks to provide pragmatic suggestions for cybersecurity practitioners to systematically 
identify deficiencies in policy structure that contribute to less than optimum outcomes. 
Research on this question is necessary as no integrative framework exists for 
describing or predicting how organizations adopt and implement cyber security policy. 
The study proposes such a framework by integrating an ideal model for cyber security 
governance with the principles of the Institutional Analysis and Design framework (IAD).  
Four research universities of the University System of Georgia are subjected to a cross-
case comparison of information security policies.  Interviews and policy documents 
provide a database of institutional statements that are analyzed using IAD methods and 
tools.   
Prior research suggests that elements of policy structure, such as how the policy 
fits the organization’s objectives and culture, are linked to policy effectiveness. Research 
also suggests that how those elements of policy structure reflect external threats and 
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organizational factors are determined by how the cybersecurity policy development is 
integrated into the governance of university wide policy.   
In addition to demonstrating the utility of an integrated approach to studying 
the problem of creating effective policy, findings demonstrate how a well-integrated 
cybersecurity governance structure provides better fit, constructs policies of 
appropriate scope, and is more likely to include the components of governance 
necessary for policy effectiveness.  Findings also suggest that policy form, the readability 
of policy, may be improved if the documents are analyzed using the institutional 
grammar tools suggested by the IAD and if collaboration with users and managers to 
construct policy is encouraged.  The capability of the methods employed by the study to 
identify deficiencies in cyber security governance structure that are manifested in less 
effective policy outcomes may aid policy makers as they strive to develop policy 
solutions to an ever changing security threat. 
1 
 




Researchers surveyed the world’s top 100 universities in a quest to examine the 
structure and content of information security policies implemented (Neil Francis 
Doherty, Anastasakis, and Fulford 2009).  The authors supposed that universities would 
be appropriately concerned with policies to protect the data, computers, and networks 
that support the administrative, education, and research missions of these 
organizations.  However, the article found a “wide diversity of policies and standards” 
indicative of a non-uniform approach to security management.  The issues covered by 
these policies were very narrow and reflected a “highly techno-centric view of 
information security management” (Neil Francis Doherty, Anastasakis, and Fulford 2009, 
449).  The study concluded that universities have not “tailored their policies to reflect 
their status as knowledge-intensive organizations” (Neil Francis Doherty, Anastasakis, 
and Fulford 2009, 456).   
There is a significant gap in the literature with “respect to approaches to the 
formulation of information security policy” (Baskerville and Siponen 2002 as found in 
Doherty, et al. 2009).  Knowledge about the challenges and constraints of policy 
processes that assess, create, and monitor security policy is minimal (Werlinger, 
Hawkey, and Beznosov 2009, 7).  Policy advisors believe that understanding how 
organizations structure cybersecurity policies in response to varying threats and 
external mandates is worthy of additional research (Portnoy and Goodman 2009).  The 
literature suggests that an understanding of the relationship between the structure of 
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policy process and policy content may improve the design of cyber security policy for 
organizations in the higher education sector (Neil F. Doherty and Fulford 2006; Neil F. 
Doherty and Fulford 2006; Werlinger, Hawkey, and Beznosov 2009; Knapp and Ferrante 
2014).   
This study addresses the research question: “How does the structure of 
cybersecurity policy relate to differences in structure of policy governance of 
universities and colleges?”  Policy governance is conceptualized as a collection of 
processes that develop, review, approve, and implement information security policy.  
The governance structure is conceptualized by the actors and the rules assigned to each 
process designed to create, retire, and modify policy in alignment with organizational 
goals.  Policy structure may be defined as the relationships between the objectives of 
policy and the policy elements available to achieve those objectives.  Those elements 
include components of policy, such as guidelines, standards and procedures, that are 
written to delineate responsibilities and actions needed to affect outcomes.  Other 
elements include the scope of issues addressed by the policy, the form of language used 
to communicate policy, and the fit of that policy relative to the organizational structure 
and culture.  Taken together, these elements provide measures of structure that 
determine the likelihood of policy effectiveness.     
I examine cyber security policy developed and implemented by the University 
System of Georgia (USG) and its 35 member institutions in a time period from 1999-
2014 is examined.  The USG colleges and universities are governed by a Board of 
Regents and that Board sets policy for the units to implement.  Despite the collaboration 
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of the college and university CIO’s within the USG to create system-wide policy the 
structure, content, and issues covered at each campus varied widely.  Given each 
college and university operates under the same board policies then logically you may 
ask whether the difference in information security policy may be related to differences 
in how policy is made.  Further, how might differences in the availability of the 
resources, the missions, and the governance of these organizations contribute to the 
differences in policies?  What role do these factors play in the various styles of 
information security policy found at each campus?   
In the next section, I will highlight some of the challenges for design and 
implementation of security policy that are unique to the higher education sector.  Next, 
I provide a summary of relevant USG policies to provide context.  A brief introduction to 
the theoretical framework and theories applied to this study follows.  I close the chapter 
with an outline of the work to follow. 
1.1 Cyber Security Issues and the Higher Education Sector 
 It would be convenient if we could solve security problems by installing 
a piece of technology, but the truth is that security is as much an issue 
of people and process as it is technology.1 
 
Prior to 2000, the research literature for cybersecurity focused on technological 
challenges (R. Anderson and Moore 2009).  One literature review calculated that 94 
percent of “public research in computer security had concentrated on technological 
                                                     
1 Oblinger, Diana G., and Brian L. Hawkins. 2006. “The Myth about IT Security.” EDUCAUSE Review 
Magazine, January 1. 
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advances” (Beznosov and Beznosova 2007).  Most organizational security practices also 
focused on technical solutions (Gurpreet Dhillon and Backhouse 2001; M. Siponen, 
Pahnila, and Mahmood 2010; Mikko Siponen and Iivari 2006), ignoring the 
organizational and human aspects of the problem.  Policymakers suggest that a focus on 
technical solutions while ignoring nontechnical factors may contribute to the lack of 
adoption of the technical solutions  (Goodman and Lin 2007, 131). 
A number of reviews and studies call for a holistic model of security research 
that recognizes the human, organizational, and technological dimensions to the 
phenomena that must be understood (Dhillon and Backhouse 2001; Albrechtsen 2007; 
May and Dhillon 2010; Kolkowska and Dhillon 2013; Zuccato 2007).  The human 
dimension focuses on the phenomena of individual behavior as a major factor in the 
outcome of security policies and practices (G. Dhillon and Backhouse 1996).  
Organizational dimension include concepts like culture, top management support, and 
environmental certainty (Knapp et al. 2006).  The correlation of the direction and size of 
these factors upon security outcomes has been documented by a number of studies 
(Knapp et al. 2009; Baskerville 2006; Berardo 2009; S. E. Chang and Lin 2007; Werlinger, 
Hawkey, and Beznosov 2009; Hsu, Lee, and Straub 2012).   
The suggestion of a holistic approach from academics is echoed in a survey of 
members of the higher education security community that identified the top three 
issues of concern for 2016: 
1. Ensuring that members of the institutional community (students, 
faculty, and staff) receive information security education and training 
5 
 
2. Developing an effective information security strategy that responds 
to institutional organization and culture and that elevates information 
security concerns to institutional leadership 
3. Developing security policies for mobile, cloud, and digital resources 
(including issues of data handling/protection, access control, and end-
user awareness2 
The importance of concepts such as top management support; security 
awareness and training; and effective policy development were recognized by the 
higher education community in the early 1990’s as essential to effective security (Elliot 
et al. 1991).  If you substitute the term “personal computer” for “mobile, cloud, and 
digital resources” in item 3, then the top 3 issues of 2016 and 1991 have not changed.  
And, despite 25 years of effort and experience, the attacks on higher education 
computing resources continue to increase in terms of frequency and cost3. 
A university or college is targeted for attack for one of two main reasons: first, 
the computing resources possessed by universities have tremendous aggregate 
capabilities; second, the philosophy protecting access to information and information 
resources makes these resources a vulnerable target (Katz 2005).  It is unreasonable to 
propose that higher education diminish the inventory of computing resources in order 
to avoid cyber attacks.  Open and “free” access to knowledge, information, and the 
resources to access both, are essential values of higher education organizations.  A 
university must protect technology and data from unwarranted and malicious access 
                                                     
2 Grama, Joanna Lyn, and Valerie M. Vogel. “The Top 3 Strategic Information Security Issues.” EDUCAUSE 
Review Magazine, January/February 2016. 
3 Smith, D. Frank. “EDUCAUSE 2014: Cyberattacks Are a Growing Problem for Higher Education.” 





while supporting the mission of the organization, and securing the values and trust of its 
individual members.  The task is not a trivial one.  The next three sections highlight the 
challenges for each of the three dimensions within the cybersecurity challenge. 
1.1.1 Organizational Dimension 
Organizational structure, culture, and resources vary widely within higher 
education (Nicholson-Crotty and Meier 2003).  Millett observed that “University 
departments, centers of research, colleges and schools present a distribution of 
authority that contains hierarchical as well as horizontal lines of authority” (1962, 61).  
He describes “communities of power” organized in four constituent groups; faculty, 
students, alumni and administration, that confound attempts to centrally organize or 
administrate higher education (p. 62).  A school, or college, may maintain functions to 
manage academic, business, student, and information system needs that are duplicated 
in other schools and divisions of the university.  Such is the organizational structure that 
Cohen and March (1972) described as a form of organized anarchy with a policy process 
best euphemized as akin to producing good eats from a “garbage can”.  Weick (1976) 
described the structure of higher education as resembling one of many “loosely coupled 
systems.”   
The culture and the mission of many universities expects and emphasizes the 
open exchange of knowledge and therefore is resistant to efforts to “lock down” 
information technology (Hess and Ostrom 2004).  Efforts to manage the tension 
between open data and secure systems are often frustrated by the lack of resources 
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necessary to fund them4.  Competitiveness and the desire to reap commercial benefits 
from original research drive the desire of universities to maintain layers of protection of 
developed, and developing, intellectual properties.  A security regime may need to 
accommodate different levels and types of data access and data security from one 
laboratory to the next. 
Obviously, educating students is the primary task of higher education.  Those 
students may have a myriad of experiences and needs.  A campus today may have a 
student population of average age 29 that reflects enrollment of ages 14 to 80.  
Students may be housed in campus or proximate housing, or may commute.  Students 
may acquire a degree using distance learning technologies, or a mix of on-campus, at a 
distance, and hybrid course delivery strategies. Providing access to the electronic 
delivery of courses, books, articles, and lectures requires an open and robust technology 
infrastructure.  Security procedures cannot inhibit access for fear of increasing the costs 
of educating students, and, perhaps, decreasing the retention of students for which 
significant resources were expended to recruit.  A campus that provides healthcare and 
residential support for students also agrees to protect the privacy of student health and 
lifestyle choices.  Many of these services are provided by private, third party vendors, 
                                                     
4 “…higher education institutions are strapped for resources to manage the balance between openness 
and security against malware and sensitive data exfiltration, according to nearly 300 higher education IT 
professionals who took a SANS survey conducted in February and March 2014. In the survey participants 
confirmed the historical difficulties of making their environments secure while also providing the 
openness institutions need for their students, staff, parents and benefactors. As one write-in response 
stated, “University culture often conflicts heavily with the need for robust security: Adjusting the culture 
would allow more emphasis on security controls.”  Marchany, Randy. Higher Education: Open and 




who use technology that is not under the direct supervision of campus security policies.  
These services are also attacked and present another layer of challenges to campus 
security5.   
Autonomy is a significant feature within the campus governance structure (Blau 
1994).  Autonomy is found at all levels of the organization from the individual faculty 
member to the systems and associations that govern public institutions of higher 
education (Christensen 2010).  The influence of autonomy contributes to the nature of 
the organizational structure and the structure is designed to protect the value held by 
the community.  Autonomy may frustrate efforts to motivate change and innovation, 
whether driven by external mandates or internal evolution, even as many pieces of 
college organization attempt to collaborate (Bartell 2003).   
The level of awareness of these issues within top management is a fundamental 
predictor of effective security policy (Rezgui and Marks 2008).  The degree of top 
management support is often reflected in the alignment of policy to organizational 
mission; the allocation of resources to implement, maintain, and monitor the policy; and 
in the culture of the staff, employees and customers who take their cues from upper 
management.  If top management is sufficiently aware, then the alignment of university 
objectives and security policy is more likely to occur and the desired outcome is more 
likely as well (Sabherwal and Chan 2001).  Unfortunately, top management within 
                                                     
5 Oblinger, Diana G., and Brian L. Hawkins. “The Myth about IT Security.” EDUCAUSE Review Magazine, 
January 1, 2006. 
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universities are not likely to acknowledge the problem as one that needs more than a 
technical solution (Neil Francis Doherty, Anastasakis, and Fulford 2009).   
External pressures from state and federal governments to protect student data, 
employee data, intellectual property, and healthcare data may conflict with that culture 
and competes for available resources.  Economic, legal, and national security 
requirements may include provisions of secrecy or security that frustrate openness and 
transparency.  Indeed, some universities are targets of foreign governments due to the 
research done on behalf of the military and intelligence agencies6.  Public universities 
are often subject to requirements that records be open to public inspection.  And, 
expectations from external groups such as the payment card industry (PCI), recording 
and movie industry, research and development partners, and privacy advocacy groups, 
to name a few, add to the challenges of designing effective policy.   
1.1.2 Human Dimension 
The second dimension of cybersecurity is the human dimension.  Once policy is 
developed and approved, users (the students, staff, and faculty) must be made aware, 
and perhaps trained, as to implementation of the policy, and the particular objectives or 
outcomes that the policy is designed to produce (Goodman and Lin 2007).  
“Unintentional human error” and insider threats constituted more than a third of data 
breaches that occurred within higher education organizations in the time period of 





2005-20137.  Training and awareness is an important tool in the fight to decrease the 
frequency of breaches. 
The diversity of stakeholders within higher education organizations is another 
challenge unique to the sector.  In addition to the four constituent groups identified by 
Millett (1962), organizations in this sector have a number of external groups that 
include federal, state, and local governments that create requirements to protect the 
privacy of data related to concerns that involve healthcare, financial, and intellectual 
property data.  In addition to external stakeholders, internal stakeholders provide a 
complex environment rich with opportunities for concepts to interact.  For example, 
individual variation of perception of risk and the distribution of security information to 
individuals via a distributed management system – may affect the scope of policy as risk 
and perceived costs affect the analysis of cost and benefits (Werlinger, Hawkey, and 
Beznosov 2009, 13). 
An organizational culture that is “security aware” improves the likelihood of 
employee compliance to formal security rules (Goo, Yim, and Kim 2013; Goo, Yim, and 
Kim 2013; Hawkey et al. 2008).  Large organizations are more likely to invest in the 
adoption of security standards given their increased reliance on formalization (i.e. 
hierarchy), increased awareness and value of information assets, and greater access to 
necessary resources such as trained IT staff and cash (S. E. Chang and Ho 2006).  The 
positive support of organizational executives is a necessary requirement for creation of 
                                                     
7 Data found in Data Breach Readiness and Follow-up: Being Prepared for the Inevitable at 
https://www.privacyrights.org/content/data-breach-readiness-and-follow-being-prepared-inevitable. Last 
accessed 25 May 2015. 
11 
 
effective policy and policy management (Knapp et al. 2009, 2) and is a predictor of 
organizational capability (Hsu, Lee, and Straub 2012).  The role of environmental factors 
that affect an organization, such as rapidly changing technology, increase in threats 
from nation states and cyber criminals, and multiple and changing laws, regulations, and 
legal requirements, is an important contributing element determine an organization’s 
security structure and outcomes (S. E. Chang and Ho 2006; Baskerville 2006; Knapp and 
Ferrante 2014).   
Both current and former employees are found to be a primary cause of security 
incidents (da Veiga and Martins 2015). Research on employee compliance to 
organizational security rules has identified education, training, and awareness programs 
as important to affecting desired outcomes (Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, and Benbasat 2010). If 
employee training and awareness programs are not supported adequately, then the 
effects of investments in cybersecurity technologies is not fully appreciated (K. Chang 
and Wang 2011).  The inclusion of employees in the development, implementation, 
education, and maintenance of policies contributes to collaboration between security 
practitioners and the individuals whose behavior is to be modified by policy (Werlinger, 
Hawkey, and Beznosov 2009).   
However, resources are required to produce the tools to provide training.  
Resources are required to create means of improving awareness of the policies and the 
respective objectives.  And, resources are required to ensure that staff, faculty, and 
students take the time required to engage in the training and awareness activities.  But, 
these requests must compete with requests to fund programs to improve the 
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acquisition and retention of faculty and students; to improve campus safety; to improve 
graduation rates; and so forth.  Top management support from outside the information 
technology department is essential to the success of such requests. 
1.1.3 Technology Dimension 
The third leg dimension focuses on technology.  Information technology changes 
at a pace that challenges the resilience of policies and procedures employed to secure 
data and other cyber assets from harm, both intentional and unintentional (Hess and 
Ostrom 2004).  Recent investments in technology become outdated, or are rendered 
useless, due to technology changes.  Advances in security may be slowed by regulator 
processes that do not inhibit illegitimate uses to proceed.   As the bad guys get smarter, 
an organization must make its employees, both technical and non-technical, aware of 
the challenges and solutions to defeating these efforts.  Acquiring new technology, 
upgrading old technology, educating and training managers, staff, and customers 
require resources that are scarce in most organizations, even more so in most higher 
education organizations.   
A university network is constructed to encourage access to information and the 
free-flow of communications (Drevin, Kruger, and Steyn 2007).  The requirement of 
open environments for research and knowledge exchange is an important tenet of 
academic freedom, and represents a serious challenge to the implementation of 
security policies (Hawkey et al. 2008).  The AAUP has written extensively on the 
importance of academic freedom and more recently on the need to balance access to 
information with the need for security (Reichman et al. 2014). So it is not surprising that 
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the president of a USG institution, when pressed to shut down those networks involved 
in the Pentagon attack, cited academic freedom in defense of not enforcing security 
policy prior to the attacks and not immediately disconnecting the attacking computers. 
The N-device problem, a name for the multiple devices (e.g. smartphones, 
tablets, and watches) employed by individuals, present additional challenges to security. 
Several years ago, a device would be a desktop or laptop computer.  Today, that device 
category includes a number of wearable, portable, and stationery devices including 
laptops, tablets, phones, watches, and phablets.  Individuals will use these devices 
simultaneously, thus creating an access problem that challenges the traditional design 
of most campus information technology architecture.  Networks deployed less than 10 
years ago cannot support a class of 35 students when each student has 3 or more 
devices requesting access to a network.  A device that could accommodate 40 laptop 
connections is now expected to support more than 130 connections. Each of those 
devices presents a potential weak point in campus security.  A lost, or compromised, 
device can allow access to data that is not permitted.  Similarly, the use of third party 
“cloud” storage services by faculty, staff, and students presents another point of 
potential compromise when data is stored “off campus” and those services are 
attached.  Such a compromise may result in campus non-compliance with student 
expectations of confidentiality, federal legal protections of confidentiality, and 
commercial contractual obligations of protection of data.   
Higher Education has formidable challenges to overcome in the design of 
effective cyber security policy.  Observations from researchers and practitioners concur 
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that little has changed in terms of the top concerns of policy makers assigned the task of 
securing the cyber assets of higher education. The question then is why is 
implementation of effective security policies seemingly difficult within the sector?  The 
next section describes the theoretical framework identified to answer the question. 
1.2 Overview of Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical frame guiding this study is based upon these findings gathered 
from the information security research discipline (Figure 1-1).  First, according to Höne 
and Eloff , effective cyber security is a product of effective cyber security policy (2002b).  
Second, effective security management can influence the effectiveness of security policy 
and thus precedes effective outcomes (Hicklin and Godwin 2009).  Higgins and others 
find that effective cyber security management is preceded by effective policy (Higgins 
1999; Fulford and Doherty 2003; Straub and Welke 1998).  Effective security policy and 
effective security management are products, or outcomes, of an organization’s 











Figure 1-1 Theoretical Frame 
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The framework suggests that deficiencies in the structure and content of security 
policy may be explained by understanding the organization’s policy process.  However, 
the literature from the field of information security is weak in regards to understanding 
security policy processes (Whitman 2008).  One review suggests the sum total of 
research on the effects of process on policy is “that the nature and scope of the 
information policy process impacts the nature and scope of the information policy and 
possibly the policy outcome” (Jones and Chudoba 2012).   
Baskerville and Siponen (2002) reviewed the information security literature and 
reported that two levels of policy are commonly identified.  High-level policy states the 
organizational goals and objectives while documenting management and employee 
responsibilities to protect organizational information resources (p. 339).  The authors 
cite an example: 
Departments should ensure that adequate information security 
management policies are implemented to protect their information 
asset. 
Lower-level policy focuses on individual methods or steps of actions to guide 
individual level decisions.  Again, the authors cite an example: 
You (user) will be required to change your password at least every 90 
days. 
The authors noted that the literature did not contribute much to the topic of how 
policy is created, implemented, enforced, and monitored for effectiveness.  Changing 
external conditions, including changing technology, places demands on organizations to 
adapt information security policies that are capable of adjusting quickly.  Organizations 
that are constantly changing identify as “emergent organizations” (Truex, Baskerville, 
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and Klein 1999).  Emergent organizations require adaptive information systems and 
policies that support and protect such systems.  That requirement necessitates a policy 
process capable of determining when and how policies, standards, and guidelines 
should adapt to changes whether internal or external to the organization.  The authors 
suggest that research should focus on a third-level of policy, a meta-policy or a “policy 
about policies”, designed to establish “how information security policies are created, 
implemented, and enforced” (Baskerville and Siponen 2002).   
The Knapp model8 is a holistic framework focused on questions as to how a 
security policy process and the external and internal influences contribute to effective 
(i.e. successful) security policies (p. 502).  The model (see Figure 1-2) identifies a policy 
process (e.g. a governance structure) that defines how policy is created, implemented, 
enforced, and maintained. The model identifies intervening effects of the organizational 
environment (e.g. context); internal influences which include senior management 
support, organizational culture, and internal threats; and external influences, which 
include policy mandates, technology changes, and external threats. The cycle of policy 
processes shown is similar to the policy stages heuristic that has been so influential in 
public policy research (Sabatier 2007a).  The inclusion of feedback loops is a 
modification encouraged by advocates of the stages heuristic (Eger and Marlowe 2006) 
as well as by researchers in the domain of quality management and cybernetics (Wiener 
1948; Deutsch 1963; Ali, Soomro, and Brohi 2013).     
                                                     




Source: Knapp, et al 2009 
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Figure 1-2 Policy Process Model 
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The Knapp model suggests there is a structure to meta-policy that can be 
identified and measured with regards to the steps or tasks required, the institutional 
constraints, and the actors involved.  The steps or activities that structure the policy 
process (e.g. development, review, awareness, etc.) describe the elements of a meta-
policy.  Measuring that structure requires an instrument that can systematically identify 
the institutions, actors, and other influences of the policy process.   
Aligica promotes the utility of the IAD framework as a tool to map structure 
(Aligica 2006).  The IAD framework has provided considerable conceptual and empirical 
contributions with regards to institutions and the role that institutions play in the policy 
process (Kiser and E Ostrom 2000; E Ostrom 1986, E Ostrom 1990, E Ostrom 2005; E 
Ostrom and Hess 2007).  Ostrom suggests that identifying “an outcome consistent with 
a pattern [of policy structure] may be the best verification we can achieve in settings of 
substantial complexity” (2005, 11).  The tools and methods employed to use them are a 
means that "produces generalizable knowledge on the interaction of policy designs and 
policy processes, and resulting policy design divergence" (Carter et al. 2015).  Recent 
works have focused on tools developed within the framework to classify institutions as 
specific rule types and to identify structural elements of institutions in a valid and 
reliable way (Basurto et al. 2010a; Carter et al. 2013; E. Ostrom and Basurto 2011; S. 
Siddiki, Basurto, and Weible 2010).    Specific to this study, these new approaches 





1.3 USG IT Policy 
The cases selected for this study are public universities that are members of the 
University System of Georgia and are governed by a Board of Regents9.  In March of 
2008, the Governor of Georgia signed an executive order (appendix A) requiring all state 
agencies to report on the status of their information security programs.  Per this order, 
all state agencies are required to provide specific reports as determined by the state 
auditor and state CIO.   Further, the Governor’s order advocated the implementation of 
the standards and compliance framework mandated by the Federal Information Security 
Management Act (FISMA) upon federal government agencies.  The Regents, responding 
to the Governor’s executive order, initiated significant changes to the University 
System’s cyber security policy and the respective cyber security policies of the 
institutions of the USG.  
The 35 units of the USG10 include four research universities (Carnegie 
Classification R-1), 2 regional universities, 13 state universities, 8 state colleges and 6 
two year colleges.  The schools within the USG present differences, some subtle and 
others not so subtle, in terms of organizational structure, resources, mission, and 
geographic location.  USG policy statements direct policy makers at each unit as to the 
construction of policy, the goals of policy, and the tactical implementation of policy.   
                                                     
9 Constitution of the State of Georgia, Article VIII, Section IV, Paragraph (b). 
10 Since 2012, the USG has consolidate 12 institutions – so the total is 29 as of this writing. 
20 
 
For example, the strategic plan of the University System Office of Information 
Security set the following expectations for campus information security governance11:  
Effective security governance is managed as an organizational-wide issue that is 
planned, managed and measured in all areas throughout the organization. In IT 
Governance, leaders are accountable for and are committed to providing adequate 
resources to information security. A core set of principles to guide the framework for 
governance should include: 
 Conduct an annual information security evaluation, review the evaluation results 
with staff, and report on performance. 
 Conduct periodic risk assessments of information assets as part of a risk 
management program. 
 Implement policies and procedures based on risk assessments to secure 
information assets. 
 Establish a security management structure to assign explicit individual roles, 
responsibilities, authority, and accountability. 
 Develop plans and initiate actions to provide adequate information security for 
networks, facilities, systems and information. 
 Treat information security as an integral part of the system lifecycle. 
 Provide information security awareness, training and education to personnel. 
 Conduct periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information 
security policies and procedures. 
 Create and execute a plan for remedial action to address any information 
security deficiencies. 
 Develop and implement incident response procedures. 
 Establish plans, procedures and tests to provide continuity of operations. 
 Use security best practices guidance to measure information security 
performance. 
 
A one page policy governed the university system from 1992 until 2005.  The 
policy required each unit to develop a security plan that followed USG guidelines.  In the 
early 2000’s, the staff of the USG created a number of policies dealing with general 
                                                     
11 From USG InfoSec/Security Governance page http://www.usg.edu/infosec/security_governance/  
accessed 22 Nov 2011 
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requirements for a security program at each unit.  By 2008, the USG policy consisted of 
13 separate policy statements and guidelines.  
An analysis of those objectives (Table 1-1), broken down by the Carnegie 
classification12 for each institution, shows that the Acceptable Use Policy13 is the only 
category of security policy for which all USG units are compliant (Table 1-1).   
 
Table 1-1 Distribution of USG Units meeting Requirements per Carnegie Class 
USG Policy Requirement 
# 
Compliant %  AA % AA BA % BA  MA 
% 
MA  RU % RU  
USG Info Sec Policy Section 11  (2011) 26 81% 8 67% 3 75% 10 91% 5 100% 
USG Password Authentication Policy 21 66% 4 33% 3 75% 9 82% 5 100% 
USG Appropriate Use Policy 32 100% 12 100% 4 100% 11 100% 5 100% 
USG Risk Management Policy 11 34% 2 17% 1 25% 4 36% 4 80% 
USG Data Handling and Storage 
Standard 23 72% 8 67% 3 75% 7 64% 5 100% 
USG Computer Security Incident 
Management Policy 13 41% 4 33% 3 75% 3 27% 3 60% 
Web Privacy Policy  14 44% 5 42% 1 25% 5 45% 3 60% 
USG - HIPAA Privacy and Security Policy 4 13% 1 8% 0 0% 0 0% 3 60% 
USG Continuity of Operations Plan 5 16% 1 8% 2 50% 1 9% 1 20% 
Use of Cryptography 4 13% 2 17% 1 25% 1 9% 0 0% 
Security and Awareness Program 4 13% 2 17% 1 25% 1 9% 0 0% 
Electronic Data Disposal 10 31% 2 17% 2 50% 4 36% 2 40% 
Copyright Violation Guidelines 14 44% 3 25% 4 100% 4 36% 3 60% 
AA – Associate Degree schools; BA – Bachelors; MA – Masters and some doctoral programs; RU – 
Research University Source: Author’s compilation of policy documents 
                                                     
12 Derived from empirical data on colleges and universities, the Carnegie Classification was originally published in 
1973, and subsequently updated in 1976, 1987, 1994, 2000, 2005, and 2010 to reflect changes among colleges and 
universities. This framework has been widely used in the study of higher education, both as a way to represent and 
control for institutional differences, and also in the design of research studies to ensure adequate representation of 
sampled institutions, students, or faculty.  
To ensure continuity of the classification framework and to allow comparison across years, the 2010 Classification 
update retains the same structure of six parallel classifications, initially adopted in 2005. They are as follows: Basic 
Classification (the traditional Carnegie Classification Framework), Undergraduate and Graduate Instructional Program 
classifications, Enrollment Profile and Undergraduate Profile classifications, and Size & Setting classification. These 
classifications provide different lenses through which to view U.S. colleges and universities, offering researchers 
greater analytic flexibility.  
These classifications were updated using the most recent national data available as of 2010, and collectively they 
depict the most current landscape of U.S. colleges and universities.  
(last accessed 1 Jun 2012) 
 
13 The words “Acceptable” and “Appropriate” are used interchangeably by organizations and researchers 
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I observed much of the policy process as an employee of the University System 
Office.  That office provides the staff to develop and implement policies approved by the 
Board of Regents.  Actors from each unit of the University System were engaged as part 
of the policy process.  Efforts were made to create policy for which a consensus from 
the individual unit representatives could be achieved.  While obvious differences in size 
and mission could explain some differences, I found the disparity in the implementation 
of policies within classes of similar campuses puzzling, especially given the consensus 
that preceded Board adoption of the policy. 
Ostrom warns us that “conditions can be so diverse that, depending on context, 
sets of rules that work best in one circumstance may fail in another” (E. Ostrom 2005, 
274–276).  The information security literature generally agrees that policies must be 
“tailored” to be effective (Neil Francis Doherty, Anastasakis, and Fulford 2011).  
Tailoring a policy to be effective for that organization requires efforts to align security 
strategy, goals, and norms with existing organizational norms, processes, and structures 
(Bohme and Kataria 2006).  The context within for which those policies are developed 
includes factors, both internal and external, identified within the Knapp model.  In 
general, one might assume that the external factors, with the exception of external 
threats, would be fairly similar for all USG units as they are subdivisions of a large, 
constitutionally created, governance body.  External threats, as a number of studies 
suggest, will vary according to the number and types of targets each unit presents.  
Those external threats may indicate, or cause to bring attention, to organizations that 
impose requirements via standards.  For example, the Payment Card Industry (PCI) has a 
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set of standards that any organization must follow in order to accept credit cards as 
payment.  The U.S. Government has created a number of standards that an organization 
must follow if that organization meets the criteria set by the law.   
Within units of similar size and mission, the expectation of finding similar policies 
across similar units should increase as suggested by findings within the research areas of 
organizational theory and information security. However, other internal factors such as 
structure and culture do vary among USG units.  Perhaps the strongest example of the 
“diversity of conditions” noted by Ostrom is that of the cultural value of academic 
freedom.  The direct effect of academic freedom on the design of information security is 
perhaps the most cogent reason that explains why enforcement of rigid, one-size fits all 
policies is more problematic for higher education organizations (Drevin, Kruger, and 
Steyn 2007).   
Academic freedom is just one of a number of values and norms that constitute 
culture for USG units.  The autonomy of colleges and departments is a significant 
feature of university governance structure (Blau 1994).  The autonomy of UGA colleges 
and departments is one factor that contributes to a process that takes up to 2 years for 
policies to be developed.   
Autonomy extends to the individual level of analysis.  One USG unit security 
official notes that the aversion of individuals to “being told what to do” creates a 
structure that writes policy as a “recommendation” as to what to do. 
An organization’s propensity towards risk and the nature of their IT resource also 
affect overall policy effectiveness (Rezgui and Marks 2008).  The Chief Information 
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Security Office of Georgia Tech explains how they manage what is an issue of 
compliance with USG policy with a view towards risk: 
“…because the centralized organization does not control the budgets within 
the departments, we put in the policy some business continuity kind of 
statements and then the procedures and guidelines to follow. And, 
basically we leave it up to the units to determine how much infrastructure 
they want to maintain locally. If you decide to maintain local infrastructure, 
then you have to include business continuity and our internal auditors do 
audit for that. So, they get to determine their threshold when it comes to 
infrastructure continuity. We just set the top level policy and what 
continuity should look like.”14 
A number of organizational factors affect the development of policy and those 
factors vary from one USG unit to the next.  How strongly top management supports 
efforts to make individual stakeholders aware of the consequences of ignoring policy is 
one factor noted in the evidence gathered for this study.  Stakeholder perception of risk, 
coupled with the effectiveness and/or presence of awareness and training programs, 
interact with individual user perception of top management support to affect the policy 
options considered as “realistic” by policy makers.  The structure of the policy process is 
affected by “who” is at the table as well as “what” those at the table may do.  And, the 
concept of collaboration plays a role in the effectiveness of the policy processes 
observed.  Each of these concepts reveals various tensions among stakeholders and 
their individual and aggregate sets of values and norms. 
                                                     
14 Baines, Herb. (22 March 2012) Telephone interview. 
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1.4  Purpose and Plan of Research  
This study has three objectives.  First, at the theoretical level, I seek to add to the 
body of knowledge concerning the relationship between the structure of cybersecurity 
policy processes and the outcomes of those processes.  Second, at a methodology level, 
the study seeks to demonstrate the usefulness of the IAD framework and tools to 
discover and define the structure of cybersecurity policy processes and the policy 
documents produced as outcomes.  Third, at the practical level, the study seeks to 
provide pragmatic suggestions for cybersecurity managers and university executive 
management to identify deficiencies in cybersecurity governance that contribute to less 
than optimum outcomes. 
Since no integrative framework exists for describing or predicting how 
organizations adopt and implement cyber security policy (Hsu, Lee, and Straub 2012, 
919), this study constructs one by merging concepts from relevant fields of study.  
Chapter Two examines theories of the policy process as I lay out my case for choosing 
the Institutional Analysis and Design framework to systematically explore the relevant 
features of policy processes employed by universities to create and implement security 
policy.  The analysis of competing theories and frameworks concludes with a description 
of the complimentary features of the Knapp governance model and the IAD framework.  
In chapter 3, I identify a number of hypotheses to be tested from among the findings 
and theories discussed.  These hypotheses reflect Whitman’s challenge to “examine 
what organizations do to adapt these policy frameworks and models to achieve 
effectiveness within their particular environments (2008, 147).”   
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The case study method is appropriate for exploring a question that attempts to 
explain “how” policies are developed within USG units.  Chapter 4 elaborates on the 
research design and methods used to collect, aggregate, and analyze the data.  In 
particular, I will outline the contributions of the institutional grammar tool as proposed 
by Hess and Ostrom (1995) and expanded by others (Basurto et al. 2010a; S. Siddiki, 
Basurto, and Weible 2012; S. Siddiki et al. 2011; Weible, Siddiki, and Pierce 2011; Carter 
et al. 2013; Carter et al. 2015).   
Chapter 5 presents the context for the cases as defined by external factors 
identified by my interviews as most influential upon the governance structure for each 
case.  A discussion follows of the context of each case and how the external conditions 
are linked to the case summary.  The chapter discusses the utility of IAD descriptors to 
categorize and identify the key features of the standards and the context of each case.   
I separate the findings into two chapters.  Chapter 6 discusses the findings 
relative to a set of hypotheses designed to understand the link between varying external 
conditions and the structure of cybersecurity governance found in each case.  The 
relationship between the defined policy structure and the governance structure is 
analyzed.  Chapter 7 analyzes the structural details of the four action situations that are 
responsible for implementing the cybersecurity policies created by the case governance 
structures.  These processes represent the administrative systems engaged in 
implementation and the institutions that regulate individual behavior within those 
systems.  Chapter 7 answers the question of whether the IAD tools can identify the 
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patterns of interaction Robichau and Lynn thought critical to describing the “missing 
link” between policy and performance. 
Chapter 8 is a discussion of how the structure of cybersecurity policy processes 
affects policy structure and the management practices observed.  Chapter 9 offers a 
discussion of this study’s contributions to theory, method and practice and possible 
directions for future research.
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- Policy Processes, Governance, and Structure 
  
Chapter 1 presented an overview of research in the field of information security 
that points to a gap in the understanding of processes employed to design and construct 
policy and management practices.  Researchers find that security policies implemented 
in higher education organizations are not likely to be tailored to fit the university’s , or 
college’s, unique environmental and organizational contexts (Neil Francis Doherty, 
Anastasakis, and Fulford 2011).  Tailoring is a process that seeks to “fit” the rules, 
norms, and standards that define policy to the features of the problem for which the 
policy is meant to regulate (Bohme and Kataria 2006).  Information security governance 
is thought to be most effective when the essential policies processes suggested by 
Knapp, et al. (2009) are designed to work within the constraints posed by the particular 
internal and external influences of an organization.  
Studies involving institutions and the governance of shared resources often 
reference Garrett Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons” (1968).  The idea of how to 
prevent the “over grazing” of a public commons is often described as a simple, straight-
forward discussion of how private behaviors may best be incented to avoid an outcome 
that negatively affects everyone.  Similarly, much of cyber security policy focuses on 
incenting individuals to avoid bad choices that can compromise the integrity and 
reliability of the information and technology to which those individuals have been 
granted access.  For example, using computers on a university network to store and 
distribute illegal copies of movies takes bandwidth and computing power (i.e. the 
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common pasture) away from students and employees that need to use for legitimate 
purposes.  The failure to maintain anti-virus software may allow denial of service attacks 
that will shut down a university network as the bandwidth is consumed by those 
attacks. 
A re-examination of the premise of Hardin’s article suggests that most 
approaches to ‘problems of the commons’ oversimplify the analysis of the phenomenon 
(Cole, Epstein, and McGinnis 2014).  A rigorous analysis requires an understanding of 
how well the institutions: 1) fit the internal and external conditions of the problem, and 
2) fit the existing institutions (2014, 10).  
In the next section, I review the concept of governance and policy making within 
the information security literature.  I follow with a brief overview of the IAD framework 
and how the concepts of collaboration, governance, and culture contribute to that 
framework.  The synergies identified between the fields of institutional analysis, policy 
governance, and information security provide strong arguments to support the research 
model created by integration of the IAD framework and the Knapp model for 
information security governance.  The ability of the research model to address the 
challenges identified by Robichau and Lynn is a matter to be determined by the 
outcomes of this study.  A summary of the arguments presented closes the chapter. 
2.1 Governance – Institutions and Implementation Research 
The concept of institutions is essential to theories of economics, political science, 
public policy, sociology and others (Coleman 1986).  Institutions fundamentally 
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determine how organizations come into being and evolve (North 1990, 5).  Institutions 
are observed as “rules, processes, norms, and strategies employed by humans to 
organize their work, their social relations, and their life; in sum to manage human 
behavior” (E. Ostrom 2005).  Analyzing institutions helps researchers in their quest to 
understand what Ostrom characterizes as “one of the most fundamental political and 
social questions:  How do fallible human beings come together to create communities 
and organizations, and make decisions and rules in order to sustain a resource or 
achieve a desired outcome?” (E. Ostrom and Hess 2007, 42).     
O’Toole (2000, 266) defines implementation research as “the development of 
systematic knowledge regarding what emerges, or is induced, as actors deal with a 
policy problem”.  Specifically, he defines policy implementation as “what develops 
between the establishment of an apparent intention on the part of government to do 
something … and the ultimate impact in the world of action” (2000, 266).  Analysis of 
policy implementation often involves two questions: 1) why are adopted policies not as 
designed; and 2) why are the outcomes not as we expected (Elmore 1979)?   
Understanding and explaining the difference between “policy as designed” and 
“policy as implemented” is important for those interested in policy implementation and 
organizational management (Imperial 2005).  O’Toole’s assessment of implementation 
research suggests that efforts involving the concepts of institutional analysis, 
governance, and networks, taken all together, are making substantial contributions to 
understanding the outcomes of implementation processes (2000).   
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2.1.1 Policy Governance 
 The policy studies literature is populated with diverse meanings that are 
“imprecise, [and] wooly” (Fredrickson 2005, p. 289 as found in Robichau 2011).  While 
researchers agree that both policy makers and evaluators must consider how 
governance affects the implementation process  (Jochim and May 2010; R. P. Stoker 
1991; G. Stoker 1998; Stone 1998; Meier 2009a), there is a significant gap in this area of 
knowledge (Weible and Carter 2015).  Within the higher education research genre, 
research has found different governance structures may lead to similar outcomes 
(Lowery 2002).  Critics note the field has produced “few theoretically valid and 
methodologically reliable approaches … to assess policy divergence as it occurs during 
the policy process” (Carter et al. 2015, 159).     
The information security literature defines information security governance as 
the incorporation of security policy in alignment with the corporate governance 
structure and its strategic plan (Posthumus and von Solms 2004, 643).  The Knapp model 
defines the concept as inclusive of a number of related processes required to “govern” 
information security issues within an organization.  The processes that review, develop, 
and align policy with organizational governance are important elements of the policy 
governance structure that this study analyzes. 
 Networks of actors, processes, and institutions are common themes found in the 
areas of research upon which this study rests.  Multiple frameworks have evolved that 
analyze the concept of networks applied to governance.  I explore three such 
frameworks in this section.  O’Toole and Meier propose a framework focused on 
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management quality , and  management networks, as a means of explaining the 
variance in policy outcomes (O’Toole Jr. 1997; Laurence J. O’Toole and Meier 2004).  
Lynn, Heinrich and Hill propose a “logic of governance” linking collective action with 
observed factors of influence (Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill 2000).  The criticisms of each 
approach provide a transition to the discussion of the IAD framework as a means to 
carry the work forward. 
2.1.2 Policy Networks and Governance 
Managing coalitions and managing institutions are key to understanding how 
policy networks are effective in managing public problems (Meier 2009b).   Policy 
networks have been suggested as a feature of governance structure that facilitates the 
sharing of resources, the collaboration of multiple parties to obtain shared goals, and 
the creation and exchange of knowledge (Weber and Khademian 2008).  In order for 
policy networks to deliver those described outcomes, managers must have the proper 
tools and skills to build “long-term collaborative problem  solving capacity” (Bardach 
1998; E. Ostrom 1991; Provan and Kenis 2008; Meier and O’toole 2001).    
 O’Toole explains that individuals “can be seen simultaneously as occupants of 
positions within a public administrative organization and also as one component of a 
multi-organizational web of action … focused on a function or public problem” (2010, 8).  
Networks do not necessarily replace the hierarchy as the functioning structure of an 
organization but, rather, complements, overlaps and even competes with the existing 
hierarchical structure.  The challenge, O’Toole notes, is the use of appropriate authority 
to coordinate and manage the action within and across these structures. 
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Network-based collaborative action may spring from “voluntaristic, self-
organized, and consensual” efforts (Ostrom 1990 as cited in O’Toole 2010).  Adding 
network actors to the public management context both adds capacity and complications 
as regards the goals meant as constraints on action (Simon 1964) and transparency (i.e. 
who is doing what to whom)(O’Toole 2010).  O’Toole suggests research is needed to 
understand how network structure and efforts to manage the networked array 
influence outputs and outcomes (2010, 10). 
“Wicked problems” represent a category of policy challenges that cut across 
problem areas, policy domains, and authority structures within and across organizations 
(Weber and Khademian 2008).  DeLeon and Varda (2009) offer collaborative inter-
organizational policy networks as the preferred structure of governance required to 
manage wicked problems.   Others suggest that the nature of wicked problems requires 
management by collective action (van Bueren, Klijn, and Koppenjan 2003) as wicked 
problems are such that “no single organization can act with assurance of predictable 
outcomes (Westley & Vredenburh, p. 381 as cited by deLeon and Varda 2009).  These 
collaborative policy networks would need to focus on: 
 efforts to draw on a broad range of knowledge, 
 a base of knowledge to address the complexities of the problem, 
 serving as a means of cooperation 
 maintaining efforts to transfer, receive, and integrate knowledge as dimensions 
of the problem will change and the participants (i.e. managers) of the problem 
will change as time progresses. (Weber and Khademian 2008, 337) 
But, collaboration is not necessarily an activity free from friction.  Implementing 
policy within a university requires the collaboration of the various units of university, 
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with different missions and objectives.  Collaboration also requires the support of 
individual actors.   
“The study of multi-actor policy implementation needs a theoretical approach 
that combines the self-organizing potential of combinations of actors (including 
corporate actors) with the mandated character of certain inter-unit links, the 
latter quite typical of at least some portions of government programs.” (O’Toole 
Jr. 2000, 275).   
2.1.2.1 Governance and Managerial Networking 
1.1 The work of Meier and O’Toole investigates how the quality of public managers 
influences public performance.  They investigate whether managers, by interacting with 
their networks, contribute to the performance of their respective jurisdiction (Meier and 
O’toole 2001).  Meier and O’Toole explore the question of whether the efforts of public 
managers within their networks, which extend to other organizations outside their 
jurisdiction’s hierarchy, affect the performance of their organization.  Networks allow 
managers an opportunity to understand the interaction of policy with environmental 
factors and to prepare strategies to mitigate those factors and optimize performance.  
Among their findings: network management allows managers to translate resources into 
outputs at a more efficient rate; and performance improves in districts where managers 
engage in more network interactions. 
“Networks are structures of interdependence involving multiple organizations or 
parts thereof, where one unit is not merely the formal subordinate of the others 
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in some larger hierarchical arrangement (O’Toole 1997, 45 as cited in (O’Toole Jr. 
2010, 8)).” 
 This concept of networks has many similarities to the concept of sub-parts that 
Simon (1962) described.  Both concepts emphasize that these sub-parts, while a part of 
a larger organization, do not necessarily confine themselves to the hierarchy of a given 
organization, nor, as an inter-organizational entity, to the boundaries of a given 
organization.  O’Toole explains that individuals “can be seen simultaneously as 
occupants of positions within a public administrative organization and also as one 
component of a multi-organizational web of action … focused on a function or public 
problem (O’Toole 2010 8).”   
Networks do not necessarily replace the hierarchy as the functioning structure of 
an organization.  Networks complement, overlap and compete with the existing 
hierarchical structure.  The challenge is the use of appropriate authority to coordinate 
and manage the action within and across these structures (O’Toole 2010 8). 
 Network-based collaborative action may spring from “voluntaristic, self-
organized, and consensual” efforts (Ostrom 1990 as cited in O’Toole 2010).  Adding 
network actors to the public management context both adds capacity and complications 
as regards the goals meant as constraints on action (Simon 1964)) and transparency (i.e. 
who is doing what to whom)(O’Toole 2010 8). 
2.1.2.2 Logic of Governance 
 The logic of governance (LOG) approach is a framework, not a theory, offered as 
a means to organize findings of empirical research, developed by multiple and diverse 
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communities of researchers, on various aspects of public governance problems 
(Heinrich, Hill, and Lynn, Jr. 2004).  A positive outcome of a logically combined effort 
would allow public management researchers to offer answers to the question “How can 
public sector regimes, agencies, programs and activities be organized and managed to 
achieve public purposes (Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill 2000).  The model organizes studies of 
governance in relation to their position in a set of hierarchical interactions starting with 
public preferences, as expressed by political and legislative choice, and extending 
through stakeholder assessments.  Operationally, the authors offer a reduced form of 
their proposed model: 
O = f (E,C,T,S,M) 
Where: 
 
E = environmental factors 
C = Client characteristics 
T = treatments 
S = structures 
M = managerial roles and actions 
 
 The logic model acknowledges the multi-level characteristic of public governance 
and the discretion by managers to implement policy as they wish (within constraints).  
Researchers benefit from such a framework as they would have access to more details 
of effects that are exogenous to their particular research focus and thus can model 
those effects across there area of research  (Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill 2000, 247). 
2.1.2.3 Criticisms of the LOG approach  
 Lowery (2002) criticizes the focus on “one narrow dependent variable” that 
reduces the study of public governance to questions of governance and public sector 
outputs.  Lynn-Heinrich-Hill (2002) respond by arguing “isn’t performance what the 
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public cares about?”  Lowery points to Simon’s Architecture of Complexity (1962)as a 
theory that argues for analysis of hierarchical organization as a reduction to its 
“decomposable parts”.  Lynn-Heinrich-Hill say that Lowery misunderstands their thesis 
and that the framework does not disallow Simon’s concepts (2002).   
 Lynn, Heinrich and Hill acknowledge the existence of alternative frameworks for 
studies of governance that may be more appropriate given the research question or 
context or the proposed unit of analysis (p. 241).  For example, the LOG focuses on the 
individual as the unit of analysis relying on institutional political economy to guide 
questions as to why an individual chose certain paths.  Their review of the literature 
points to network analysis as a logic that explains implementation and performance 
based upon social and political relationships among various organizations (actors) with 
varying interests and resources.  The exchange of information among network members 
explains the network’s influence on outcomes as the network optimizes the promotion 
of individual actor’s interests (p. 242).   
2.1.3 Governance and Institutional Analysis and Development 
 The Institutional Analysis and Development framework (IAD) has been employed 
to understand phenomenon such as collaboration and its role in the implementation 
process (Buchan et al. 2009), the role of institutional settings in the implementation 
process (1999a), strategies required for adaptive governance (Koontz 2005), and the 
analysis of the effects of globalization upon cooperation (Clement and Amezaga 2008).  
Carlsson (2000) proposed integrating the policy network approach into the IAD 
framework taking advantage of the IAD’s analytical tools “to examine the processes of 
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policymaking”.  Others promote the framework as one appropriate to understand 
questions of governance in areas of study beyond that of common pool resource 
problems (Nowlin 2011).  This study takes advantage of three strengths of the IAD 
approach: (1) the success of modeling approaches to successful governance of common-
pool problems; and, (2) the relevance of identifying and mapping configurations of 
institutions and actors as the structure of policy governance; and, finally, (3) the ability 
of the IAD to integrate research from multiple disciplines. 
The framework has been applied to a number of studies of governance related 
to managing common-pool resource problems.  Contributions from the study of natural 
resource problems relevant to the governance of cybersecurity are numerous. The 
application of IAD to the university knowledge ecosystem is particularly relevant to this 
study (E. Ostrom and Hess 2007).  The authors propose that “conceptualizing 
information and knowledge as a commons brings a rich body of research on natural 
resource commons to the table” (Hess and Ostrom 2004).  Information technologies 
such as networks, servers, and databases, are facilities that have limits to capacity, to 
which access is restricted (e.g. club good), and for which the consumption of the 
resource by one denies that resource to another (rivalry) (E. Ostrom and Hess 2007). 
Smith (2010) employs the IAD framework to analyze “institutional arrangements 
used to implement ecosystem-based management programs”.   He argues that in order 
to implement key principles for ecosystem management, policy makers must focus on 
questions of institutional design and performance.  His study finds that “polycentric 
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institutions can be just as effective as centralized hierarchical approaches to 
coordinating and implementing integrated coastal resource management programs”.   
Koontz (2008) examined several counties in Ohio to determine how collaborative 
planning affected the implementation of land-use policies.  He found that local context 
affects collaborative efforts.  Collaboration fails to yield expected outcomes if the 
context (i.e. local rules/institutions) is not conducive to collaboration.  Clement and 
Amezaga (2008) demonstrate how the conflict in values, and structure, between 
national land use policy institutions in Viet Nam and local institutions, where there is a 
high degree of individual interaction, created turmoil in the implementation of the 
policy.  Stable institutions and governance structures that facility collaboration 
contribute significantly towards building trust and credibility among the actors 
networking to achieve open-space protection.  Mollenkamp and others (2008) compare 
two different agencies responsible for implementing water management policy and find 
differences of power, as exhibited in decision-making processes, led to different 
implementation outcomes for the same policy.   
 The second strength of the IAD framework relevant to this research project is the 
focus on configurations of institutions and actors as integral components of the 
implementation process (McGinnis 2011b).  There are institutions of governance that 
affect organizational learning, especially the institutionalization of knowledge and 
values within a given organization or system (Blomquist and Ostrom 2008; Anderies, 
Janssen, and Ostrom 2004; Hess and Ostrom 2004).  The identification of such 
configurations (Basurto et al. 2009; S. Siddiki, Basurto, and Weible 2010; Carter et al. 
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2013) contributes to a reliable method of studying the relationship between policy 
processes and policy outcomes (Kwon, Berry, and Feiock 2009; Weible and Carter 2015).  
Mapping the structures of policy processes (governance) and policies (outputs) 
contributes to the identification of patterns in outcomes (Aligica 2006).  As to policy 
management, “stakeholder mapping and institutional mapping are indispensable 
strategic instruments (Aligica 2006, 76). 
Finally, the ability of the framework to integrate findings across multiple 
disciplines is key.  The use of the framework and its tools have expanded beyond the 
study of areas traditionally tied to common-pool resource problems.  The mission of the 
Ostrom Workshop is “to build upon the theme of governance to understand and 
address major societal problems”15.  Scholars expect that the “utility of the framework is 
likely to be both further demonstrated and further improved” as IAD applications 
extend to examine institutional structure in areas “from securities trading to academic 
tenure” (Blomquist and deLeon 2011).  Scholars have suggested tying the IAD 
framework with the Advanced Coalition Framework in efforts to better understand the 
structure of belief systems and how key actors attempt to modify that structure for 
various purposes (Weible et al. 2011) .  The framework has been applied to study how 
institutions evolve in judicial systems (Blomquist and Ostrom 2008).  Scholars are using 
the framework to better understand structural diversity expressed via city charters and 
how the various structures affect public participation (Feiock et al. 2014).   
                                                     




Robichau and Lynn suggest that the IAD framework holds considerable promise 
to expand and explain concepts of networks and governance in terms of relationships 
between administrative systems and processes that extend beyond the concept of 
institutions (2009, 30).  But, the condition their suggestion noting that the IAD approach 
may be challenged to interpret “patterns of interaction” involving policymaking 
structures, management structures, processes, and outputs are interpreted as “patterns 
of interaction” within and among action situations.  Of course, it this the interaction 
among the various processes and structures that Cole et al. (Cole, Epstein, and McGinnis 
2014) argue must be understood.  Identifying the effects of these patterns is a way 
forward on the “missing link” of implementation research, the focus of Robichau and 
Lynn’s analysis. 
2.1.3.1 Levels of Analysis 
The IAD framework provides a systematic analysis of the structure of situations 
where choices must be made.  That structure is defined by the institutions involved, and 
the individuals and communities affected (E. Ostrom 2005, 9).  Figure 2-1 illustrates the 
working parts of institutional analysis.  Three levels of decision-making define an arena 
where actions are taken and outcomes produced via multiple, nested action situations 
(Kiser and Ostrom 2000).  The three action levels of operational, collective, and 
constitutional choice reflect the nested nature of governance prevalent in polycentric 
systems (McGinnis 2011a, 173).   
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(Source: Kiser and Ostrom, 2000, p. 60) 
 
Those distinct levels of choice also represent distinct levels of analysis.  The 
Operational Level is described as “the world of action”(Kiser and Ostrom 2000, 76).  
Actions at this level “involve the day-to-day actions of individuals working with the 
resource” (Hardy and Koontz 2009).  Analyses at this level focus on the choices made by 
individuals regarding actions allowed by decisions at the collective choice level 
(McGinnis 2011a, 173).  In our examination of cyber security policy, polices that define 
how students, staff, and faculty may use campus technologies are categorized as 
operational level rules.   For example, one form of acceptable use policy is one requiring 
individuals to install anti-virus software on their computers prior to connecting to 
campus networks.  The individual user must comply with the rule or be sanctioned, 
Figure 2-1 Three Levels of Institutional Analysis 
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possibly by an automated refusal to allow their computer to connect to the campus 
network.   
Individuals, i.e. users and managers, need accurate information that helps them 
to understand the benefit of compliance, and, the risk of non-compliance (E. E. 
Anderson and Choobineh 2008; R. Anderson and Moore 2009).  In the world of micro-
institutional analysis, management practices (e.g. policy enforcement and training), 
rules and norms (i.e. policies) are institutional arrangements created from a 
combination of collective level decisions (policies) and organizational culture (Kiser and 
Ostrom, 2000, 76).  The decisions made at this level result in an action that affects the 
resource (cyber space).  Such actions may include a user’s decision not to install anti-
virus software, or management’s decision not to enforce a policy.  Such decisions will 
lead to a deterioration of the resource. 
Collective Choice level decision-making includes “the processes by which 
institutions are constructed and policy decisions made, by those actors authorized to 
participate in the collective decisions as a consequence of constitutional choice 
processes, according to the procedures as established by constitutional choice 
processes” (McGinnis 2011a, 173).  The outcomes from the decisions made by actors at 
this level combine to create plans for the execution of operational level actions (Hardy 
and Koontz 2009).  Factors such as alignment of business objectives, culture, economic 
factors, and the structure of cyber security governance affect the actors and outcomes 
of this level of action (Knapp et al. 2006).   
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The outcomes from the Collective Choice level include rules that enable, or 
prohibit, a key management practice; rules that require or forbid a specific action to be 
taken by a user of computer services, and so on.  Collective Choice rules determine the 
resources available for training and awareness, incentives for adoption of certain 
policies, and who has ultimate approval of policies under consideration.  In other words, 
decisions made at the collective choice level  “… determine, enforce, continue, or alter 
actions affected within institutional arrangements” (Kiser and Ostrom 2000, 77).    
Constitutional level decisions affect the decision rules that constrain the 
collective choice level decisions (Imperial 1999b).  Rules created at this level may 
determine who participates in making policy, what options may be considered, and who 
is held accountable for the outcomes generated at the collective level (Hardy and 
Koontz 2009).  The Board of Regents policy manual is one source of constitutional choice 
rules identified for our study.  Federal and state mandates provide additional 
constitutional choice rules.     
2.2 Mapping Governance Concepts with the IAD Framework 
 Robichau and Lynn (2009) suggest that process modeling, utilized in public policy 
theories, and multi-level analysis may enhance the strength of governance theories.  
Their analysis of policy theories included in Sabatier (2007b) found two areas of 
concern: “ the failure to distinguish between outputs and outcomes and the imprecise 
treatment of the role of administrative systems in mediating the relationship of 
policymaking to its ultimate consequences (p. 27).”  Noting the similarities between 
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Ostrom’s IAD framework and the LOG framework, they suggest Ostrom’s framework be 
expanded to include “more discussion of the relationships of administrative systems to 
structures and processes beyond rules (p. 30)”.   
A challenge to any form of institutional analysis is the need for a methodical 
means of examining cases to search for factors relevant to the outcomes produced 
(Aligica 2006, 71).  Aligica posits that “an outcome consistent with a pattern may be the 
best verification we can achieve in settings of substantial complexity (Ostrom 2005 11 in 
Aligica 2o14).  Identifying such a relationship addresses the missing link problem. 
2.2.1 Information Security: Governance, Frameworks and Models  
Hong (2006), May and Dhillon (2010), and Knapp et al. (2007; 2009; 2006), 
discussed in the previous chapters, describe efforts to conceptualize theories and 
frameworks to study the human and organizational elements of cyber security.  These 
and other studies (Appari, Johnson, and Anthony 2009; D’Arcy and Hovav 2008; 
Hassebroek 2007; Hu, Hart, and Cooke 2007) indicate a positive contribution from 
research examining institutional factors of policy processes and cyber security.  Bjork 
(2004) suggests that research engaging institutional theory will enhance research into 
policies designed to secure cyber assets via the management of human behavior. 
Hsu, et al, did not find an “integrative framework depicting how organizations 
adopt and assimilate administrative innovations in response to institutional pressures” 
(2012, 919).  Numerous efforts have examined various components, or factors, 
important to understanding how organizations adopt and implement policy and the 
practices that are necessary to maintain successful policy.  The paper concluded that 
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future research regarding the “interaction between institutional pressures and 
organizational change” would be important in efforts to understand the traits of 
effective information security management (p. 936). 
The literature clearly identifies a number of processes and factors that interact 
with institutional arrangements to affect processes that develop, adopt, and implement 
security policy.  Karyda, et al (2005) describes the policy process as one of inputs, 
activities, and outputs as embedded in social processes unique to the organization.  In 
order to understand the outputs and outcomes of these processes, one must 
understand the organizational context.  They identified a number of factors they believe 
merit further research including: organizational structure, the role of an information 
security officer, participation by users in the policy process, top management support, 
and training and education (p. 257).  Other elements of organizational context include 
culture, environment, social, political, economic, and technology factors (Hatch 2006).   
May and Dhillon proposed a semiotic framework to provide a holistic and 
general means for addressing the social and technical perspectives of information 
security (2010).  Their framework (Table 2-1) accommodates analysis via six layers of 
abstraction that focus on categories of signs, basic units of communication, by which 
information is communicated throughout a community, organization or culture (p. 3-4).  
Among their findings, Dhillon and May suggest that the framework's systematic analysis 
of the human, social and technical layers yielded "an enriched security analysis" with 




Table 2-1 Semiotic Framework for Security Research 
Semiotic Layer Brief Description Information Security Issues 
Human Level 
Social System of Norms, beliefs, 
expectations, commitments, law, 
contracts, values, shared models 
of reality, and attitudes 
Alignment of mission of business, ethical 
environment, social implications, and security 
policy, with security requirements 
Pragmatic Culture, communications, 
intentions, and negotiations 
Organizational norms and security culture; 
education, training and awareness 
Semantic Meanings and consequences of 
human behavior 
Consequences of misinterpretation of data or 
misapplication of rules; responsibility and 
attribution of blame 
Technical Level 
Syntactic Rules, procedures, structure, and 
language 
Software; Security reviews and audits to ensure 
data integrity and to handle program bugs and 
software piracy 
Empiric Statistical behavior, efficiency, 
and redundancy 
Telecommunication equipment and network 
strategies; Virus handling and encryption 
Physical Physical Domain Hardware; Physical security 
Source : May and Dhillon (2010) (Adapted from: Stamper, 1973; Liebenau and Backhouse, 1990; and 
Dhillon, 1997) 
 
Hong and others offer a conceptual paper that integrates five information 
management theories (Table 2-2).  Individually, these theories fail to account for all the 
security management activities thought to be essential to effective management (p. 
246-7).  Reasons for failure include: 
 Four of the theories, contingency theory is the exception, emphasize a 
top-down approach  
 Structured methods difficult to adapt to dynamic environments 
 Information Security auditing not addressed appropriately making 
evaluation of policies difficult to do reliably. 
 Management systems could not complete periodic cycles. 
 Contingency theory lacks comprehensive methods and procedures. 
The synthesis proposed by Hong, et al, recognizes the cyclical nature of 
management activities; the need of a feedback loop for evaluation and modification of 
policies; and, that management and policy activities are functional processes whose 
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inputs and outputs create sequential activities.  Finally, security management must align 
with organizational objectives.   
Table 2-2 Five Management Theories Adapted from Hong, et al 2003, p. 246 





Security policy establishment 




Policy is main focus 
Emphasize sequential, structured 
procedures 
Flynn 
Gupta et al. 
Kabay 
Risk Mgt Theory Risk Assessment 
Risk Control 
Review and Modification 
Sequential 
Periodic 
Understand insecure environments 
Ignore security policy and 






Establish Control Systems 
Implement Control Systems 
Information Auditing 





Security Policy Establishment 





Information auditing is ignored and 
implementation is affected 
Lack of periodic check 
Lack of feedback 
BS7799 




Risk management strategy 
Control and Audit Strategy 
Management System Strategy 
Contingency Consider environments both 
outside and inside the organization 
Choose appropriate security 
strategies 
 
Drazin et al 
Kaplan 
Lee et al. 
Tudor 
 
2.2.2 Cyber Security Policy Process: External and Internal Factors   
No single factor has been shown, by itself, to  affect cyber security (Neil F. 
Doherty and Fulford 2006; Kankanhalli et al. 2003a; von Solms 2005; Ku, Chang, and Yen 
2009).  Studies point to the need of a holistic approach, integrating policy and 
management practices to incorporate the human, organizational, and technical tools in 
a dynamic process responsive to a dynamic threat environment (Werlinger, Hawkey, 
and Beznosov 2009; Easterby-Smith 1997).  Flexibility, responsiveness, and sensitivity to 
context are attributes of a policy process deemed necessary for dealing with a wicked 
problem, especially within emerging organizations (Baskerville and Siponen 2002).  A 
number of studies suggests that the likelihood of effective cyber security can be 
predicted by top management support for the organization’s information security 
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program (Fulford and Doherty 2003; Hawkey et al. 2008; Knapp et al. 2006; Warkentin 
and Johnston 2008).   
Threats, both internal and external, constantly evolve.  Changes in threats 
necessitate continual evaluation of risks.  Evaluation of the costs of implementing, 
monitoring and enforcing policies is a constant task.  Cyclical evaluation processes 
indicate an organizational culture, along with management support, to prioritize the 
organization’s efforts to secure its cyber assets.  Effective organizational responses to 
threats depends on the “quantity and quality of information available to decision 
makers about threats, vulnerabilities, potential damages and likelihoods, the 
modularity, interdependence and integration of systems, and the scope of 
responsibilities and risk tolerances of decision makers” (Tversky and Kahneman 1986).   
Conflict with business objectives and organizational culture create issues for 
policy implementation.  The requirement of open environments for research and 
knowledge exchange, thought necessary to protect academic freedom, represents a 
challenge for practitioners on campuses of higher education (Hawkey et al. 2008).  
Academic freedom is argued by some in support the decentralization of IT management 
and IT security management; giving control of IT policy to individual schools and 
departments.  Yet, decentralization may harm efforts to protect organizational 
information assets.  Finally, the interaction of some factors – such as individual variation 
of perception of risk and the distribution of security information to individuals via a 
distributed management system – may affect the scope of policy as risk and perceived 
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costs affect the analysis of cost and benefits (Werlinger, Hawkey, and Beznosov 2009, 
13). 
While investigating the implementation quality of cyber security controls, 
researchers find that because of a lack of sufficient knowledge, managers implement as 
many controls (tools, policies) as possible without regard to the effectiveness of those 
controls (Wade H. Baker and Linda Wallace 2007).  The authors propose that managers 
should adopt the quality management paradigm: incidents reflect defects in the 
organization’s security program.   
Effective cyber security is the implementation of appropriate policies and 
management practices that yield positive outcomes such as a decrease in security 
breaches, an increase in blocked attacks, or a measured increase in system integrity 
(Sangseo Park, Ahmad, and Ruighaver 2010).  If an organization can identify the 
appropriate controls for their situation and implement them efficiently, then the 
organization can effectively manage information security risks (D. W. Straub and Welke 
1998 as cited in Baker and Wallace 2007).   
2.2.3 Governance in Higher Education 
The literature concerning governance in higher education is quite extensive.  I 
will highlight two findings of importance to this study.  The structure of governance and 
the cultural value of autonomy. 
Millett observed that University departments, centers of research, colleges and 
schools present a distribution of authority that contains hierarchical as well as 
horizontal lines of authority.  (1962, 61).”  He describes “communities of power” 
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organized in four constituent groups: faculty, students, alumni and administration (p. 
62).  These communities create internal organizations that confound attempts to 
centrally organize or administrate higher education (p. 62).  A school, or college, may 
maintain functions to manage academic, business, student, and information system 
needs that are duplicated in other schools and divisions of the university. 
The autonomy of colleges and departments is a significant feature of university 
governance structure (Blau 1994).  The influence of autonomy contributes to an 
organizational structure that Cohen and March (1972) describe as a form of organized 
anarchy with a policy process best euphemized as  akin to producing good eats from a 
“garbage can”.  Research into the phenomena of collaboration within institutions of 
higher education demonstrates how factors such as norms, values, knowledge, 
experience and autonomy can defer or defeat efforts to collaborate.     
A polycentric structure consists of multiple centers of decision-making where 
authority may overlap yet the interaction of those centers occurs in a consistent manner 
(Imperial 1999b).  Ostrom and Hess (2007, 44)  believe analysts should employ a 
framework that can assimilate the polycentric nature of such enterprises and the 
multiple levels of analysis  required to understand them.  This belief suggests a conflict 
between the hierarchical structure observed by Millet and the polycentric structure 
suggested by Ostrom as one that “fits” better the cultural value of autonomy. 
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2.3 Mapping the Policy Process – A Research Model 
Peter Blau (1974, 12) defines structure as “the distributions, along various lines, 
of people among social positions that influence the role relations among these people.”  
This definition has the following components: 1) individuals and interactions among 
individuals, 2) rules either explicit or implicit (vis-à-vis role definitions) to govern those 
interactions, and 3) levels of influence (hierarchy).  The IAD framework emphasizes 
actors constrained by rules within a given action situation (E. Ostrom, Gardner, and 
Walker 1994).   
The IAD framework divides the factors that influence a collective-level action 
situation into three categories: 1) Material/Organizational Conditions, 2) Community 
Attributes, and 3) Rules-In-Use.  I translate the internal influences identified by the 
Knapp model as community attributes but rename the category as organizational 
factors.  For reasons of parsimony, I rename the category of Material conditions as 
External Conditions.  The relevant factors taken from findings of the information 
security literature are mapped into the three categories to finish the description of the 
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The processes identified in the Knapp model reside at different and multiple 
levels of decision-making.  I identify the Knapp processes of Risk Assessment, Policy 
Review, Development, Retirement and Approval with the Collective Level of the IAD 
model.  The processes of Training, Implementation, Monitoring, and Enforcement are 
placed at the Operational Level.  Each level of action interacts with the other levels 
affecting outcomes, rules modifications, adjudication of differences, and individual 
decisions of compliance (McGinnis 2011b; E. Ostrom 1990).   
How does the research model reflect the context of the cases in this study?  The 
Knapp model maps processes identified by both researchers and practitioners as 
essential to effective information security governance.  The IAD framework can map the 
features of the structure of these processes both singularly as a solitary action situation 
or as a network of action situations (McGinnis 2011b).  Recall the three levels of choice 
shown in Figure 2-1.  The constitutional level of choice represents the decision-making 
situation held by the Board of Regents of the University System.  The collective level 
situation represents the policy process for each of the USG campuses.  The operational 
level situation represents the various sub-units, including individuals that are engaged in 
daily operations that are regulated by the policies created at the collective level.  
The Knapp model provides expectations of what an analyst should expect to find 
in an organization that seeks to implement an effective security policy.  In other words, 
the model is a high-level map of policy processes.  The model can be overlaid at any 
point in the process.  For example, an analysis of policy making at the Board of Regents 




committees responsible for developing and reviewing proposed policies.  The 
“constitutional level” rules applied to the Board would be found in the state constitution 
as well as statues and regulations from both state and federal government units.  If a 
campus is of sufficient size requiring complex sub-units such as colleges and research 
divisions, the collective level can be focused at the sub-unit level.   
The precision of analysis increases as the analyst drills into the structure of each 
Knapp process.  The IAD model of an action situation identifies, at a minimum, several 
sets of variables (Table 2-3) that describe the structure of a process: (1) participants, 
those involved in the process; (2) positions that are associated with a set of actions that 
the holder of a position is authorized to employ; (3) actions (decision points) for each 
process; (4) outcomes: results from the interaction of participants determining actions 
within the rules that constrain such decisions; (5) information: about the process and 
the implications of potential decisions and outcomes; (6) payoffs: incentives and 
disincentives for potential actions and behaviors of the participants in the process; and, 












Position Positions Title of position; Number of actors in a position; quorum level; 
Boundary Participants 
(Actors) 
Define (1) who is eligible to enter a position, (2) the process that 
determines which participants may/must enter positions, and (3) how 
a participant may/must leave.  Some rules may spell out eligibility for 
participants 
Choice Actions what an actor must, must not, may, may not do based upon Conditions 
at the time of decision - Choice rules affect the total power created in 
an action situation 
Choice rules determine the decision tree linking actions to outcomes 
Aggregation Control whether one individual decides, or votes of several aggregate to decide 
Determines the level of control an actor given a position may exercise 
over the selection of an action 
Information Information Affects level of information available to participants; limits topics to be 
considered; frequency and accuracy of communication, legitimate 
channels of communication, language 
Payoff Costs/Benefits Assigns external payoff/sanctions to particular actions 
Creates incentives and deterrents for action 
Scope Outcomes Defines the range of acceptable outcomes permitted. 
Also limits actions linked to the outcomes. 
Source: Adapted from Crawford and Ostrom (2005, 191) and Ostrom (2011) 
The configuration of these variables are affected by the organizational and 
external factors identified in the Knapp model.  The framework classifies rules by 
identifying the component the rule regulates.  Configurations of these rules have been 
suggested as a means of understanding policy change across time and organizations in a 
“rigorous manner” (E. Ostrom and Basurto 2011).  These configurations may identify 
features of the policy processes employed by each campus and thus define the structure 
of those processes.  The next chapter will elaborate on this point. 
2.4 Summary 
Relevant theories of the policy process were reviewed and key concepts 
identified to define and identify structures of policy processes used to develop 




policymaking and the actions within administrative systems to implement those policies 
is not explicitly defined (Robichau and Lynn Jr. 2009).  The Knapp model presents an 
approach based on both theory and practice that provides a systematic approach to 
analyzing and defining those relationships.  The utility of the IAD framework to identify 
these concepts as structures of actors and institutions represents a viable opportunity 
to address a serious gap in understanding the relationship between policy processes and 
the divergence of policies implemented from the intended designs.  In Chapter 3, I 
discuss the theoretical expectations of relationships between policy structure and the 





Chapter 3– Hypotheses 
 
The IAD framework and the research model offered by Knapp, et al., both agree 
that the influence of external and organizational conditions affect and regulate the 
behavior of the decision making within the action situations being studied.  I submit that 
these conditions are “baked in”.  In other words, the rules-in-use reflect the influence of 
those conditions (Carter et al. 2015).  The hypotheses discussed in this chapter reflect 
this idea.  For example, if Top Management are strongly supportive of securing cyber 
assets, the rules-in-use will reflect their participation throughout the security 
governance model.  Further, an organization that requires top management 
participation via formal rules indicates a stronger governance structure than an 
organization that has no designation of top management participation written or 
otherwise.   
The presence of those rules, and their effects upon the actors as they make 
choices, will be reflected in the policy documents produced by this process.  These 
expectations form the central hypothesis of this study: that a more formal, and thus 
more effective, cybersecurity governance structure should produce relatively more 
effective policy than an ad hoc, and less effective, governance structure.   
The unit of analysis is the case, a university selected for this study.  Much of the 
evidence used in this study focuses on policy documents, and more specifically, the 
statements that comprise those documents.  I refer to these data as “units of 




(Babbie 2004, 95 cited in Basurto, et al. 2010).  I aggregate these observations to 
identify configurations of statements that form patterns defining the structure of policy 
and policy making (governance) for each case.   
The IAD tools provide the analyst a means for a robust, systematic analysis of 
these observations.  The analysis provides details at a level of precision that is finer than 
the document level of analysis employed by studies such as the analysis of university 
policies discussed previously (Neil Francis Doherty, Anastasakis, and Fulford 2009).  
That study identified document types (standards, guidelines, etc.) and policy 
areas (e.g. password protection) via review of the policy objectives noted in each 
document.  The Institutional Grammar tool disaggregates components of institutions 
observed among policy statements within such documents.  For example, the Attribute 
of a statement identifies the entity responsible for accomplishing the objective or goal 
(component is aIm) within a statement.   
Before we get down to this level of analysis, it is important to tie structure back 
to the analysis of documents upon which the findings of prior research is based. The 
chapter begins with an effort to connect the prior efforts using document analysis to 
this study’s use of statement analysis by suggesting how the conceptualization of policy 
structure is treated by both approaches. The next section proposes thoughts regarding 
how varying organizational conditions, particularly the concepts of Top Management 
Support and Collaboration, are manifested within those structures.  Finally, I examine 





3.1 Conceptualizing Policy and Governance Structures as Networks 
Doherty, et al., conceptualized Policy Structure by asking three questions: 1) how 
many types (issues covered) of policy are available; 2) How many documents compose 
the information security policy; 3) how do the documents relate to each other vis-à-vis 
lower level standards and procedures (2009).  Those structure types and the attributes 
of the documents described by Doherty are similar to terms found in social network 
analysis.  One can create a scale from “no relationships” to “ad hoc” relationships (with 
few connections among the documents), to clusters of documents with inter-connecting 
references (cluster network) to a single large cluster (formal network) with relations 
among lower level documents (standards and procedures).   
Security documentation must provide clear references to connect the various 
documents and the issue areas those documents address (Doherty, et al 2011 p. 205).  
The types of documentation identified by Doherty, et al, includes procedures, forms, 
guidelines, standards, and policy statements.  Effective security relies upon clear 
references between these documents as well as some consistency in the naming of 
those documents (Doherty et al 2009).  Analysis of policy structure is focused on the 
understanding of “the number of policies in use and how these relate to each other and 
to lower level standards and procedure” (Neil Francis Doherty, Anastasakis, and Fulford 
2009, 451). 
One can represent the connections between document types (standards, 
procedures … as Doherty labeled them) and policy issues as a network graph.  Ideally, all 




Figure 3-1. The formality of the policy structure is dependent upon the resources 
invested to create and maintain that structure.  As the structure grows more formal, the 
graph evolves, showing more connections at varying component levels. 
The different document types are represented by the shapes on the graph.  The 
different policy areas are shown as colors.  So a well-constructed policy for an area will 
show vertical links between the procedures (solid diamonds) standards (open squares), 
policies (solid squares) and meta-policy (sphere).  The interconnection of document 
types across areas is a horizontal connection as shown in both the Informal and Formal 
graphs.  The criteria for each type of policy structure is found in Table 3-1. 
 
 
Figure 3-1 Sample Policy Structure Type 
Legend: Sphere – Metapolicy, Solid Square – Policy, Square – Standard, Solid Diamond – Procedure, 
Diamond - Guideline 
  

















1 A general Information Security Policy, accompanied by a number of related policies and 
supplemented by specific guidelines and practice-related documents.  Policy documents 




2 Policies and standards, supplemented by a number of related guidelines and procedures, 
with each guideline or procedure focused on one aspect of security mgt. The documents x-
reference across types of security issues.  .  A map of these policies demonstrates vertical 
links between policies, standards and procedures with few horizontal links connecting types 
of security issues. [emphasis mine].  A map of documents would present the horizontal links 




3 A series of inter-related, cross-referenced policies (separate system, product, community, 
and corporate information security policies) –governed by a Meta Policy.   
 
H1: The structure of a policy governance process will be reflected in the formality of the 
policy structure created by that process.   
 
Intuitively, one expects that a formal policy structure is created by a similarly 
formal governance structure.  Conceptually, a comparative measure of governance 
structure may be created by comparing the presence of Knapp processes used by an 
organization to the ideal Knapp model.  We know from the review of literature that a 
dynamic, well-structured policy process increases the effectiveness of security policy 
(Baskerville and Dhillon 2008; Neil Francis Doherty, Anastasakis, and Fulford 2011; 
Moule and Giavara 1995; Baskerville and Siponen 2002). The Knapp processes of Risk 
Assessment, Development, Review, Retirement and Approval taken together compose 
the basic features of the policy governance structure for cyber security for each case.  It 
is the combined outcomes of these processes that produce policy documents and 
practices to be implemented.  The Knapp processes of Awareness, Implementation, 
Monitoring, and Enforcement comprise a process dimension of policy operational 
structure.  The relationship between the presence and structure of individual Knapp 




A crude test of relative “strength” of structure relies on the configuration of 
institutions in each Knapp defined process.  A frequency analysis of observations coded 
for each Knapp process for each case provides measures of “relative strength” of 
processes.  A “Weak” structure has fewer statements in a process than the average of 
all cases.  A “Present” structure has average or above statements.  “N”o presence is 
coded when no statements are present for the process.  
3.1.1 Structural Components  
The grammatical analysis of statements found in policy documents provide data 
to align those statements with the types of policy components identified by multiple 
researchers.  The precision of analysis may improve as we move from documents to 
statements and identify these components. 
Baskerville and Siponen (2002) suggest that emergent organizations require a 
meta-policy that governs the creation, implementation, and enforcement of security 
policies.  Moule and Giavara (2009) define policies, standards, guidelines and 
procedures as components that comprise a framework employed to manage “guiding” 
information for an organization implementing a technology plan.  Rees et al (2003) 
defines security policies as “... generally high-level, technology neutral, concern risks, set 
directions and procedures, and define penalties and countermeasures if the policy is 
transgressed”.   The authors distinguish the policy from “… implementation specific 









Table 3-2 Presence of Knapp Process per Structure type 
IAD 
Framework 
Knapp Governance Model Structure  
Level of 
Analysis 




Collective Approval Actions required to approve policy; to operationalize the policy W W P 
Collective Development Activities include issue identification, definition of scope, research and 
analysis and stakeholder input 
W P P 
Collective Retirement Removal of policy from active service N W P 
Collective Review Management review of policy performance, alignment with business 
objectives, and effectiveness given other emerging technologies and security 
issues 
N W P 
Collective Risk Assessment Identification of organizational values, policies that may be compromised if 
certain behaviors are allowed to occur 
N W P 
Operational Awareness and 
Training 
Efforts to communicate to the campus community and to train them in the 
issues related to the policy in question 
W W P 
Operational Enforcement Judgment of whether a violation of policy occurred; application of sanctions N W P 
Operational Implementation Operational level application of the rules and norms contained within the 
policy document 
W P P 
Operational Monitoring Observation of policy compliance, audits of systems, use of automated tools 
to scan for behaviors not allowed 
N W P 




The configuration of policy components, as defined in table 3-3, represent 
increasingly specific sets of activities to support policy outputs and outcomes. 
 





Establishes how info sec policies are 
created, implemented, enforced 
(Baskerville & Siponen 2002) 
Not mentioned 
Policy 
Describes management's requirements at 
a high level, defining "what is required" 
not "how to do it".(Moule & Giavara) 
Defines importance of information assets 
to organization 
Defines management, employee 
responsibility to safeguard the resource 
Expresses concerns/objectives at “highest 
level of abstraction” (Baskerville and 
Siponen, 2002) 
a concise document that outlines specific 
requirements, business rules or company stance 
that must be met. The policy is the 
organization’s stance on an issue, program or 
system. It is a rule that everyone must meet. 
Standard 
Established rules or requirements that 
must be observed in the execution of 
procedures.   
(Baskerville and Siponen 2002) 
 
May provide specific security measures 
Often carry statement of sanction for non-
compliance 
a requirement that supports a policy 
Define minimum requirements designed to 
address certain risks 
Define specific requirements that ensure 
compliance with policies 
Outline implementation and enforcements 
plans 
Balance protection with productivity 
Procedure 
A series of specific instructions which 
must be followed in order to comply with 
prescribed policies and practices 
(Moule & Giavara) 
Define specific requirements that ensure 
compliance with policies 
Provide a basis for verifying compliance through 
audits 
(USG lumps standards and procedures together 
as “standards”) 
Guideline 
suggestion, approach or issue that the 
reader should keep in mind when 
performing a particular task or activity 
(Moule & Giavara) 
a document that suggests a path or guidance on 
how to achieve or reach compliance with a 
policy. 
Ancillary Policies Not defined in the literature 
Organizational policies not considered part of 
security framework – e.g. student handbook, 
faculty handbook, etc.  but referenced for 








In practice, the University System of Georgia recommends the use of these 
components as part of its policy program governing the campus CIO’s and CISO’s16.  The 
System’s policy program uses defined categories of instructions that are similar to those 
identified in the research literature.  The creation of Table 3-3 is a straightforward 
alignment of those definition and categories.  There are two exceptions. The USG does 
not define procedures as a separate class of instructions, consolidating the definitions 
for procedures within the term “standards” in their documentation.  Second, the 
concept of a metapolicy is not directly referenced.  Nonetheless, the components 
identified by research is validated in practice by the USG documentation. 
How may these components relate to observed features of governance 
structure?  The existence of a meta-policy implies the presence of most, if not all, of the 
policy components.  This statement is particularly true if the meta-policy is found in a 
formal document. The absence of a formal meta-policy suggests that components may 
be missing.  The next set of hypotheses will explore this question. 
A formal, or written meta-policy is the outcome of the investment of actors 
within an organization to publicly acknowledge how policies are to be developed, 
reviewed, retired, and implemented.  A meta-policy indicates an emergent organization 
that provides structure to allow individuals and sub-units of an organization the latitude 
to adapt policy as needed.  Standards, procedures, policies, and guidelines are provided 
within emergent organizations to assure that such adaptations are done with minimal 
                                                     
16 University System of Georgia Information Security and ePrivacy – Policy and Compliance Management 




adverse effect on desired organizational outcomes. The existence of a meta-policy 
implies a culture that adopts and promotes best practices.  In sum,  
H2: If an organization possesses a meta-policy then the likelihood that that 
organization observes most if not all of the processes identified in the Knapp 
model is greater than an organization without a meta-policy.   
 
The presence of a nearly ideal Knapp model in an organization will correlate with 
an appropriate configuration of all policy components.  However, as Baskerville and 
Siponen observed, meta-policies are not ubiquitous among organizations.  The absence 
of a meta-policy suggests a governance structure is missing, or at best presents weak, 
governance processes.  A deficient structure is defined as one that is missing a Knapp 
process or presents a weakly structured process (i.e. few formal rules/actors).   
3.1.2 Policy Components and Formality of Structure 
A meta-policy is not an approach that generates a “one size fits all” set of 
policies for an organization.  A meta-policy, properly constructed, is a framework that 
governs policymaking in a manner that recognizes the need for organizational units to 
tailor policy to fit each unit’s respective needs in the context of organizational goals, 
mission, and objectives.  An important characteristics of an emergent organization is the 
reliance on decentralization of policy management (Baskerville and Siponen 2002, 340).  
Decentralization introduces opportunities for innovation and exploration of means to 
promote the ease of use of the policies to secure cyber assets (Baskerville and Siponen, 
2002, 341).  Many of the requirements of a formal meta-policy defined by Baskerville 




identified in the Knapp model and the components of policy identified in the literature.  
Therefore: 
H3: An effective formal governance structure presents a full complement of 
components and Knapp processes to be effective.   
 
The hypotheses express the expectation that a more formal, and thus more 
effective, governance structure should produce relatively more effective policy than an 
ad hoc, and less effective, governance structure.  The hypothesis presumes that anything 
less than a formal structure will present missing processes or components.  As the 
governance structure moves from a formal to informal to ad hoc structure, the number 
of missing processes and components will increase.  Missing components and processes 
are symptoms of an ineffective policy.  For example, a policy without monitoring and 
enforcement cannot effectively contribute to desired outcomes.  The hypotheses 
suggests a continuum that correlates to the increasing deficiencies in policy structure.   
For example, I suggest that an informal structure has definitive statements 
defining activities within Approval, Development, Review, Risk Assessment, 
Implementation and Monitoring.  The appropriate policy components, representing 
policies, standards, procedures and guidelines, are present.  Retirement, Awareness, 
and Enforcement activities may not be strongly present, if at all.  But, the essence of a 
learning cycle – which requires monitoring of behaviors, assessment of risks, and review 
of policy performance – is present.  It is likely that required policy areas have varying 




of the policy components, clearly assigning responsibility and procedures to 
management, staff, and casual users. 
Policies created within an informal governance structure will present a more 
diverse set of policy components (e.g. standards, procedures, and guidelines) which 
improve the effectiveness of security efforts (Moule and Giavara 1995) than a policy 
structured in an ad hoc governance process.  In addition to filling the “vertical” spaces of 
the policy component table, a map of policy documents will present a number of the 
components linked horizontally across policy areas revealing a cluster network 
structure.  The horizontal links serve to reference procedures and guidelines that can be 
applied regardless of the policy area.  Enforcement and judicial procedures to determine 
guilt and punishment are an example of processes that can be applied to most policy 
infractions.   Improvements to the policy structure, as compared to ad hoc processes, 
may be related to strong leadership, an adopted design philosophy, or a strongly 
collaborative organizational culture.  
An ad hoc policy structure may be the norm for many organizations (Baskerville 
and Siponen 2002).  There is no formal meta-policy document available to define the 
process.  The policy statements for the Knapp processes, if there are any to be 
identified, are likely to represent the guideline or ancillary components of policy.  The 
process for approval may exist, but the positions within that process that are given the 
decision-making powers to approve, or not, are unlikely to be inclusive, or similar to, the 
organizational decision structure.  Most likely, the CIO or CISO will unilaterally approve, 




identified as standards and policy components.  The other Knapp processes (M)aybe 
present, and will feature statements that tend to be more norm than rule, are not 
inclusive of the organizational membership, have relatively little information required to 
be presented for consideration, and little sanctions, or rewards, to incent the desired 
behavioral outcomes. 
3.2 Organizational Conditions – Relationship with Governance Structure 
The literature review finds two organizational conditions, Top Management 
Support (TMS) and Collaboration, as necessary for effective policy and policy 
management.  Literature from research on higher education acknowledges the effects 
of autonomy as a cultural value that may frustrate changes of policy necessitated by the 
dynamic environment of cyber security. These conditions are recognized as 
organizational conditions by the research model. I hypothesize that these conditions will 
be observed in the structure and configuration of the policy statements observed as 
rules, norms and standards.   
3.2.1 Top Management Support (TMS) 
Board of Regents policy sets constitutional-level rules requiring a) the President 
of each college or university ensure that a cybersecurity program is in place; and, b) that 
the CIO for each BOR organization will create and maintain such a program.  These 
requirements fall into the category of “Compulsory Boundary Rules”.  If Top 
Management Support (TMS) for cybersecurity is low, then one expects that an 




CIO is likely to informally charge his or her staff, a compulsory rule with an implied 
eligibility determined by position on the IT staff, with the responsibility of drafting 
policies.  But, the final decision as to which policies to develop and how those policies 
are word will be made by the CIO and President.  If TMS is high, then one expects to see 
representation for all campus sub-units.   
Recall from chapter 2: “governance institutions are used by the organization to 
‘enable the selection of agents to act on its behalf in different decision contexts, thus 
affecting the actors and positions they hold within the focal action situation’” (McGinnis 
2011b, 54).  The influence of top management support is observed in the institutions 
that guide behavior (Purvis, Sambamurthy, and Zmud 2001).  Top Management Support 
is measured by a proxy that identifies actors holding top positions given responsibility 
by the governance rules for tasks related to the development, review, and approval of 
policy.  Attributes and conditions of Boundary rules define ‘who’ and ‘when’ may enter 
and exit the action situation.   
Ostrom and Crawford classify boundary rules as three types (2005b, 194).  
Eligibility boundary rules determine who may hold a particular position.  Entry boundary 
rules define the process by which actors may/must enter a position.  Exit boundary rules 
define the process by which actors may/must leave a position.    Ostrom and Crawford 
further classify boundary rules as first and second-order.  First-order rules define 
eligibility of individuals to hold a position.  Second-order rules classify those who are 
eligible to participate into “subsets of position-holders and non-holders” (2005b, 195).  




rules require an invitation from positions of authorities inviting eligible members to 
accept a position.  Compulsory rules deny an individual the choice to accept a position.  
Competitive rules require a competition to determine who may hold a position.  
Variation in conditions of entry, attributes, and deontic of the rules alter the structure of 
a situation by changing who participates in the process. 
I suggest that the number of principals of the organization specified to 
participate by first order rules within the governance structure is a proxy for Top 
Management Support (TMS).  The intention of a first-order rule is clear.  If you occupy a 
position of leadership in an area critical to the success of information security, then you 
should participate in the governance of security policy.  Requiring actors to participate 
may be seen as action on the part of top management to make security a priority of the 
organization.   
H4a: Governance structure will resemble the ideal Knapp model as the number of 
principals identified in 1st order boundary rules increase. 
 
The IAD framework identifies one rule type, Boundary rules, that determine 
participation in decision-making arenas.  Best practice and theory find that participation 
of Top Management is necessary to assure policy effectiveness.  A compulsory boundary 
rule possesses a “Must” deontic versus a “May”.  Therefore: 
H4b: High TMS is likely accompanied by compulsory Boundary rules requiring the 
participation of a number of principals of the organization.   
 
The literature describes a “default” configuration for the role of IT personnel as the 






H4c: If there are no compulsory boundary rules, then the likelihood that a techno-
centric governance process increases.  TMS will be “lower” than in organizations with 
compulsory boundary rules. 
3.2.2 Collaboration  
A solitary rule type does not define the structure of a situation by itself.  If the 
TMS is low, then the choice rules (denoting who has the power to decide final 
outcomes) are likely simple and designate the CIO, most likely, as the primary decision-
maker.  If TMS is high, then the addition of other actors implies a more sophisticated 
choice-rule structure.  Aggregation rules, those that determine how decisions are made, 
will reflect the likely condition that the CIO or CISO makes the final decision regarding 
policy content and structure without consulting stakeholders, which might require a 
consensus for approval. 
Collaboration is essential to securing cyber space (Goodman and Lin 2007, 227).  
The literature confirms that institutional rules, and organizational context, are 
important factors in determining the effectiveness and likelihood of collaboration 
(Hardy and Koontz 2009).  Effective policy, therefore, requires a governance structure 
that permits and encourages collaboration in the production of policy. 
Among the goals found in the USG Information Technology Strategic Plan, is the 
implementation of a commons security management framework to ensure “trustworthy 
information sharing, analysis and collaboration” (“Information Technology Strategic 
Plan” 2010, 24).  An important characteristic of collaborative governance is the 
inclusiveness of “all stakeholders who are affected by or care about the issue” (Chrislip 




that an Open Boundary Rule allowing any persons with an interest to opt in to the policy 
situation will be present.   
Open Boundary Rules support collaboration and collaboration is consistent with 
an emergent policy structure. 
H5a: The presence of Open Boundary Rules setting the criteria for participation 
in making security policy reflects an organizational condition that values 
collaboration. An Ad Hoc structure will be the least likely to present Open 
Boundary rules.  A Formal structure is likely to present Open Boundary Rules. 
 
An Invitation boundary rule may be required to insure effective leadership 
participates in the process as the lack of effective leadership may decrease the 
likelihood of effective collaboration (Ansell and Gash 2008, 555). 
H5b: The absence of an invitation boundary rule specifying participation of 
university leadership will increase the likelihood of a governance structure that is 
largely ad hoc in nature. 
 
 Being present is necessary, but not sufficient, to assure collaboration.  
Aggregation rules specify who decides whether and which action may be taken (E. 
Ostrom and Basurto 2011, 323).  Aggregation rules are most likely, and most necessary, 
when “choice rules assign multiple positions partial control over the same set of action 
variables” (E. Ostrom and Crawford 2005b, 202).  Ansell and Gash (2008), citing Connick 
and Innes (2003) and Seidenfeld (2000), note that decision-making within collaborative 
governance is “consensus oriented.”  They conclude: “the goal of collaboration is 
typically to achieve some degree of consensus among stakeholders” (547).   
Ostrom and Crawford identify three types of aggregation rules that define 




cannot be reached (E. Ostrom and Crawford 2005b, 202).  Non-symmetric rules provide 
actors with variable capacity to render a decision (2005b, 203).  Non-symmetric rules 
may assign a subgroup with power to make decisions under certain conditions.  
Symmetric rules ensure that all participants possess similar power over outcomes.  Such 
rules may state conditions of consensus or require unanimity before an action is taken.  
Studies of agreement rules have found that variation of just this part of a rules 
configuration can have great effects upon outcomes and illustrates the importance of 
examining rules configurations and not just single types of rules (2005, 205). 
H5c: The presence of symmetric Aggregation rules along with Open Boundary 
rules reflects existence of a collaborative culture and the governance structure is 
more likely to resemble a completed Knapp model. 
 
Consensus depends upon trust among the actors.  Trust is dependent upon 
reliable access to information.  Information rules determine what participants know of 
an action situation (topic); from whom participants gain information (channels); how 
often participants are given information (frequency); how reliable the information may 
be (accuracy); and even the codes or languages used to communicate (language) (E. 
Ostrom and Crawford 2005b, 206–207).  Various configurations of information rules 
may alter the power within an action situation and therefore the outcomes.  For 
example, a study of occupational subcultures of IT employees found that dysfunction in 
communications among these groups can have negative effects on the organization 
(Guzman et al. 2004, 79).  The absence of a process to exchange information across 
individual policy areas complicates and frustrates efforts to understand the policy and to 




H5d:  The presence of information rules requiring the exchange of information 
among actors indicates the existence of a collaborative culture and indicates a 
stronger governance structure when compared to cases without such rules. 
3.2.3 Autonomy  
Autonomy describes a key component of the culture of the university that 
dominates all levels of the organization from the individual faculty member to the 
systems and associations that govern public institutions of higher education 
(Christensen 2010).  The strength of the desire for autonomy has influenced the 
governance structure common to most universities and colleges.  The influence of 
autonomy contributes to an organizational structure that Cohen and March (1972) 
describe as a form of organized anarchy with a policy process best euphemized as  akin 
to producing good eats from a “garbage can”.  To wit, Weick (1976) described higher 
education as many “loosely coupled systems.”  Each of these authors attempts to 
describe an organization of multiple sub-units that possess either autonomous or semi-
autonomous governance authority with respect to the larger institution.  Autonomy, 
therefore, makes change and innovation, even when driven by external mandates, slow 
at best, or inhibited, at worst (Bartell 2003) as these sub-units attempt to collaborate, to 
decide how and whether to act.   
Intuitively, I expect that an organization with strong values regarding autonomy 
will exhibit a diffuse governance structure.  In other words, the ability to make decisions 
regarding policy are distributed across and down the organizational structure.  Scope 
rules define outcomes that must, must not, or may be affected by actions taken (Ostrom 




(Ostrom and Crawford 2005b, 208).  A scope rule may be used to affect an outcome 
otherwise not attainable using choice rules.  A specific example is given within the 
context of universities where the norms and rules governing academic freedom may 
make efforts to restrict how a professor teachers as suspect, but rules that encourage or 
incent specific outcomes, thus encouraging professors to choose a particular method, as 
permissible (Ostrom and Crawford 2005b, 209).   
How does a governance structure that protects autonomy differ from an 
emergent organization that complies with enterprise policy objectives?  In this case, a 
department, with strong autonomy, could choose to ignore a policy written by the CIO.  
The department is able to do so when monitoring and/or enforcement processes are 
not present.  Autonomy is protected when the deontic for the policy statements is 
permissive (may) and not obligatory (must).  Autonomy is protected when actors from 
the department are not obligated to participate in the development of policy and when 
those actors are not required to share information with others as to policy 
implementation, or methods used to meet policy objectives.  Autonomy is less 
threatened in an ad hoc structure than an informal structure but is more likely managed 
in a formal governance structure as all the processes required to implement, and to 
manage tailoring and implementation at the department level, are available for 
managing unit level implementation. 
H6: If Scope rules limit actions of sub-units to modify policies, the governance structure 




3.3 Elements of Policy Structure  
The role of cyber security policy is to provide rules to govern individual behavior 
as that behavior affects the information and technology resources of their organizations 
(Whitman 2008).  Information security policy defines the roles and responsibilities of the 
employees to safeguard the information and technology resources of their organizations 
(Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, and Benbasat 2010).  The composition of policy includes written 
policy documents consisting of many textual statements that regulate the behavior of 
an organization, its sub-units, individual employees, and policy makers (Weible and 
Carter 2015).   
Most of the articles addressing policy content have been prescriptive in nature 
(Baskerville and Siponen 2002).  From these prescriptions, a synthesis suggests four 
dimensions conceptualized as variables derived from policy content that affect the 
relative strength of policy effectiveness (Figure 3-2).  The main working hypothesis of 
this study is that there is a correlation between elements of policy structure such as 
components, scope, tailoring, and form that correlate with structures within the Knapp 





The lack or relative weakness of these qualities may be termed as deficiencies in 
policy structure.  Deficient policies may possess “inconsistent formats, inappropriate 
scope, incomplete structure and coverage of subjects, ambiguous wording, and weak 
coupling between risk and intent” (Knapp et al. 2009, 502).  Such deficiencies in 
governance structure can be found in a weak or non-existent policy for policy 
development, review, or lack of feedback from key constituencies.   
Security policies are ineffective, becoming “paper tigers” (Bjorck 2004), when the 
desired security behavior does not become part of the organizational norms (Backhouse 
and Dhillon 1996, 8), a condition related to weak or non-existent means to tailor a 
policy, or to make stakeholders aware of a policy.  The lack of awareness of a new or 
revised policy will decrease the likelihood that the new norms will become part of the 












relationships between the structural elements of policies and the structure of 
governance that created those policies.  
3.3.1 Components 
The presence of a nearly ideal Knapp model in an organization is likely to 
correlate with an appropriate configuration of all policy components.  If the appropriate 
components are present in the governance structure, it is likely we will find a similar set 
of components in the policy structure.  An informal or ad hoc governance structure will 
likely not present needed components of standards, procedures, and guidelines that 
help the organization to implement and manage a policy effectively.   
H7: As an organization’s governance structure declines from Formal to Ad Hoc, 
then it is less likely to present a coherent set of standards, procedures, 
guidelines and policies appropriate for effective policy. 
3.3.2 Scope 
 The objectives, issues, and topics of policy statements, as explicitly stated, define 
policy scope (Neil Francis Doherty, Anastasakis, and Fulford 2011, 203). Scope, says 
Hong, et al., refers to the coverage of relevant security issues which have been 
identified by multiple standards (see ISO 17799, COBIT, and others noted by Hong, et al 
(2006) and Hone and Eloff (2002)).   As the comprehensiveness (coverage) of content 
increases, so does policy effectiveness (Hong et al. 2006, 113).  The baseline security 










USG Info Sec Policy Section 
11  (2011) 
Requires all institutions to maintain an IS infrastructure and program to ensure 
confidentiality, availability, integrity of information assets 
USG Password 
Authentication Policy 
It is the responsibility of every Institution and the University System Office to 
implement authentication mechanisms such as passwords to access sensitive 
data and the responsibility of the user to appropriately select and protect their 
passwords. 
USG Appropriate Use Policy The USG expects all institutions and their users to use IT resources in a 
responsible manner, respecting the public trust through which these resources 
have been provided, the rights and privacy of others, the integrity of facilities 
and controls, state and Federal laws, and USG policies and standards. 
USG Risk Management 
Policy 
University System of Georgia (USG) Institutions must ensure the confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of information and information systems resources and 
assets by protecting them from unauthorized access, modification, destruction, 
or disclosure and ensure the physical security of IT resources and assets. 
USG Data Handling and 
Storage Standard 
This policy is intended to ensure that the information is uniformly used and 
disclosed in accordance with all USG policies and applicable state and federal 
laws. 
USG Computer Security 
Incident Management Policy 
This policy establishes the requirement for each University System of Georgia 
(USG) institution and the University System Office (USO) to establish an internal 
capability for handling computer security incidents. 
USG - HIPAA Privacy and 
Security Policy 
To meet the requirements of the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules, the 
University System of Georgia, it’s institutions; hospitals, GPLS and benefit plans 
will develop policies, which govern the use and disclosure of PHI. 
USG Continuity of 
Operations Plan 
This policy shall establish a requirement to develop a formal program to 
develop, maintain, and evaluate plans to appropriately respond to a wide range 
of contingencies and disasters that may occur at all of the USG institutions, 
System Office and Georgia Public Library Service. 
Use of Cryptography This policy establishes the requirement to use cryptographic controls on 
University System Office (USO) and University System of Georgia (USG) 
Institution information systems as necessary. 
Security and Awareness 
Program 
The USG’s employees (full/part-time employees and contractors) shall be made 
aware of their basic information security responsibilities through an awareness 
program. 
Electronic Data Disposal All computer systems, electronic devices and electronic media must be properly 
cleaned of sensitive data and software before being transferred outside of the 
University System or GPLS, either as surplus property or as trash. 
Copyright Violation 
Guidelines 
The purpose of this guideline is to establish acceptable practices that support 
the policy as it applies to copyright violations. 
 
A study identified three conditions: environmental uncertainty, competitive 
advantage, and resource availability, along with three organizational conditions: top 
management support, IT capability, and culture; as conditions that affect managers’ 
perspectives of security requirements and the benefit of implementing those 




affected the Information Rules and the Payoff rules that regulate the decisions made 
related to policy.  Top Management Support reflects these perspectives.  Therefore, 
H8: The likelihood of coverage of USG issues will correlate with the relative 
strength of top management support for securing cyber assets 
 
3.3.3 Tailoring (Fit) 
Karyda, et al (2005) describes the policy process as one of inputs, activities, and 
outputs embedded in social processes unique to the organization.  If cyber security 
policy is to be effective, one must align security policy strategy, structure, goals and 
norms with existing organizational norms, processes and structures (Bohme and Kataria 
2006).  The content and structure of cyber security policies should accommodate the 
unique needs of an organization if desired outcomes are likely to be realized (Drevin, 
Kruger, and Steyn 2007).  When structuring policy to improve situational awareness of 
cyber sec issues at the individual level, factors such as “conscientiousness, cultural 
assumptions and beliefs, social conditions that affect staff behavior, and attitude 
towards work “ must be accommodated in the design (Eeten and Bauer 2009; Eeten et 
al. 2007; Gurpreet Dhillon and Torkzadeh 2006).     
In sum, the “devil is in the details”.  Do the various policy statements that 
constitute Acceptable Use policies reflect differences in the users, the context, and the 
structure of an organization?  Most prior research examines fit in concert with 
organizational mission and objectives.  If these policies are not tailored to fit the 
organization, then their effectiveness is greatly reduced.  Fitting a policy to an 




Faculty discipline policies, Student Judiciary proceedings); assigning responsibility to 
individual departments for monitoring; or assigning responsibility to various positions to 
implement the policy.  Using the IAD tools, I will look for Attributes and oBjects 
containing references to organizational specific actors and ancillary documents (e.g. 
Faculty Handbook).   
The organizational conditions requisite to encourage tailoring include strong 
TMS for security compliance and a culture that values collaboration so that language 
and structure will reflect a consensus of those affected.  The absence of organizational 
specific references indicates a lack of tailoring of policy statements consistent with 
organizational context (Kotulic and Clark 2004).   
H9: Acceptable Use Policies will vary in “fit” as the governance structure varies.  A 
Formal structure will provide greater evidence of fit, measured in terms of specific 
assignments and positions referencing that particular organization. 
 
In order to measure fit, I use the rules typology developed within the IAD 
framework (E. Ostrom and Crawford 2005b; Basurto et al. 2010a; E. Ostrom and Basurto 
2011); the definition of coverage areas (Table 3-5) assigned to Acceptable Use Policies 
(Neil Francis Doherty, Anastasakis, and Fulford 2011); and the components of 
institutional statements identified by the Institutional Grammar Tool (Crawford and 
Ostrom 1995).  Analysis focuses on observations identified as part of Acceptable Use 
Policies (AUP) and assigned to operational level action situations such as Awareness, 
Implementation, Monitoring and Enforcement.  The Implementation observations are 
then categorized as to the issue by criteria found in Table 3-5.  The premise of the fit 




and a collaborative culture.  Therefore, the positions identified via analysis of Attributes 
and oBjects will be more likely to be organizationally specific and will represent the 
organizational structure.  The Conditions of the statement will also more likely reference 
the organization and its structure.  And, the aIms, the goals or objectives of statements, 
will reference objectives specific to the organization. 
 
Table 3-5 Coverage Areas – AUP  
Source Doherty, et al, 2011, 204 




Covers issues such as who is authorized to use systems and corporate information; 
username and password management regulations and good practice guidelines 
Acceptable 
Behavior 
covers permitted user activities, such as work-related use of the systems and information, and 
internet usage in particular.  
Unacceptable 
behavior 
Covers prohibited user activities, such as hacking, downloading illegal material, accessing illegal 
websites, dissemination of illegal or offensive material, sending bulk emails, harassment of 
other users, violating privacy of others users, dissemination 
of viruses, use of systems and/or corporate information commercial purposes, personal usage of 
systems and/or corporate information 
License 
Compliance 
Rules and regulations about software downloading, sharing and usage 
Roles and 
Responsibilities 
Explanation of the specific roles and responsibilities of users, system administrators, and so on 
User 
Monitoring 








Details of responsibilities and procedures for policy management and maintenance 
 
3.3.4 Form 
Form is a dimension which includes the elements of clarity (is intent 
understandable) and brevity.  How well a policy is written determine the effectiveness 
of the policy (Goel and Chengalur-Smith 2010).  If effectiveness of security policy is 
dependent upon the individual and their behavior (Lane 1985 as cited in Backhouse and 




them as they use and manage cyber assets (Höne and Eloff 2002b).  Therefore, policy 
should be written in a manner that focuses on the user (Höne and Eloff 2002a).   
Goel and Smith identify clarity and brevity as two dimensions of form that relate 
to policy effectiveness (2010).  In their literature review, Goel and Smith note that 
research evaluating the effectiveness of privacy policies found that most policies were 
incomprehensible to the general population (Sheehan, 2005; Anton et al., 2007 as cited 
in Goel and Smith 2010 283).  Concepts such as clarity and brevity of policy predict the 
likelihood that users will understand the policies (p. 283).  Goel and Smith operationalize 
clarity by grading policy statements using the Flesch Reading Ease Score (FRES) and 
Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level (FGL).  The researchers operationalize brevity as a function of 
the total number of non-stop words (ex: in, and, the) divided by the number of unique 
words. 
H10: As the governance structure of a university becomes more formal, then the 
likelihood increases that clarity of the policy is more appropriate to the 
comprehension skills of the university’s student population. 
3.4 Summary 
The research model and the hypotheses address the need identified by 
Orlikowski and Barley (2001, 153) to: “understand how institutions influence the design, 
use, and consequences of technologies, either within or across organizations”.  The 
hypotheses (Table 3-6) explore different facets of the research question, “How does 
policy structure relate to differences in policy governance?”  
The first section of this chapter connected prior research using document 




conceptualization of policy structure is treated by both approaches. The next section 
explained how varying organizational conditions, particularly the concepts of Top 
Management Support and Collaboration, are expected to be manifested by the various 
types of rules within those structures.  Finally, I discussed several hypotheses describing 
the relationship of essential elements of policy structure and the structure of 
governance.  
Table 3-6 Study Hypotheses 
Hypothesis Component 
Tested 
H1: The structure of a policy governance process will be reflected in the formality of 
the policy structure created by that process.   
Governance 
Structure 
H2: If an organization possesses a meta-policy then the likelihood that that 
organization observes most if not all of the processes identified in the Knapp model is 
greater than an organization without a meta-policy 
Governance 
Structure 
H3: An effective formal governance structure presents a full complement of 
components and Knapp processes to be effective.   
Governance 
Structure -  
H4a: Governance structure will resemble the ideal Knapp model as the number of 
principals identified in 1st order boundary rules increase 
TMS 
H4b: High TMS is likely accompanied by compulsory Boundary rules requiring the 
participation of a number of principals of the organization 
TMS 
H4c: If there are no compulsory boundary rules, then the likelihood that a techno-
centric governance process increases.  TMS will be “lower” than in organizations with 
compulsory boundary rules. 
TMS 
H5a: The presence of Open Boundary Rules setting the criteria for participation in 
making security policy reflects an organizational condition that values collaboration. 
Collaboration 
H5b: The absence of an invitation boundary rule specifying participation of university 
leadership will increase the likelihood of a governance structure that is largely ad hoc 
in nature. 
Collaboration 
H5c: The presence of symmetric Aggregation rules along with Open Boundary rules 
reflects existence of a collaborative culture and the governance structure is more 
likely to resemble a completed Knapp model. 
Collaboration 
H5d:  The presence of information rules requiring the exchange of information 
among actors indicates the existence of a collaborative culture and indicates a 
stronger governance structure when compared to cases without such rules. 
Collaboration 
H6: If Scope rules limit actions of sub-units to modify policies, the governance 
structure is likely to resemble a Knapp model. 
Autonomy 
H7: As an organization’s governance structure declines from Formal to Ad Hoc, then 
it is less likely to present a coherent set of standards, procedures, guidelines and 
policies appropriate for effective policy. 
Policy Structure - 
Components 
H8: The likelihood of coverage of USG issues will correlate with the relative strength 
of top management support for securing cyber assets 
Policy Structure - 
Scope 
H9: Acceptable Use Policies will vary in “fit” as the governance structure varies.  A 
Formal structure will provide greater evidence of fit, measured in terms of specific 
assignments and positions referencing that particular organization 
Policy Structure - 
Fit 
H10: As the governance structure of a university becomes more formal, then the 
likelihood increases that clarity of the policy is more appropriate to the 
comprehension skills of the university’s student population. 
Policy Structure -
Form 
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Chapter 4– Research Design 
 
This chapter discusses the research design, case selection, data collection and 
data analysis under taken to answer the research question.  A review of the logic model 
provides a visual map to help the reader see the relationship between the design and 
the research objectives.  The research design employs a non-experimental multiple-case 
study.  The case is the unit of analysis and the cases selected are four research 
universities.  I walk through the case selection logic and discuss the data to be collected 
and the process employed to manage the collection.  Much of the data collected must 
be broken down into statements so that both governance and policy structure may be 
understood.  These statements are classified as units of observation that are aggregated 
to understand behaviors of the individual cases.  The Data analysis procedures describe 
the methods for examining documents and interviews identifying institutional 
statements as units of observation.  Procedures for interpreting the data are discussed 
also.  The chapter concludes with a discussion on limitations of the design. 
4.1 Review of Logic Model 
The research design must facilitate the objectives of my research: 
• Determine how does the structure of cybersecurity policy relates to differences 
in structure of policy governance of universities and colleges; 
• Understand the relationships between policy processes (governance) and the 
outcomes (policy content, form, structure, effectiveness); 
• Demonstrate utility of IAD framework and tools to discover governance 




• Provide pragmatic suggestions for practitioners to create more effective policy to 
secure university cyber space. 
The logic model I employ is derived from research agendas found in the fields of 
information security, organization theory, and institutional design.  The theoretical 
frame serves as a foundation for the design (Figure 4-1).  Information security research 
finds that effective security is a function of effective policy and policy management.  
Policy and management are regulated by the policy governance structure of the 
organization.  The frame suggests that the key to creating effective policy is found 
within the governance of the policy process. 
 
Figure 4-1 Theoretical Frame 
 
Chapter 2 provides the background for selecting the IAD framework to create the 
basic research model (Figure 4-2).  The model shows three levels of action that lead to 
security outcomes.  My research objectives require an understanding of all three – the 
constitutional level as defined by the Board of Regents and legislative bodies; the 




and the operational level where policy is implemented.  The model acknowledges the 
influence of both organizational and external factors. 
 
 
The Knapp model is a map of processes and factors that are necessary to create 
an effective security governance structure (Figure 4-3).  The map is created from 
research that combined relevant findings of theoretical research with data captured 
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 Each of the processes within the model represents an action situation where 
actors work within the procedures of each organization to create defined outcomes 
such as assessments of risk, new or revised policies, approvals, training, etc.  Those 
situations are mapped to either the collective or operational level of analysis as defined 
by the IAD framework.   
The framework provides a logic model to analyze the structure of an action 
situation (Figure 4-4).  The structure of each of those action situations is defined by the 
actors and institutions employed by each case to create the outcome.  The analyst can 
nest the structures of Knapp situations to define the structure in policy governance 
among organizations and, also, identify differences or variations of policy governance 
structure across the cases. The same approach can be employed to analyze, nest, and 
discern the structures, and variations among structures, of the operational level 
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An institutional grammar categorizes the institutional statements by the 
structural elements found within an action situation (E. Ostrom and Crawford 2005b).  
The configuration of such elements suggests a method similar to genotyping can be 
used to trace structure back to higher level (i.e. organizational) traits and institutions (E. 
Ostrom and Basurto 2011).   
The logic model provides a means of identifying the structure of the action 
situations; nesting those situations to analyze the structure of governance and 
operations; and to connect theoretical and pragmatic concepts from relevant fields of 
research.  The research design will explain how I exercise the model to compare the 
structure policy governance and the structure of cybersecurity policy among the 
selected cases.   
4.2 Research Design – Multiple Case Study 
A research design represents the plan for connecting the data and the analysis of 
that data to the research question (Yin 2009).  The research design designates the 
means to gather data, test hypotheses and present results (Hoover and Donovan 2007).   
In addition, the design offers acknowledgements of, and controls for, study limitations 
and biases known to the investigator.  The research design for this study is a non-
experimental, multiple-case study.  A case study method is optimal when a “’how’ or 
‘why’ question is being asked about a contemporary set of events over which the 
investigator has little or no control” (Yin 2009, 13).   
The research question asks “how does policy structure relate to differences in 




University System of Georgia campuses.  The case study method has been used to test, 
extend, and generate theory (K. M. Eisenhardt 1989; K. M. Eisenhardt 1991; Miles and 
Huberman 1994; Yin 2003; Yin 2009).  Case studies are commonly used for research of 
information security (Bakari, Tarimo, Yngstrom, Magnusson, & Kowalski, 2007; Bakari et 
al., 2007; Flechais & Sasse, 2009; Hassebroek, 2007; Hu, Hart, & Cooke, 2007; Iachello & 
Abowd, 2008) and is an appropriate approach to research where context is an important 
factor (K. M. Eisenhardt 1989).  Case study designs are appropriate for the study of 
phenomenon involving information technology given the complex interactions among 
humans, organizations and technology (Dubé and Paré 2003).  The approach forces a 
strategy of reliance on data convergence (e.g. triangulation) that benefits from prior 
theory to guide data collection and analysis (Yin 2009, 18).   
Multiple cases permit the analyst an opportunity to “strengthen the precision, 
validity and stability of the findings” (Miles and Huberman 1994, 24).  Multiple cases are 
“… discrete experiments that serve as replications, contrasts and extensions to the 
emerging theory” (EISENHARDT & GRAEBNER, 2007 citing Yin 1994, p. 25).   
A replication logic design is not uncommon for multiple case studies (Yin 2009).  
Replication logic is comparable to experimental research designs (K. M. Eisenhardt 1989, 
537).  Literal replication involves study of cases thought to produce similar results.  Prior 
research suggests that organizations of similar size, mission, and culture that 
demonstrate similar levels of top management support should adopt similar governance 
and policy solutions for securing cyber space.  Theoretical replication involves studying 




organizations with different cultures and varying degrees of top management support 
will approach the problem of cyber security differently.  Selecting groups of cases using 
both literal and theoretical replication logic can provide a richer explanation of the 
phenomenon under study by providing the analyst with rich data to observe contrasting 
effects of the same variables in different contexts (Yin, 2009 pp. 54-46). 
4.3 Case selection 
Resource constraints make sampling a pragmatic strategy of many studies, 
including this one (Dubé and Paré 2003, 609).  An analyst must construct the sampling 
frame for a multiple-case study carefully using the research questions and model (i.e. 
conceptual framework) as a guide.   
The research model contains a number of concepts, such as business objectives, 
culture, and internal threats that theory regards as antecedents to policy outcomes.  
Context also includes the actors, the organization, the culture and interactions among 
those concepts (Fendt and Sachs 2008).  Context is important to understand the 
outcomes of decisions made within the action arena (E. Ostrom and Hess 2007).  Holistic 
research efforts are characteristic of case studies and “suit well our need to understand 
the complex and ubiquitous interactions among organizations, technology, and people 
(Dubé and Paré 2003)”.  The contextual data encompasses the material conditions of 
each organization, the culture and structure of each organization that defines the 
community under observation, along with the institutions (rules, norms and standards) 




4.3.1 Case Selection Criteria 
A study of college administration found that as colleges and universities 
decrease in size, the likelihood that an administration would be bureaucratic (formal, 
centralized power) increased (Blau 1994).  Research also suggests colleges and 
professional schools at research universities are more likely to demonstrate 
independence” from the central office (Blau 1994, 270).  This study employs three basic 
criteria to choose individual units of the USG as cases: the Carnegie Classification, size17, 
and rate of compliance with USG requirements.     
The Carnegie Classification framework classifies organizations of higher 
education into categories that control for institutional differences18. Using the Carnegie 
Classification provides researchers with a means of categorizing cases to control for 
“extraneous variation and … defines the limits for generalizing the findings” (K. M. 
                                                     
17 measured by the number of students registered for spring semester 2012 taken from the Spring 2012 
Semester Enrollment Rpt - USG 
http://www.usg.edu/research/documents/enrollment_reports/spr2012.pdf last accessed 1 June 2012.  
Size, as defined here, is more precise than the size defined by Carnegie, allowing differentiation among 
USG units within basic Carnegie Classes such as AA, BA, and MA. 
 
18 Derived from empirical data on colleges and universities, the Carnegie Classification was originally 
published in 1973, and subsequently updated in 1976, 1987, 1994, 2000, 2005, and 2010 to reflect changes 
among colleges and universities. This framework has been widely used in the study of higher education, 
both as a way to represent and control for institutional differences, and also in the design of research studies 
to ensure adequate representation of sampled institutions, students, or faculty.  
To ensure continuity of the classification framework and to allow comparison across years, the 2010 
Classification update retains the same structure of six parallel classifications, initially adopted in 2005. 
They are as follows: Basic Classification (the traditional Carnegie Classification Framework), 
Undergraduate and Graduate Instructional Program classifications, Enrollment Profile and Undergraduate 
Profile classifications, and Size & Setting classification. These classifications provide different lenses 
through which to view U.S. colleges and universities, offering researchers greater analytic flexibility.  
These classifications were updated using the most recent national data available as of 2010, and 
collectively they depict the most current landscape of U.S. colleges and universities. (as found at 
http://classifications.carnegiefoundation.org/ last accessed 1 June 2012)  
The methodology for assignment of classifications is found at 




Eisenhardt 1989, 537) and allows for generalization of results to other organizations of 
higher education.  
Employing the highest Carnegie category level, USG units are grouped into 4 
areas – AA, BA, MA, and RU.  As the categories shift from AA towards PhD granting 
universities, the mission, size, and complexity of the organization changes significantly.  
Literal replication supports selection of cases within the same Carnegie class.  Within a 
class, I expect to find less different governance structures and policies than when 
comparing USG units across Carnegie classes as the factors describing context will be 
noticeably different.   
Size is “one of the main differentiating structural factors among institutions” and 
is one of the more important elements determining structure as discussed within 
organization theory (Kezar 2006, 92).  Structure, as we learned in chapter 2, determines 
how an organization governs itself. We expect processes to vary as organizational 
structure varies (Kezar 2006). 
Compliance, the final selection factor, is measured by identifying the policies 
published by each USG unit and aligning the policy areas with those defined by USG 
requirements.  Literal replication logic suggests an examination of units with similar 
compliance rates given similar missions should yield similar results.  Theoretical 
replication logic suggests that compliance is related to size (i.e. as size grows so do 




4.3.2 Case Selection: Data collected 
Data collection for determining the sample population focused on summary case 
data (Appendix A) and an inventory of documents describing the information security 
policies for each unit of the USG (Appendix B).  If not available on the web, documents 
were located by requesting them from the CIO’s office of the USG unit.  Protocols 
developed by Doherty et al, (2009; 2004; 2011) were adapted to create inventories of 
the policies by Policy Type and Coverage Area.  In addition, the identification of type and 
coverage area provided data to suggest the policy document met USG required policy 
coverage.    Every policy document found on a USG unit site received a unique id 
number, serialized, to serve as a reference throughout the database.   
4.3.3 Cases Selected 
The Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia has directed the USG 
CISO to: 
… maintain information security implementation guidelines that the USO, all USG 
institutions, and the GPLS should consider in the development of their individualized 
information security plans. Board of Regents Policy 11.3.219 
 
I compared the policies for each USG unit to the USG guidelines to determine 
compliance.  A summary of compliance to those requirements is shown in Table 4-1. 
  
                                                     
19 Found at http://www.usg.edu/policymanual/section11/policy/C430/#p11.3.1_general_policy last 





Table 4-1 USG Units Policy Compliance 
USG Policy Requirement 
# 
Compliant %  
AA 
(n=12) % AA 
BA 






(n=5) % RU  
USG Info Sec Policy Section 11  
(2011) 26 81% 8 67% 3 75% 10 91% 5 100% 
USG Password Authentication 
Policy 21 66% 4 33% 3 75% 9 82% 5 100% 
USG Appropriate Use Policy 32 100% 12 100% 4 100% 11 100% 5 100% 
USG Risk Management Policy 11 34% 2 17% 1 25% 4 36% 4 80% 
USG Data Handling and 
Storage Standard 23 72% 8 67% 3 75% 7 64% 5 100% 
USG Computer Security 
Incident Management Policy 13 41% 4 33% 3 75% 3 27% 3 60% 
Web Privacy Policy  14 44% 5 42% 1 25% 5 45% 3 60% 
USG - HIPAA Privacy and 
Security Policy 4 13% 1 8% 0 0% 0 0% 3 60% 
USG Continuity of Operations 
Plan 5 16% 1 8% 2 50% 1 9% 1 20% 
Use of Cryptography 4 13% 2 17% 1 25% 1 9% 0 0% 
Security and Awareness 
Program 4 13% 2 17% 1 25% 1 9% 0 0% 
Electronic Data Disposal 10 31% 2 17% 2 50% 4 36% 2 40% 
Copyright Violation Guidelines 14 44% 3 25% 4 100% 4 36% 3 60% 
Legend: AA – Associate Degree schools; BA – Bachelors; MA – Masters and some doctoral programs; RU – 
Research University 
 
The descriptive statistics (Table 4-2) for provides a quick picture of the variation 
in regards to population and policy compliance for each sector (BA to RU).   
 
Table 4-2 Descriptive Statistics for USG Units 
Sector 
 
n Avg Pop Stdev 
Avg  # 
Policies Stdev 
AS 12 5450 6070 4.5 2.4 
BA 4 5546 1513 7.6 3.1 
MA 11 8411 5302 5.4 2.3 





An examination of four of the Research Universities as a complete group20 
provides an opportunity to examine more established units with significant outside 
resources (research grants, private grants, etc.) that also demonstrate significantly 
different business objectives in their mission statements (Table 4-3).  The rate of 
compliance is the same for each of the four but the variation of size is a strong indicator 
of structural differences, and provides opportunity to examine more closely the effect of 
the different governance structures on policy structure.   
Table 4-3 Selected Cases 
  
 
4.4 Data Collection 
The study used three primary methods of data collection.  First, policy documents 
were located on USG unit web sites and downloaded to a local drive.  Second, a survey 
of individuals accountable for managing cyber security policy for each unit provided 
information regarding the internal influences of the cyber security action situation.  
Third, interviews provided data regarding policy processes, structures, and rules that 
                                                     
20 Georgia Health Sciences University was merged with Augusta State University and renamed Georgia 
Regents University during the time this study was conducted.  Given the dynamics of the merger and the 









University of GA (UGA) DR 8/13 33367 
Georgia State University (GSU) DR 8/13 30606 
Georgia Tech (GT) DR 8/13 19431 




governed those processes.  A triangulation of data collected by all three methods 
assisted in validating and clarifying the findings within the research model. 
4.4.1 Case Summary Data 
Descriptive data for each case was collected from three sources.  The USG 
provided data regarding mission, enrollment, and the url for the campus web site and 
campus information security pages.  Information regarding the current staffing for the 
positions of Chief Information Officer and Chief Information Security Officer was taken 
from the respective campus pages.  Carnegie classifications were obtained from the 
Carnegie Institute web pages.  The data dictionary for the case summary tables is found 
in Appendix D. 
4.4.2 Documents 
Documents were collected from each case.  Most documents were obtained 
from the case websites.  On occasion, the case contact supplied documents that could 
not be found otherwise.  Interviews provided information as to the source of the policy 
development methodologies employed by each case.  Those documents were sought 
from the appropriate standards organizations. Each document was processed according 
to the document protocol (Appendix C).  Meta-Data for each document was collected as 
found in the Document Summary (Appendix E). 
4.4.3 Surveys 
The golden rule for constructing survey questions is: “Ask what you want to 




(Knapp et al study (2007)) that identified the internal factors influencing the CSP action 
situation for each USG unit was adapted for the context of this study (Appendix F).  A 
small sample of potential respondents (n=6) responded to the instrument.  I interviewed 
the respondents (also testing questions for semi-structure interviews) to learn which 
survey questions were ambiguous or were unlikely to be answered21.  
I chose software manufactured by Qualtrics to manage the survey instrument.  I 
invited respondents by email to answer survey questions online.  Respondents clicked 
on a link generated by Qualtrics and inserted into the mail message.  Follow-up emails 
were generated to non-respondents a maximum of three times. 
The survey was sent to all IT professionals for each USG unit selected for study.  
The sampling strategy is valid for the following reasons.  First, surveying only IT 
professionals is consistent with the population chosen by the Knapp study upon which 
the research model of this study rests.  Second, technical solutions for security policy is 
the dominant strategy across all sectors (Gurpreet Dhillon and Backhouse 2001; M. 
Siponen, Pahnila, and Mahmood 2010; Mikko Siponen and Iivari 2006), including higher 
education (Baskerville and Siponen 2002; Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, and Benbasat 2010).  
Third, the level of analysis for this study is the collective action level.  The actors at the 
collective action level that develop and implement security policy are information 
technology personnel.  Surveying the actors of the action situation under analysis is an 
efficient means of understanding the institutions that govern that action situation. 
                                                     
21 Recall the intrusive nature of security surveys and interviews are a concern for researchers (Fulford and 





In order to understand the outcomes, a researcher must “discover the rules 
being used” (E. Ostrom 2008a).  Interviews of individuals responsible for managing the 
cyber security policy process provided details regarding the structure of the action 
situation, the CSP rules, and the actors that heavily influenced the process.  A semi-
structured interview protocol was developed (Appendix G).   The survey instrument 
helped identify either exogenous factors or other institutional statements as a means of 
identifying reasons for variance.  I tailored Interview questions if the case survey 
responses and policies required clarification. 
4.4.5 Field Notes 
Field notes provide “a running commentary” of the research process and provide 
a means of overlapping data analysis with data collection (K. M. Eisenhardt 1989).  
Overlapping the two activities provides a head start on analysis and can provide a 
quicker reaction to the need to adjust data collection efforts due to insights from the 
field research (p. 539).  Field notes were captured within a word document for each 
month of the research effort.  I reviewed these notes for data relevant to each case 
prior to construction of the case study report. 
4.5 Data Management 
Yin stresses important principles that support a quality case study project.  First, 
the researcher should construct a case study database with a chain of evidence 




the conclusions drawn (Yin 2009, p. 98).  The data management plan for this project 
follows Yin’s principles.   
The researcher downloaded policy documents from the unit websites, if 
available, and placed within data folders identified with each USG unit studied.   If paper 
copies are provided, those are scanned and placed in digital folders.   
I recorded each interview, securing each digital file in secure locations.  An 
assistant transcribed the interviews using Microsoft Word.  Each document was tagged 
to identify the USG unit and personnel interviewed. 
 Each document received a unique document number and tracked in a database 
developed for the project.  The analyst links institutional statements to the document 
using the document number.  Data is backed up regularly using Dropbox™ for automatic 
backups and thumb drives for offsite, weekly backups.  
 The analyst maintained a daily resource journal that served as a means of 
recording context, maintaining a diary of actions and notes regarding analysis, and field 
notes that can be used to reconstruct events if needed. 
 I collected, stored, and analyzed data using a number of tools.  Each tool 
generated its own files that were included in the daily backup rituals.  Much of the data 
collected was kept in a relational database managed by Microsoft Access.  Access 
provides tools that document the database, its structures, and the procedures written 
to manipulate data and create tables for analyses.  I integrated simple tables created by 





4.6 Data Analysis 
Analysis of the survey data required the fewest steps as I was not attempting to 
infer or derive data using statistical models. Interview analysis identified information 
that added to a process description or provided institutional statements that further 
specified the structure of each Knapp process.  I was able to process the interview data 
in the same manner as the document data once this reduction was achieved. 
Processing the documents was a time-consuming and tedious affair.  The heart 
of the analysis lay in the “parsing” of the documents into the individual units of 
observation.  Those observations were then parsed into the grammar components 
identified by the Institutional Grammar Tool.  Additional coding tagged each observation 
with an appropriate identification for policy components, Knapp action situation, actor 
categories, and other variables of interest. 
This section of the chapter provides detail for each of the procedures used to 
organize, analyze, and interpret the data.  First, I will discuss the distinction between 
“units of observation” and “units of analysis”. 
4.6.1 Units of Analysis 
The concept, unit of analysis, refers to “the entities under study and to the level 
at which data are analyzed and generalizations made” (Singleton, 1999 cited by Basurto 
et al., 2010).  The research question determines the unit(s) of analysis (Yin 2009).  The 
case, the university, is the unit of analysis.  This study examines and compares the 




understand how differences in the governance structure may explain differences in the 
policies created by the respective cases.  
The structure of policy governance and policy is operationalized as a 
configuration of actors and institutions that regulate the decisions and behaviors of 
those actors.  Much of the analysis will be spent on the sentences found in policy 
documents and interview transcripts that represent the institutional elements critical to 
defining and understanding structure.  Each of these statements are treated as a ‘unit of 
observation’.  The concept refers to data aggregated to draw conclusions about the unit 
of analysis (Basurto et al. 2010b, 537).  The institutional statements to be analyzed are 
contained in one or more policy documents that, in aggregate, create the policy and 
governance structures of the cases under study.  The aggregation of the institutional 
statements provides a more granular, and perhaps more precise, means to analyzing the 
outcomes of the policy and governance processes of interest (Basurto et al. 2010b, 524).    
Two methods are described that aggregate institutional statements into units of 
analysis.  Nested analysis allows the analyst to aggregate multiple statements by sorting 
those statements by shared grammar components such as a common attribute, aIm,  or 
aIm topic (Basurto et al. 2010b).  The logic used to link the observations must be 
justified by the researcher (Basurto et al. 2010b, 528).    
The second method examines the statements as “rule configurations” (E. Ostrom 
and Basurto 2011).  Rule configurations represent the network of institutional 
statements that govern an action situation.  These statements are categorized into 




4-4).  Within the rule types, an analyst may identify topics, goals, and other criteria that 
categorize the statements within the rule type.  The matrices that are produced by this 
method provide a means to observe the evolution of institutional configurations across 
time, organization, economic sector, and other constructs22.  This study employs rules 
both nesting and rules configurations in its analysis. 
 






Position Positions Title of position; Number of actors in a position; quorum level; 
Boundary Participants 
(Actors) 
Define (1) who is eligible to enter a position, (2) the process that 
determines which participants may/must enter positions, and (3) how 
a participant may/must leave.  Some rules may spell out eligibility for 
participants 
Choice Actions what an actor must, must not, may, may not do based upon Conditions 
at the time of decision - Choice rules affect the total power created in 
an action situation 
Choice rules determine the decision tree linking actions to outcomes 
Aggregation Control whether one individual decides, or votes of several aggregate to decide 
Determines the level of control an actor given a position may exercise 
over the selection of an action 
Information Information Affects level of information available to participants; limits topics to be 
considered; frequency and accuracy of communication, legitimate 
channels of communication, language 
Payoff Costs/Benefits Assigns external payoff/sanctions to particular actions 
Creates incentives and deterrents for action 
Scope Outcomes Defines the range of acceptable outcomes permitted. 
Also limits actions linked to the outcomes. 
Source: Adapted from Crawford and Ostrom (2005, 191) and Ostrom (2011) 
 
During the early analysis of the cases, I found that each case relied upon a policy 
design methodology that was distinct from the other cases.  These design 
methodologies included the AGILE software development methodology, ISO 27002 
Security Standards, and a policy model developed by the Association of College and 
                                                     




University Administrators (ACUPA). I acquired documentation that outline the process 
for each methodology and processed those documents in the same manner as the 
policy documents acquired from each case.  The institutional statements identified in 
those policy design standards were included as meta-policy statements for each case.   
The design methodologies are complimentary to the Knapp model while 
providing more details as to specific tasks or steps the organization included as part of 
the policy process.  The discrete steps become the “rows” of the matrix used to present 
the rule configurations (“columns”) for each step.  The entire matrix describes the rules 
structure for the governance processes used to develop, implement, and review policy 
for each case. 
4.6.2 Data Coding 
Once collected, the key variables for the study were coded.  Responses to 
surveys did not require coding, but did serve as clues for matters to explore more 
deeply within the case interviews.  The interpretation of the data collected from 
documents and interviews into key variables consumed most of the effort. 
4.6.2.1 Surveys 
The survey received a total of 3 responses from the case campuses. The 
response rate, while not surprising, was disappointing.  Security officers are known to be 
reticent to reply to surveys (Knapp et al. 2007; Kolkowska and Dhillon 2013; M. T. 






Interviews were conducted in person and via telephone following the protocol 
developed (Appendix G).  I obtained signed, voluntary consent, from each of the 
interviewees.  The interviews were recorded with the permission of the participants.  A 
total of 4 interviews were conducted with 8 persons participating.  The interviews were 
conducted by case (Table 4-5). 
 
Table 4-5 Interviews Conducted 
Case Participants (Titles) Length Dates 
Georgia State 1 
CISO 
53 mins 23 Mar 2012 
Georgia Tech 3 
CISO; Compliance 
Manager; 
Dir. Of Compliance, Office 
of Enterprise Risk 
45 mins 22 Mar 2012 
UGA 1 
CISO 
50 mins 23 Mar 2012 
Georgia Southern 2 
CIO, CISO 
50 mins 13 Apr 2012 
 
 The transcribed interview was edited into an annotated version of the interview 
with a focus on extracting statements relevant to the categories of actions and rules 
that the research model suggested.  This version of the interview was processed in the 
same manner as other documents so that institutional statements could be identified, 
coded, and categorized by the process where those statements were employed. 
4.6.2.3 Documents 
Most of the documents analyzed were policy documents obtained from the 
cases.  Other documents include the annotated interviews and significant external 




referenced by the cases in two ways.  Most were referenced within the information 
security documents obtained.  The remainder were identified through the interviews as 
a set of institutions integrated into the case’s policy process. 
The meta-data for each document was captured as part of the inventory process 
discussed in the document protocol (Appendix C).  The entire set of documents (policy, 
interview, external policies) were complete, each document was dissected, employing 
methods developed as part of the Institutional Grammar Tool (IGT), to capture the 
institutional statements that are the units of observation for this study. 
Institutional Grammar Analysis 
Much research has focused on how policy should be structured while very little 
work has been done with regards to the content of policy (Baskerville & Siponen, 2002; 
Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001; N. Doherty, Anastasakis, & Fulford, 2009).  Policy content 
provides observable data that can measure differences between “policy as 
implemented” against “policy as mandated or suggested”.  Document analysis of 
published policies provides an inventory of formal rules, norms and standards.  
Interviews of actors engaged in the respective action situations provide an additional 
source of rules, formal and informal, relevant to the policy process.  The deconstruction 
of these statements into their respective types (norms, strategies, and rules) and 
elements provides a granular level of data from which an analyst may observe the 
effects of governing institutions upon policy outcomes.   
A clear categorization of the components of policy or institutional statements is 




identify institutional statements; (2) code institutional statements; and (3) conduct a 
nested analysis of institutional statements (Basurto et al. 2010b, 524).  The IGT reveals 
the actions permitted; the objects of the actions; the conditions for those actions; and 
the sanctions/incentives.  Applied to analysis of policy documents, IGT gives the analyst 
a more robust and rigorous understanding of both scope and structure of policy.  The 
IGT enables analysts to investigate: 
1) The effects of configurations of institutional statements; 
2) The consistency and completeness of institutional statements; 
3) Legitimacy and compliance of institutional statements (Crawford and Ostrom 
1995, 595). 
 
 Crawford and Ostrom define the grammar of institutional statements as a syntax 
expressed in a format called ADICO: Atrributes, Denotic, aIm, Conditions, Or else (1995, 
584).  An institutional statement is composed of: 
Attributes : a variable which identifies the actor, or position, to whom the 
statement applies. 
Deontic : a variable which contains the modal verb defining what may be 
permitted, required, or forbidden. 
aIm: variable describing the actions or outcomes to which the deontic is 
assigned.  The action or outcome must be physically possible.  The negation of 
the action or outcome must be possible as well. 
Conditions : a variable defining when, where, how and to what extent the aIm is 
allowed per the Deontic 
Or else : a variable defining the sanctions to be imposed for not following the 
rule. 
 
Siddiki and others suggest a sixth component of the syntax, the oBject, is needed 




(2011, 87).  The oBject provides clarification as to the intended receivers of policy 
actions.  Mapping the intended policy action to a specific recipient provides a measure 
of policy clarity used to test policy effectiveness.   
Basurto and others found that the definition of the Attribute supplied by 
Crawford and Ostrom (1995) is ambiguous.  The statement AIM has both an actor 
creating the action and an actor receiving the action causing confusion as to which actor 
is the focal actor (Basurto et al. 2010b, 525).  Siddiki and others argue that the concept 
of oBject distinguishes between the actor responsible for the action and the actor 
receiving the action.  Statements that do not explicitly name the Attribute often identify 
the oBject.  Context then determines the Attribute.   
Knowing to whom the responsibility for executing an action is given improves 
the specificity of our mapping of institutions, interactions, and actors.  Such specificity 
enhances the explanatory power of the Knapp model, and provides a firm foundation 
for future research questions that focus on actors, their qualifications, their networks, 
and their positions of influence within organizations.  For this purpose, I categorized the 
Attributes of policy to identify Top Management, Individuals, Vendors, and the 
Organization as primary actors. 
IGT Analysis of Cyber Security Policy Documents 
A number of recent studies employ the grammar tool as a method for reliable data 
collection and analysis (Carter et al. 2013; S. N. Siddiki 2013; Feiock et al. 2014). One 
study (Basurto et al. 2010b) has proposed guidelines to: 
1. Identify institutional statements; 




3. Conduct a nested analysis of the coded institutional statements 
 
The protocol for coding the statements observed in the documents is found in 
Appendix H.  Every statement within the document is assigned a sequential number 
identifier.  The statements were broken into their grammatical ADICO components.  
Once those components were separated, the observed statement was coded for the 
following variables: 
Table 4-6 Statement Variables 
Variable Description 
Category (of Attribute) 
 
Is the actor 
Organization, Top Management, Individual, Vendor 
Deontic Class Is the action Required, Permitted, Forbidden 
ACUPA Statement assigned to what step within the ACUPA 
methodology. 
ADICOB2 sequence What ADICO elements are present 
Policy type Is statement part of a  
Meta-policy, Policy, Standard, Procedure, Guideline, or ancillary 
Statement Type Is the statement a Strategy, Norm, Rule, Definition, External 
Policy reference, Objective Definition, Outline indicator 
Rule Type Following the definitions found in Table , is the statement a rule 
that belongs in the category of: Aggregation, Boundary, Choice, 
Information, Payoff, Scope 
Governance Action 
Situation 
The statement applies to which Knapp process? 
CyberSec Action The statement applies to which USG required policy area? 
 
4.6.3 Nested Analysis 
Policy documents represent a collection, or aggregation, of institutional 
statements.  It is the aggregate nature of those statements that creates the decision-
making situation that governs individual and collective behaviors.  Nesting those 




4.6.3.1 Nested analysis of the coded institutional statements 
The method proposed to identify variations in policy governance requires a 
means of cataloguing and measuring the combination of institutional statements and 
the interactions of those statements with actors as structures that define action 
situations identified by Knapp as requisite for create effective security policy.  One 
research paper employed a method to “nest” institutional statements in order to 
“…help understand the constraints and opportunities of individuals in a particular action 
arena” (Basurto et al. 2010b, 524).   
The Knapp Action Situations (Table 4-7) represent the various processes 
identified by practice and theory as necessary for an organization to create effective 
information security policies.  Organizing these statements within those defined 





Table 4-7 Nested Analysis - Example 
Action 
Situation 
Rule Type Section Level cstate 
Review Boundary 1. Issue Identification & Scope 
Definition 
identify [I] Policy issues [B] [at all times] [C] [Obs: 336 , 3 
] 
Development Boundary 1. Issue Identification & Scope 
Definition 
identify [I] Policy issues [B] [at all times] [C] [Obs: 336 , 3 
] 
Review Choice 1. Issue Identification & Scope 
Definition 
determine [I] who is or should be affected by policy issue 
[B] [at all times] [C] [Obs: 336 , 4 ] 
Development Choice 1. Issue Identification & Scope 
Definition 
determine [I] who is or should be affected by policy issue 
[B] [at all times] [C] [Obs: 336 , 4 ] 
Review Choice 1. Issue Identification & Scope 
Definition 
define [I] scope of the issue [B] [at all times] [C] [Obs: 
336 , 5 ] 
Development Choice 1. Issue Identification & Scope 
Definition 
define [I] scope of the issue [B] [at all times] [C] [Obs: 
336 , 5 ] 
Review Choice 1. Issue Identification & Scope 
Definition 
determine [I] existence of policy [B] if policy exists [C] 
[Obs: 336 , 6 ] 
Development Choice 1. Issue Identification & Scope 
Definition 
determine [I] existence of policy [B] if policy exists [C] 
[Obs: 336 , 6 ] 
Development Boundary 1. Issue Identification & Scope 
Definition 
assign [I] focal points [Officers of Primary Responsibility 
(OPR) and Officers of Coordinating Responsibility (OCR)] 
[B] [at all times] [C] [Obs: 336 , 8 ] 
Development Choice 1. Issue Identification & Scope 
Definition 
assign [I] focal points [Officers of Primary Responsibility 
(OPR) and Officers of Coordinating Responsibility (OCR)] 
[B] [at all times] [C] [Obs: 336 , 8 ] 
Development Boundary 1. Issue Identification & Scope 
Definition 
assign [I] Focal Points - Officers of coordinating 
Responsibility (OPR) Most of the time this will be the IT 
Director [B] [at all times] [C] [Obs: 336 , 9 ] 
Development Choice 1. Issue Identification & Scope 
Definition 
assign [I] Focal Points - Officers of coordinating 
Responsibility (OPR) Most of the time this will be the IT 
Director [B] [at all times] [C] [Obs: 336 , 9 ] 
Development Information 1. Issue Identification & Scope 
Definition 
deliver [I] Memoranda [B] regarding Statement of Policy 
Need [C] [Obs: 336 , 10 ] 
Key: A – Attribute, I – AIM, C – Condition, B – oBject.  Observation – Doc ID, Unit of Observation 
4.6.3.2 Analyzing Action Situation Structure with IGT  
The nesting analysis method, described by Basurto and others (2010), suggests 
that one means of testing for complementary values and structures within and among 
institutions is to compare the goal (or aim) of the institutional statements.  The Knapp 
model conceptualizes structure as a set of processes, individually defined, whose 
outcomes and outputs create interaction among the institutions and actors within each 
process.  That interaction is the linkage that creates a structure for policy.   
Ostrom and Basurto (2011) describe a process of identifying configurations of 
rule types to define action situation structures.  The authors inventoried rules from 




matrix), one can categorize them as focused on the use of the objects of Land (B1), 
Shares (B2), and Membership (B3) to define entry and exit to the action situation.  
Those sub-types are measured by strength of the deontic (S, N, R).  The resulting 
observations (Figure 4-5) are assembled, for their purposes, in a matrix where each row 
symbolizes a point of time and the rule type observations symbolizing the rule 
configurations at that time (E. Ostrom and Basurto 2011, 328).   
 
 
Figure 4-5 Configuration Inventory (Ostrom and Basurto 2011, 328) 
 
Two particular types of policies are: a) meta-policies that govern information 
security policymaking and b) acceptable use policies that govern the behavior of 
individuals and organizational.  A nested analysis of institutional arrangements yields a 
matrix that highlights the rule structure as shown in Table 4-8.  This table shows the 
most granular configuration of rule types within each of the governance action 













Aggregation Boundary Choice Information Position Scope 
Policy Awareness 
and Training 
N 4    2  2 
Policy 
Development 
N 10 1  3 2  4 
Policy 
Enforcement 
N 2   2    
Policy 
Implementation 
N 5   4  1  
Policy Review N 9   2 3  4 
 
Rules from the USG are combined with the institutional statements of the USG 
unit that represent the policy component described as meta-policy.  This creates the 
unique set of rules that govern policy making for that unit.  A matrix such as Table 4-8 
will vary according to the differences in unit statements added at the time of analysis. 
A comparison of a policy type (such as Acceptable Use) across multiple organizations is 
shown in Table 4-9.  The table allows us to see rule configurations vary within Knapp 
action situations across multiple organizations.  From this level of analysis, we can 
identify opportunities to explore further detail as directed by the hypotheses.   























































N 2    2    
 Development GT N 3 2   1    
 Development GT N 3   1    2 
 Development USG N 15   7    8 
 Development USG R 2     1  1 
 Enforcement Ga 
Southern 
N 18  2 5 6 5   
 Enforcement Ga 
Southern 
R 1     1   
 Enforcement GT R 1     1   




4.7 Interpreting Data 
Given the eccentricities of the IAD framework and the tools of analysis 
employed, the ability to discern the forest from the trees is an important obligation for 
which the analyst is responsible.  At the end of the day, what does all this data mean? 
The governance structure is defined by the actors and the rules assigned to each 
process designed to create, retire, and modify policy in alignment with organizational 
goals.  Policy structure may be defined as the relationships between the objectives of 
policy and the policy elements available to achieve those objectives.  Analysis of the 
date examines the components of policy, such as guidelines, standards and procedures, 
that are written to delineate responsibilities and actions needed to affect outcomes.  
The scope of issues addressed by the policy can be identified to understand what areas 
of concern are covered by policy.  The form of language used to communicate policy 
indicates to whom and for whom the policy is written to be understood.  And the fit of 
that policy relative to the organizational structure and culture carries implications as to 
whether the policy serves the organization practically.  Taken together, these elements 
provide metrics of structure that correlate with the likelihood of policy effectiveness.     
4.7.1 Governance Structure 
The measure of governance structure is operationalized by identifying actors and 
institutions within the Knapp action situations.  A simple crosstab of statements sorted 
by action situation and Attribute Category shows the distribution of actors 




identified as “meta-policy” statements, those that are the rules guiding how policy is 
made, are the focus of this analysis.  The main features of the governance structure are 
presented by counts that indicate which institution types are distributed across the 
action situations of interest. An example is found in table 4-10. 
 
Table 4-10  Sample Analysis of Structure - Actors within Action Situations 
Action Situation  Organization Top Mgt Row Total 
Approval             4              3              7   
                                 0.1            0.2                  
                                57.1%          42.9%           9.2%  
                                 8.0%          11.5%                 
                                 5.3%           3.9%                 
----------------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- 
Awareness and 
Training  
           4              4              8   
                                 0.3            0.6                  
                                50.0%          50.0%          10.5%  
                                 8.0%          15.4%                 
                                 5.3%           5.3%                 
Development            25             17             42   
                                 0.3            0.5                  
                                59.5%          40.5%          55.3%  
                                50.0%          65.4%                 
                                32.9%          22.4%                 
Implementation             4              0              4   
                                 0.7            1.4                  
                               100.0%           0.0%           5.3%  
                                 8.0%           0.0%                 
                                 5.3%           0.0%                 
Review             7              2              9   
                                 0.2            0.4                  
                                77.8%          22.2%          11.8%  
                                14.0%           7.7%                 
                                 9.2%           2.6%                 
Risk Assessment             6              0              6   
                                 1.1            2.1                  
                               100.0%           0.0%           7.9%  
                                12.0%           0.0%                 
                                 7.9%           0.0%                 
----------------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- 
Column Total            50             26             76   





The precision of analysis may be increased by “drilling down” into the detail.  
Understanding the policy making processes using the ACUPA methodology give the 
analyst an opportunity to look at more discrete action situations located within a Knapp 
process.  For example, eight of the nine boundary rules that determine entry to action 
situations are employed to formally identify who may be appointed to the team (Table 
4-11).   





























































1 0 1 1 0 0 0 3 
  2.02 Determine 
Path (Policy 
Plan – Scope 
Definition) 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
  2.03 Assemble 
Team 
0 8 0 0 0 0 0 8 
  2.04 Gather Data 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  2.06 Determine 
Risks 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  2.07 Determine 
Stakeholders 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 




0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 
  2.09 Determine if 
present policy 
can be revised 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
  2.1 Determine 
need for new 
policy 
0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 
 
Normalization of the organizational positions referenced by institutional 
statements provides clarity as to which actors participate across the case organizations.  




required, or not, to participate, in the policy making structure.  The specificity of how 
those actors may be compelled to participate is provided by the quality of the boundary 
rules identified for each case.  A 1st order boundary rule is one that specifically requires 
participation of a particular actor.  A 2nd order rule, an invitation, is one that makes 
participation one that is at the will of the actor and not necessarily a decision that is 
institutionalized.   
 
Table 4-12 Actors and the Boundary Rule Types 
Actor Georgia Tech 
President 1st Order – USG 
CIO 1st Order 
CISO 1st Order 
Legal Affairs 1st Order 
Internal Audit 1st Order 
Faculty and Research Invite CISO/CIO 
Bursar Invite CISO/CIO 
Extended Campuses Invite CISO/CIO 
Finance 1st Order 
Human Resources 1st Order 
Public Affairs  
IT – Policy 
Compliance 
1st Order 
Registrar 1st Order 







Stakeholders Invite CISO 
Others Invite CISO 
 
A determination of the relative formality of the governance structure is made 





Table 4-13 Criteria for Determining Type of Governance Structure 











Approval Actions required to approve policy; to operationalize 
the policy 
W W P 
Developmen
t 
Activities include issue identification, definition of 
scope, research and analysis and stakeholder input 
W P P 
Retirement Removal of policy from active service N W P 
Review Management review of policy performance, alignment 
with business objectives, and effectiveness given other 
emerging technologies and security issues 
N W P 
Risk 
Assessment 
Identification of organizational values, policies that 
may be compromised if certain behaviors are allowed 
to occur 
N W P 
Legend: (P)resent; (W)eakly Present; (N)ot Present 
 
4.7.2 Policy Structure 
An analysis of the distribution of statements by the type of policy component 
represented by the statement, shows how documents may focus on management or 
individual users (Table 4-14).   









































Computer Usage and Security Policy  [ 343 ] 0 18 37 46 50 6 157 
Credit Card Processing  [ 348 ] 0 1 15 15 31 4 66 
Data Access Policy  [ 344 ] 0 0 18 8 10 2 38 
Information Security Exception Policy  [ 353 ] 2 0 1 0 2 18 23 
Interview with GT CISO  [ 476 ] 0 0 22 1 0 1 24 
Policy Exception Procedure  [ 359 ] 0 0 0 0 0 34 34 
Policy Review Process  [ 360 ] 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 





A cross-tab analysis examines the distribution of statements identified by 
components  (Table 4-15). 








































AGILE Software Development Principles  [ 473 ]   0   0   0   0   0  11  11 
Appropriate Use of Telecommunication Services 
Policy  [ 338 ] 
  1   0   0   5   1   1   8 
Compliance with the Higher Education Opportunity 
Act Peer-to-Peer File Sharing Requirements  [ 330 ] 
  0   0  22   6   4   0  32 
Data Stewardship and Classification  [ 325 ]   1   3  45  16  20   0  85 
Incident Response Procedures  [ 331 ]   0   3  17   4   4   0  28 
Information Technology Appropriate Use Policy  [ 
332 ] 
  0   1  24  51  31   3 110 
Interview Analysis - Table of Rules  [ 474 ]   0   0   0   0   0  10  10 
IT Policy Development & Review Process  [ 336 ]   0   0   4   2   0  45  51 
Protection and Security of Records Policy  [ 337 ]   0   0   2   1   2   0   5 
Workstation management policy  [ 341 ]   0   0   1   0   8   0   9 
Workstation Management Standard Procedures  [ 
342 ] 
  0   3  20  15   5   0  43 
Total Observations   2  10 135 100  75  70 392 
 
An organization’s policy structure, using Doherty’s taxonomy, is defined by the 
types of documents found within each policy area Table 4-16.   
 
Table 4-16 Criteria to Determine Policy Structure 
Criteria – Document Structure Ad Hoc Informal Formal 
General Info Sec policy present Yes Yes Yes 
Number of related documents present Yes Yes Yes 
Documents reference existing policies Maybe 
(few) 
Yes Yes 
Vertical links, few horizontal Few Yes Yes 
Policies and standards present – each 
focused on specific area 
Maybe Yes Yes 
Horizontal links present Maybe 
a few 
Yes Yes 
Meta policy present No Maybe Yes 
Criteria – Knapp Structure    
Awareness and Training -  Weak Yes Yes 
Implementation Few Yes Yes 
Monitoring None Maybe Yes 
Enforcement None Weak Yes 




4.7.3 Structure as Networks 
Graphing the relationships among the policy documents provides a visual 
confirmation of the decisions made regarding structure.  The stated purpose of each 
document, along with an analysis of the distribution of statements as policy 
components, classifies each document which is given a shape.  Connections are made by 
references between these documents.   
4.7.4 Case analysis  
The unit of analysis for this study is the case.  The case defines the context within 
which the policy statements analyzed are constructed.  Analysis of each case was a 
continual exercise. 
4.7.4.1 Early Analysis 
One of the strengths of qualitative research is the rich data the analyst is able to 
observe.  “Early analysis” is strongly suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994, 50) to 
energize field research, helping the analyst to “think about existing data and strategies 
for collecting new, often better, data”.  Working with the data from the early attempts 
to capture survey responses, interviews, and document analysis provided opportunities 
to identify improvements to the research protocol.  I noted improvements in the 
research journal and updated the protocol.  This necessitated multiple data collection 





4.7.4.2 Within Case Analysis – Case Reports 
Writing up the observations of a case is the typical first step of case analysis (K. 
M. Eisenhardt 1989, 540).  The case report helps the analyst to cope with the volumes of 
data that generally accompany case studies (Miles and Huberman 1994, 84).  The act of 
summarizing and analyzing the data for the case within a structured report is a process 
that enables the analyst to become intimate with the case, to identify patterns unique 
to each case and to develop knowledge necessary to develop cross-case comparisons (K. 
M. Eisenhardt 1989, 540).   
The conceptual framework, research questions, hypotheses, and sampling plan 
determine the case outline (Miles and Huberman 1994, 84).  The outline defines a 
structure where data will be placed and analyzed; and provides the analyst with a map 
that includes data displays and narratives for each group of data collected (Miles and 
Huberman 1994, 84).  This map provides the analyst with a means of assuring consistent 
data capture and analysis for each case.  Sharing the case report with the subjects 
provided important feedback necessary to the reliability and accuracy of data collected 
for each case (Miles and Huberman 1994, 85).   Case reports provide focus and 
efficiencies for data analysis and improve the reliability of that analysis for multiple case 
studies (Miles and Huberman 1994, 84).   
The initial work spent creating an outline is in itself a process that forces the 
analyst to review the research questions, the research framework, and the hypotheses.  
The analyst can observe how best to display data collected and whether the research 




study, each report begins with an overview of the case, its environment, and data that 
describe the external and internal factors of that USG unit.  The data analysis for each 
case broke into two sections: policy governance and analysis of the acceptable use 
policy.   The order of hypotheses presented in chapter three organizes the data analysis 
for each section.  The case report concludes with a summary of the findings of that case 
and notes regarding items for further research.  An appendix provides annotated 
descriptions of the policy documents analyzed, the survey data for that unit, and a 
summary of the interview data collected.    
4.7.4.3 Cross-Case Analyses 
Case reports present the data found by observing each case  (within-case 
analysis) and the data created when those observations are compared against other 
cases (cross-case analysis).  Eisenhardt suggests a tactic of selecting key categories of 
factors to observe patterns of behavior via cross-case analyses.  Cross-case analysis 
provides an opportunity to observe whether individual factors affect the expected 
governance structures and policy outcomes for USG units(K. M. Eisenhardt 1989, 540).  
These observations may consider the effects of these factors more succinctly by 
observing pairs of cases that are more similar and more different.  The case selection 
strategy for this study supports this tactic.  Cross-case analyses improves the likelihood 
that subtle effects within the data may be found (K. M. Eisenhardt 1991). 
4.8 Data Validity and Reliability 
The methods employed, use of IGT, survey tools, and interview techniques have 




reliable approach to identifying policy designs that can be mapped to the policy areas 
being attacked.  When possible the study has relied upon external measures of 
categories (e.g. Carnegie Classification) enhancing the potential for more reliable 
generalizations across the higher education sector.  This study builds upon and expands 
recent studies exploring the relationship between configurations of institutional 
arrangements as they affect policy design and policy implementation.   
4.8.1 Construct Validity 
 Yin elegantly summarizes the four tests used to assess the quality of a research 
design (2009, 40-41). Construct validity can be demonstrated if concepts are 
operationalized using approaches demonstrated by other, similar studies.  For this 
study, external sources will justify the operationalized concepts employed.  Multiple 
sources of evidence will be derived from published statements, interviews and surveys.  
Finally, I propose allowing key actors within each case review the unit data reports for 
omissions and errors. 
4.8.2 Internal Validity 
 Internal validity refers to the strength of the design of the study to account for 
alternative explanations or spurious effects which may otherwise account for the 
phenomena under study (Yin 2009).  In order to address this test, this study has 
surveyed the literature to identify models and frameworks that have accounted for 
spurious effects to the extent that present knowledge allows.   Triangulation of data 




Comparison of data across unit classifications will test the strength of institutional 
models versus traditional explanations such as contingency theory.  Rival explanations, 
such as a network theory of governance, are discussed within the analysis.  The use of 
best-worst case analysis both within and across categories provides a test of the 
strength of inferences drawn from this study.   
4.8.3 External Validity 
 External validity is the likelihood that the findings of this case study may be 
generalizable beyond the study.  The study design builds upon recent studies, using 
models and frameworks developed using diverse approaches such as grounded theory, 
action research, and institutional analysis.  These multiple approaches provide a 
foundational framework which supports development of several theories, particularly 
institutional rational choice theory, as applied to wicked problems.  Cyber security is a 
type of wicked problem.  The hundreds of studies produced by researchers employing 
the IAD framework point to an area of study where generalizable results may be 
applied.  By extension of logic, a study of how institutions affect policy processes which 
manage cyber security problems may produce findings from which inferences or 
implications are drawn to advance studies of other wicked problems. 
Selection bias – truncating – seriously alters our ability to generalize our findings. 
4.8.4 Selection Bias 
Analysts should be aware that selection bias may lead to an observed correlation 




population were analyzed.  This effect is similar to that observed in regression analysis 
using truncated data which leads to the analyst underestimating the strength of the 
causal variables in the truncated sample (Collier and Mahoney 1996, 66).  Small-N 
studies such as this one are prone to the effects of selection bias.  However, Collier and 
Mahoney specify that when using pair-comparison to select the cases studied, the 
important test is whether the analyst has used the full range of variation of the outcome 
studied when selecting the cases of both extremes [p. 67].  In this study, we have 
selected USG units that are compliant and non-compliant and exhibit variation in the 
causal variables such as size and mission.  Examination of cases within the more narrow 
groups and across the groups thus allows the analysis to reasonably manage effects of 
selection bias while compensating for possible loss of parsimony, accuracy and causality.  
This study analyzes cases within comparative groups of USG units, as established by 
their respective Carnegie classifications.  Examination of cases within the more narrow 
groups and across the groups thus allows the analysis to compensate for possible loss of 
parsimony, accuracy and causality and maintain integrity in relation to generalizability of 
results. 
4.8.5 Reliability 
 Reliability is a quality of design which assures us that if another researcher 
follows the same methods and procedures the likelihood of replicating the results of this 
study are quite good.  This study will follow an established research protocol with each 
action step aptly described.  A research journal will capture highlights of the effort as 





Information security research causes many organizations to distrust external 
researchers (N. Doherty et al., 2009) because the research is viewed as “one of the most 
intrusive types of organization research” (Kotulic and Clark 2004).  The statistics for 
reported incidents at US-CERT show that despite the predominance of cyber assets in 
the private sector, reports of incidents from that sector lag behind incidents reported by 
public sector entities.   
Social demand bias occurs when subjects of interviews, like the semi-structured 
interviews proposed here, believe it is “politically incorrect for subject to indicate they 
believe security was unimportant” (Ramachandran, Rao, and Goles 2008, 9).  IT 
professionals have admitted a “bias towards performance over security when working 
under pressure” (Ramachandran, Rao, and Goles 2008, 10).  Triangulation of data 
collected from the survey, documents, and interview can highlight examples of such 
bias.  But, such bias may be evidence of the very “norms” that regulate the policy 
process.  As such, that bias cannot be directly dismissed without considering the 
possibility that data is being omitted in a fashion that will adversely affect the outcomes 
of the study. 
The investigator of this study has been an employee of the University System for 
10 years.  A significant portion of that time was spent as a special advisor on policy for 
the USG CIO.  Bias is objectively an item of concern.  On the other hand, the 




also facilitates confidence with respondents answering surveys and interviews as the 
investigator has material knowledge of their area of expertise. 
As this study is an exercise to satisfy requirements of a dissertation, the study 
was unable to employ multiple coders to manage possible coding biases.  Thus coding 
reliability is a real concern that can only be addressed by introducing additional coders 
to test and manage such bias. 
The study is an exploratory comparative case study.  As such, the findings are 
limited to the cases observed.  A number of means are presented that are used to 
classify observations.  The reliability and validity of those classification methods can only 
be substantiated by replication in other studies.  I identified and placed those 
observations within action situations thought to model the actual processes employed 
by the cases studied.  Additional research is needed to validate those classifications.  For 
this study, the validity rests upon the prima facie evidence presented. 
Ostrom (2007,22) believes that at any one level of analysis, combinations of 
rules, attributes of the world, and communities of individuals involved are combined in 
a configured, rather than an additive manner.  The small n of this study limits any 
attempt of combinatorial analysis.  This aspect of institutional analysis is an important 
goal of future research that can lean upon the data collection framework validated in 
this study to gather a larger sample of higher education organizations from which such 
analysis may yield results of statistical significance. 
I noted in the introduction caution that the tool may not eliminate all ambiguity 




Ostrom 1995, 583).  Identification of statements critical to analysis and the appropriate 
level of precision “…are important research design questions in institutional analysis 
analogous to specifying the appropriate variables and precision of variables in statistical 
analysis (Crawford and Ostrom, 2005, 373)”.   Trial and error is an important part of that 
process. 
4.10 Ethics and Human Subjects Issues 
 A research protocol approved by Georgia State University’s Internal Review 
Board guided this study.  Confidentiality of interviewees was not guaranteed as the roles 
and comments can easily be used to discern the individual involved.  Further, employees 
of the University System of Georgia are subject to the Open Records Act and thus have 
limited expectations as to privacy and confidentiality. 
4.11 Summary 
This chapter has reviewed the logic model, the research design and methods of 
analysis followed to examine the research question and to test several hypotheses.  
Plans for managing the data collection and analysis activities were discussed, as were 




Chapter 5–External Conditions and Constitutional Level Rules 
 
The research model expects influences external to the organization to affect the 
structure of the policy making apparatus for each case.  In addition to the Board of 
Regents, the individual cases must comply with expectations of security from vendors, 
funding partners, and the federal government to secure all or at least portions of their 
information assets.  In this chapter, I examine the conditions noted by the subjects of 
my interviews as most influential upon the policy governance for each respective case.  
First, I explain how the IAD descriptors and tools work within the context of this study.  I 
then examine the external standards acknowledged as strong influences on the design 
of policy governance and policy statements. Finally, a summary of case descriptions 
provides contextual details that are important to the data analysis presented in chapters 
6 and 7.   
5.1 Interpreting the Data using IAD Descriptors 
The Knapp model (Figure 5-1) provides high-level expectations of how an 
organization should structure the governance of its security processes to create and 
sustain effective security policy.  This study treats each Knapp process as an action 
situation.  An action situation is “an analytic concept that enables an analyst to isolate 
the immediate structure affecting a process of interest to the analyst for the purpose of 




Ostrom 2011).  The Knapp model describes a network of action situations that both 
theory and practice suggest are essential to assure effective cyber security policies.   
Figure 5-1 Knapp Security Governance Model 
 





















The structure of each process/action situation is determined by observing and 
identifying the process components.  Those components are described by the common 
set of IAD variables shown in Figure 5-2.  
 The IAD components and their attributes (Table 5-1) help to organize my analysis 
of each step in the process used by campuses to develop policy.  If I am to compare how 
each campus develops policy, I want to know:  
 Actors - Who participates?  Are we limited to leadership (CIO, CISO) from the 
technology division?  Is there representation from across the campus?  How 
many?   
 Positions - What are the positions in this process?  Who calls the meetings?  
Who runs the meetings?  
 Actions - What actions is this group allowed to take?  Can this group formulate 
policy without the approval of the cabinet? 
 Control - Can one person or any persons in this group make the decision that a 
policy is complete?  Is a decision final or conditioned upon the decision of 
another policy processor processes?  Is consensus of the group required?  
 Information – What type of information is shared/not shared?  Does the process 
of risk assessment, monitoring, enforcement provide information as to 
effectiveness of current policy?  What kind of information does this group share 
with others that may have inputs to the decision of what the policy may include?  
What kinds of information do other sources feed to this group?  Is there a 
connection between the information and the actions that may be taken?  Is 
budget information shared with the group?  Is information from standards 
organizations, the USG, federal security centers, and vendors available to the 
group while policy is being developed? 
 Cost/Benefits – What incentives motivate the individual actors?  The group?  Are 
there penalties for taking ineffective actions?  Are those penalties financial? 
Social?   
 Outputs – what is the range of outputs expected/allowed?  Are the outputs 
contributing to actions to make the campus aware of policy changes?  Who 
monitors these outputs?  Who measures the actual outputs against expectations 
(i.e. mandates)?  Do these outputs contribute to the sanctions or incentives 







Table 5-1 Action Situation Components  
(Table created from terms found in An Introduction to the IAD and the Language of the Ostrom Workshop, 
Michael Dean McGinnis 2010 and Understanding Institutional Diversity, Ostrom 200) 
Component Definition Attributes 
Actors 
who evaluate actions, outcomes, outputs, and 
information and are assigned to 
 Number 
 Status as individuals, team, 
composite actor 




roles and titles that confer authority over the process; 





Term includes overt acts and choice not to act.  May 
be thought of as selection of a setting or value that 
will affect an outcome variable (Ostrom 2005 45) 
 choice of a specific action 
 strategy – series of choices 
 action sets –available 
actions 
Information 
Formal representations of action situations assumes 
all actors have knowledge of all actors, actions, 
linkages between actions and outcomes, positions, 
information available to other players, and 
cost/benefit data 
 Complete information – all 
actors know full structure 
of action situation 
 Incomplete – which actor 
knows what becomes 
important 
Outcomes 
Generated by product of outputs of an action 
situation, other closely related action situations, and 
exogenous influences 
 Physical results 
 Material rewards/costs 
 Valuation of physical 
results and material 
rewards/costs 
Control 
Power over the linkage of actions to outcomes – 
control varies from none (0) to 1 (total).  A value of 1 
occurs when the probability of an action to an 
outcome is certain given the action. 
 Likelihood of affecting 
outcome 
 Power (value of 
opportunity x control) 
 opportunity 
Costs/Benefits 
Rewards/sanctions distributed to actors  
Also 
Actions have costs weighed against the “benefits” of 
outcomes 
 Outcome related – 
incentives assigned to 
outcomes as a result of 
actions taken 
 Path related – incentives 
assigned to actions taken 
to produce the outcome 
 
The structure of an action situation is defined by the actors, and the rules and 
norms that represent “shared understandings among those involved that refer to 
enforced prescriptions about what actions (or states of the world) are required, 
prohibited, or permitted” (E. Ostrom 2011, 17).  The rules can be typed, or categorized, 











Position Positions Title of position; Number of actors in a position; quorum level; 
Boundary Participants 
(Actors) 
Define (1) who is eligible to enter a position, (2) the process that 
determines which participants may/must enter positions, and (3) how 
a participant may/must leave.  Some rules may spell out eligibility for 
participants 
Choice Actions what an actor must, must not, may, may not do based upon Conditions 
at the time of decision - Choice rules affect the total power created in 
an action situation 
Choice rules determine the decision tree linking actions to outcomes 
Aggregation Control whether one individual decides, or votes of several aggregate to decide 
Determines the level of control an actor given a position may exercise 
over the selection of an action 
Information Information Affects level of information available to participants; limits topics to be 
considered; frequency and accuracy of communication, legitimate 
channels of communication, language 
Payoff Costs/Benefits Assigns external payoff/sanctions to particular actions 
Creates incentives and deterrents for action 
Scope Outcomes Defines the range of acceptable outcomes permitted. 
Also limits actions linked to the outcomes. 
Source: Adapted from Crawford and Ostrom (2005, 191) and Ostrom (2011) 
The seven rule types shown in Figure 5-3 help describe action situation structure 































Figure 5-3 Rules Affecting Action Situation  







Rule configurations may describe “features” of a particular action situation.  
These features provide an indispensable instrument for diagnosing and/or modeling 
interactions that lead to specific outcomes (Aligica 2006, 89). Configurations of these 
rules have been suggested as a means of understanding policy change across time and 
organizations in a “rigorous manner” (E. Ostrom and Basurto 2011).  However, Ostrom 
reminds us, the configuration of rule types alone is never “a necessary and sufficient 
explanation of the structure of an action situation and results” (E. Ostrom 2011, 19).   
The IAD framework, as the Knapp model acknowledges, points to the effects of 
both the external and organizational conditions that describe the context within which 
an organization operates.  The next section summarizes the external conditions for each 
case. 
5.2 Discussion of External Standards 
Several standards are referenced within the guidelines and procedures that 
constitute the USG Information Security Program.  USG Security Awareness [Doc 403] 
specifically references Public Law 100-235 created the Computer System Security and 
Advisory Board and set in law a requirement that federal employees receive periodic, 
mandatory training [403:5].  Other references include Federal Information Processing 
Standards (FIPS) found in the Risk Management Policy [Doc 397].  The same document 
references the Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems (NIST SP 




Incident Management Policy [Doc 400] references the NIST Computer Security Incident 
Handling Guide (800-61).  Outside of federal standards, the USG references ISO/IEC 
27002:2005 as a process model for security policy.   
I offer a discussion of these standards within the category of external conditions 
for two reasons.  First, the adoption and implementation of a framework reflects the 
influence of external (peer and superior) networks on internal structures.  Second, the 
individual case analysis revealed that management within each case treated these 
standards as external to the organizational structure and culture. 
Two of the standards, the Association of College and University Administrators 
(ACUPA) model for policy development (ACUPA), and Agile, are process methodologies 
that are not specific to the creation of cybersecurity policy.  ACUPA and Agile are models 
for governance of policy and are employed by the cases in that fashion.  Payment Card 
Industry (PCI) standards, NIST, and ISO 27002 are standards that present both 
governance and policy standards for the cases to follow.  These three standards may 
affect both the governance and policy structure for a case. 
ACUPA provides specificity for the steps required to successfully add, delete or 
modify a policy on a campus.  ACUPA defines steps within each major task.  Adaptation 
of the ACUPA steps within the Knapp model provides an elegant means of breaking the 
analysis of institutions and actors into “buckets” of action small enough to aid analysis 
without losing sight of the big picture.  The mapping of the major tasks with the Knapp 
model maintains consistency between my research model and the analysis found in the 




into these steps is an indication of the positive and consistent influence on the 
structure of the case cybersecurity policy processes. 
Agile is a design methodology that focuses on the inclusion of all stakeholders in 
a process that moves very quickly towards a consensus-driven set of outcomes.  The 
“bottom-up” focus of the methodology resembles the standard for stakeholder 
inclusion found in the ISO standard that is also discussed.  AGILE was explicitly 
identified in interviews with the Georgia Southern CIO as the model used to structure 
cybersecurity governance at the school. 
PCI is specific towards protecting the integrity of the electronic payment systems 
managed by the credit card processing industry.  Other than expecting a general 
information security policy, PCI is not concerned so much with the details of policy 
making as it is with the implementation and enforcement of practices to prevent the 
theft of credit card data.  The role of PCI, as noted in the case descriptive summaries, is 
that of a catalyst causing a campus to review and restructure security governance with 
a payoff of mitigating or avoiding costly fines and loss of service.   
Finally, the ISO standard is one that has influenced only Georgia State, even 
though the USG has endorsed the standard as an acceptable path.  Nonetheless, 
implementation of ISO is voluntary and, as implemented by GSU, represents an effort 
by a campus to implement a standard that was not initially endorsed by USG staff.  The 





The University System of Georgia formally adopted, or at least suggested, the 
Association of College and University Administrators (ACUPA) model for policy 
development in 2009 (Figure 5-4) 23.  The USG instructions for policy and compliance 
management described three phases of policy development: Formulate, Refine, 
Formalize.  Those three phases are echoed in the ACUPA standard as: Predevelopment, 
Development, and Maintenance.  The ACUPA standard is uniformly supported by all 4 
cases.   
 
Figure 5-4 ACUPA Process Flow 
 
The ACUPA model is a practical guide to link the observations as the cases 
studied relied on the ACUPA steps to inform their practices (Table 5-3).  Basurto, 
                                                     




Kingsley, et al., suggested that a researcher could sort their observations into “common 
sections and subsections that share the same broad aim” (2010a, 528).  The ACUPA 
action steps provide a finer level of detail for the Knapp model as each step “nests” 
within a Knapp Process. The Knapp model reflects research specific to the processes 
required for effective cybersecurity governance.  However, cybersecurity research is 
weak when it comes to describing the structural details of those required processes.  
Incorporating ACUPA into the research model provides an “anatomical guide” that 
describes the skeletal, muscular, respiratory, and other organs that should be present 
when examining the institutions and actors within the governance structure of each 
case.  
How do the ACUPA “organs” relate to Knapp?  Examination of the Actions within 
each ACUPA step reveals a set of verbs that denote the aIm component.  The aIm 
component indicates the purpose or goal of the statement.  The aIm verbs in Table 5-4 
emphasize the creation, maintenance, documentation, and implementation of controls, 
standards, architecture, procedures and plans deemed sufficient by the USG unit to 
secure the “confidentiality, integrity, and availability” of USG information.  The 
Conditions expressed in the observations emphasize a reliance on USG policies and 
standards to guide these actions.  Taken together, these statements are meta-policies 
that define what each campus should do in order to comply with USG policy.  The 
collection of Rule types within each step represent the rule configurations of the USG 
meta-policies.  




Table 5-3 ACUPA Action Sets 
ACUPA Situation Step # Actions Knapp 
Action 
1. Identify Issues 
 
.01 Scans for changes in law, threat, best 
practices, organizational change, 
technology change, need to control risky 
behavior 
Risk 
.02 may identify need/issue Development 
2. Conduct Analysis 
 
.01 Identify Owners Development 
.02 Determine Path (Policy Plan – Scope 
Definition) 
Development 
.03 Assemble Team Development 
.04 Gather Data Development 
.05 Id deadlines Development 
.06 Determine Risks Risk 
.07 Determine Stakeholders Development 
.08 Determine solutions for the problem/need Development 
.09 Determine if present policy can be revised Development 
.10 Determine need for new policy Development 
3. Draft Policy .01 Agree on Definitions Development 
.02 Drafts Policy -Use Common Format Development 
.03 presents drafts to stakeholders Development 
.04 review and vet proposals Development 
.05 presents to policy advisory Committee Development 




.02 Considers/approves/modifies proposals Approval 
 
.03 collects comments/revises as needed Approval 
 
.04 Obtain Approvals Approval 
5. Education (Awareness) .01 Plan Communications Awareness 
.02 Put online Awareness 
.03 Provide searches Awareness 
.04 Communicates policy to appropriate 
audiences 
Awareness 
6. Plan Maintenance (Review/Risk 
Assessment) 
 
.01 Versions new policy Maintain 
.02 Archives old poicy Retirement 
.03 Establishes schedule for review Review 
.04 Determines review procedures Review 
.05 solicits feedback Review 
.06 Reviews risk and Cost Risk 
.07 Recommends whether policy still needed Review 
7. Measurement & Compliance .01 Measures/monitors outcomes Monitor 










aIm oBjective Condition Ref 
1.02 ID Need SS1 employ prudent information security 
policies, standards, and 
practices 
to minimize the risk to the 
confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability (CIA) of USG information. 
9 : 6 
2.01 ID Policy 
Owners 
 
A1 [ensure]  information security controls appropriate and auditable are in 
place 
9 : 12 
CC1 develop and 
maintain 
an information security 
organization and architecture 
for support of information security 
across the USG  and support of 
activities between institutions. 
9 : 9 
CC2 develop information security plans using the same guidelines as 
referred to above 
9 : 20 
2.02 Strategy CC1 create and 
maintain 
an internal information 
security technology 
infrastructure 
consisting of an information security 
organization and program that 
ensures the confidentiality, 
availability, and integrity of all USG 
information assets 
9 : 7 
CC2 develop an individualized information 
security plan 
that is consistent with the guidelines 
provided by the USG Office of 
Information Security (OIS); 
consisting of a set of information 
security policies, standards, and 
guidelines 
9 : 13 
CC3 document procedures in the individualized information 
security plan. 
9 : 19 
2.08 Solutions IC1 maintain information security 
implementation guidelines 
 that the USO, all USG institutions, 
and the GPLS should consider in the 
development of their individualized 
information security plans. 




CC1 include methods for ensuring that information 
regarding the applicable laws, 
regulations, guidelines, and policies 
is distributed and readily available 
to its user community 
9 : 16 
II1 make USG’s employees (full/part-
time employees and 
contractors) 
aware of their basic information 
security responsibilities through an 
awareness program 
403 : 9 
5.05 Training CC1 ensure each person  is trained to perform [roles and 
responsibilities] 
403 : 4 
6.00 
Maintenance 
CC1 maintain an individualized information 
security plan 
consisting of a set of information 
security policies, standards, and 
guidelines that is consistent with the 
guidelines provided by the USG 
Office of Information Security (OIS). 
9 : 13.2 
6.03 Review 
Schedule 
II1 submit information security plan to the OIS for periodic review 9 : 14 
7.01 Monitor CC1 [develop] procedures for reporting of incidents to the USO 
in a timely manner 
9 : 18 
8 Implement CC1 implement an individualized information 
security plan 
consisting of a set of information 
security policies, standards, and 
guidelines that is consistent with the 
guidelines provided by the USG 
Office of Information Security (OIS). 
9 : 13.1 
      







Agile was developed as a framework for collaborative design and construction of 
information systems. The application of the AGILE framework to policy development is 
appropriate given the premise that policies are constructed of institutions and 
institutions are similar to coding instructions.  AGILE values map easily to values 
identified in the IAD framework (Table 5-5).   
Table 5-5 Comparison AGILE and IAD Values 
Agile IAD 
Individuals and interactions over 
processes and tools 
Interaction between and among the various 
levels of action shape the outcomes of 
implementing policies (vertical action 
levels).  Ostrom emphasized the interaction 
of actors and rule sets on those outcomes as 
well (horizontal action levels) 
Working software over comprehensive 
documentation 
Policy change, policy effects, rule change 
(norm shifts) preferred over creation of 
formal rules that become  paper tigers 
Customer Collaboration over contract 
negotiation 
Collaboration among all actors within a 
policy situations is seen as key to success in 
much IAD research 
Responding to change over following a 
plan 
Responding to changes of the bio-physical 
world – the action situation changes (a rule 
configuration may be identical, yet 
differences in the bio-physical events will 
create a different action situation as sets of 
actions / possible outcomes are limited by 
the bio-physical and material conditions 
Ostrom 2005, 22).   
 
One can think of this model as an empowered bottom-up organization.  The 
manifesto was developed by a group of developers who believed the “top-down” model 
of system design and development failed to acknowledge the need to meet the 




values inherent in the manifesto emphasize organizational models based on people that 
collaborate and trust one another to deliver software that functions as needed.  
The Agile process emphasizes a self-organizing team that includes both technicians 
and customers.  Meetings are frequent (daily) to examine project progress.  Progress 
towards the goal is incremental as the team delivers pieces of working software to the 
customer for approval and feedback.  The incremental approach, combined with the 
iterative steps that include design, code, test, collect feedback, and repeat.  A very 
simple translation of AGILE principles into policy process institutions is shown in Table 5-
6. 





Manifesto Principle Policy Process Adaptation 
2.02 Choice The best architectures, requirements, and 
designs emerge from self-organizing teams. 






Business people and developers must work 
together daily throughout the project. 
Stakeholders will include technical,. 
Management, and operational actors 
Team will collaborate with stakeholders. 
 2.09 Boundary Build projects around motivated individuals. 
Give them the environment and support they 
need, and trust them to get the job done. 
Policy Owners will engage stakeholders 
committed to sound policy 
development. 
2.09 Choice Simplicity--the art of maximizing the amount of 
work not done--is essential. 
Team shall simplify policy to minimize 
effort required to comply. 
3.03 Information 
Rule 
The most efficient and effective method of 
conveying information to and within a 
development team is face-to-face conversation. 
Team will exchange information in face-
to-face meetings as much as possible 
3.03 Scope Our highest priority is to satisfy the customer 
through early and continuous delivery of 
valuable software. 
Policy owners will satisfy the 
stakeholders through timely and 
continuous policy actions. 
3.05 Payoff Working software is the primary measure of 
progress. 
Team will receive commendation for 
maintaining progress by delivery of 
working policies 
3.05 Payoff Continuous attention to technical excellence 
and good design enhances agility. 
Team shall improve policy effectiveness 
by focusing on technical excellence and 
good design. 
 4.03 Choice Welcome changing requirements, even late in 
development. Agile processes harness change 
for the customer's competitive advantage. 
Policy Owners will accept stakeholder 
input anytime in the cycle. 
  
4.03 Choice Deliver working software frequently, from a 
couple of weeks to a couple of months, with a 
preference to the shorter timescale. 
Team will deliver viable policy drafts 
frequently during the development 
process. 
Determines a timescale – a condition to 
the action of delivery policy drafts. 
6.03 Choice, 
scope 
At regular intervals, the team reflects on how 
to become more effective, then tunes and 
adjusts its behavior accordingly. 
Team will review the Policy Process for 
effectiveness on a regular basis. 






 The Payment Card Industry (PCI) Data Security Standard is designed to ensure 
that credit-card transaction systems are managed “to protect consumer 
data”(Rowlingson and Winsborrow 2006).  The standard contains no guidelines 
regarding how policy is constructed.  However, it does contain a number of procedures 
and policies that must be contained in the organization’s security policy and must be 
verified by an audit of the PCI auditors (Table 5-7). Failure to comply with PCI standards 
can lead to fines and withdrawal or limitation of credit card services (Rowlingson and 
Winsborrow 2006, 19).   
 PCI standards and controls are intended for a limited range of functions (i.e. 
credit card transactions). The controls are mostly technical in nature.  Most of the 
actions are best practice oriented and found in other security standards and guidelines.  
Two controls are relevant to development of policy on campus: 1) Regularly test security 
systems and processes; and, 2) Maintain a policy that addresses information security. 
Table 5-7 PCI Data Security Controls - Source Rowlingson and Winsborrow 2006) 
 
 
Data Security Standard (DSS) Control Topic 
Install and maintain firewall configuration to protect data 
Do not use vendor-supplied defaults for system passwords and other 
security passwords 
Protect stored data 
Encrypt transmission of cardholder data and sensitive information across 
public networks 
Use and regularly update anti-virus software 
Develop and maintain secure systems and applications 
Restrict access to data by business need to know 
Assign a unique ID to each person with computer access 
Restrict physical access to cardholder data 
Track and Monitor all access to network resources and cardholder data 
Regularly test security systems and processes 




5.2.4 ISO 27002 
ISO 27002 is a set of standards that provides “a code of practice for information 
security management and a process framework for information security governance” 
(Rowlingson and Winsborrow 2006, 17).  If the organization successfully provides 
evidence that it has implemented all the elements of the standard, that organization 
may receive a certificate of compliance.  The ISO standard specifies the policy process in 
stages entitled ‘Plan-Do-Check-Act’: 
 Plan - establish a security policy and relevant procedures and controls' 
then prepare a statement of the scope of its application, justifying why 
the controls were selected and why others were not; 
 Do -- implement the security policy and relevant procedures; 
 Check -- assess and measure the process performance, and report the 
results to management; 






Figure 5-5 Plan-Do-Check-Act 




 The main steps to develop an Information Security Management System (ISMS) 
are:  
1. Obtain management approval for initiating an ISMS project 
2. Define ISMS Scope, boundaries and ISMS policy 
3. Conduct risk assessment and planning risk treatment 
4. Conduct risk assessment and plan risk mitigation 
5. Design the ISMS   
(Asosheh, Hajinazari, and Khodkari 2013) 
 
The structure of ISO27002 (Fig. 5-7) is similar to that of the Knapp structure.  The 
Information Security Management System is equivalent to the ISO Governance.  The 
security policy structure is composed of policies, standards, guidelines, procedures, 
plans and programs.  The processes of risk assessment, monitoring (compliance), 








While the standard does not give guidance as to how policy should be written, it 
does specify details of what is expected (von Solms 2005).  At the top level, there should 
be an overall “information security policy” that specifies how the policy aligns with 
organizational mission and objectives. The standard specifically sets expectations for top 
management of the organization to define “a set of policies to clarify their direction of, 
and support for, information security” (Karabacak and Sogukpinar 2006).   
5.2.5 National Institute of Standards (NIST) Publication 800 
The Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA)24 provides that the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology “prescribe standards and guidelines” to 
secure Federal information systems25.  The executive order signed by Governor Perdue 
in 2008 referenced the NIST model for information technology security as a preferred, 
single model for all agencies of state government to follow.  The effort to standardize on 
NIST was an effort to create a single view of security across state government and to 
ensure effectiveness of state security controls. 
NIST defines a formal information security governance structure as: 
Information security governance can be defined as the process of establishing and 
maintaining a framework and supporting management structure and processes to 
provide assurance that information security strategies are aligned with and support 
business objectives, are consistent with applicable laws and regulations through 
adherence to policies and internal controls, and provide assignment of responsibility, all 
in an effort to manage risk.26 
                                                     
24 Title III of the E-Government Act of 2002 (Pub. L. No. 107-347) 
25 Fiscal Year 2012 Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Federal Information Security 
Management Act of 2002” 2013, 1 - 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/egov_docs/fy12_fisma.pdf last accessed 26 
Feb 2014 
26 Bowen, Pauline, Joan Hash, and Mark Wilson. 2006. “Information Security Handbook: A Guide for 
Managers”. NIST Special Publication 800-100. Information Security. Gaithersburg MD: National Institute of 






The key activities that facilitate integrating information security governance activities 
with agency structure and activities are: 
 strategic planning,  
 organizational design and development,  
 establishment of roles and responsibilities,  
 integration with the enterprise architecture, and  
 documentation of security objectives in policies and guidance27.  
The standard contains no guidelines regarding the policy process (how to 
develop the policy).  The document details positions and responsibilities, but does not 
provide the structure to create policy as seen in ACUPA, ISO, and other standards.  
Beyond a reference here and there, there is no finding of influence on a case’s 
governance structure. 
5.3 Case Summaries  
The study design employed “replication logic” to select cases where policy 
variations occur among “similar” organizations.  Four research universities, University of 
Georgia, Georgia Tech, Georgia State, and Georgia Southern were selected.  Descriptive 
meta-data are found in table 5-8.  The organizational factors of interest, as set by the 
research model, include culture, size (population and resources available), and mission.  
I examine external threats and industry standards that apply to each unit as the external 
                                                     
 




factors of interest for this study28.  I discuss the findings of hypotheses related to the 
effects of internal and external conditions on the governance structure in chapter 6.  
The evidence presented here should be read as a “prologue” for that discussion. 
 
Table 5-8 Case Descriptive Data 











19,431 19,150 33,367 30,606 
Carnegie Class RU/VH, DR DRU, DR RU/VH, DR RU/VH, DR 
















































For each case, observations of institutions tagged for an ACUPA step are counted 
(Table 5-9).  I cover the configuration of rules for each case and step in Chapter 629.  
However, this “x-ray” of the structure for each case suggests some structures may be 
relatively stronger than others.    
                                                     
28 The limitation is due mostly to resources (time and human capital).  I also find defense in Ostrom’s 
standard that as we analyze an action situation, we hold the exogenous conditions constant (2005).  The 
external threats are observed to vary for each case and are therefore included. 
29 If the reader wishes, the institutions are presented in tables found in the Appendix sorted by ACUPA 




Table 5-9 Summary Data - Distribution of Meta-policy observations 
ACUPA 
Situation 
 Step Actions Cases 
       Ga 
Sou 
GSU GT UGA Sum 
1. Identify 
Issues 
 1.01 Scans for changes in law, threat, best practices, 
organizational change, technology change, need to 
control risky behavior 
0 2 1 0 3 
 1.02 may identify need/issue 1 1 0 0 2 
   2.00 Miscellaneous 0 0 1 0 1 
2. Conduct 
Analysis 
 2.01 Identify Owners 4 2 3 1 10 
   2.02 Determine Path (Policy Plan – Scope Definition) 2 0 1 3 6 
   2.03 Assemble Team 3 3 8 15 29 
   2.04 Gather Data 1 0 0 2 3 
   2.05 Id deadlines 0 0 0 0 0 
   2.06 Determine Risks 1 2 0 1 4 
   2.07 Determine Stakeholders 3 0 1 3 7 
   2.08 Determine solutions for the problem/need 0 1 2 0 3 
   2.09 Determine if present policy can be revised 3 2 1 1 7 
   2.10 Determine need for new policy 2 1 0 2 5 
3. Draft Policy  3.01 Agree on Definitions 1 0 0 0 1 
 3.02 Drafts Policy -Use Common Format 4 4 2 0 10 
 3.03 presents drafts to stakeholders 5 3 2 1 11 
 3.04 review and vet proposals 1 1 5 2 9 
 3.05 presents to policy advisory Committee 1 0 3 0 4 
4. Get 
Approvals 
 4.01 Presents policies for approval to advisory committee 2 6 1 0 9 
 4.02 Considers/approves/modifies proposals 0 13 3 0 16 
 4.03 collects comments/revises as needed 6 4 5 0 15 
 4.04 Obtain Approvals 1 4 0 5 10 
5. Education 
(Awareness) 
 5.01 Plan Communications 2 0 0 1 3 
 5.02 Put online 1 2 2 0 5 
 5.03 Provide searches 1 0 0 0 1 





 6.01 Versions new policy 1 7 2 0 10 
 6.02 Archives old policy 3 0 0 0 3 
 6.03 Establishes schedule for review 1 1 2 2 6 
 6.04 Determines review procedures 4 9 3 8 24 
 6.05 solicits feedback 0 0 4 3 7 
 6.06 Reviews risk and Cost 4 0 8 0 12 
 6.07 Recommends whether policy still needed 4 0 1 0 5 




 7.01 Measures/monitors outcomes 0 5 0 1 6 
 7.02 Enforcement 0 0 0 4 4 




5.3.1 Georgia Tech 
Georgia Tech approved a meta-policy that defined cybersecurity policy 
governance in 2008 (Document 360 - “Policy Review Process”).  Two other documents, 
“Information Security Exception Policy” [353], and “Policy Exception Procedures” [359], 
followed.  The policies and procedures30 for “exceptions” to university policy recognized 
a need to tailor and/or change the scope of some policy due to differences in 
organizational factors at the sub-unit level (i.e. Georgia Tech Research Institute, School 
of Computer Science, etc.).  The meta-policy follows the ACUPA model, with some 
influence from the PCI (Payment Card Industry) model in areas that interface with credit 
card data31.  Interview data indicates the campus policy structure is influenced by the 
ISO standards and federal cybersecurity standards.   
Prior to 2008, Georgia Tech’s security governance was an accurate reflection of 
the “loosely coupled” description.  College, department, and auxiliary units could 
supplement and supersede policies created at university level.  Compliance to a 
university-wide policy was not enforced.  As a result, policies differed among the 
colleges and departments of the university. 
A couple of high-profile incidents motivated the President of Georgia Tech to 
change that structure.  A breach of a server housed at the campus theatre reaped 
                                                     
30 The observations found in the “Procedures” document are coded as metapolicy statements as 
the statements manage the exception requests from departments as though the requests are 
amendments to the policy – therefore these instructions focus on how to create/amend/delete 
policy which is the definition of a metapolicy statement. 
31 PCI representatives required formal policies to protect against future thefts of credit card data 




thousands of credit card numbers including those of President Jimmy Carter, 
Ambassador Andrew Young, and many notable CEO’s in the Atlanta Area.  The breach 
occurred because the theatre failed to install software patches regularly as required by 
university policy.   
Within a year, an email server maintained by the College of Biochemistry was 
hacked.  The server began to congest the university network with denial-of-service 
attacks.  The dean of the college rejected offers from the university Office of 
Information Technology to help, saying, “We have smart people, we can handle the 
incident ourselves.”  The OIT had no choice but to physically disconnect the college from 
the university network.  After several months of “downtime” for the college’s email 
server, the college was able to restore mail services. 
The GT President issued instructions to the university vice presidents and the 
college deans that any future breaches of security found to occur because of non-
compliance would not be tolerated.  At this time, the university’s deep cultural ties to 
autonomy were re-examined. 
Under the new governance structure, “Campus units are allowed to have their 
own policies, but they can’t supersede institution policy.”32  Document 359 reflects the 
Georgia Tech culture as it values autonomy.  The structure is also an acknowledgement 
that differing local context requires a tailoring of policy to make policy effective.   
However, compliance among GT units does vary.  USG policy and Georgia Tech 
policy require business continuity and disaster recovery plans, but compliance is not 
                                                     




strictly enforced.  The Chief Information Security Office of Georgia Tech explains how 
they manage what is an issue of compliance with USG policy: 
“…because the centralized organization does not control the budgets within 
the departments, we put in the policy some business continuity kind of 
statements and then the procedures and guidelines to follow. And, 
basically we leave it up to the units to determine how much infrastructure 
they want to maintain locally. If you decide to maintain local infrastructure, 
then you have to include business continuity and our internal auditors do 
audit for that. So, they get to determine their threshold when it comes to 
infrastructure continuity. We just set the top level policy and what 
continuity should look like.”33 
5.3.2 UGA 
UGA experienced more than one significant breach of stored credit card data in 
2004-2005.  Auditors from the Payment Card Industry (PCI) insisted on major changes in 
the policies that governed data security.  Like Georgia Tech, the Office of the President 
engaged in the process, as well as the Office of the Provost.  Concurrent with the 
Governor’s executive order of 2008, the Provost of the University of Georgia issued a 
memo denoting the responsibility of everyone at UGA to follow the new security 
guidelines.  Unlike Georgia Tech, UGA did not formalize a policy review and exception 
process with a metapolicy.   
UGA responded to the incident with the Credit Card Policy [380], and a plan 
entitled SecureGA [466].  UGA followed the ACUPA policy management scheme.  In 
addition, the university’s Credit Card Processing policy indicates that standards from ISO 
1779934 and the Payment Card Industry (PCI) standards contributed to the security 
                                                     
33 Baines, Herb. (22 March 2012) Telephone interview. 
34 International Standards Organization document defining computer standards.  This document was 




program [380:2].  In addition, the role-based accountability model discussed in the 
SecureGA plan [466] relied upon National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
publication 800-16, “Information Technology Security Training Requirements: A Role-
and Performance-based Model.”  In sum, all the standards for creating security policy 
were referenced.  
However, these mandates did not precede the creation of a formal metapolicy as 
was the case for GT.  At UGA, if a policy is required by an external organization, UGA will 
not develop policy documents that may replicate the mandated policy.  I asked the UGA 
CISO: “When you have a requirement sourced from an external source, such as the 
Board of Regents or the Payment Card Industry (PCI), do you respond in an ad hoc 
fashion?”   
CISO: Certainly. Now usually what we tend to do, as opposed to regurgitate what 
it is in a law in our policy, we’ll take more of an awareness stance. There are a 
couple of sites that we have that explains what our requirements are as opposed 
to just having a specific incident handling policies for instance. We have a 
website that says what you can and cannot do with this based on these legal 
references. And that we’ve found is a lot easier to socialize and enforce and a lot 
easier to get out in the public’s hands quickly. [post 30:32] 
                                                     
guidelines and general principles for initiating, implementing, maintaining, and improving information 
security management in an organization” – found at 
http://www.iso.org/iso/home/store/catalogue_ics/catalogue_detail_ics.htm?csnumber=50297.  Last 




Interviewer: So guidelines and standards are accepted more easily than law or 
policy? 
CISO: No, what I’m saying is that I think law is a lot harder to argue with. So what 
we’ve essentially done is in a lot of these cases. HIPPA is another case. We will 
explain what that the requirements on the UGA are under the law and make that 
available to them and a part of the training. Beyond that what’s created next is a 
central set of procedures that enable us to comply with those laws. And we do 
the same with USG policies. We don’t have an incident management policy 
because USG has one. We have a reference and explanation of incident 
management at USG and then an explanation of how UGA handles those 
procedures to comply with those policies. 
This practice of referencing members of the UGA organization to external 
policies is unique among the four cases.  Policy owners develop guidelines and 
awareness activities to inform stakeholders of the external requirements.  Policy owners 
place references to these external requirements.  UGA’s structure reflects a 
heterogeneous network of inter- and intra-organizational policy documents. 
In general, the university policy will establish responsibility of what needs to be 
done.  Departments may determine how to comply with policy in some cases.  The 
university may distribute authority to enforce compliance with policies to departments, 
offices, colleges and other sub-units of the university.  A student who misuses an asset 




themselves subject to discipline by their college.  A staff member may be disciplined by 
the Human Resources department.   
The responsibility for implementing, monitoring, and enforcing these standards 
is left to the individual departments, divisions, and other units.  Activities at the 
collective level for policy development, under this model, are minimal with the output 
constrained to a reference to the externally required mandate.  Awareness activities are 
decentralized as the units are responsible for making users aware.  Operational level 
activities are entirely decentralized.   
The data indicates a high cost for engaging a centralized policy process to 
develop or modify policy.  The process for gaining support to adopt new or revised 
policies may take up to 2 years.  Referencing external policies is seen as a means of 
complying while avoiding costly and time-consuming drafting and approval processes.   
5.3.3 Georgia Southern  
The CIO of Georgia Southern acknowledged that proposing and adopting new 
policies “…can take years to debate, if you’re not careful”35.  The CIO noted that 
universities are delegated authority to “…establish policy and procedures which suit our 
particular environment.”  However, “we get into a lot of trouble legal-wise when we 
have a policy that we do not follow or a policy that is followed inconsistently”.  Such 
inconsistency requires central policy, monitoring, and review. 
                                                     




The CIO cited a “pre-audit” visit as one factor prompting the revision of the 
Acceptable Use Policy at Georgia Southern. A “pre-audit” visit is a meeting that involves 
the audit team leaders and the campus committee responsible for assisting the audit 
team.  The audit team will discuss the areas to be audited and ask the campus team to 
prepare for the audit by identifying and organizing relevant documents that will be 
needed by the team to complete the audit.  This particular visit discussed the audit 
team’s intent to review information security policies.  The GS IT team reviewed the 
Acceptable Use Policy and the Copyright provisions of the Higher Education Opportunity 
Act policy and modified them as needed to position the university to defend its 
reputation for compliance to law and policy. 
The CIO adopted a method created by software developers to improve the 
quality and responsiveness of programmers to customer requests.  The AGILE process 
emphasizes a self-organizing team that includes both technicians and customers36.  
Georgia Southern modified the AGILE Development Process to guide the development 
of IT policy.  AGILE principles promote collaboration with stakeholders as a priority.  The 
AGILE process is a “bottom-up” approach focused on rapid, incremental progress 
towards development of systems for the organization.  The emphasis of the process is 
creation of “working policy” rather than development of a carefully worded policy 
document.  The application of AGILE principles to the Georgia Southern policy structure 
                                                     






provides a comparatively rapid policy development cycle (4-6 months) as compared to 
UGA or Georgia State (1 – 2 years). 
Followers of Agile principles value the ability to respond to change versus how 
well a formal plan is followed.  Emergent organizations depend upon the flexibility 
offered by such principles.  Dr. Burrell described how those principles drove the 
frequency and scope of interaction between and among the IT personnel responsible for 
developing policy and the stakeholders affected by the policy change.   
“… using the AGILE process, getting immediate feedback, starting from 
some place. If you give people a blank page, they don’t know where to 
start. So it’s easier to give them something to criticize than it is to ask 
them to come up with something original. And I don’t mind people 
criticizing my writing….and then give them immediate feedback…..24 to 
48 hour period to turn that document back around for consideration. A 
lot of that can be done through email correspondence once you’ve laid it 
all out there for them. And then troll that to the next group and so on. 
During the interview process you end up with some ends to it and then 
you troll it back by high level managers, taking a slightly different slice, 
taking a functional slice and that process has worked pretty well for us 
here.”  Dr. Steven Burrell 
Like UGA and Georgia Tech, Georgia Southern experienced a data breach in 2006 
that compromised the bookstore financial system.  This incident involved merchant 
banks and required a repair to the integrity of the organization’s financial systems.  The 
event raised awareness of security protocols within the university.  General media news 
reports may have helped to construct a norm that is important to the organizational 
culture: 
“I just think the media has helped us in some respects that the issues of 
computer hackers and bad things happening to good people out there 
has become more a part of daily consciousness of people by virtue of 




It is important to recognize how the AGILE development philosophy is reflected 
within the organizational culture and norms related to university policy development.  
The CIO of Georgia Southern describes a collegial environment where Vice Presidents 
and their delegates work across the functional areas of the university to develop policy.  
Strong top management support of adopted policies is an outcome of that environment.   
As to the “security culture”, the CIO believes the employees and students at 
Georgia Southern have accepted the idea that “security is just as much their 
responsibility as somebody else’s”.  He attributes this understanding as one reason why 
he does not see systematic resistance when security policies are added/changed and 
implemented.  
The “understanding” among the stakeholders is an expected consequence of the 
“bottom-up” approach to policy achieved through implementation of the AGILE 
methodology.   Collaboration, an organizational condition necessary for effective policy, 
is a key value.  Collaboration is emphasized in the principles of AGILE.  For example, 
consensus of the team is an expected Aggregate rule under AGILE.  Other understand 
rules and norms include: 
 Engagement of all stakeholders 
 Free exchange of information  
 Continuous and timely discussions 
 And others (See Table 5-6). 
GS security policies were developed following a process formalized as a 




Whenever an initial assessment determined that a policy addition or revision was 
required, a network of committees was engaged that included Vice Presidents as chairs 
and co-chairs.  Those committees would examine the policy changes in the context of 
the committee constituencies (deans, students, business managers, etc.).  The Georgia 
Southern policy process follows the outline suggested by the ACUPA model.  The AGILE 
principles, in concert with the University process for approving and implementing IT 
policy [336], provide the detail needed to identify the governance structure.   
The CIO of Georgia Southern stressed the distinction between university policy 
and the procedures and guidelines used by a department or division: 
A University policy is an official statement expressing the position of the 
University on an issue of institution-wide importance. A policy guides the 
decisions and actions of the institution and is consistent with its mission. 
As such, it meets the following criteria:  
o The administrative authority of the University or the Board of Regents of 
the University System of Georgia has sanctioned it.   
o It has a broad institution-wide application. 
o It is a governing principle for both established and future activities of the 
University. 
o It exists to ensure consistency in University practice to conform to the 
University's mission and goals, Federal and State legislation, and other 
legal requirements. 
If a policy fits these criteria, it is a University policy. If it does not, it is a 
departmental, office or unit policy or guideline. No collection of policies 
and procedures can anticipate every circumstance. The contents of these 
policies are subject to change from time to time. As policies and 
procedures change, the University will make necessary revisions 
(“Georgia Southern University Policies” 2013) 
Procedures and guidelines handled at the department level are not elevated for 




implementation of policy but cannot substantively change policy, another distinction 
emphasized by Dr. Burrell in the interview. 
“There may be some different procedures that are followed in various 
department or what not but I don’t call those policy changes.” –Dr. 
Burrell (Interview by author). 
 The collective level process resembles the GT process in the following ways: 1) 
Includes all top management; 2) includes all stakeholders in the decision chain; and 3) 
emphasizes flow of information.  However the Policy Process document [336] is not as 
formal with regards to positions, responsibilities, and tasks as the GT metapolicy.  The 
GS process, as stated earlier, restates the ACUPA model with minimum specificity 
regarding the GS organizational structure.  In other words, “tailoring” of the process is 
minimal.  However, the adoption of the AGILE methodology introduced a number of 
norms into the GS process that are similar to the GT rules.  The process may be less 
formal, but the cost of outcomes, measured in terms of time and resources to modify or 
create policy are very similar. 
5.3.4 GSU 
GSU has experienced no significant breach of security in the time period 
covered.  The lack of external threats manifested as breaches in security or thefts of 
confidential data certainly contrasts with that of the other three cases.   
The structure of the policy process encases a network of action situations.  My 
interview of the CISO at GSU confirmed that the university employs formal and informal 
institutions to govern the policy process.  Two different policy models manage the policy 




The policy explains how university-wide policies are to be developed, approved, and 
managed.  However, this process is not binding on “policies developed by individual 
colleges, schools, divisions, or departments to govern their internal operations”37  The 
CISO led an effort to implement the ISO 27002 process model but only two areas 
achieved certification, financial systems and the data center.  The lack of financial 
resources as allocated by the university governance process prevented certifying other 
areas of the university.  The influence of ISO 27002, as a meta-policy, is limited to the 
scope of the Information Security Management System Policy (Document 367). 
The Office of Legal Affairs constrains the agenda and scope according to their 
interpretation of need and risk.  The Office of Legal Affairs decides whether the need 
identified requires a new policy, a modification of existing policy, or no action.  This 
office acts as the guardian of policy for the university and maintains a central catalog of 
university policies and procedures.  The office must accept the CISO’s argument that the 
need for policy is significant and that the objectives cannot be achieved by an existing 
policy.  The university attempts to create “umbrella” policies that are broad in scope, 
yet flexible in application, to minimize creation of a number of “specialty” policies.   
The CISO stated that as she tried to push for compliance with Payment Card 
Industry (PCI) requirements, the Office of Legal Affairs noted the requirements were not 
law.  The office did not believe the risk of a breach of financial systems employing 
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credit/debit cards was high.  The adoption of the PCI standards to secure credit card 
transactions was deferred due to cost and a perception of low risk.   
The narrative discusses two examples of the effects of autonomy.  The 
University-Wide Policy on Policies explicitly defers to sub-units to determine their 
individual governance structure.  Guidelines employed by the Office of Legal Affairs 
defend existing policy as preferable to adaptation of external requirements. It is a 
mistake to characterize the policy structure as “decentralized”.  Departments and 
divisions do exercise certain levels of autonomy in making policy specific to their units.  
However, when a department wishes to implement a “department-only” policy that 
requires university resources to implement, the request for those resources travels 
through a centralized procedure for analysis of risk and budget capacity.   
The cost of modifying or creating policy, measured in terms of time and 
resources, are similar to that of UGA, 18-24 months.  The absence of a significant breach 
at GSU suggests a low risk to not modifying policy.  The CISO did not share in the 
perception of “low-risk”, but, the decision of the Office of Legal Affairs seems justified 
by their perception of risk.  Similarly, the CISO was unable to expand implementation of 
the ISO 27001 standard due to a difference in the perception of risk and the significant 
cost for implementing the standard. 
5.4 Summary 
I have summarized four standards that are identified by the cases as influential 




model reflects the standards implemented by practitioners across the industry, it is no 
surprise that this summary confirms the each of the four standards is sympathetic with 
the Knapp model.   
These standards are the most significant influences of the external conditions 
identified in this study, as confirmed by interviews with officials responsible for 
constructing security policy.  An initial scan of the structure of each case per the ACUPA 
steps indicates substantial variation among the cases.  The case summaries indicate 
reasons given for the different configurations shown in each case.    The next chapter 
will summarize notable organizational conditions and the policy governance structures 
for each case.  Analysis in the next chapter will highlight institutions selected from the 
external mandates and standards.  The IAD descriptors will reveal differences in 
governance due to the selections among the cases by examining the variation in the 





Chapter 6- Governance Structures 
 
The Knapp model summarizes the theoretical and practical consensus of an ideal 
structure of cybersecurity governance.  Details as to the structure of the individual 
policy processes is an admitted weak point of the information security literature.  The 
previous chapter noted a number of standards, in particular ACUPA, as those standards 
can be applied within the Knapp model.  All of the standards that have been discussed 
emphasize a governance structure that engages all stakeholders in a manner that aligns 
policy with organizational goals while maintaining an appropriate fit between the policy 
objectives and the context of the organizational condition.  These definitions serve as a 
baseline from which I can identify elements of policy structure that may contribute to 
determining the structure of policy produced.   
The central hypothesis suggests that effective cybersecurity policy and 
management practices are preceded by an effective governance structure.  Governance 
structure is measured along a continuum from ad hoc, with few but not all of the 
necessary processes, components and conditions, to formal, with a formal metapolicy 
and all of the Knapp processes and appropriate policy components.  Effective policy 
becomes more likely as the governance structure approaches a formal status.  
I borrow the IAD’s definition of structure as the configuration of actors and rules 
that constrain the actors’ choices that lead to outcomes. The IAD framework and the 
Knapp model both suggest that variations in governance structure are related to 




Knapp model adds needed precision to measure differences in governance and policy 
structure as they relate to variation of select internal and external conditions   
This study focuses on three of those conditions: external policy standards, 
organizational top management support, and organizational collaboration.  The effects 
of those conditions are expected to influence the structure of the governance for each 
case.  Those variations in structure are expected to be manifested by variations in the 
structure of policy produced for each case. 
The findings are presented as observations of varying configurations of 
institutions (rules) and actors that describe the security policy for each case.  The rule 
configurations represent an aggregation of statements collected from Policy 
Documents38 as units of observation.  These observations are aggregated to draw 
conclusions on organizational structure (the cases are the units of analysis)39.  
Observations are nested by major ACUPA task and are presented in Appendices M 
through Q. Analysis of observations focused on the components aIm (I), oBject (B), and 
Condition (C).   
The research model is built upon information security research that finds 
effective cybersecurity is preceded by effective policy and effective management 
practices to implement that policy.  The qualities of both policy and management 
practices are preceded by the quality of the policy processes, the governance structure 
that defines the policy and the environment to support effective management 
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practices.  Policy structure reflects governance structure.  The success of the former 
depends heavily upon the latter. 
In the analysis that follows, I reference noted observations through the use of 
square brackets [].  Within the brackets, I identify the document [Doc ID] and the 
observation [:obs id].  For example, the second observation [:2] from the interview of 
the UGA CISO [471] would be referenced as [471:2]. 
This chapter starts with an examination of the governance structure.  I begin 
with a rudimentary analysis of case descriptive data and case policy documents 
building upon the research cited in chapters 2 and 3.  That analysis is joined with 
analysis of structure as prescribed by the IAD framework.  The second section presents 
findings regarding key features of governance structure influenced by Top 
Management Support, Collaboration, and the external policy standard that influenced 
each case.  The third section compares policy structures for each case and the 
respective relationships with governance structure.  A summary of these findings closes 
the chapter. 
6.1 Comparing Structures – Preliminary Analysis 
H1: The structure of a policy governance process will be reflected in the formality of 
the policy structure created by that process.   
 
My first hypothesis explores the relationship between formal policy processes 
and policy structure.  If a university has a formal meta-policy, then I expect to find a 




procedures) within a policy area and one that connect policy areas (data protection, 
privacy) by sharing components such as guidelines and procedures.  Such sharing is 
indicated by documents referencing each other.  The sharing of components indicates a 
plan to efficiently along organizational resources with policy objectives.  Various 
components, such as procedures and guidelines, are used to “fit” the policy within sub-
units of the organization that must tailor the policy to unique needs or conditions.  The 
lack of components, and more importantly, the lack of documented policy, is noted as a 
condition that signals the lack of organizational resolve to managing the policy problem 
(Knapp and Ferrante 2014, 2009).  
6.1.1 Document Level Analysis 
The first test of hypothesis number one examines whether a document 
structure, as proposed by Doherty, et al (2009), and the process structure proposed by 
Knapp, et al (2009) show increasing formality when comparing universities with and 
without meta-policies.  Georgia Tech and Georgia Southern have formal meta-policies.  
UGA and Georgia State have similar documents, but neither are in-use on a university 
wide bases.  All four have observations that are coded as meta-policy statements.  
These aggregations represent an informal metapolicy. 
So, to begin, each case was examined and data gathered to answer the three 
questions found in the Doherty paper (2009): 
1) Policies cover how many security issues? 
2) How many documents compose the policy? 
3) How do the documents relate to each other? 
 




Table 6-1 Case Policy Descriptive Statistics 
Pearson's Chi-squared test  
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Chi^2 =  742.9476     d.f. =  39     p =  6.221765e-131  
 
 











AUP  107  117  92  145  461  
                              3.35          0.11          5.34         17.29                
                              0.23          0.25          0.20          0.31          0.29  
                               0.24          0.30          0.23          0.41                
                              0.07          0.07          0.06          0.09   
------------------------ --------- ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ 
Awareness     25             4             0             3            32  
                                 29.39          1.91          8.12          2.40                
                                   0.78          0.12          0.00          0.09          0.02  
                                   0.06          0.01          0.00          0.01                
                                      0.02          0.00          0.00          0.00                
------------------------ ----------- ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ 
Copyright             5            27             8             5            45  
                                      4.47         22.87          1.02          2.53                
                                      0.11          0.60          0.18          0.11          0.03  
                                      0.01          0.07          0.02          0.01                
                                      0.00          0.02          0.01          0.00                
------------------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ 
Data Handling            52            73            13           105           243  
                                      3.48          2.90         38.40         47.61                
                                      0.21          0.30          0.05          0.43          0.15  
                                      0.12          0.19          0.03          0.29                
                                      0.03          0.05          0.01          0.07                
----------------------- ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ 
Incident             3            37            12             0            52  
                                      9.03         45.72          0.11         11.60                
                                      0.06          0.71          0.23          0.00          0.03  
                                      0.01          0.09          0.03          0.00                
                                      0.00          0.02          0.01          0.00                
------------------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ 
Information 
Security Program  
         157            86           154            93           490  
                                      3.34          9.96          7.07          2.43                
                                      0.32          0.18          0.31          0.19          0.31  
                                      0.36          0.22          0.38          0.26                
                                      0.10          0.05          0.10          0.06                
------------------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ 
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Password            32             0             0             1            33  
                                     57.19          8.13          8.37          5.50                
                                      0.97          0.00          0.00          0.03          0.02  
                                      0.07          0.00          0.00          0.00                
                                      0.02          0.00          0.00          0.00                
------------------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ----------- ----------- 
Privacy            60             1             6             3            70  
                                     85.09         15.29          7.79         10.19                
                                      0.86          0.01          0.09          0.04          0.04  
                                      0.14          0.00          0.01          0.01                
                                      0.04          0.00          0.00          0.00                
------------------------ ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- 
HIPAA             1             0             0             0             1  
                                      1.89          0.25          0.25          0.22                
                                      1.00          0.00          0.00          0.00          0.00  
                                      0.00          0.00          0.00          0.00                
                                      0.00          0.00          0.00          0.00                
------------------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ 
Continuity             0             1             0             1             2  
                                      0.55          0.52          0.51          0.69                
                                      0.00          0.50          0.00          0.50          0.00  
                                      0.00          0.00          0.00          0.00                
                                      0.00          0.00          0.00          0.00                
------------------------
--- 
------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ 
Cryptography             0             1             2             0             3  
                                      0.83          0.09          2.02          0.67                
                                      0.00          0.33          0.67          0.00          0.00  
                                      0.00          0.00          0.00          0.00                
                                      0.00          0.00          0.00          0.00                
----------------------- ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ 
Electronic Data 
Disposal  
           0            10             2             0            12  
                                      3.32         16.80          0.36          2.68                
                                      0.00          0.83          0.17          0.00          0.01  
                                      0.00          0.03          0.00          0.00                
                                      0.00          0.01          0.00          0.00                
------------------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ 
Resource 
Management  
           0            36           112             0           148  
                                     40.99          0.01      147.56         33.01                
                                      0.00          0.24          0.76          0.00          0.09  
                                      0.00          0.09          0.28          0.00                
                                      0.00          0.02          0.07          0.00                
------------------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ 
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Risk Mgt             0             0             4             0             4  
                                      1.11          0.98          8.78          0.89                
                                      0.00          0.00          1.00          0.00          0.00  
                                      0.00          0.00          0.01          0.00                
                                      0.00          0.00          0.00          0.00                
------------------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ 
Column Total           442           393           405           356          1596  
                                      0.28          0.25          0.25          0.22                
------------------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ 
 
The policy issues on the left hand column represent issues the University System 
of Georgia (USG) requires each of its campuses to cover in their policy.  The number 
underneath the case initials represents the number of documents that cover those 
issues for each case.  The counts within the table represent the units of observation, 
statements, found within those documents as they align with the policy issue those 
statements are designed to regulate. 
The table shows that among all cases, some issues receive more attention.  
Coverage of an Information Security Program and Acceptable Use Policies (AUP) 
represents 60 percent of all statements counted among the cases.  Coverage for Risk 
Management, HIPAA (confidentiality of health data), Continuity planning, Cryptography, 
and Electronic Data Disposal receive almost no attention, comparatively.   AUP is among 
the oldest of policy areas which may explain why so many issues are covered in one 
document.  Areas such as continuity planning require greater inter-organizational 
collaboration and additional resources to plan and to test plans that will ensure the 




The literature suggests that well-structured policy consists of a variety of policy 
components (Table 6-2).  Analysis of a policy document40  identified individual 
statements that are categorized as the criteria in Table 6-1 suggest.  The criteria for 
categorization used for analysis is found in appendix H.4.  For this study, statements that 
did not meet the existing criteria and that referenced external documents were 
considered “Ancillary” components.  Ancillary statements play an important role in 
connecting features of policy found across documents.  So, these statements were not 
discarded. 






Establishes how info sec policies are 
created, implemented, enforced 





management's requirements at a high 
level, defining "what is required" not 
"how to do it".(Moule & Giavara) 
Expresses concerns/objectives at 
“highest level of abstraction” (Baskerville 
and Siponen, 2002) 
a concise document that outlines 
specific requirements, business rules 
or company stance that must be met. 
The policy is the organization’s stance 
on an issue, program or system. It is a 
rule that everyone must meet. 
Standard 
(Square) 
Established rules or requirements that 
must be observed in the execution of 
procedures.   
(Baskerville and Siponen 2002) 
 
a requirement that supports a policy 
Standards: 
Define minimum requirements 
designed to address certain risks 
Define specific requirements that 




instructions which must be followed in 
order to comply with prescribed policies 




suggestion, approach or issue that the 
reader should keep in mind when 
performing a particular task or activity 
(Moule & Giavara) 
a document that suggests a path or 
guidance on how to achieve or reach 




 Organizational policies referenced for 
enforcement or credibility reasons  
                                                     
40 I found such a collection of components within some “policy documents” that the “document” was 
merely a container in which all sorts of statements are found.  The documents for this study contained a 
range of policy areas and components.  A collection of such containers bring to mind the “garbage can” 




A graphical representation of the structure of policy components constructed by 
capturing references among policy documents for each case suggests some differences 
in policy structure.  Georgia Tech (Figure 6-1) references almost all security policy 
documents from one information security document, the GT Computer and Network 
Usage and Security Policy [343].  The document references procedures (solid diamonds), 
policies (solid squares), guidelines (hollow diamond), and ancillary policies.  The best 
formed structure is created by the process to review, develop, and approve policies.  In 
the upper right hand corner of the graph, the sphere represents the document entitled 
“Policy Review Process” [360].  The document, a formal meta-policy, references an 
exception policy and procedures a unit of Georgia Tech must follow to request an 
exemption from a university-wide security policy.  The arrows indicate the directional 
nature of the references found within each of those documents. Each individual 
document references the central information security policy [343] individually. The 
Usage and Security document also references the exception policy [353] giving 
department heads and unit IT personnel explicit direction as to where to learn about the 





Figure 6-1 GT Policy Structure Graphic 
 
 
Georgia Southern (GS) also presents a formal meta-policy in the document 
entitled IT Policy Development and Review Process [336].  However, the network 
structure displayed in the GS graph (Figure 6-2) shows a number of policy documents; 
Appropriate Use, Data Stewardship, Workstation procedures, and Copyright, attached 
to a small set of similar policies and procedures creating four “star” network 





Figure 6-2 Georgia Southern Policy Structure Graphic 
 
Similarly, the graph for UGA (Figure 6-3) shows areas of policy represented by an 
arrangement of procedures and ancillary documents referenced by a single policy 
document for each policy issue.  In Chapter 5, I described the UGA strategy of 
referencing external policy requirements rather than integrating those requirements in 
a university-wide policy.  Those references are identified by the triangles referenced by 
a UGA policy document.  UGA has a single Acceptable Use policy that uses these 
references without providing procedures, guidelines, or other direction for campus 
employees and students.  The UGA Password policy shows more components than any 




studied.  The Secure UGA Plan [466], presented as a memorandum to UGA cabinet 
members, is a meta-policy, but one that has been abandoned.   
 
 
Figure 6-3 UGA Policy Structure Graphic 
 
 
 Finally, Georgia State (GSU) shows a strongly networked collection of documents 
(Figure 6-4).  The central document, University Information Systems Use Policies [361], 
is a collection of policy issues referencing more specific policy documents that, in turn, 
reference procedures.  A couple of horizontal connections are found between the Web 
Policy [374] and the Web Accessibility Policy [373]; and the Information Systems Ethics 
Policy [365] references the Information Security Management System policy (ISMS) 




for policy development that are employed by IT and two other departments of GSU.  
The document does not qualify as a meta-policy because the university did not adopt 
the policy for the entire organization.   
 
 
Figure 6-4 GSU Policy Structure Graphic 
 
 The literature suggests that a well-structured policy system would have each of 
the components represented.  As the findings show, this is not the case.  However, the 
components identified in the graphs are consistent with USG expectations, also 
described in Table 6-1.  The USG does not mention a meta-policy, per se, nor does it 
describe procedures.  However, the USG definition for standards combines the elements 




GT and GSU, present the components under the USG expectations.  GT and GSU exhibit 
the strongest structuring using these components.  UGA represents the weakest 
structuring. 
The general document-level findings are not dissimilar from those discussed by 
Doherty (2009).  The authors noted that universities tended to have an information 
security policy, accompanied by a number of related policies, and then also 
supplemented by a number of specific guidelines and/or practice-related documents” 
(Neil Francis Doherty, Anastasakis, and Fulford 2009, 453).  The graphical analysis 
provides a succinct visualization of that finding. 
Taking the analysis one step further, I examined the data in light of the criteria 
defining the network structure of the documents (Table 6-3).  Georgia Tech’s structure 
shows the strong influence of the meta-policy document and the discipline of creating 
university-wide policy versus the previous history of allowing colleges and departments 
to “opt out” of coverage as they saw fit.  The case meets the minimum criteria of Formal 
structure.  Given time, one can speculate that relative strength will improve.   
An Ad Hoc structure is one that contains a general information security policy, 
accompanied by related policies.  UGA’s structure closely resembles this description.  
The meta-policy document for UGA, shown in the graph, is not in use.  Georgia Southern 
has a stronger array of documents surrounding its Appropriate Use Policy, and it has an 
active, formal meta-policy.  However, no horizontal linkages are found.  This suggests a 
cluster network structure labeled as informal.  However, the existence of a meta-policy 












A general Information Security Policy, accompanied by a number of related policies and 
supplemented by specific guidelines and practice-related documents.  Policy documents 




Policies and standards, supplemented by a number of related guidelines and procedures, 
with each guideline or procedure focused on one aspect of security mgt. The documents x-
reference across types of security issues.  .  A map of these policies demonstrates vertical 
links between policies, standards and procedures with few horizontal links connecting types 
of security issues. [emphasis mine].  A map of documents would present the horizontal links 




A series of inter-related, cross-referenced policies (separate system, product, community, 
and corporate information security policies) –governed by a Meta Policy.   
 
Georgia State (GSU) presents a central security policy document surrounded by a 
number of documents focused on particular policy issues which then reference 
standards and procedures.  A couple of horizontal connections are evident between 
policies.  The absence of a formal meta-policy places GSU has an in the informal 
category. 
To summarize, using the above criteria, the findings suggest the following policy 
structures: 
 GT – Formal 
 GS – Informal (leaning toward formal) 
 GSU – Informal  
 UGA – Ad Hoc 
 
The underlying claim to the research question is that the policy structure reflects 
the governance structure.  So, an ad hoc policy structure is one that shows little 
coordination among policies focused on different cybersecurity areas of concern.  A 
collection of policies that address acceptable use, password protection, data 




the staff and students in a well-structured awareness effort.  Policies that do not take 
advantage of existing organizational procedures for implementation, monitoring, and 
enforcement are likely to be perceived as “not a priority” by individuals charged with 
operational decisions.  If top management participation is not apparent, the perception 
that the policy is not among the organization’s priorities is amplified.  As structure 
improves, then some of these problems are mitigated.  A formal policy structure 
suggests a documented approach to policy making that requires collaboration of all 
stakeholders, the education of individuals, and a concerted effort to fit cybersecurity 
policies within organizational goals, objectives and culture.  The remaining hypotheses 
test these assumptions.  
6.1.2 Measuring Structure –Categorizing Observations 
Both measures, graphical and institutional, are crude measures of structure.  
Both indicate differences in structure among the cases.  Units of observation are 
collected across several documents and across time for each case.  The frequency 
analysis in Table 6-4 shows variation in the proportion of institutions observed within 
each Knapp process.  Those proportions are a crude measure of structure by counting 
institutions. The Chi^2 statistic confirms that a relationship between institutional 
structure and organizational structure exists.  In other words, it is unlikely that the 
proportion of observations that fall in to the Knapp processes are independent of the 






Table 6-4 Frequency Analysis - Observations within Knapp Processes 
Action 
Situation  
         UGA   Ga 
Southern  
         GSU            GT     Row Total  
Approval            19             3            19             9            50  
                                1.92          7.04          3.14          0.42                
                                0.04          0.01          0.05          0.03              0.03    
Awareness and 
Training  
          69            36            23            32           160  
                               13.76          0.29          7.63          0.38                
                                0.16          0.09          0.06          0.09               0.10 
Development            54            54            48            50           206  
                                0.16          0.21          0.35          0.36                
                                0.12          0.14          0.12          0.14               0.13 
Enforcement            39            44            19             5           107  
                                0.36          0.41          0.18          0.05   
                                0.09          0.11          0.05          0.01             0.07   
Implementation           215           221           237           197           870  
                                2.79          0.21          1.19          0.04                
                                0.49          0.56          0.59          0.55           0.55            
Monitoring            17            15            39            17            88  
                                2.23          2.05         12.44          0.35                
                                0.04          0.04          0.10          0.05         0.06       
Review            28            14            18            18            78  
                                1.90          1.41          0.16          0.02                
                                0.06          0.04          0.04          0.05           0.05     
Risk 
Assessment  
           1             4             2            28            35  
                                7.80          2.47          5.33         52.23                
                                0.00          0.01          0.00          0.08          0.02          
            
Retirement  
           0             2             0             0             2  
                                0.55          4.61          0.51          0.45                
                                0.00          0.01          0.00          0.00        0.00        
Column Total 
(N)  
         442           393           405           356          1596  
 N/Table Total                0.28          0.25          0.25          0.22                





  Chi^2 = 166.5745 
 
d.f. = 24 















Table 6-5 Structure Determined by Presence of Knapp Processes 
IAD 
Framework 











GS GSU GT UGA Avg 
Collective Approval Actions required to approve policy; to operationalize the 
policy 









Collective Development Activities include issue identification, definition of scope, 
research and analysis and stakeholder input 


















Collective Review Management review of policy performance, alignment with 
business objectives, and effectiveness given other emerging 
technologies and security issues 











Identification of organizational values, policies that may be 
compromised if certain behaviors are allowed to occur 
N W P W 
0.01 
N 






Operational Awareness and 
Training 
Efforts to communicate to the campus community and to 
train them in the issues related to the policy in question 









Operational Enforcement Judgment of whether a violation of policy occurred; 
application of sanctions 









Operational Implementation Operational level application of the rules and norms 
contained within the policy document 









Operational Monitoring Observation of policy compliance, audits of systems, use of 
automated tools to scan for behaviors not allowed 














The analysis in Table 6-5 provides an opportunity to measure “relative strength” of 
processes.  First, I classify a “Weak” structure one that has fewer statements in a 
process than the average of all cases.  A “Present” structure has average or above 
statements.  “N”o presence is coded when no statements are present for the process. 
Those values are then compared to expectations of structure presented in Table 6-5.  
Relatively speaking, Georgia Tech presents the strongest Knapp structure (4 Ps and 1 N), 
and Georgia Southern (GS) presents the second strongest.  Georgia State and UGA 
present relatively weak Development processes. GSU also has a weak Review process, 
compared to UGA.   
I measured the relative strength of policy structure by examining the results in 
Table 6-4 for deficient (missing or weak) Knapp processes.  My measure is a simple 
count of Knapp processes for each case and whether the process strength maps to 
Formal, Informal, or Ad Hoc structure.  I present two different counts in Table 6-6.  The 
first count is of all Knapp Processes.  The second count removes Retirement from the 
analysis.  Retirement is absent from all cases, except for 2 observations found at Georgia 
Southern.  Elimination of this one process adds some clarity to the structural 
differences. 
Table 6-6 Knapp Process Tallies 
Case Formal Informal Ad Hoc 




























 The results are similar to the ones found when graphing the structure of 
documents.  GT might be labelled a weak Formal, as the analysis by Knapp process adds 
some specificity not previously available.  GS is a strong Informal.  GSU and UGA are 
similar – which would demote GSU to Ad Hoc status.   
 My first hypothesis expected Policy structure to be a reflection of Governance 
structure.  The previous section examined the measurement of policy structure using 
document and statement analysis.  My second hypothesis expects a correlation 
between governance structure and the presence of formal meta-policy: 
 
H2: If an organization possesses a meta-policy then the likelihood that that 
organization observes most if not all of the processes identified in the Knapp 
model is greater than an organization without a meta-policy.   
 
I examine a correlation between the Knapp structure of governance and whether 
that organization possesses a formal meta-policy document.  Table 6-6 summarizes the 
Knapp collective level processes observed for each case. 
Table 6-7 Observed Knapp Processes - Relative Strengths 
 UGA GS GSU GT 
Approval P W P P 
Development W P W P 
Retirement N P N N 
Review P W W P 
Risk Assessment N W N P 
Legend: “N”o process, “W”eak process, “P”rocess Present 
 
The two cases with a meta-policy document, GT and GS, demonstrate an 
observance of most Knapp processes.  I compare the expected strength of processes 




Retirement process, but codes as a Formal structure in all other processes.  The relative 
strength of GS processes map closely to Informal, although its Retirement process is 
stronger than necessary.  UGA and GSU have no statements observed that code for Risk 
Assessment and Retirement.  And, they are both relatively weak in Development.  
Neither UGA nor GSU have a formal meta-policy for information security in use.  The 
relative strength of GT compare to GS, UGA, and GSU suggests there is merit to the 
premise of Hypothesis 2. 
6.1.3 Differences in Components 
The precision of analysis may improve as we move from documents to 
statements and identify these components.  The grammatical analysis of statements 
found in policy documents provide data to align those statements with the types of 
policy components identified by multiple researchers.  As the governance structure 
becomes more formal, I expect the structure of policy will present a more complete set 
of policy components necessary for effective security. 
H3: An effective formal governance structure presents a full complement of 
components and Knapp processes to be effective.   
 
A frequency analysis of policy components (Table 6-8) tests this hypothesis.  
Georgia State (GSU) has the largest proportion (29%) of policy statements coded as 
metapolicy statements.  UGA and GSU have similar proportions (17%) while GT 
metapolicy statements occupy 22% of the total statements identified (Table 6-7). 
Analysis shows that 24% of GSU governing statements are identified with Approval, by 




of statements in the Development action situation with 43% of statements regulating 
activities to develop policy.  The other three cases show roughly similar proportions 
ranging from 55% (GT) to 64% (UGA).     
Table 6-8 Distribution of Observations as Components 
Policy Type UGA Ga 
Southern 
GSU GT Row 
Total 
Cell Contents 
Ancillary             6             3             1             2  12  N 
                        1.55          0.01          0.70          0.28                Chi Square 
Contribution 
                      0.50          0.25          0.08          0.17  0.01  N/Row Total 
                      0.01          0.01          0.00          0.01                N/Col Total 
Guideline            42            10             9            19  80   
Chi^2 =  81.24561 
 
d.f. = 15 
 
p = 4.131141e-11 
                     13.09          6.08          2.44          0.01                
                      0.52          0.12          0.11          0.24  0.05  
                      0.10          0.03          0.03          0.05                
Procedure            78           135            49            93  355  
                      8.05        16.84          4.75          0.61                
                      0.22          0.38          0.14          0.26  0.24  
                      0.18          0.35          0.18          0.26                
Standard           132           100            74            70  376  
                      2.93          0.00          0.15          4.78                
                      0.35          0.27          0.20          0.19  0.26  
                      0.30          0.26          0.27          0.20                
Policy           110            75            63            93  341  
                      0.45          2.90          0.02          1.37                
                      0.32          0.22          0.18          0.27  0.23  
                      0.25          0.19          0.23          0.26                
Metapolicy            74            68            79            76  297  
                      2.80          1.66          9.54          0.25                
                      0.25          0.23          0.27          0.26  0.20  
                      0.17          0.17          0.29          0.22                
Column 
Total  
         442           391           275           353  1461  
                      0.30          0.27          0.19          0.24                
 
Graphing the distribution of components as a percentage of the total statements 
observed (Figure6-6) shows that the two cases with formal meta-policy documents, GT 
and GS, share similar distributions of statements across the components from meta-
policy through procedure.  The variance in proportions, and the direction of that 




meta-policies in use, show similar behaviors both in quantity and direction of change in 
proportions as well.   
UGA and GSU are similar in the representation of components with the 
exception of use of guidelines, where UGA is superior to GSU.  UGA and GSU seem to be 
biased to expressing policy in terms of statements that define specific requirements that 
must be met by all individuals.  GT and GS show a balance between outlining 
organizational and management responsibilities (meta-policies and policies) and those 
specific requirements found in standards and guidelines.  Such a distribution is 
consistent with the relative strengths of Knapp processes measured above.   
 
 
Figure 6-5 Distribution of Components 
 
The third hypothesis is not supported in this analysis.  Most of the data points 
are within 1 standard deviation of the mean for each component.  GSU and UGA tend to 










Ancillary Guideline Procedure Standard Policy Metapolicy




Outside of that pattern, you cannot attribute the presence of policy components to 
formality of structure.   
6.1.4 Dialing in Precision 
The next set of hypotheses test variations in structure by examining meta-policy 
statements within the distinct tasks that the ACUPA model proposes (Table 6-9). I 
identified the ACUPA step for each statement by aligning the aIm with the task 
description for each step.  Each statement was also coded for rule type using the criteria 
discussed in chapter 4.  The statements grouped by the appropriate ACUPA steps are 
shown in tables identified by case in the appendix41.  The total number of metapolicy 
statements for each case is similar, the graph (Figure 6-6) showing the proportion of 
observations within each ACUPA Action Situation shows the different emphasis on 
specific governance tasks for each case.  
 
                                                     
41 Georgia State (GS) – Appendix J; Georgia Southern (GSU) – Appendix K; Georgia Tech (GT) – Appendix L; 
UGA (UGA) – Appendix M 
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Scans for changes in law, threat, best 
practices, etc. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
1.02 may identify need/issue 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
2 Miscellaneous 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
2.01 Identify Owners 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 3 0 2 3 0 0 1 0 6 15
2.02
Determine Path (Policy Plan – Scope 
Definition) 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 4 9
2.03 Assemble Team 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 3 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 3 1 0 0 11 0 15 29
2.04 Gather Data 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 4
2.06 Determine Risks 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 4
2.07 Determine Stakeholders 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 3 7
2.08 Determine solutions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 5
2.09 Can present policy be revised? 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 7
2.10 Determine need for new policy 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 3 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 3 12
3.01 Agree on Definitions 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3
3.02 Drafts Policy -Use Common Format 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
3.03 presents drafts to stakeholders 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 11
3.04 review and vet proposals 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 5 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 9
3.05
presents to policy advisory 
Committee 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
4.01
Presents policies for approval to 
advisory committee 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 1 3 2 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
4.02
Considers/approves/modifies 
proposals 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 8 0 0 4 0 13 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 17
4.03 collects comments/revises as needed 0 0 2 3 0 0 1 6 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15
4.04 Obtain Approvals 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 0 2 0 0 0 0 7 13
5.01 Plan Communications 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 4
5.02 Put online 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
5.03 Provide searches 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
5.04 Communicates policy to audiences 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 10
6.01 Versions new policy 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 4 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
6.02 Archives old policy 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
6.03 Establishes schedule for review 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 7 11
6.04 Determines review procedures 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 2 7 0 0 0 9 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 4 2 2 4 0 0 0 0 8 25
6.05 solicits feedback 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 0 0 0 5 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 3 8
6.06 Reviews risk and Cost 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12
6.07
Recommends whether policy still 
needed 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 4 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
7 Miscellaneous 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
7.01 Measures/monitors outcomes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 6
7.02 Enforcement 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 4
(blank)




The relevance of Table 6-9 is how it summarizes the differences in structure 
among the cases for each ACUPA step.  The table succinctly presents the types of rules 
that each case employs to accomplish the objective of that step.  The configuration of 
rule types (i.e. number of Choice, Information, Scope rules) defines the context within 
which actors make the decisions that are linked together as the tasks are completed to 
create policy decisions.  In the next section, I highlight the role that the grammatical 
components play in determining and identifying the signature features of governance 
structure for each case.  The “actor” for each step is included to complete the set of 
data required to understand the structure of each task. 
6.2 Organizational Conditions – Differences Compared 
Organizational conditions are described in the development of the research 
framework (Ch. 2) and the discussion of hypotheses (Ch. 3).  Two of the most influential 
conditions, Top Management Support and Collaboration, are analyzed as they are the 
most likely to affect the structure of governance and policy for the cases. 
6.2.1 TMS 
Top Management Support (TMS) is a criteria for success that is prevalent in the 
literature and in the security standards (PCI, ACUPA, ISO) described in chapter 5.  
Institutions are employed to select agents acting on behalf of an organization in 
different decision contexts (McGinnis 2011b, 54).  The influence of top management 
support is reflected in the institutions that govern behavior (Purvis, Sambamurthy, and 




policy and ineffective or weak cybersecurity (Chan, Woon, and Kankanhalli 2005; Goo, 
Yim, and Kim 2013; Thong, Yap, and Raman 1996; Kankanhalli et al. 2003b; Hu et al. 
2012).   
I suggested in chapter three that the number of principals of the organization 
within the governance structure is a proxy for Top Management Support (TMS).  If all of 
the vice presidents of a college are engaged in the policy making decisions, then it is 
reasonable to expect that the structure of cyber security governance will approach the 
emergence level (i.e. tailored to the organization, able to respond easily to changing 
external and organizational conditions).  The review of standards (PCI, ISO, AGILE) 
support this proposition.  Requiring actors to participate may be seen as action on the 
part of top management to make security a priority of the organization.   
6.2.1.1 TMS Findings 
I created a categorical variable to assign the Attribute of each institutional 
statement into categories of: Individual, Top Management, Organization, and Vendor42.  
The distribution of Attributes within metapolicy statements for each organization is 
shown in Table 6-10.  Georgia Southern shows an overwhelming percentage of 
Attributes coded as Top Management (85%).  Almost 3 of every 5 UGA metapolicy 
statements identify a member of Top Management as Attribute, while 34 percent of GT 
statements and 29 percent of GSU statements identify as TMS.   
UGA and Georgia Southern are more likely to assign responsibility for 
policymaking to top management positions while Georgia Tech and Georgia State are 
                                                     




more likely to assign the responsibility to an organizational entity (e.g. department, 
division, or the university.  The president of every campus is bound to participate with 
the position of final approver (as the USG rule holds the president responsible for policy 
compliance).   
 
Table 6-10  Attribute Category by Case 
Category           UGA   Ga 
Southern  
         GSU            GT     Row Total  
  Individual             1             2             3             0             6  
                      0.16          0.29          1.24          1.54                
                      0.17          0.33          0.50          0.00          0.02  
                      0.01          0.03          0.04          0.00                
                      0.00          0.01          0.01          0.00                
Organization            29             8            53            50           140  
                      0.99         18.05          6.67          5.61                
                      0.21          0.06          0.38          0.36          0.47  
                      0.39          0.12          0.67          0.66                
                      0.10          0.03          0.18          0.17                
     Top Mgt            44            58            23            26           151  
                      1.08         15.88          7.34          4.13                
                      0.29          0.38          0.15          0.17          0.51  
                      0.59          0.85          0.29          0.34                
                      0.15          0.20          0.08          0.09                
Column 
Total  
          74            68            79            76           297  
                      0.25          0.23          0.27          0.26                
 
Pearson's Chi-squared test  
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Chi^2 =  62.96843     d.f. =  6     p =  1.120226e-11 
 
 
   Cell Contents 
------------------------- 
                       N  
 Chi-square 
contribution  
           N / Row Total  
           N / Col Total  






An analysis of the cases revealed that all boundary rules were compulsory but 
for those that left it up to an actor to invite actors to participate (Table 6-11). 
Table 6-11 Boundary Rules establishing teams 
Actor Georgia Southern Georgia State Georgia Tech UGA 
President 1st Order (USG) 1st Order – USG 1st Order – USG 1st Order – 
USG 
CIO 1st Order 1st Order  1st Order 1st Order 
CISO Invite CIO 1st Order  1st Order 1st Order 
Legal Affairs Invite CIO 1st Order  1st Order 1st Order 
Internal Audit Invite CIO 1st Order  1st Order 1st Order 
Faculty and 
Research 
  Invite CIO 1st Order 
Bursar   Invite CIO 1st Order 
Extended 
Campuses 
  Invite CIO 1st Order 
Finance Invite CIO Invite 1st Order 1st Order 
Human Resources Invite CIO Invite  1st Order 1st Order 
Public Affairs Invite CIO   1st Order 
IT – Policy 
Compliance 
NA NA 1st Order NA 
Registrar Invite CIO Invite 1st Order 1st Order - 
PCI 
IT – Enterprise Invite CIO Invite 1st Order Invite CISO 
Subject Matter 
Experts 
Invite Invite 1st Order Invite - CISO 
Policy (Process) 
Owners 
Invite CIO Invite CISO/CIO Invite CISO/CIO Invite - CISO 
Stakeholders Invite CIO Invite CISO/CIO Invite CISO Invite CISO 
Others Invite CIO Invite CISO/CIO Invite CISO Invite -CISO 
     
 
UGA has significant and compulsory participation of TMS per the formal rules.  
However, interview data acknowledges that model is not the routine.  The rules-in-use 
at UGA keep the top management informed, but avoid the formality of policy 
development by electing to reference externally mandated requirements.  Georgia State 
formally engages top management once policy is proposed through the University-wide 
Policy process.  The Information Security Management System, the metapolicy 




GSU, two of those are IT departments.  Engagement of TMS in the identification of 
issues and in the analysis is minimal.  Georgia Southern and Georgia Tech are found to 
have rigorous TMS within their respective systems.  Georgia Southern employs a mostly 
informal metapolicy based upon the AGILE philosophy with some formal rules found in 
the IT Policy and Development Review Process document [336].  Georgia Tech has a 
formal metapolicy which is found to be used consistently. 
6.2.1.2 Assessment of TMS Effects 
I explored three hypotheses that suggest a simple relationship between the 
formality of policy structure, how many Knapp processes are present, and the numbers 
of top management officials that participate in the policy process.   
H4a: Governance structure will resemble the ideal Knapp model as the number 
of principals identified in 1st order boundary rules increase. 
 
H4b: High TMS is likely accompanied by compulsory Boundary rules requiring the 
participation of a number of principals of the organization.   
 
H4c: If there are no compulsory boundary rules, then the likelihood that a 
techno-centric governance process increases.  TMS will be “lower” than in 
organizations with compulsory boundary rules. 
 
A review of the counts of statements observed within Knapp Action situation 
(Table 6-4) and the TMS actors identified (Table 6-10) does not lead to a clear conclusion 
concerning the first hypothesis.  The basic premise suggests that an effective 
governance structure is more likely to be present when TMS support is high because the 
managers will not waste time and resources on ineffective procedures.   
Simple counts don’t provide enough information to draw conclusions.  The 




counts alone to draw conclusions.  Each case has Knapp situations with very few 
statements, and the Development situation is generally robust.   
However, adding context and identification of key features suggests some 
conclusion may be drawn on the relationship of TMS and Knapp structure. GSU invests 
24% of observed metapolicy statements into the process of policy approval.  All but one 
of those approval observations (see Appendix P) occur only if a policy reaches the Policy 
Advisory Group formed on behalf of the faculty senate under the University Wide Policy 
on Policies [475].  The interview with the GSU CISO indicated that the CIO would present 
a draft policy [470:12] only after the Office of Legal Affairs deemed the policy change as 
necessary [470:7] (see Appendix M).  And, until that approval is gained, the process for 
developing security policy at GSU rests with the efforts of the CISO.  There is no formal 
process to bring actors together to initiate a policy review until the CISO gets the Office 
of Legal Affairs to agree that a new policy or policy revision is necessary.  This finding 
suggests that TMS support is weak in the GSU structure and that the policy process, as it 
is, is IT centric.  The finding also fits the ideal of a “feature” which sets one map of 
institutions apart from another (Aligica 2006). 
UGA presents strong, compulsory rules developed at the behest of the auditors 
from the Payment Card Industry (see documents 466 – SecureGA Plan and 472 – UGA 
Security Committee Charter).  The first-order compulsory rules identifying TMS actors to 
participate are set by those documents.  However, the interview [471] with the UGA 
CISO indicated the team of top management is not active.  Review of the statements 




as the most active actors and the actors responsible for inviting other team members to 
participate.   
The norm for complying with external mandates for policy change is to reference 
those mandates within the UGA policies [471:16].  In fact, the statement noted that 
policy restating external requirements was forbidden.  Simply referencing the external 
document in user agreements helped the organization avoid the time and resource 
consuming processes necessary to gain consensus to adopt a revised policy tailored to 
the UGA organizational conditions43.  As is the GSU case, the actors are from the IT 
domain and TMS support is not required for the references to be made in lieu of a 
formal policy process. 
Georgia Tech and Georgia Southern demonstrate strong engagement of TMS.  
Georgia Southern relies mostly upon the norms found within the AGILE philosophy 
(described in Chapter 5).  Georgia Tech formally requires participation of upper 
management on the committee that decides whether the policy process is initiative, and 
if so, decides when the policy process has produced an outcome to be forwarded to the 
cabinet and President for final approval.  The GT process also sets expectations that the 
Compliance Manager, in concert with the CISO and CIO, work to keep all appropriate 
sub-divisions of the university engaged in the drafting, revision, approval, and 
awareness processes.  Notably, both organizations reported that the time required to 
                                                     
43 Of course, this rule also raises the prospect that autonomy is a strong organizational condition to be 




produce a policy was reduced to a period of 4 to 6 months.  A contrast to the timetable 
of 18-24 months noted by the CISOs at UGA and GSU.   
An examination of the institutions governing actors, top management, and 
collaboration adds information to the determination of the influence of TMS in these 
cases.  Criteria examining how actors defined in TMS are engaged is presented in Table 
6-12.  Based on these criteria, the structure is determined to be Formal, perhaps leaning 
towards informal. 
Table 6-12 Collective Level Structure Assessment 
CRITERIA  ASSESSMENT GT GS GSU UGA 
ACTORS REPRESENT THE SUB-
UNITS  AND INDIVIDIUALS 
WITHIN THE ORGANIZATION 
Rules-in-use require 




Yes Yes No No  
TOP MANAGEMENT 
SIGNIFICANTLY ENGAGED (BY 
NUMBER OF ACTIONS AS 
ATTRIBUTE, IDENTIFIED IN 
COMPULSORY BOUNDARY 
RULES 
Formally identified as 
Attribute responsible 
for actions; boundary 





No No  
 







This evaluative criteria connects the observations of institutions with actors.  The 
data from GT supports all three hypotheses.  The policy process [360] provides strong 
formal relationships between TMS actors and the process, defining areas of 
engagement, and ties to outcomes.  The process document describes the steps 
acknowledged by the Knapp model to be necessary for effective policy governance, with 
the exception of a formal retirement policy.  Georgia Southern provides evidence that a 
norm-driven philosophy can be as successful as the formal structure provided at GT.  




stakeholders and TMS as well.  The rules-in-use, as Ostrom and others have noted, are 
the observations which matter.  At GT the rules-in-form are, largely, the rules-in-use. 
GSU and UGA indicate that rules-in-use are not necessarily the same as rules-in-
form.  As the criteria suggest, TMS in both cases is relatively weaker than TMS found at 
GT and GS.  GSU demonstrated in the three sub-divisions that adopted the formal ISO-
27002 standards how effective policy can be in regulating behavior.  However, in the 
other areas of GSU that reside under the “umbrella policy” philosophy of the Office of 
Legal Affairs, alignment of organizational policy with external mandates has not 
occurred.  The removal of the observations from the Information Security Management 
System document [367], developed for the ISO 27002 implementation, and the 
University-Wide Policy on Policies [475], eliminates 70% of the formal metapolicy 
observations as well as almost all the TMS actors found in those attributes.  The 
governance structure is largely ad hoc, supporting the premise of all three hypotheses. 
UGA also provides evidence that the active engagement of TMS makes a 
difference in the governance structure.  TMS support is formally required in the two 
documents created as an outcome of collaborating with the Payment Card Industry.  
But, outside of the security policies directed at credit card information, the TMS levels 
drop back to an IT centric model of policy governance.  The quick answer to new policy 
mandates is to place a reference in existing policy.  The lack of TMS is observed in this 
Choice rule directing that no tailoring, no formatting, no scoping be applied to align the 




the Knapp model as the GT and GS structures are.  Without strong TMS, the first three 
hypotheses are supported. 
Clearly, the presence of first order rules-in-form does not guarantee strong TMS 
influence within an organization.  It is apparent that “Rules-in-use” may construct an 
entirely different set of actors than those found in the written documents.  Therefore, 
Hypothesis 4a is not clearly supported.  When I focused on rules-in-use, then the 
number of compulsory boundary rules requiring diverse yet influential participation of 
Top Management aligned with the data on formality of structure.  Georgia Tech shows 
the strongest TMS influence.  Georgia Southern shows weak formal TMS influence, yet 
the practice, as guided by AGILE, provides a relatively stronger influence of TMS than 
GSU or UGA.  Hypothesis 4b is supported. The interview data of the latter two cases 
confirmed a largely techno centric approach to policy making.  Both UGA and GSU 
present the weakest governance structures.  Hypothesis 4c is supported by this 
evidence. 
6.2.2 Collaboration and Autonomy 
Theory suggests that in addition to TMS, collaboration among the stakeholders is 
an important criteria for development of effective policy.  However, autonomy of 
departments and divisions may defeat the positive effects of collaboration and 
frustrate policy effectiveness.  Tailoring the content of policy to align with 
organizational objectives, culture, and other conditions improves effectiveness.  
Tailoring occurs when stakeholders are able to submit modifications that are adapted 




by those same stakeholders to inspect whether the modifications were accepted. The 
form of policy content is also more likely to align with the needs of stakeholders if 
those same stakeholders review the content prior to publication.  So, tailoring depends 
upon strong collaboration between top management, security managers, and 
stakeholders. 
6.2.2.1 Open Boundary Rules 
“Open” boundary rules allow individuals flexibility to enter and leave action 
situations based on their desire to participate.  The invitation boundary rules are the 
type of “open” boundary rules thought to encourage collaboration.  Hypothesis 5a 
examines the relationship between rules that set criteria to guarantee participation of 
individuals affected by a potential rule to participate.  
H5a: The presence of Open Boundary Rules setting the criteria for participation 
in making security policy reflects an organizational condition that values 
collaboration. An Ad Hoc structure will be the least likely to present Open 
Boundary rules.  A Formal structure is likely to present Open Boundary Rules. 
 
The findings suggest that “openness” varies by case.  The rules that set the 
criteria for participation are found in Appendix N – “Conduct Analysis” and Appendix O 
– “Draft Policy”.  At UGA, the CISO and CIO set the agenda and scope of policy 
development in “consultation with stakeholders” [471:14].  Those stakeholders are 
identified and invited on an ad hoc basis [471:7].  And, the CISO refines the strategy for 
developing policy in consultation with team members [471:3].   
A similar criteria is employed at GSU to select individuals to participate in the 
“early” analysis prior to the critical decision by the Office of Legal Affairs as to whether 




Policies”).  The CISO indicated that the Office of Legal Affairs preferred the Network 
Standards Policy [368], adopted in January of 2004, in lieu of new policy, if it all 
possible.  Per this “umbrella policy”, the CISO is the individual responsible for working 
with Information resource owners, data administrators, and “functional” users to 
develop policy [368:3].  “Functional” users is a vague term that refers to those using an 
application in the course of the business day. Observation 361:20 provides that the 
Information Technology Senate Sub-committee has responsibility to decide upon 
changes to policies.  However, the CISO stated that committee had not met in many 
years after the departure of its last chair.  Opportunities for other stakeholders to 
participate are not defined under these procedures. 
The rules-in-use at Georgia Southern are driven by AGILE design principles to 
take input, turn around modified policies, and achieve approvals across these groups in 
a network of activity versus pushing drafts of policy through a top-down structure of 
communication.  The AGILE design approach focuses on consensus rather than 
authority.  While the formal rules for policy development are non-symmetric (i.e. top-
down management decisions), the informal rules are symmetric, allowing the actors to 
work towards consensus using flows of information to inform group decision-making.  
The feedback encouraged by AGILE reflects the Circular processes in the Knapp model 
which both practice and theory acknowledge as necessary for effective policy. 
Collaboration by the many stakeholders in the GT policy process is encouraged 
both formally and informally. A number of observations implicitly define who may 




(ACUPA 3.03, [360:30]), to vet proposals (ACUPA 3.04, [476:4]) and to approve (e.g. 
ACUPA 4.03, [476:8])44.  There are also actors that participate in the policy process due 
to their position in adjacent action situations (budgeting, institutional research boards, 
etc.). 
Information rules requiring the distribution of policy drafts and evidence 
supporting the policy drafts indirectly create opportunities for participation45.  The 
Policy Review Policy [360] requires the Policy Compliance Manager (PCM) to 
communicate all prospective changes to the community representatives, and to seek 
input from the same. The CIO is required to discuss policy proposals with the executive 
leadership team [476:1].  Drafts of the proposals must be discussed among members of 
the Policy Review Committee [360:37], meet with data stewards and policy owners 
[476:3], Human Resources and Legal Affairs [476:11], deans and unit IT directors 
[476:6], the faculty senate committee [476:7], the faculty executive board [476:7], and 
seek input from a variety of technical communities on campus [360:27].  The PCM must 
socialize draft policies with the student government, faculty members, and the PRC and 
solicit feedback from those groups [360:28-30].  The Policy Review Committee has to 
provide “feedback and constructive criticism” within the context of their individual 
                                                     
44 In the final chapter, I discuss a proposed methodology change to allow assigning of multiple rule types, 
action situations, and policy areas to a unit of observation and how that may increase the descriptive 
power of this approach. 
45 This is an example of observations that are directly coded as one rule type (information) that by 
inference create another rule type (boundary).  In this case the OBJECTs of the rule (sharing and feedback 
of information) are the stakeholders from whom the Attributes are expected to receive information and 
support.  Clearly, informal rules exist to “open” the participation to many who care, and others, who by 
title, have responsibility for areas affected by the proposed draft.  I will discuss this item further in 




functional responsibilities [360:13-14].  Finally, the policy must be published in a 
manner that facilitates access by the entire campus [344:71, 353:26,353:29,360:38-39]. 
 As the sequence of findings ranging from UGA to GT suggest, as the participation 
in the process becomes more open, the Knapp processes become more explicit in the 
depth of the activities for development, risk assessment, and review of policies.  The GS 
and GT actions found in Appendices M and N display a more diverse configuration of 
Choice, Information, and Scope rules than UGA or GSU.  The opportunities recognized 
to include stakeholders in the observations for UGA and GSU decrease significantly 
when the observations are limited to “rules-in-use”.  At the same time, the relative 
strength of GT and GS rules-in-use for open participation remain strong.  The evidence 
supports Hypothesis 5a. 
6.2.2.2 Absence of Invitation Rule – indicates ad hoc structure  
H5b: The absence of an invitation boundary rule specifying participation of 
university leadership will increase the likelihood of a governance structure that is 
largely ad hoc in nature. 
 
The hypothesis expects that unless an invitation boundary rule specifies 
university leadership then you are more likely to find an ad hoc policy governance 
structure.  The findings for Hypothesis 5b, based on observed data (Table 6-11) alone 
suggest that GS and GSU are more likely to have Knapp deficient structures while GT 
and UGA will have more complete governance structures.  A comparison of Georgia 
Southern and UGA institutions (Appendix M) suggests the relationship between the 




There are three tasks identified in the ACUPA model (Table 6-4) that specifically 
identify policy owners (2.01), policy team (2.03), and policy stakeholders (2.07). Both GS 
and UGA have similar counts of Boundary rules.  However, UGA has far more 
observations (24) in these three areas than GS (10).  A significant number of 
observations are coded as Position rules for Step 2.03 “Assemble Team”.   
Coding rule types is done based on the verb form of the aIm component of the 
observation. The aIm component is the variable describing statement outcomes, actions 
or goals (Appendix H, Table 5). A Position rule is determined by whether the Aim verb is 
of the form “be”.  A Boundary rule is determined when the Aim verb suggests an action 
that allows an actor to “enter” or “leave” the action situation (Appendix H, Table 9).   
A number of Position Rules found in the UGA data indicate the required 
participation of much of the leadership.  The UGA observations show a number of 
observations coded as position rules specifying the participation of individuals from 
“Legal Affairs”, “Bursar”, “Human Resources”, etc.  By inference, these actors must be 
allowed to “enter” the respective action situations.  Coding these Position rules required 
counting them as mandatory Boundary rules for the construction of the table showing 
TMS via participation of leadership (Table 6-11). 
Requiring an observation to specify participation directly is also problematic.  
Georgia Southern has specific invite rules that do not mention “faculty”, “Bursar”, or 
“Extended Campuses” like UGA.  However, interview data shows that the CIO and CISO 
make every effort to include all appropriate leadership in policy discussions.  These 




the AGILE design method.  So, while an observation specifying participation does not 
exist in the GS case, the rules-in-use indicate that a flexible rule for inclusion does 
permit participation, and in fact encourages participation.   
A final observation, when you eliminate the observations from the documents 
created as part of the PCI supervised audit of security at UGA, the mandatory 
participation rules disappear.  None of the “invite” boundary rules specify campus 
leadership at UGA.  Given the issues discussed, I am unable to draw a conclusion 
regarding Hypothesis 5b although individual cases generally support the concept, with 
UGA being the sole exception.  
6.2.2.3 Presence of Symmetric Aggregation indicates existence of collaborative 
culture 
 
H5c: The presence of symmetric Aggregation rules along with Open Boundary 
rules reflects existence of a collaborative culture and the governance structure is 
more likely to resemble a completed Knapp model. 
 
A symmetric aggregation rule indicates a democratic process of achieving 
consensus. Symmetric implies relative equality among the actors for making decisions 
on outcomes.  If these types of rules exists, then one expects the organization has a 
collaborative culture supporting the rule.  Aggregation rules “determine the control an 
actor may exercise over the selection of an action” (E. Ostrom and Crawford 2005a, 
191).   
Observations coded as Aggregation rules are sorted by organization and ACUPA 
step (Appendix T).  A scan shows a few observations inferring a consensus or majority of 




Table 6-13 Example Symmetrical Aggregation Rules 











the University Senate 
(academic and 










prior to final 
approval by the 
President, as 








Document 472 is the Security Charter which UGA does not maintain as a set of 
current rules-in-use.  Elimination of observations from this document brings the UGA 
decision action back to the structure employed prior to the Payment Card Industry 
audit.  The UGA Network Security Standards, document 381, approved in 2005 and the 
Password policy, origins unclear but language consistent with 2001 versions found in 
other cases, place the sole decision-making authority with regards to a final policy 
version on the shoulders of the CISO and CIO [382:30, 381:29].  In a sense, the 
structure evolved from a non-symmetric Aggregation rule found in these statements 
(circa 2001-2004), to a democratic consensus found in the Security Charter created 
during the PCI audit (2008), back to a non-symmetric rule [471:15] (2011). 
GSU Aggregation rules show a required consensus via observations found in the 
University Policy on University-Wide Policies [475].  But, we know that this process 
cannot be executed unless the Office of Legal Affairs approves the need for policy and 
the policy draft [470:6].  The sole exception is the requirement within the Network 
Standards policy [368].  This policy requires the Information Security Officer to work 




policy components.  But, no consensus is required to create policy as that condition is 
reserved to the Senate and Administrative Council.   
Once again, I find that a single rule type does not meet the necessary and 
sufficient conditions to unilaterally affect structure.  Other rule types contribute to the 
decision process.   
Georgia Southern has formal rules in place that strongly suggest the CIO and 
CISO have broad, almost unilateral authority to make final decisions [336:46].  The 
Aggregation rules observed at Georgia provide the CIO with similar authority [343:184].  
In both cases, other rule types create a decision structure that cannot move forward 
without some level of consensus.  Georgia Southern specifically grants the Team 
authority to simplify a policy [473:9] prior to seeking feedback from the Technology 
Advisory Council [474:8] and informing Stakeholders [336:21].  Both the CIO and CISO 
are required to inform stakeholders and solicit their input [336:18-22].  Both positions 
are required to seek input from Legal Affairs [470:18], and Audits [470:9].  All of these 
actions are coded as Choice.  The Georgia Tech process has both formal and informal 
rules requiring multiple levels of information exchange and feedback.  For example, a 
rule coded as Information requires the GT Information Security Office to “vet the 
proposal” with the “faculty executive board, faculty senate, and all units of the 
campus” [476:4]. 
At UGA, the CISO refines the strategy for developing policy in consultation with 
team members [471:3].  The final decision to develop policy is defined by a Choice rule 




Attribute “UGA”, implying that the cabinet, President, and IT team reach a consensus 
after reviewing all alternatives.  Those alternatives are carefully considered because 
the “cost” of developing policy is the 18-24 months of effort required to create 
university policy.  For that reason, an unwritten rule is found that forbids UGA from 
developing policy documents if those documents replicate policy mandated by an 
external entity such as the Board of Regents, the U.S. Congress, and the state 
legislature [471:16].  In sum, UGA defaults to referencing an external requirement.  This 
decision does not require consensus of stakeholders.   
Clearly, a true test of the premise of the hypothesis, should consider the effects 
of the configuration of rules, rather than relying upon a specific instance of a rule type.  
The “final approvals” rules are found in Step 4 “Get Approvals”.  I eliminate the 
documents no longer in use at UGA [Security Charter] and GSU [University Policy on 
University-Wide Polices].  With this action, GSU presents zero observations in this step.  
The hypothesis suggests an Ad Hoc structure for GSU.  UGA is left with rules from the 
Password policy document.  Given no reference to other policy types, the hypothesis 
suggests UGA has a structure deficient in Knapp processes.  Georgia Southern presents 
a configuration of Choice, Information and Scope rule types that suggests a rigorous 
feedback mechanism.  In fact, the Scope rule requires that “Policy Owners must satisfy 
the stakeholders through timely and continuous policy actions” [473:1].  This statement 
comes from the AGILE document, but its intent is reflected in the number and the Aims 
of the statements from other policy documents.  The hypothesis suggests Georgia 




Tech presents a number of Information rules requiring the exchange of policy drafts 
and feedback with stakeholders and Choice rules requiring approval by the Policy 
Review Committee, composed of many campus leaders, and the Cabinet.  Again, the 
hypotheses suggests GT has reflects a stronger Knapp model.  Hypothesis 5c is 
supported. 
6.2.2.4 Presence of Information rules exchanging data among actors 
H5d:  The presence of information rules requiring the exchange of information 
among actors indicates the existence of a collaborative culture and indicates a 
stronger governance structure when compared to cases without such rules. 
 
 An Information rule is determined by verbs indicating a “send or receive” 
function (E. Ostrom and Crawford 2005a, 191).  I collected all observations coded as 
Information rules (Appendix U).  UGA has one such observation [472:21].  The 
hypothesis suggests it is unlikely that UGA’s governance structure will resemble the 
Knapp Model.   
 GSU has 22 such observations.  A frequency analysis of Information Rules per 
Policy Document shows that 5 of the observations originate from the University Policy 
on University Wide Policies [475].  Three observations are sourced to the interview 
[470].  The remaining 14 come from the Information Security Management System 
Policy (ISMS) [367], a product of the limited implementation of the ISO 27002 security 
standard.  The three statements found in the interview state that the CISO must present 
draft policy to Internal Audits, CIO, and the responsible Administrative council.  
Observations found in the ISMS document detail the types of information to be included 




appropriate stakeholders.  As this policy applies to only three divisions, the hypothesis, 
at best, indicates a partially recognizable Knapp model at GSU. 
 Georgia Southern Information rules outline what information should be 
distributed to whom and when.  The rules are found in the IT Policy Development and 
Review Process document [336].  The hypothesis suggests GS will present a structure 
strongly resembling the Knapp model. 
 Finally, GT presents the strongest presentation of Information rules with 32 
observations, accounting for almost half of the 76 metapolicy observations analyzed.  
The observations offer detailed direction as to what information is offered when to 
which groups.  The hypotheses suggests GT governance structure more strongly 
resembles the Knapp model.  Hypothesis 5d is supported. 
6.2.3 Autonomy 
H6: If Scope rules limit actions of sub-units to modify policies, the governance 
structure is likely to resemble a Knapp model. 
  
 This hypothesis focuses on observations that restrain the sub-units of a case 
from amending or ignoring university policy.  Scope rules define outcomes that must, 
must not, or may be affected by actions taken (Ostrom and Crawford 2005b, 208).  
Scope rules constrain the range of outcomes available (Ostrom and Crawford 2005b, 
208).  A scope rule may be used to affect an outcome otherwise not attainable using 
choice rules.  I collected all observed Scope rules in Appendix V.  The findings indicate 




 There are no observations coded as Scope statements for GSU.  The hypothesis 
indicates GSU governance structure will have deficiencies when compared to the Knapp 
model and other cases with such statements. 
UGA explicitly restrains its departments from amending the password policy.  
Given that is the sole observation, the hypothesis indicates autonomy is strong and the 
governance structure at UGA will be deficient when compared to the Knapp model. 
Autonomy is restrained under the GT Policy Review Process [360].  Scope rules 
make it clear that organizational units of GT (i.e. Campus units, GT Organizations) must 
not reduce the requirements established by this process [343:14].  The same units may 
augment [343:13] restrictions but at no time may campus units create rules that take 
precedence over policy created by the process [476:5].  Individuals from Information 
Security, Internal Audits, and the unit requesting the exception must review the 
proposals [353:16], gain the approval of top management for the request[353:17], and 
evaluate the request within given parameters [353:19-21].  The hypothesis suggests that 
the GT structure is likely to be formal. 
The formal observation, found in the Acceptable Use Policy published by Georgia 
Southern [332] says the University must, at a minimum, comply with USG policy.  A 
statement of scope pertaining to satisfying stakeholders may suggest a “tip-of-the hat” 
to a group’s autonomy.  But, a clarifying statement from the interview of the Georgia 




policy is strongly discouraged46.  Hypothesis indicates GS governance structure should 
strongly resemble Knapp. 
6.3 Summary - How does the governance structure vary among the cases? 
The chapter began by following a document level analysis of policy structure.  
That structure is hypothesized to reflect an appropriately formal level of governance 
structure.  The tools of the IAD framework identified configurations of rules and actors 
that were thought to be present in Formal structures and weakly present in informal 
structures.  Drilling down into the specific ACUPA tasks provided support for the notion 
that formality of structure is found in organizations with strong TMS and a culture of 
collaboration.  The analysis of observations within ACUPA sets also confirmed that it is 
the “configuration of rules”, rather than the presence of a single rule type, that is 
important to rigorous analysis of these structures. 
External conditions clearly provided incentive for a change in governance.  We 
have two cases, Georgia Tech and UGA, which experienced major breaches involving 
credit card data.  GT responded to the coercive pressure brought to bear by the 
Payment Card Industry by restructuring governance of policy making and increasing the 
negative payoff for non-compliance by deans and department heads.  UGA responded 
                                                     
46 Interview indicates pro-active CIO works to “dissuade” departmental amendments.  Can the 
departments or colleges do additional policy either more constrictive or as an amendment to your 
institutional policy. 
Q:  Can the departments or colleges do additional policy either more constrictive or as an amendment to 
your institutional policy.  Answer: 
Philosophically I would probably discourage them from doing something more or less. It doesn’t occur and 
if it does, I’d try to reel it back in to what the institutional policy is. There may be some different 




to similar coercive pressures by creating an executive level review committee and 
creating tight privacy policies to support explicit credit card policies required by PCI.  
However, UGA did not structurally change the way policy is made at the collective level 
and did not specify payoff incentives to encourage the type of collaboration that would 
ensure compliance.  Georgia Tech did substantially change its governance structure. 
Responding to multiple breaches, the governing body of the four cases, the 
University System of Georgia, revamped its rules outlining expectations that the cases 
should follow.  Georgia Southern demonstrated a voluntary effort to comply with USG 
requirements.  The Georgia Southern culture is one that rewards collaboration and 
consensus.  Coercive pressure was not involved in policy changes.    
Georgia State attempted to do what no other university in the world had done as 
it began a program to incrementally increment security standards promulgated by the 
International Standards Organization.  However, a university governance structure did 
not adopt the standards promoted by ISO outside of two IT units and a financial unit.  As 
a result, the governance structure at Georgia State resembles more of a weakly informal 
structure, perhaps even ad hoc like that of UGA. 
The findings summarized in Table 6-14 show a pattern of support for the idea 
that policy structure will reflect the formality of governance structure and for the notion 
that organizational conditions, such as TMS and a collaborative culture, are “baked” into 
the institutions governing policy making.  These findings suggest the “missing link” tying 
the performance of policy with the act of policy making (Robichau and Lynn Jr. 2009) 







Table 6-14 Summary Findings 
Factor Georgia Tech 
(GT) 
Georgia Southern (GS) Univ. of Georgia (UGA) Georgia State (GSU) 
Security Office ISO – one person focused 
on security, additional 
personnel focused on 
compliance, monitoring, 
implementation 
ISO one person, other 
responsibilities 
 
ISO – one person focused on 
security, responsibilities for 
implementation and monitoring 
distributed across the 
organization 
ISO –two persons, security 
officer and security engineer 
 
Policy Structure Formal Informal (Strong) Ad Hoc Informal 
Governance Structure Formal Informal Ad Hoc Informal/Ad Hoc 
Metapolicy present Yes Yes No Limited to 3 departments 
Knapp Model All but Retirement Weak retirement No Retirement, weak 
awareness, risk assessment 
No retirement, weak Risk 
Assessment 
External Standard ACUPA, NIST AGILE PCI (limited) ISO 27002 (limited) 
Culture: Autonomy Budget controls/limits 
implementation 
Autonomy not identified as a 
factor 
Strong factor, bias to autonomy Bias to autonomy 
Culture: Collaboration Provided by rule/norm Norm driven supported by 
rule 
Weak, when Top management 
requires 
Weak, informal requirements 
in process 
Culture: Top Mgt Support Strong – compulsory Strong – compulsory and 
cultural 
Formally – strong; practice 
weak; affected by autonomy, 
budget 
Weak 
Hypothesis     
H1: The structure of a 
policy governance 
process will be reflected 
in the formality of the 
policy structure created 
by that process.   
True True True Not True – 
H2: If an organization 
possesses a meta-policy 
then the likelihood that 
that organization 
observes most if not all 






True – more deficient processes 
than GS/GT 
True – more deficient 












Factor Georgia Tech 
(GT) 
Georgia Southern (GS) Univ. of Georgia (UGA) Georgia State (GSU) 
identified in the Knapp 
model is greater than an 
organization without a 
meta-policy 
 
H3: An effective formal 
governance structure 
presents a full 
complement of 
components and Knapp 
processes to be effective.   
 
Not Clear Not Clear 
 
Not Clear Not Clear 
H4a: Governance 
structure will resemble 
the ideal Knapp model as 
the number of principals 
identified in 1st order 
boundary rules increase 
Supported 
Data indicate a more formal 
relationship among actors 
and policy process 
institutions 
Inconclusive 
Expectations are supported – 
informal process with 
relevant Top Management 
identified – yet need 
comparative case data to 
reach conclusion 
Rejected 
Formally, the evolution of 
structure from near Ad Hoc to 
near formal network occurred 
when Top Management was 
named as participants in the 
Security documents required by 
PCI.   
Supported 
No formal rules require top 
management participation; 
governance structure is 
deficient in the necessary 
Knapp processes for areas not 
under ISMS [367] 
H4b: High TMS is likely 
accompanied by 
compulsory Boundary 
rules requiring the 
participation of a 
number of principals of 
the organization.   
Supported 
GT presents compulsory 
and invitation rules.  The 
number of principles 
engaged indicates relatively 
strong TMS and GT presents 
the Knapp model well 
Supported 
The CIO does employ 
invitational boundary rules.  
And, the structure at GS 
represents the Knapp model 
well.   
Supported 
Practice currently reveals the 
structure is deficient in 
necessary Knapp processes as 
the participation of top 
management is declining. 
Supported 
CISO almost a “lone wolf” as 
she is only one focusing on 
security policy for an 
organization among the 
largest within USG 
H4c: If there are no 
compulsory boundary 
rules, then the likelihood 
that a techno-centric 
governance process 
increases.  TMS will be 
“lower” than in 
Supported 
TMS is indicated within the 
process institutions 
Inconclusive 
The measure of TMS is the 
representation of high level 
management in the policy 
process.  But, there are no 
compulsory boundary rules 
found.  Yet, indications are 
Supported 
Directives from the 
Provost/President created 
compulsory rules as part of the 
compliance to USG and PCI 
demands.  But these directives, 
instigated by PCI audit, are no 
Supported 
GSU has low TMS.  The only 
compulsory boundary rule 
requires the CIO/CISO as 
responsible for drafting 
policy.  IT centric – suggesting 












Factor Georgia Tech 
(GT) 




that by invitation TMS is 
achieved. 
longer followed – no 
compulsory rules, weak TMS 
 
H5a: The presence of 
Open Boundary Rules 
setting the criteria for 
participation in making 





Individuals may opt in, 
criteria for participation on 
committee also clear. 
Supported 
Requires heavy reliance on 
rules-in-use.  There is an 
informal open boundary 
allowing anyone to 
contribute to specification of 
needs or feedback to 
proposals.   
Supported 
No open boundary rules 
identified, and the structure 
presents Knapp deficiencies. 
Supported 
No open boundary rules 
found.  Policy structure looks 
has Knapp deficiencies. 
H5b: The absence of an 
invitation boundary rule 
specifying participation 
of university leadership 
will increase the 
likelihood of a 
governance structure 
that is largely ad hoc in 
nature. 
Supported 
GT specifies TMS 
participation via a number 
of boundary rules.  
Structure resembles Knapp. 
Supported 
GS has invitation boundary 
rules present.  Structure 
resembles Knapp. 
Not Supported 
Invitation boundary rules exist 
but use of rule in practice is not 
clear  and there are Knapp 
deficiencies 
Supported 
The only invitation rule is an 
administrative advisory 
committee with scope limited 
to examining the form of 
policy, not the content and 
the resemblance to Knapp is 
weaker than cases with such 
rules. 
H5c: The presence of 
symmetric Aggregation 
rules along with Open 
Boundary rules reflects 
existence of a 
collaborative culture and 
the governance structure 
is more likely to 
resemble a completed 
Knapp model. 
Supported –  
A configuration of 
information and choice 
rules support the notion 
that a collaborative 




AGILE process supports 
symmetric choices.  
However,  Formal rules lean 
toward non-symmetric 
aggregation rules permitting 
CIO/CISO to make final 
arbitration. 
Supported 
A symmetric rule is not 
identified.  And, the structure 
has weaknesses when 
compared to Knapp.   
Supported 
A symmetric rule was not 
found.  GSU structure is 
deficient when compared to 
Knapp. 
H5d:  The presence of 
information rules 
requiring the exchange 
Supported 
GT specifies a number of 
channels to communicate 
Supported 
Information rules requiring 
exchange are found in the 
Supported 
This case has a lack of 
information rules and the 
Supported 
The process of information 












Factor Georgia Tech 
(GT) 
Georgia Southern (GS) Univ. of Georgia (UGA) Georgia State (GSU) 
of information among 
actors indicates the 
existence of a 
collaborative culture and 
indicates a stronger 
governance structure 
when compared to cases 
without such rules. 
with stakeholders during 
each stage of the process 
informal and formal rules-in-
use.  . 
structure has no retirement, 
very weak Risk Assessment and  
Awareness  
the administrative leadership, 
and is informal (interview 
data).  Governance Structure 
has weak resemblance to 
Knapp 
H6: If Scope rules limit 
actions of sub-units to 
modify policies, the 
governance structure is 
likely to resemble a 
Knapp model. 
True 
All but formal retirement 
process.  It may be argued 
that the review process 
does act to retire policies. 
Weak – no specific scope 
statement, but evidence that 
autonomy is managed within 
the formal process to 




Autonomy exists –and the 
governance structure at UGA is 
not formal. 
True 
No formal structure present – 
may explain the lack of 









Chapter 7–Policy Structures 
 
Effective policy is an outcome of effective policy governance.  Simply having a 
policy will not prevent breaches of security (Neil F Doherty and Fulford 2005). Effective 
governance aligns policy with organizational structure (Pieters, Dimkov, and Pavlovic 
2013), organizational environment (Sangseo Park, Ahmad, and Ruighaver 2010), and 
organizational culture (Baskerville 2006).  Effective policy is operationalized by 
understanding these four elements: 1) whether the necessary components are present 
in the structure; 2) whether the scope of areas and issues covered is appropriate given 
organizational context; 3) whether the policy structure “fits” the organization; and, 4) 
whether the form of the policy content provides the clarity required for individuals to 
comprehend and integrate into operational decisions appropriately. 
The previous chapter explored the structural details of policy governance and 
how the structure may vary as a consequence of varying organizational and external 
conditions.  A theme of the hypotheses related to governance structure is that those 
conditions are “baked in”.  In other words, we find rules, standards, and norms that 
regulate policymaking for each case accommodating the pressures of the organizational 
culture, mission, external threats, and external mandates.  This chapter explores the 
question as to the relationship between variations in governance structure and 




7.1 Relating Governance Structure to Policy Structure 
Knapp’s model (Figure 7-1) outlines four key processes necessary for effective 
security governance at the operational level: Awareness & Training, Implementation, 
Monitoring, and Enforcement.   
 
 





Hypotheses explored in this chapter focus on the idea that the operational level 
policy structure is largely determined by the collective level structure.  For example, an 
ad hoc policy structure – resembling small linear networks of a main document for each 
policy area with no links among the policy areas (i.e. password protection, data access) – 
is the likely outcome of an “it centric” governance structure – with little support from 
top management and little support from the culture of the organization.    
As top management support improves, and collaboration improves – then the 
governance structure evolves to one that informally brings the major stakeholders 
together – the output of this governance structure is likely to approach an ideal network 
of policy actors and institutions, somewhat resembling a cluster, but with some gaps.    
Finally, a formal governance structure increases the likelihood that the policy 
structure approaches the ideal model proposed by Knapp et al (2009). As the structure 
grows towards the complete Knapp model – the organization will invest the resources 
necessary to create the policy components required to ensure policy achieves expected 
outcomes.  I apply this concept of structure to the data previously gathered (Table 7-1).  





Table 7-1 Case Governance Structures - Descriptive Data 












19,431 19,150 33,367 30,606 
Carnegie Class RU/VH, DR DRU, DR RU/VH, DR RU/VH, DR 
































Not a factor Strong factor, bias 
to autonomy 






supported by rule 









































Yes Yes No No for 
organization, 
limited 
application of ISO 
to 3 departments 
Gov Structure  Formal Informal Ad Hoc Informal/Ad Hoc 




7.2 Elements of Policy Structure 
In Chapter 3, I discussed four elements of policy structure the literature found 
relevant to effective policy.  Components of policy refers to the element of policy 
focused on the “pieces” of structure are present.  Those components include 
instructions to create policy (metapolicy), manage policy (policy), implement policy 
(standards), and operationalize policy objectives (procedures and guidelines).  Scope of 
policy details the problems and issues categorized as areas of focus or concern for policy 
makers.  The “Fit” of policy measures whether and how well the policy is tailored to fit 
the unique organizational and environmental conditions.  Finally, policy form measures 
the clarity of policy, in this case by its readability. The hypotheses regarding policy 
structure, discussed in chapter 3, are summarized in Table 7-2. 
Table 7-2 Policy Structure Hypotheses 
 
I confine my analysis of policy structure to one particular policy issue, Acceptable 
Use Policy (AUP) (Table 7-3).  I do so for two reasons.  First, the number of observations 
is more manageable (n=432).  Second, external mandates create new requirements for 
Hypothesis Component 
Tested 
H7: As an organization’s governance structure declines from Formal to Ad 
Hoc, then it is less likely to present a coherent set of standards, procedures, 
guidelines and policies appropriate for effective policy. 
Policy Structure - 
Components 
H8: The likelihood of coverage of USG issues will correlate with the relative 
strength of top management support for securing cyber assets 
Policy Structure - 
Scope 
H9: Acceptable Use Policies will vary in “fit” as the governance structure 
varies.  A Formal structure will provide greater evidence of fit, measured in 
terms of specific assignments and positions referencing that particular 
organization. 
Policy Structure - 
Fit 
H10: As the governance structure of a university becomes more formal, then 
the likelihood increases that clarity of the policy is more appropriate to the 






AUP documents in the 2008-2011 timeframe.  This perspective provides “fresh” data to 
examine expected effects.   
Table 7-3 AUP Operational Level Statements 
Action.Situation  UGA   Ga 
Southern  
GSU  GT  Row 
Total  
 Cell Contents 
Awareness and 
Training  
         7             5             4          7       23   N 
                        0.33          0.21  0.01  0.00                 Chi-square 
Contribution 
                        0.30          0.22        0.17     0.30    0.05   N / Row Total 
                            0.07       0.04       0.05      0.05                N / Col Total 
                            0.02          0.01       0.01     0.02                 N / Table 
Total 
--------------------- -------- ----------- --------- --------- -------  
Enforcement           4            25             4           1      34    
                        2.26  28.10        0.79      8.49                
                            0.12        0.74       0.12      0.03   0.08    
                            0.04          0.22       0.05      0.01                
                            0.01          0.06      0.01  0.00                
--------------------- --------
- 
------------ ---------- --------- -------  
Implementation         95            83            55      115     348    
                           1.08          1.00        1.17      0.71                
                           0.27          0.24      0.16  0.33    0.81    
                            0.90          0.72       0.70     0.87                
                           0.22          0.19       0.13      0.27                
-------------------- -------- ------------ ---------- --------- -------  
Monitoring           0             2            16           9       27    
                            6.62        3.74      24.79      0.07                
                            0.00          0.07       0.59     0.33    0.06    
                           0.00          0.02       0.20      0.07                
                           0.00          0.00       0.04      0.02                
--------------------- -------- ------------ ---------- --------- -------  
Column Total       106           115            79      132     432    
                            0.25          0.27       0.18      0.31                
--------------------- --------
- 
-------- ---------- --------- ------  
Pearson’s Chi**2 = 79.36988 
d. f. = 9 
P = 2.155744e-13 
    
    
    
 
The patterns identified in the analysis that follows show that the more 




also show the content reflects organization structure and conditions.  UGA and GSU 
largely stay “ambiguous”. 
7.2.1 Components 
Components are observed in the policy structure.  My analysis of components 
and the network structure qualities of policy documents is where I tie together 
observations of the governance structure to observed qualities of the policy structure.  
In chapter three, I proposed one hypothesis concerning the relationship between the 
components of policy and the governance structure that produced the policies.   
H7: As an organization’s governance structure declines from Formal to Ad Hoc, 
then it is less likely to present a coherent set of standards, procedures, 
guidelines and policies appropriate for effective policy. 
 
I present a frequency analysis in Table 7-4. This is similar to the analysis found in 
Table 6-8 with two exceptions.  This test focused only on AUP statements. And, the test 
focuses only on Operational Level action situations, so there are no metapolicy 
statements included.  While the significance test suggests there is a relationship 
between the component observation counts and the cases, the pattern of that 
relationship is not clear.  In the previous chapter, I concluded that this measure of 
structure for the entire policy structure is not sensitive enough to offer much 
explanatory power as to the nature of the relationship.  For example, all four cases 
present similar distributions of procedural statements. There is no straightforward 
explanation by structure as to the frequencies of statements coded as procedures, 
guidelines, or policies.  In sum, this hypothesis is not supported by the evidence 




Table 7-4 Distribution of Policy Components within AUP Operational Level Observations 
Policy Type  UGA   Ga 
Southern  
GSU  GT     Row 
Total  
 Cell Contents 
   Ancillary           1             0          0           0           1  N 
                  2.32          0.27      0.18      0.31               Chi**2 
Contribution 
                  1.00         0.00     0.00      0.00      0.00   N / Row Total 
                 0.01          0.00      0.00  0.00                 N / Col Total 
                 0.00          0.00      0.00      0.00                N / Table Total 
   Guideline        17            1           8         15         41    
                  4.79        9.01      0.03      0.49                
                  0.41         0.02      0.20      0.37      0.09    
                  0.16          0.01      0.10      0.11                
                  0.04         0.00      0.02      0.03                
   Procedure        24            25         17         31         97    
                  0.00          0.03      0.03      0.06                
                  0.25          0.26      0.18      0.32      0.22    
                  0.23        0.22      0.22      0.23                
                  0.06         0.06      0.04      0.07                
    Standard        55            59        36        41       191    
                  1.41      1.31      0.03      5.16                
                  0.29       0.31      0.19      0.21      0.44    
                  0.52          0.51      0.46      0.31                
                  0.13          0.14     0.08      0.09                
      Policy          9           30         18         45       102    
              10.26          0.30      0.02      6.14                
                  0.09          0.29      0.18      0.44      0.24    
                  0.08          0.26      0.23      0.34                
                  0.02          0.07     0.04      0.10                
Column 
Total  
     106        115        79       132       432    
                  0.25          0.27      0.18      0.31                
       
Pearson’s Chi-squared Test 
Chi^2 = 42.15409 
d.f. = 12 
P = 3.13743e-05 
    
    
    
    
 
7.2.2  Scope 
H8: The likelihood of coverage of USG issues will correlate with the relative 
strength of top management support for securing cyber assets 
 
Coverage of USG required policy areas was measured by identifying statements 




such as Password protection, data stewardship, and Acceptable Use.  The findings are 
summarized in Table 7-5.  The importance of proper coverage has been well 
documented in the literature.  Intuitively, a well-structured policy process should 
produce coverage appropriate for the organization’s conditions. 
Table 7-5 Case Statements Per Requirement (Proportion) 
 (Legend: P-Present, W – Weakly Present, N- Not present; (% total statements) 























































































































































The proportion of policy statements focused on an area is compared across the cases. A 
relative comparison uses the score of “N” if no statements are present, “W” if the 




proportion of statements equals or exceeds the average.  I record the results in Table 7-
6.  The coverage of Acceptable Use Policies shows the weaker structured cases with 
smaller numbers of statements.  Only Georgia Southern exceeds the average with 
copyright protection.  At the time of the study, GS was the only organization to include 
the protections that were mandated by the Higher Education Opportunity Act of 2009 
passed by Congress to include copyright language that was demanded by the Recording 
and Motion Picture Industries. 
Table 7-6 Summary of USG Requirements Met 
Case Present Weakly 
Present 
Not Present TMS 
Strength 
GT 2 5 7 Strong 
GS 5 2 7 Present 
GSU 4 4 6 Weak 
UGA 4 4 6 Weak 
 
The summary data does not indicate strong support for the hypotheses.  To be 
fair, many of the USG requirements were set in policy long before the 2008 mandate.  
The AUP policy did undergo changes at each institution post 2008.  The next two 
hypothesis will test the fit (tailoring) and form of the AUP policies that resulted from 
current governance. 
7.2.3  Tailoring 
Analysis focused on the AUP documents to determine if the statements in that 
document have been tailored to fit the organization.   
H9: Acceptable Use Policies will vary in “fit” as the governance structure varies.  
A Formal structure will provide greater evidence of fit, measured in terms of 





 I discuss findings beginning with observations identified with awareness 
activities.  The Implementation activities are subdivided to present information in 
practical groups defined by prior research. 
7.2.3.1 Awareness 
The observations are found in Appendix W.  Table 7-7 presents a summary of the 
positions and the aIms (goals/objectives) for which an action choice by that position is 
expected  GS refers specifically to its community with statements requiring their 
affirmation that their AUP agreement includes copyright compliance rules specified by 
the Higher Education Opportunity Act.  GS requires “students, employees, and service 
providers” affirm their acquiescence to the AUP policy as they begin their relationship 
with the University and re-affirm as frequently as the CIO desires.  GT delegates to the 
units responsibility for monitoring the compliance of their users with policy and for 
providing awareness session.  GT also assigns responsibility to of Office of Information 
Technology (OIT) to provide support to those units for awareness activities.  GSU 
focuses on older policies (Information System Ethics [365]: 2003; Minimum Security 
[368]: 2004) and places responsibility on users for consenting and understanding these 















Case Generic Positions Issue 
GS Members of Georgia Southern Community 
Students, employees and Service Providers 
University 













Compliance with AUP and Copyright 
GSU Users 
University 
Understand Password standards 
Follow Email rules 
Consent to monitoring 
UGA UGA User Community 
UGA Student Body 
Email 
Security Policy and Procedures 
 
GS and GT make clear the positions responsible and reference organizational 
entities as such.  In this regard, both cases link the policy to the organization structure as 
they reference policies (institutions) and positions.  UGA refers to is user base in general 
terms.  GSU does not name the university or any entity within the university.  Neither 
UGA nor GSU reference awareness training activities organized by the organization.  The 
relative strength of specific organizational references is consistent with the formality of 
governance structure.  GT is the most specific with regards to organizational structure 
with GS relatively less so.  GT shows a distributed network of awareness – delegating 
the monitoring, communication, and facilitation of awareness activities to the individual 
units.  UGA is weakly represented and GSU the weakest.   
The relationship between formal governance institutions that emphasize 
collaboration evidently contribute to the fit of awareness institutions within the 
organizational structure.  GT formally requires participation of top management, and 




“Policy Review Process” [360].  GS documents similar requirements in its document 
entitled “IT Policy Development & Review Process” [336].  GSU has a document, 
“Information Management Security Policy” [367], that operates as meta-policy for three 
units only as resources prevented GSU from applying the ISO standard throughout the 
university.  UGA has no single document defining meta-policy.  Observations categorized 
from meta-policy are derived from a memo, “SecureGa Plan” [466], a charter, “UGA 
Security Committee Charter” [472], and interview data [471].   
7.2.3.2 Implementation 
Observations occupying the Implementation action situation are the most 
numerous.  The observations were categorized using the AUP coverage criteria 
discussed in Chapter 3 (Table 7-8).  I sorted the Implementation observations by AUP 
coverage by Organization and by Attribute (Appendix X). 
 
Table 7-8 AUP Area Coverage Criteria 
Issue Definition 
Access Management 
Covers issues such as who is authorized to use systems and corporate information; 
username and password management regulations and good practice guidelines 
Acceptable Behavior 
covers permitted user activities, such as work-related use of the systems and 
information, and internet usage in particular.  
Unacceptable 
behavior 
Covers prohibited user activities, such as hacking, downloading illegal material, 
accessing illegal websites, dissemination of illegal or offensive material, sending bulk 
emails, harassment of other users, violating privacy of others users, dissemination 
of viruses, use of systems and/or corporate information commercial purposes, 
personal usage of systems and/or corporate information 
License Compliance Rules and regulations about software downloading, sharing and usage 
Roles and 
Responsibilities 
Explanation of the specific roles and responsibilities of users, system administrators, 
and so on 
User Monitoring Explanation of approach to monitoring user activities 
Sanctions for policy 
violations 
explanation of actions that will be taken in the event of a user breaching the 
acceptable use policy 




A scan of the results reveals patterns that conform to my expectation that as the 
governance structure grows more formal, so does the policy structure.  For instance, the 
specificity in references to that specific case’s positions, policies, and structures are 
higher for GT and GS and noticeably more ambiguous (i.e. university instead of Georgia 
State University) for GSU and UGA.  UGA and GSU policy statements tend to be older.  
Older policy documents (created before 2005) that focused on password guidelines and 
acceptable behavior for use of university e-mail services are prevalent for the two cases 
with the less formal governance structures.  As an example, I extract two AUP coverage 
areas: Acceptable Behavior (Table 7-9) and Access Management (Table 7-10).   
 






















Case Positions AIM and Object  




Connect to university networking 
Use IT resources only for intended 
purpose 
Do no harm 
Dispose according to procedures 
Abide by laws and USG policies 




Use assigned wired ports 
Use resources for scholarly purposes 
May use email lists 
Use resources in lawful manner 




Members of USG community 
May join email lists 
Use secure web server 





UGA user community 
UGA Student Body 
May reference links and commercial 
sites 
Use ethical conduct 
Exercise caution when forwarding 
messages 





  GT specifically calls out policies and regulations from employee, student,  and 
faculty manuals as it explains to differing groups of users how they may use IT 
resources.  Both GT and GS are specific as to who grants access and monitors that 
access.  GSU and UGA observations do not reference specific entities or titles when it 
comes to granting access.  These two cases choose the more ambiguous university 
reference.  Note that the AIMs for both UGA and GSU are more likely to reference an e-
mail or password topic.   
 
























Case Positions AIM and Object  





Grant access (provide privileges) 
Requires Compliance to local, state, 
federal laws, GS policies 
Issue passwords 
According to authorization 
Use IT resources  





Give accounts to all authorized GT 
users 
Check access privileges with 
managers 






Make resources available (to GSU 
students/employees) 
 
Use strong passwords 







Allow use of email facilities for 
sanctioned activities 
 
Use for academic/authorized use only 
Use unique individual user id at all 
times 
 





The licensing coverage highlights another age/detail difference (Table 7-11).  
Both GT and GS reference the need to respect copyright laws, a direct reference to the 
copyright mandates inserted into the U.S. Higher Education Opportunity Act (2009).  The 
references for GSU and UGA come from policies not revised since 2005. 
 


















Case Positions AIM and Object  





Respect copyrights/intellectual property 
 
 
Use in compliance with copyright and USG policy 







Must respect copyrights 








Requires valid licenses for systems used by users 
 















May repost material using email only after receiving 
permission from the source 
May quote from source only if properly identified 
Reveal UGS information only after approved for release by 
appropriate office 
 
Obey laws against private use of state property 
  
The specificity inherent in the GT policy structure is demonstrated in the Policy 
Management area of the GT AUP policy structure (Table 7-12).  Positions are given 




enforce, a deference to the distributed style of governance that GT stresses in its 
governance structure.  GSU references some goals of general policy such as maintaining 
user confidence in the reliability of the systems and data made available.  UGA 
observations focus only on e-mail policy created prior to 2004. 
 
























Case Positions AIM and Object  





















Policy applies to all GT users 
Reviews requests for sites not ending in 
“Gatech.edu” 
Recognizes needs for policy exceptions 
 
Responsible for managing GT resources 
Delegate to specific units network admin 
responsibilities 
Provide centralized IT services 
 
Delegate network monitoring 
Maintain adequate tech support team 
Ensure sufficient funding for unit IT infrastructure 
Delegate responsibility for IT planning 
 




Consider state of technology when evaluating tech 
for planning purposes 
 
Require authorization 







Applies policies to students, employees 
Grants access of level required to perform job 
Provides site-wide license for anti-virus software 
to all 
Seeks to preserve individual privacy 








administrative office IT staff 
Committed to responsible use of information 
Applies email policy to all services owned by UGA 
Applies email policy to all users 
Applies email policy to printed emails 
Encourages academic and business use of email 
 





GSU breaks its pattern of ambiguous Attributes and policy references with a 
marked increase in specificity.  Most of the GSU observations are found in the System 
Ethics Document [365] last revised in 2003.  GSU System Use Policy [361] says users 
“should” report violations.  The e-mail policy [363] gives responsibility for monitoring 
compliance with e-mail standards to departments.  And, the Minimum System Security 
Environment Policy [368] gives users responsibility for ensuring their PC is secure. The 
majority of GSU observations stipulate the generic “university” “may” “access and 
monitor” systems and system usage.  The only required action of the university is the 
observation requiring notification of the user if the university must monitor activities on 
the user’s account.  
The number of GSU observations is in stark contrast to GS as it provides succinct 
direction to users and how they may or should report violations.  Unlike GSU, GS 
requires users to report any observed violations.  GT continues its delegation of 
authority to IT technical leaders and unit heads to observe and maintain compliance.  GT 
users should report violations, but are not required.  GT officials, on the other hand, 
must report violations and have permission to access and observe user accounts at any 
time.  UGA monitoring requirements are limited to compliance with the e-mail policy 
[379]. 
While GSU presents the greatest number of institutional statements, the deontic 




to the individual or department.  GT and GS show a stricter “must” deontic, requiring all 
to report known violations. 
7.2.3.4 Enforcement/Sanctions 
GS provides a significant and specific set of observations to enforce policy.  The 
statements specify how the policies are to be enforced and who has latitude to 
determine the sanction applied.  GSU specifies that sanctions will be determined by the 
appropriate judicial organization (student, staff, faculty) as prescribe by the handbook 
appropriate for the offender.  GT offers a generic “violators will be prosecuted”.  UGA 
refers disciplinary matters to appropriate authorities, staying consistent with the 
philosophy of linking to external policies when appropriate.  The relationship between 
governance and policy structures is not clearly defined for these actions.  However, the 
actions are relatively weak when measured in terms of number of observations.  The 
small n constrains the conclusions that may be taken from this step. 
7.2.3.5 Measuring Indicators of Fit 
A stronger presentation of the patterns discerned from Appendix X is created by 
counting the number of positions, aims, and conditions that met the criteria for specific 
references and those observations that used ambiguous references to “university”, 
indicating a statement that could be “cut and pasted” into any college policy document.  











Table 7-13 Fitness Test 
 
Issue Definition Pos Aims Cond # Obs Pos Aims Cond # Obs Pos Aims Cond # Obs Pos Aims Cond # Obs
Access Management
Covers issues such as who is authorized to use systems and corporate 
information; username and password management regulations and 
good practice guidelines 2,0 0 3,0 6 4,0 0,1 2,1 9 0 2,2 0,3 5 0 0,3 1,0 5
Acceptable Behavior
covers permitted user activities, such as work-related use of the 
systems and information, and internet usage in particular. 4,0 2,0 4,0 9 0,3 0 0,1 8 0 1,0 0,1 5 3,0 1,0 1,0 11
Covers prohibited user activities, such as hacking, downloading illegal 
material, accessing illegal websites, dissemination of illegal or 
offensive material, sending bulk emails, harassment of other users, 
violating privacy of others users, dissemination 3,0 7,0 4,0 25 0 1,7 3,7 32 1,0 0,1 0,3 18 0 1,3 2,4 20
of viruses, use of systems and/or corporate information commercial 
purposes, personal usage of systems and/or corporate information
License Compliance Rules and regulations about software downloading, sharing and usage 1,0 0 0 4 1,0 0,2 2,1 5 1,0 0 0 2 6,0 2,0 0,2 7
Roles and 
Responsibilities
Explanation of the specific roles and responsibilities of users, system 
administrators, and so on 33,0 8,0 17,0 49 8,4 3,2 1,5 23 2,0 1,0 1,3 14 1,4 1,1 0,2 19
User Monitoring Explanation of approach to monitoring user activities 6,0 3,0 4,0 13 0 0 2,1 5 6,9 0 1,5 19 0 3,0 0 3
Sanctions for policy 
violations
explanation of actions that will be taken in the event of a user breaching 
the acceptable use policy 0 0 0 1 12,7 3,4 8,6 28 0,3 0 2,1 5 1,1 1,0 1,0 4
Policy management
Details of responsibilities and procedures for policy management and 
maintenance 12,0 2,0 10,0 18 NA NA 0 0,3 0 2,0 7 2,2 1,1 3,4 15
Positions (Attributes)
Organizational specific and reference organizational 
structure
Aims and Object Reference organization specific objectives
Conditions
Reference organization and structure specifically - including 
named policies, divisions, goals




Key - (Specific, Vague):  A reading of (8,4) should be read as follows.  8 
observations referred to a specific title, position, policy, or 







The relative differences between GT and GSU/UGA are apparent.  The count of 
observations for “Roles and Responsibilities” show the detail presented for GT in 
Appendix X.  The number of times that a GT observation refers to the university or 
department within the Attribute by its appropriate name is a strong 33 out of 49 
observations.  GSU identifies itself 2 out of 14 times.  UGA identifies only once.  GS is 
relatively stronger with 8 identifications.  The pattern supports the thesis that as the 
governance structure grows more formal, the specificity within the policy structure is 
more direct.   
7.2.4 Form 
This test uses the Flesch readability algorithm to measure the readability of the 
document.  An Ad Hoc structure will produce lower reading ease scores, a Formal 
structure will produce scores closer to the reading level of the population that must 
understand and implement the operational level statements.  A Formal structure will 
also present higher reading ease scores.  The results of the test are shown in Table 7-14. 
H10: As the governance structure of a university becomes more formal, then the 
likelihood increases that clarity of the policy is more appropriate to the 





Table 7-14 Form of AUP Policy 






GS – AUP 12.3 19.1 2588 2010 
GT AUP 14.6 26.9 4233 2011 
GSU – System 
Ethics (AUP) [365] 
16.5 14.4 852 2003 
UGA – AUP [377] 12.1 19.8 1273 2004 
 
A reading ease score that approaches zero increases in difficulty and decreases 
in clarity.  While GT is close to 30, its text is still within the “Hard to read” category.  GSU 
has the lowest reading ease score.  But, GS and UGA show similar scores that are not 
much better than GSU.  The findings of this hypothesis are mixed at best and do not 
clearly support the premise with demonstrable clarity.  
7.3 Summary 
This chapter explored findings related to hypotheses testing the relationship 
between governance structure and policy structure.  In particular, I examined four 
elements of policy structure that prior research suggests are essential elements of an 
effective policy.  The hypotheses express the expectation that a more formal, and thus 
more effective, governance structure should produce relatively a more effective policy 
structure than an ad hoc, and less effective, governance structure.  I summarize those 





Table 7-15 Findings Summary 
 
 The failure of Hypothesis 7 cannot be taken as the final finding regarding the 
relationship between governance structure and the composition of effective policy.  The 
test examines only one dimension of structure, institutions.  Ostrom defined structure 
as one that is defined by the set of actors and the rules that regulate their actions (E. 
Ostrom 2005).  One could propose a test where you compare the composition of 
components in other policy areas apart from cybersecurity for the same organization.  
Actually, a test of the average composition of a significant number of policy areas would 
provide a grounded approach for analysis of this relationship. 
While one can expect that a strong governance structure will produce necessary 
and sufficient coverage of policy issues, the test used for Hypothesis 8 is not a precise 




H7: As an organization’s governance structure 
declines from Formal to Ad Hoc, then it is less 
likely to present a coherent set of standards, 
procedures, guidelines and policies appropriate 
for effective policy. 
Components Not Supported 
 
Count data of component 
statements not sufficient to 
explain the structure. 
H8: The likelihood of coverage of USG issues will 
correlate with the relative strength of top 
management support for securing cyber assets 
Scope Not Supported 
 
Test of data may not be precise 
enough to measure relationship 
H9: Acceptable Use Policies will vary in “fit” as 
the governance structure varies.  A Formal 
structure will provide greater evidence of fit, 
measured in terms of specific assignments and 




Precision greatly enhanced with 
use of institutional analysis tools – 
grammar and rule configurations 
H10: As the governance structure of a university 
becomes more formal, then the likelihood 
increases that clarity of the policy is more 
appropriate to the comprehension skills of the 
university’s student population. 
Form Not Supported 
 




problem related to the organization’s context?  The measure used may suffer from an 
ecological fallacy.  Is the association of the proportion of observations categorized by 
policy area related to the compositional effectiveness of the policy?  Would an analysis 
of rule configurations within each required policy area provide a more cogent measure 
of compliance?  What does an ideal proportion of institutional statements per policy 
area look like?   
As to effectiveness, copying and publishing a policy does not necessarily affect 
the rules-in-use.  And, it is the rules-in-use that genuinely defines the structure of an 
action situation.  “Paper Tigers” are a well-known means of meeting compliance 
measures that yield outcomes that fall short of expectations.  However, no observations 
means no policy.  And, no policy is not effective policy.  More work to be done in this 
regard. 
Hypothesis 9 provides the strongest test of linking the outcomes of varying 
degrees of formality of governance structure with the necessary elements of effective 
policy structure.  Analysis of rule types and the construction of those rules via the value 
found in the statement components, particularly the Attributes, aIms, and Conditions; 
provide data that offer cogent descriptions of the differences in structure between Ad 
Hoc cases, such as UGA, and Formal cases, such as GT.  I believe further research will 
confirm this finding and expand the possibilities of relating policy content and structure 




Finally, the failure of the hypothesis test for policy form cannot be an indictment 
of the concept.  Rather, the test should be revised to include data from surveys of users, 
managers, and other groups of actors as they interpret the policies.   
 A failure of the design used for these tests is the decision to focus on Acceptable 
Use Policy as the only policy area.  A more robust test would explore how all areas with 
written policies are structured and whether those areas share components and 
processes as appropriate.  The success of using IGT tools to “dig deeper” into the 
structural analysis holds promise, especially as it relates to increasing the precision of 
analysis by aggregating multiple institutional statements as units of observation.  The 
method needs much refinement, but the general findings of this chapter do encourage 
further exploration of the relationship between the collective and operational action 








Are there patterns, trends, and other generalizations identified in the previous 
three chapters that indicate the study’s objectives were achieved?  Do those findings 
agree with research in the fields identified?  I begin by summarizing the research 
framework and study design.  The findings are then discussed in the context of the 
hypotheses posed in Chapter 3.  I summarize the discussion in the context of the 
research objectives and more current applications of the IAD tools to understand 
municipal, regulatory, and organizational policy designs.     
8.1 Purpose of the Study 
My research question is motivated by a personal curiosity developed while 
serving as deputy to the CIO of the University System of Georgia.  The governing board 
of the USG prescribed a path for the individual units to follow in order to develop 
information security programs.  While tremendous freedom was given to the units to 
tailor those policies, the variations of responses were not uniform.  The responses 
varied within groups of USG units of similar size, mission, and resources.  From my 
observations, the following question emerged: “How does Policy Structure vary as a 
function of Policy Governance?” 
The literature documents the variation in scope and structure of security policy 
in sectors such as postsecondary education.  Findings in the literature suggest that if we 
are to develop and implement effective cyber security policy then we must have 




decisions are regulated by institutions as they work together to create policy.  Policy 
structure is how an organization’s work to manage organizational behavior is organized 
(Robichau and Lynn Jr. 2009).  It is this interaction that determines the policy structure 
of an organization (Arnold and Fleischman 2013).  In this study, policy structure is 
conceptualized as a configuration of the statements that compose the strategies, norms, 
and rules use to govern the behaviors of actors and organizational entities.  
Theoreticians care about policy structure because that structure determines the 
outcomes and outputs that determine the effectiveness and efficiency of policy, the 
determinants of how and whether policy works.  Practitioners care about policy 
structure because that structure determines how efficient and effective the security 
solutions are, and whether the organization’s strategies, objectives and mission are 
protected. 
A review of the cyber security research literature found no integrative 
framework to describe, much less predict, how organizations adopt and implement 
cyber security policy (Hsu, Lee, and Straub 2012).  In other words, a robust method to 
identify the key features of an organization’s policy governance structure was lacking.  
In order to answer my question, I integrated concepts from institutional analysis, 
information security, policy governance, and policy implementation into a research 
framework described in chapter 3.  The tools of analysis were adopted from the 
Institutional Analysis and Development Framework.  The security governance 




providing a model recognizing the various contextual factors and the interaction of 
context with structure.   
The integration of institutional analysis theory with security theory is not new.  
But, the application of the tools previously used to analyze governance structure of 
“problems of the commons” is unique.  I used the institutional grammar tool and 
analysis of rules configurations to identify and map features of structure essential to 
effective policy.  Measures of relative strength of structure were developed to aid in the 
cross-case comparison of these structural features. 
 The framework suggested a number of hypotheses, guided by both institutional 
and information security theory, to test the relationship between governance structure 
and the various policy structures found within the USG units.  Scarce resources for a 
study such as this naturally limited the number of external and organizational factors 
the effects of which could be considered in this analysis.  I focused on mandates from 
external sources such as the Board of Regents and the Payment Cards Industry as 
motivators to structural and policy changes among the cases.  I also chose to focus on 
the concepts of Top Management Support and the cultural values of collaboration and 
autonomy as primary factors from the organizational conditions.   
The case study method was chosen as my research context involved questions of 
how and why within a set of events that I did not control (Yin 2009).  I chose to examine 
4 cases involving USG units with similar missions as research universities.  Those cases 
provided paired observations of similar size (UGA & GSU, Ga Sou & GT), similar 




breaches, GSU & Ga Sou – no breach).  Data was collected from multiple sources.  I 
inventoried and catalogued the policy documents using the methods described by 
Doherty, et al (2009).  Those documents were then analyzed using the Institutional 
Grammar Tool to decompose the observations.  Interviews of the primary actors, usually 
the CIO or CISO, for each case provided insight as to informal policies and institutions.  
The transcripts of those interviews were coded in the same fashion as policy documents.  
The configuration of rule types were then collected into the action situations defined by 
Knapp, as well as those defined by the ACUPA model.  The ACUPA model permitted 
more discrete analysis on situations with specific expectations of outcomes such as 
team selection, draft revision, etc.  From these analytical exercises, several findings 
emerged. 
8.2 Summary of Findings 
Findings suggest a direct relationship between structural features of policy 
governance (i.e. the actors and institutions configured to develop policy) and the 
structure of policy produced by that process.  A cross-case comparison of policy 
governance identified key features that explain those differences.  Prior research 
suggests that these differences are predictive of effectiveness of policies for the 
respective cases.   
The key features identified are: 
 UGA institutionalized the reference to external policy mandates as preferable to 
managing a policy review and development process to adapt mandates to fit 
organizational conditions. 




 GSU’s governance structure is “bi-furcated” – three departments employ the ISO 
27002 standard, the remaining departments reside under a structure described 
by the “University Policy for University-Wide Policies”. 
 GS institutionalized a system design philosophy (AGILE) that emphasizes a 
“bottom-up” style of policy development.  However, the scope of this method 
remains under the tight control of the CIO. 
 GT features the largest divergence from the models suggested by the University 
System and external standards organization.  Yet, the governance structure 
provides a collaborative method to tailor policy to fit various and divergent 
organizational conditions found within the larger enterprise of the university as a 
whole.   
 
These features were found to relate to differences in the strength of the 
formality of the respective governance structures.  Analysis of the presence and relative 
strength of structure of the Knapp action situations, along with identification of whether 
a metapolicy is present, contributed to a sliding scale of formality of structure.  GT was 
identified as the most formal, followed by GS.  UGA and GSU both were tagged as 
possessing a structure with Ad Hoc features, but GSU, largely due to the limited 
implementation of the ISO 27001 standard, was noted for an “informal” governance 
structure.  The criteria for evaluating policy structure found similar assessments, 
confirming the primary hypothesis that formality of policy structure is defined by 
formality of governance structure. 
Before discussing findings specific to the hypotheses tested, a few general 
observations must be discussed.  This study affirms the need for avoiding the reification, 
or in some cases “deification”, of institutions.  Individuals may or may not share mutual 
expectations of an action situation, the intent of its institutions, even the 
comprehension of the information presented to affect a collective decision (Crawford 




individual and mutual understandings.  The weak relationships found between the 
existence of specific configurations of rules and policy outcomes is a testament to that 
observation.  Simply counting rule types is not sufficient.  There must be a means of 
understanding how those rule types vary in terms of the actors identified and the 
conditions and objectives of the institutional statements as understood by those actors. 
The literature affirms that policy must be aligned with organizational goals if the 
policy is to be effective in producing the desired outcomes.  Simon proposed that the 
term “organizational goal” refers to the constraints imposed by the role that an 
individual plays within the organization.  And, that decision-making (i.e. policy making) is 
a decentralized structure involving different sets of constraints for disparate 
organizational parts that affect decisions in other parts (1964).  So, just as Crawford and 
Ostrom cautioned against reifying particular sets of institutions at the harm of ignoring 
the truth that decisions are outcomes of individual interactions, one must not reify the 
organizational goal and set it apart from a general understanding that goals are “fuzzy” 
perceptions within the limits of mutually shared perceptions of those goals.  Given these 
cautions, the scale of structure formality employed in this analysis perhaps sets an 
appropriate expectation as to the precision of predicting policy structures and 
outcomes.   
Monitoring and enforcement matters.  The cases are compliant with a majority 
of the requirements within the USG policies and guidelines.  However, their individual 
governance structures did not represent a mimetic implementation of those influences.  




a result of significant breaches of credit card data at those units.  At GT, the 
enforcement action created a more centralized governance structure, and constrained 
the influences of autonomy while encouraging collaboration.  However, at UGA, despite 
initial documents prescribing a centralized policy review process with cabinet-level 
participation, the process is not used.  So, at GT, Top Management Support of formal 
and informal security policies is more easily observed and measured as a result of those 
enforcement actions.  At UGA, the informal policies have sidelined the formal policies 
requiring such participation.  While collaboration is documented and required at GT 
within a formal meta-policy, the energy required to create similar collaborative efforts 
at UGA is deemed too costly in terms of time and resources.  The structure for such 
efforts at UGA are found in a memorandum but were not produced in a formal policy 
document. 
Relatively weak Top Management Support, along with strong values of 
autonomy and mixed support of collaboration are noted within the action situations 
mapped for GSU.  While Georgia Southern did not experience a traumatic external 
condition like a breach, the influence of the AGILE philosophy is found within those 
observations.  The level of information rules, frequency of feedback, and sense of 
urgency yield policy outcomes that included a shorter time of development (4-6 months 
compare to up to 2 years), and a culture that is aware of the import of security issues 
exhibited by collaborative efforts not seen at GSU. 
Internal conditions clearly affect policy structure.  I found that the governance 




27001, ACUPA, AGILE, etc.  And those standards were largely selected on a couple of 
criteria : 1) The CIO’s preferences based on information related to their experience and 
knowledge, and 2) whether the IT governance area was strongly integrated with the 
governance structure of the unit.   
 The diffusion of decision-making power reflects, and may be a proxy for, values 
such as autonomy and collaboration.  At Georgia Tech, the enforcement action taken by 
PCI representatives formalized tighter controls by individuals held accountable by the 
entire organization for security outcomes.  Accountability also flowed down through the 
organizational structure for successful implementation of those policies.  Finally, top 
management required more information on a more frequent basis from all units of the 
organization as to policy performance.  The diffuse structure at GSU reflects a lack of 
accountability within the rules and information flow across the organization. 
I am confident that some elements important to assessing structure were not 
found due to weaknesses in the research design.  A richer set of interview data, perhaps 
supplemented with sample survey data from the case populations would provide 
evidence of missing structural components.  Counting observations coded for Knapp 
processes is not a strong quantitative definition of structure.  Using comparisons of 
those counts (i.e.% of total statements compared to average) is a relativistic measure at 
best (see Table 6-5).  But, at least it is a start.   
 The answer to my research question is in the affirmative.  I did find a diverse set 
of institutions that describe the governance of policy-making within each case.  I also 




institutions.  Perhaps most important, I found that the research framework, once 
modified with the ACUPA steps, aided the organization and interpretation of data 
significantly.  The framework provided structure that made the task of analysis and 
follow-up easier to manage.  In the following sections, I discuss findings specific to the 
hypotheses proposed in chapter three. 
8.2.1 Structure 
Measuring structure is an interesting exercise.  I chose a continuous scale of 
structure that mimics the graphing of social networks to a certain degree.  An ad hoc 
network is one resembling “loose” connections of seemingly disparate topics.  A formal 
network shows connections between policy components (vertical connections) and 
policy issues (horizontal connections).  An informal structure lies in between the two.  
Given the wealth of literature regarding policies and policy networks, it seems 
appropriate that defining policy structure could also benefit from what has been 
developed by the social network analysis literature. 
The policy document was initially identified as the unit of observation used to 
map the graphs.  The precision of this analysis, while thought provoking, is not robust in 
its representation of the true relationships among components (procedures, guidelines, 
standards, etc.) and the policy areas that those components are designed to regulate.   
The second hypothesis simply tested how the presence of a metapolicy is 
reflected in the structure of policy governance.  I created a relative measure of strength 
relating the presence of Knapp processes to the formality of structure and the presence 




Aggregating the policy statements, essentially creating count data, is not a precise 
description of the structure of those processes.  Structure, as a concept, reflects the 
outcomes of repeated interactions of actors constrained by a given set of rules.   
I propose digging further into developing a means of measuring the “strength” of 
individual Knapp processes in the future.  Can the idea of “deficiencies”, features 
essential to effective policy that are either missing or weak, be a predictor of policy 
outcomes.  How can deficiencies be reliably identified and measured?  Are there 
patterns within rule configurations that mark or predict the presence of deficiencies?  
These are but a few questions worthy of exploration. 
8.2.1.1 Governance Structure 
The study mapped key governance features against the ACUPA suggested model 
and found differences in structures that support the notion that differences of observed 
policy structures among the cases are related (Hypothesis 1).  The findings affirmed 
that, as Baskerville and Siponen thought, the existence of a metapolicy predicts a more 
formal structure (2002).  The GSU case demonstrated the need to be cautious in 
accepting the existence of a formal metapolicy as an indication that the metapolicy was 
institutionalized within the organization’s governance structure.  The GSU case also 
demonstrated the importance of identifying key features of governance, such as the 
review by Office of Legal Affairs.  Such features can “short-circuit” the best designed 
processes, even those that emulate best practices or strong standards. 
I shifted the focus to individual policy statements as the unit of observation.  A 




component types in the size and direction that is expected.  The presence of appropriate 
policy components as indicators of policy effectiveness is one that has strong support in 
the literature (Baskerville and Dhillon 2008; Neil Francis Doherty, Anastasakis, and 
Fulford 2011; Moule and Giavara 1995; Baskerville and Siponen 2002).  Measuring those 
combinations and proportions is an area of future research that this study indicates may 
have promise.  Both theory and practice can benefit from understanding how those 
proportions may change per organizational context and how those proportions relate to 
measured outcomes of policy effectiveness. 
However, the findings from the analysis of the set of hypotheses (3 a, b, c) that 
test this relationship do not strongly support the concept just described.  Intuitively, one 
may expect that a more formal governance process would invest in the knowledge and 
process to sufficiently construct the necessary standards, guidelines and procedures to 
assure policy success.  So, while the findings do not positively support this conjecture, I 
conclude that the study design needs additional thought before arguing that prior 
research is at fault.  The ratios of observations for the components identified for each 
case do suggest a relationship between the composition of components observed and 
the cases.  However, the details hidden within these component counts offer an 
opportunity to explore exactly what elements are related to the case conditions, and 
what elements are not.  The tables and analysis produced by mapping institutions to the 
ACUPA model suggests deeper analysis of the variations of specific attributes, aims, and 




8.2.1.2 Structure and Graphs – an exception 
Structure did not behave as expected for the GSU case. Perhaps the limited 
implementation of ISO 27002, and the generic University Policy on University-wide 
Policies, cause the two structures to differ. The graphs suggest the documents and their 
references are artifacts of the “ad hoc” fashion of developing security policy.  GS and 
UGA show the older policies of data handling, password protection, etc. that operate as 
though other policies do not exist.  Later policy efforts “loosely” connected these 
policies together to form a system. GT’s process demonstrates how developing a new 
policy process brings structure to the document relationships.  Given the relative 
“newness” of the meta-policy, one can speculate that as time passes, the structure will 
exhibit more of the horizontal cross-references that a meta-policy is thought to 
encourage. 
8.2.2 External Conditions 
At the beginning of the study, I anticipated a finding that would show key 
features of externally mandated standards become part of the case policy structure.  
Georgia Southern and Georgia Tech both showed “copyright” features required from 
the federal Higher Education Opportunity Act.  UGA and GT both showed features from 
the PCI standards to secure credit card transaction data.  And, all four cases showed 
some affinity for the ACUPA model of policy governance.   
The variation in compliance with USG requirements showed “independence” 
from the parent governing body as to the structure of security policy.  Top management 




construction of these requirements.  One may consider it odd that compliance varied as 
much given the participation.  One plausible explanation is found in the evolution of 
USG policy requirements.  From one year to the next, differing external standards were 
suggested by the USG Office of Information Security as the model to follow (e.g. NIST 
800, ISO 27001, etc.).  At one point, multiple models, some with fairly distinct 
differences in objectives, were listed as “ok” for units to adapt.  The lack of firm 
guidance certainly would lower perceived risk of “non-compliance” among the case 
actors.  A further note, the limited implementation of ISO 27001 at GSU was initially 
view with skepticism by USG personnel.  Once outside praise of the implementation 
began to appear, the standard was added to the USG list. 
Consideration for future research includes examining the processes that 
“filtered” these features and adapted them to the case organizational conditions.  Initial 
observations suggest that a few key actors hold the power to filter and adapt the 
externally required features in a manner that reflects organizational priorities such as 
resource allocation, autonomy, and management objectives. 
External mandates may instigate changes to governance and policy structure. 
But, those changes may not necessarily be “institutionalized”, or integrated, into the 
fabric of organizational culture and operations.  As the UGA and GSU cases confirm, a 
written rule does not mean the rule plays any part in influencing the discussion.  UGA 
and GT experienced egregious breaches involving credit card data.  Both institutions 
were subjected to severe penalties by the Payment Card Industry and were required to 




to operate as a merchant using those payment systems.  GT chose to restructure policy 
governance and to institutionalize those standards along with other best practices to 
create a robust governance structure driven by the type of meta-policy suggested by 
Baskerville and Siponen (2002).  UGA adopted specific documents in response to PCI 
standards, but operates under a system of “referencing” mandates within existing policy 
rather than engaging the campus community in a university policy process.  The findings 
among the cases showed that despite similar external conditions, the two cases present 
different policy structures as a result of differing governance structures. 
8.2.3  Organizational Conditions 
I examined two sets of hypotheses that explore the relationship between 
governance structure and the organizational conditions related to Top Management 
Support and Collaboration.  The findings supported the findings of earlier research, 
confirming the relationship and the direction of the relationship (Table 8-1).   
8.2.3.1 TMS 
Knapp et al (2009) found strong support for their proposition that “…an 
organization’s overall security health can be accurately predicted by asking a single 
question: ‘Does top management visibly and actively support the organization’s 
information security program?’”.  I proposed a set of hypotheses to test this finding by 
approaching the analysis from the institutional perspective.  The hypotheses propose 
that the presence of top management support can be validated and identified within 




The findings affirmed prior warnings that rules-in-form (i.e. policy documents) 
are not sufficient proof.  The identification of TMS in “rules-in-use” was more 
informative as to the role and extent of TMS within each case.  The relative strength of 
TMS, measured in terms of compulsory boundary rules showed that the more formally 
structured participation of top management in the GT case yielded a diverse 
participation of actors reflective of the decentralized structure of the GT organization.  
The philosophy of AGILE similarly guided GS to be more inclusive than was the finding 
for UGA or GSU.  As the inclusiveness of various top management from across the 
organization diminished, a more techno-centric oriented set of actors emerged at GSU 
and UGA.  And, consistent with prior findings regarding the technical nature of 
information security policy and weak TMS, the two less formal cases presented the 
weakest security governance structures.   
Perhaps the most significant finding is the correlation between the appearance, 
and frequency, of compulsory boundary rules and the strength of the formal 
governance structure.  Rationally, given the perspective of most individuals, 
management or otherwise, that security is a technical issue, then certain actors must be 
compelled to participate.  But, the use of a rule type, and in this case, a further 
refinement of that type, to identify a feature like top management support, suggests the 
methods provided by the IAD framework can be applied by policy analysts to sift 








Table 8-1 Hypotheses Exploring TMS and Collaboration 
Factor Georgia Tech 
(GT) 
Georgia Southern (GS) Univ. of Georgia (UGA) Georgia State (GSU) 
H4a: Governance structure 
will resemble the ideal 
Knapp model as the number 
of principals identified in 1st 
order boundary rules 
increase 
Supported 
Data indicate a more formal 
relationship among actors and 
policy process institutions 
Inconclusive 
Expectations are supported – 
informal process with relevant 
Top Management identified – 
yet need comparative case data 
to reach conclusion 
Rejected 
Formally, the evolution of structure 
from near Ad Hoc to near formal 
network occurred when Top 
Management was named as 
participants in the Security 
documents required by PCI.   
Supported 
No formal rules require top 
management participation; 
governance structure is deficient 
in the necessary Knapp processes 
for areas not under ISMS [367] 
H4b: High TMS is likely 
accompanied by compulsory 
Boundary rules requiring the 
participation of a number of 
principals of the 
organization.   
Supported 
GT presents compulsory and 
invitation rules.  The number of 
principles engaged indicates 
relatively strong TMS and GT 
presents the Knapp model well 
Supported 
The CIO does employ 
invitational boundary rules.  
And, the structure at GS 
represents the Knapp model 
well.   
Supported 
Practice currently reveals the 
structure is deficient in necessary 
Knapp processes as the 
participation of top management is 
declining. 
Supported 
CISO almost a “lone wolf” as she 
is only one focusing on security 
policy for an organization among 
the largest within USG 
H4c: If there are no 
compulsory boundary rules, 
then the likelihood that a 
techno-centric governance 
process increases.  TMS will 
be “lower” than in 
organizations with 
compulsory boundary rules. 
Supported 
TMS is indicated within the 
process institutions 
Inconclusive 
The measure of TMS is the 
representation of high level 
management in the policy 
process.  But, there are no 
compulsory boundary rules 
found.  Yet, indications are that 
by invitation TMS is achieved. 
Supported 
Directives from the 
Provost/President created 
compulsory rules as part of the 
compliance to USG and PCI 
demands.  But these directives, 
instigated by PCI audit, are no 
longer followed – no compulsory 
rules, weak TMS 
Supported 
GSU has low TMS.  The only 
compulsory boundary rule 
requires the CIO/CISO as 
responsible for drafting policy.  IT 
centric – suggesting ad hoc policy 
structure 
 
H5a: The presence of Open 
Boundary Rules setting the 
criteria for participation in 
making security policy 
reflects an organizational 
condition that values 
collaboration. 
Supports 
Individuals may opt in, criteria 
for participation on committee 
also clear. 
Supported 
Requires heavy reliance on 
rules-in-use.  There is an 
informal open boundary 
allowing anyone to contribute to 
specification of needs or 
feedback to proposals.   
Supported 
No open boundary rules identified, 
and the structure presents Knapp 
deficiencies. 
Supported 
No open boundary rules found.  
Policy structure looks has Knapp 
deficiencies. 
H5b: The absence of an 
invitation boundary rule 
specifying participation of 
university leadership will 
increase the likelihood of a 
Supported 
GT specifies TMS participation 
via a number of boundary 
rules.  Structure resembles 
Knapp. 
Supported 
GS has invitation boundary rules 
present.  Structure resembles 
Knapp. 
Not Supported 
Invitation boundary rules exist but 
use of rule in practice is not clear  
and there are Knapp deficiencies 
Supported 
The only invitation rule is an 
administrative advisory 
committee with scope limited to 
examining the form of policy, not 












Factor Georgia Tech 
(GT) 
Georgia Southern (GS) Univ. of Georgia (UGA) Georgia State (GSU) 
governance structure that is 
largely ad hoc in nature. 
to Knapp is weaker than cases 
with such rules. 
H5c: The presence of 
symmetric Aggregation rules 
along with Open Boundary 
rules reflects existence of a 
collaborative culture and the 
governance structure is 
more likely to resemble a 
completed Knapp model. 
Supported –  
A configuration of information 
and choice rules support the 
notion that a collaborative 
structure is evident in the rules  
 
Weakly Supported 
AGILE process supports 
symmetric choices.  However,  
Formal rules lean toward non-
symmetric aggregation rules 
permitting CIO/CISO to make 
final arbitration. 
Supported 
A symmetric rule is not identified.  
And, the structure has weaknesses 
when compared to Knapp.   
Supported 
A symmetric rule was not found.  
GSU structure is deficient when 
compared to Knapp. 
H5d:  The presence of 
information rules requiring 
the exchange of information 
among actors indicates the 
existence of a collaborative 
culture and indicates a 
stronger governance 
structure when compared to 
cases without such rules. 
Supported 
GT specifies a number of 
channels to communicate with 
stakeholders during each stage 
of the process 
Supported 
Information rules requiring 
exchange are found in the 
informal and formal rules-in-use.  
. 
Supported 
This case has a lack of information 
rules and the structure has no 
retirement, very weak Risk 
Assessment and  Awareness  
Supported 
The process of information 
exchange is mostly among the 
administrative leadership, and is 
informal (interview data).  
Governance Structure has weak 






In order to understand how TMS directly affects outcomes, I propose additional 
investigations that would explore in detail the processes that require, permit, or 
otherwise encourage these actors to influence the structure and content of policy.  
Models of direct participation would look like the Knapp model.  The addition of the 
ACUPA steps added needed precision and detail to this analysis.  I would further explore 
integrating these ‘sub-processes’ to enrich the analysis.  McGinnis and others (O’Toole 
Jr. 1997; Blomquist and deLeon 2011; McGinnis 2011b; Aligica and Boettke 2009; Cole, 
Epstein, and McGinnis 2014) have suggested that policy decisions are influenced by 
processes and actors that are “networked” to the particular policy process of interest.  
Identification of the linkages between these secondary networks of influence may 
sharpen the understanding of the structure of an organization’s policy governance. 
8.2.3.2 Collaboration and Autonomy 
The fifth set of hypotheses explored the relationship between structure and the 
organizational conditions of collaboration and autonomy.  Analysis showed a strong 
presence of Open Boundary Rules (e.g. rules structured to encourage voluntary 
participation by other actors) in the cases with more formal governance structures.  
However, “open” seemed to operate as a relative term as we found that the definition 
of who may be included may be controlled by one or two actors.  Terms identified in the 
Attributes and Conditions of the boundary rules were seen as ambiguous, allowing 
actors to assume authority to define, or use, the term as they perceived to be proper.  






the case and the USG from understanding the effects that a “narrowing” of participation 
may bring to policy outcomes. 
On the other hand, findings from the GT and GS cases show the positive effects 
that openness may have on the policy process.  Time required to propose, discuss, draft, 
and approve a policy was found to be significantly shorter for these two cases when 
compared to UGA and GSU.  Some of the “speed” of policy development can be traced 
to the distributed network structure employed by GT to engage a diverse population of 
GT representing most if not all of the organizational structure. 
The reluctance of both UGA and GSU to pursue policy change due to the amount 
of time required, up to 24 months, is noted in the respective interviews for the CISO of 
each case.  Both cases are larger, in terms of population, than GT or GS.  And, the 
logistics of managing meetings and feedback is daunting.  However, structural features 
were identified at GSU that further complicate efforts to collaborate.  Before a policy at 
GSU can be discussed among the disparate division, the GSU CISO needs the blessing of 
both the Office of Legal Affairs and the CIO.  With few resources, winning an argument, 
as to whether a new policy is needed versus maintaining the status quo of an umbrella 
policy, is in itself a major disincentive to pursuing policy change.   
The reluctance at UGA seemed driven by the cost of pursuing policy change 
versus simply inserting a reference to the requirement into existing policy documents.  
This reasoning reflects a rational economic decision weighing the time and effort to 






policy.  Given the lack of structure monitoring, the perceived benefit of new policy is 
likely to be low and the perceived cost of the process very high. 
Information rules play an important role in any process that encourages 
collaboration, feedback, and learning.  Information rules play a key role in the 
identification of structural features that support, and therefore indicate, organizational 
conditions regarding collaboration.  The lack of strength, or presence, of information 
rules also indicate an organizational condition that values autonomy.  The presence, or 
not, of invitational boundary rules (that encourage participation) along with the 
presence of information rules further defines the relative strength of a structure that 
supports, or not, collaboration. 
Even though a structure may present the necessary information and boundary 
rules to support collaborative policy development efforts, the effect of these rules may 
be constrained by the lack of aggregation rules that determine how a final decision is 
made.  If an aggregation rule is symmetric, supporting a means of achieving consensus, 
then support for collaboration is stronger than if the rule is non-symmetric.  A non-
symmetric aggregation rule may allow a CIO, CISO, or Legal Affairs officer, the means of 
ignoring, or discouraging, a consensus.  Further, the frequency of interactions specified 
by the conditions within information rules may indicate whether collaboration is indeed 
a value that is strong within the organization or not. 
Future research will explore the paired concepts of collaboration and autonomy 
in greater detail.  This study suggests that there are ways to structure rules-in-form to 






configurations of rules that value autonomy.  A field study involving interviews of many 
actors across different units of an organization could identify the structure of these 
arrangements.   
8.2.4 Elements of Policy Structure 
The units of observation were confined to include those statements that are 
coded for the Knapp processes of Awareness, Implementation, Monitoring, and 
Enforcement.  Four hypothesis tested the existence and strength of four elements of 
policy structure (Table 8-2).  I discuss those findings below. 
Table 8-2 Elements of Policy Structure 
 
8.2.4.1 Components 
The contrast between Georgia State and Georgia Southern when the component 




H7: As an organization’s governance structure 
declines from Formal to Ad Hoc, then it is less 
likely to present a coherent set of standards, 
procedures, guidelines and policies appropriate 
for effective policy. 
Components Not Supported 
 
Count data of component 
statements not sufficient to 
explain the structure. 
H8: The likelihood of coverage of USG issues will 
correlate with the relative strength of top 
management support for securing cyber assets 
Scope Not Supported 
 
Test of data may not be precise 
enough to measure realtionship 
H9: Acceptable Use Policies will vary in “fit” as 
the governance structure varies.  A Formal 
structure will provide greater evidence of fit, 
measured in terms of specific assignments and 




Precision greatly enhanced with 
use of institutional analysis tools – 
grammar and rule configurations 
H10: As the governance structure of a university 
becomes more formal, then the likelihood 
increases that clarity of the policy is more 
appropriate to the comprehension skills of the 
university’s student population. 
Form Not Supported 
 






informal structure.  GSU can’t be designated formal due to the absence of a formal 
meta-policy.  On the other hand, GS has a formal meta-policy, but is missing the 
requirement of cross-referencing issues (a requirement of both informal and formal 
policy structures).  One can argue that without the meta-policy GS is similar to UGA and 
has an Ad Hoc structure.  But, the interview data confirms that the GS processes are 
strongly influenced by the metapolicy.  The relatively short-time period required for 
policy construction lowers the perceived costs and allows GS to move quickly to adapt 
new external requirements like the copyright feature of the Higher Education 
Opportunity Act.  UGA had not adopted that requirement, except for publishing an 
external reference in the old copyright policy document. 
The weak findings tying the use of policy components to formality of structure 
may be explained by the lack of education of policy developers as to the purpose of 
each component.  I coded individual observations to the appropriate component 
category.  In a few instances, the case labeled a document, or section of document, as a 
guideline, procedure, or policy.  The inconsistency, or more likely, the consistency of 
throwing all components together as one document to be applied to managers, 
technicians, and users alike – contributes to the lack of observable structure.  This 
finding begs the question, if an analyst can’t tell the difference between guidelines and 
policies – can the individuals who are supposed to implement the policy? 
8.2.4.2 Scope 
The test of the relationship between top management support, acting as a proxy 






best.  I fault the design of the study for not preparing a more robust measure of this 
relationship.  Perhaps a more appropriate test is one that measures the awareness of 
both top management and users as to the existence and relevance of a policy area 
solution.  Methods such as Q-sort have been used in other studies employing the IAD 
framework to measure policy compliance and divergence (S. Siddiki et al. 2011; S. 
Siddiki, Basurto, and Weible 2012; Carter et al. 2013; Feiock et al. 2014; Carter et al. 
2015).  Additional interviews may also serve to understand the relationship between 
policy compliance to external requirements and policy scope in response to perceived 
threats to organizational security. 
8.2.4.3 Tailoring (Fit) 
The analysis to identify how organizations tailor statements to improve policy fit 
to the organizational mission and objectives was perhaps the strongest indication of the 
power of the IAD tools to contribute to analyzing structure.  Counts of statements 
combined with the nested analysis of those statements to aggregate the story of “who 
does what to whom and under what conditions” created compelling evidence to show 
that the structure of policy increases in specificity to organizational conditions as the 
governance structure grows more formal.  The demonstration of fit also validates the 
rudimentary measures of relative strength of Knapp processes that were used to 
confirm coding of governance and policy structure discussed earlier. 
8.2.4.4 Form 
Testing the Form of policy as a measure of clarity and understanding is a sensible 






effectively understood by the individuals whose behaviors are to be regulated.  
However, the test of readability was flawed.  Most of the observations are collected 
from “one-size-fits-all” documents that included policy statements meant for managers, 
standards and procedures meant for technicians, and ancillary documents with 
references for attorneys.  As a matter of practice, this form does not bode well for 
improving the understanding of a student or professor as to the acceptable use of 
university IT resources.  Relating a simple readability test to that understanding belies 
the complexity of educating individuals as to the expectations of behavior that are 
heavily dependent upon the role those individuals assume within the organization.  I 
propose future research will need to explore how policies are constructed, published 
and disseminated in role-appropriate forms as a means of improving policy awareness 
and effectiveness. 
8.3 Discussion Summary 
What do we know or understand as a result of this research?  How does the 
structure of cybersecurity policy relate to the structure of policy governance?  Does an 
understanding of governance structure contribute to predicting, or explaining, likely 
policy outcomes, such as effectiveness?  Are the concepts and tools developed for the 
IAD framework appropriate and effective for discerning these questions?  Can we 
evaluate both governance and policy structure with these tools in a way that 






The evidence shows variation in the actors and the institutions that govern the 
interactions of those actors among all four cases.  In short, structure does matter and 
the ability of the framework to identify differences in structure is an important 
contribution to policy design and evaluation (Carter et al. 2013; Carter et al. 2015; 
Feiock et al. 2014). 
The strongest structure is found in the case of Georgia Tech.  Members of Top 
Management are required to oversee a structured, step-by-step process that mandates 
collaboration among all segments of the university through a series of information and 
aggregation rules that set “consensus” as a standard to be achieved prior to adopting a 
new policy.  Georgia Tech formalizes policy governance in a document and has 
“institutionalized” the process by repeatedly employing the process to revise and 
replace most of the institutions used to govern policy areas such as Acceptable Use, 
Copyright protection, and Data Protection.  Georgia Southern has a similar policy 
process document but without the formal institutions declaring participation of Top 
Management and setting consensus as a required outcome.  However, Georgia 
Southern has institutionalized norms and standards similar to the Georgia Tech policy 
via its implementation of the AGILE philosophy applied to policy making.  The 
commitment of the Georgia Southern CIO to following the AGILE philosophy is a key 
factor in the success of institutionalizing these values, norms, and standards.  The 
perspective of an individual’s interpretation of “rules” is an important aspect of 






policy (D’Arcy and Herath 2011).  The ability of the IAD tools to identify and compare 
formal and informal institutions is suggested by Siddiki, et al (2010).     
Formality of structure at the remaining two cases is found to be lacking, despite 
documented attempts to formalize such structure.  UGA created a plan that required 
Top Management Support similar to Georgia Tech’s.  However, the plan focused on 
solving the requirements mandated by representatives of the Payment Card Industry as 
a response to serious credit card data breaches.  Other issues, such as copyright 
protection, data protection, and privacy, have been “solved” by referencing external 
mandates.  This solution requires the least effort to “amend” university policy and 
achieves compliance on its face.  However, the solution also avoids efforts to integrate 
the policy goals with organizational goals, mission, and culture.  Critical processes such 
as Awareness and Enforcement are not addressed via the process of using references to 
external mandates. 
Georgia State has adopted the ISO 27001 standard for policy governance for 3 
departments, leaving the university’s remaining operational units and its academic 
division to abide by an existing “umbrella” policy that has generic standards and goals 
with a few specific policy areas addressed by documents authored priot to 2005.  The 
work of identifying policy issues and creating a policy revision is done by the university 
Information Security Office without the collaborative efforts of university top 
management.  A single point of contact, the Office of Legal Affairs, preserves the status 
quo by insisting that the current umbrella policy is sufficient, unless overwhelming 






lack of resources allocated to the Information Security Office which has two employees 
to manage security efforts for more than 33,000 students and several thousand 
employees.  The implementation of the ISO 27001 standard is limited to the three 
departments because of the inability of the CISO to get additional funds budgeted to 
expand the project to other areas of the university. 
 While not conclusive, hypotheses testing the relationship of governance 
structure to policy structure in the context of organizational factors such as Top 
Management Support, Collaboration, and Autonomy, indicates continued support of 
findings from other research as well as positive indications that institutional analysis can 
contribute to identifying evidence of how these concepts are “institutionalized”, thus 
becoming part of the formal structure of the organization.  These findings are 
sympathetic to efforts to explain collaboration (Calanni et al. 2014; S. N. Siddiki et al. 
2015) or the need for coercion (S. N. Siddiki 2013), and the likelihood of successful 
policy making exercises.  
 As to the discussion of the elements of policy structure; components, tailoring, 
fit, and form are concepts that may not have been fairly investigated within this 
research design.  The elements are largely qualitative in nature, but could be evaluated 
using quantitative measures given a more appropriate research design.  Moreover, the 
effects of these elements may be better understood in the context of user perspectives. 
Such perspectives can be identified with surveys, Q-sort analysis, and interviews using 






 How do the different approaches to policy among the cases contribute to more 
or less effective cybersecurity?  First, remember that effectiveness in this study is 
measured by identifying processes and practices that practitioners and theoreticians 
alike agree are necessary to assure effectiveness.  The study did not measure the 
concept of effectiveness directly for two reasons.  First, the reluctance of organizations 
to share their relative exposure to compromises in security is well documented.  
Second, a casual question to the CISO’s of the cases revealed that reluctance is real.  
Analyzing effectiveness indirectly, by comparing the structure of policy and policy 
processes, is the only available path given this reluctance. 
 So, given that effectiveness is measured in this way, do differences in policy 
governance lead to more or less effective cybersecurity within the universities 
examined?  I believe the answer to the question is affirmative.  I offer three reasons 
why. 
 First, security literature and popular literature denote the need for dynamic 
policy governance to respond to ever changing threats and conditions.  The two 
strongest governance structures, Georgia Tech and Georgia Southern, can produce new 
policy, or policy revisions, in four to six months.  Georgia State and UGA managers 
contend their processes take 18-24 months.  The prevalent choice for GSU and UGA Top 
Management is a preference to avoid policy change. GT and Georgia Southern engage 
faculty, staff, and top management in time efficient process to produce policy changes 
that address changing conditions.  And, the policy changes are created with a wealth of 






substantial number of rules that would be in play, if the Office of Legal Affairs allows the 
process to proceed past the determination of need for a revision.  UGA presented only 
one information rule. 
 Second, the importance of consensus cannot be overstated.  The two structures, 
GT and Georgia Southern, that facilitate consensus through participation and 
information exchange will, by design, create policies and practices that are more likely 
to align with organizational objectives and culture than the structures presented by UGA 
and GSU.  Remember, UGA opts to reference external policy mandates rather than 
engage the policy change process.  There is little doubt that a significant gap exists 
between language written by policymakers in Atlanta and Washington and the norms 
found within those respective institutions. 
 Third, the importance of top management support is reflected, once again, in the 
structure of GT and Georgia Southern.  Georgia Tech, prior to the formalization of its 
current metapolicy for managing cybersecurity, deferred to the many autonomous units 
for implementation of policy suggested by the Information Security Office.  The new 
process, with mandated, first order, participation of top management, became a reality 
once the President of Georgia Tech communicated clearly that the current model was 
not securing organizational assets and was creating adverse impressions of Georgia Tech 
that damaged the university’s reputation as a leader in security.  Georgia Southern’s 
adoption of AGILE philosophy integrated well with the university culture.  The 
participation of top management assured strong alignment of policy objectives with 






 On the other hand, UGA lost the participation of top management once the 
credit card access problems were resolved.  The topic of security at GSU remained at a 
level of management that was two steps below the cabinet.  In both cases, only limited 
changes to security policy occurred in the time frame referenced by this study. 
 Governance structure determines the likelihood that a policy statement or 
practice will reflect organizational culture and organizational factors such as top 
management support.  Governance can determine how responsive policy making is to 
the organization’s changing threat environment.  My findings in regards to the “fit” 
hypothesis (#9) support this conclusion, which aligns with findings of other studies 
discussed in chapters 2 and 3.  In retrospect, perhaps the formality of structure (#7), 
coverage of issues (#8), and form of policy (#10) are related strongly with organizational 
culture and may actually be a reflection of that culture.  Rather than measuring 
differences in formality of structure, for example, deference should be given to the 
alignment of governance structure with organizational culture and related factors.   
Ostrom’s notion of polycentric approaches to find optimum, localized, solutions 
to common problems supports such a conclusion (E. Ostrom 2010).  A polycentric 
approach challenges suggestions that security ontologies, created to adaptively map 
security standards to organization’s implementations, will best enable inter-
organizational comparison, and compliance,  of the implementation of security solutions 
(Ramanauskaite et al. 2013).  The notion of an ontology is not the issue, but the creation 
of a security ontology must be sensitive to the human institutions within which those 






 In sum, the findings achieved the objectives of this study.  The idea of relating 
features of governance structure to features of policy structure holds promise.  How 
policy is created can determine the structure and effectiveness of policy.  The IAD 
framework and tools are found to contribute towards reliable analysis of the research 
question and related concepts.  I will expand on the implications of this research to the 









Breaches, or failures, in cybersecurity is an issue that is considered a strategic 
threat to our national security and our national economy.  Private sector losses due to 
security breaches have increased and continue to increase.  Compromises of payment 
systems have led to increasingly large losses for retail, finance, healthcare, and even 
government employers. Postsecondary organizations have not escaped the financial and 
reputational damage that such breaches create. 
Threats to cyber security have many origins and exploit a variety of human, 
organizational, and technical weaknesses.  Knowledge of how organizations structure 
security policies to meet this myriad of threats within their varying contextual 
conditions is minimal yet needed (Portnoy and Goodman 2009; Werlinger, Hawkey, and 
Beznosov 2009).  This study focuses on four cases involving research universities to 
examine the research question: “How does structure of cybersecurity policy relate to 
differences in structure of policy governance of universities and colleges?”     
Why was it important to do this research?  The research design is one that 
addresses this requirement as well as the requirements of the research question.  The 
findings of this study suggest that both the research framework and the tools adapted 
from other IAD studies are valid, effective means of mapping key features of policy 
governance and the relationship of the effects of those features upon both the structure 
of policy and policy management, as well as the potential effectiveness of both within 






logical guide to future research to tie theory, such as deterrence theory, organizational 
learning theory, and individual rational choice theory, to policy design and policy 
practice.   
This chapter begins with an examination of the theoretical, policy, and practical 
implications, of this study.  Second, I discuss future directions of research that can 
expand upon the discussion from the previous chapter.  The limitations of the design 
and findings are discussed.  A final thought offers a philosophical perspective as to the 
value of this and other such works that integrate the human, organizational, and 
technical perspectives of problems similar to cybersecurity. 
9.1 Contributions to Theory, Method, and Practice 
One of the objectives of this study is to add to the body of knowledge concerning 
structure of policy processes (i.e. governance structure) and the outcomes of those 
processes.  The second objective is to demonstrate the utility of analytical tools such as 
the Institutional Grammar tool and analysis of rules configurations.  The third objective 
was to provide suggestions derived from the study that may aid policy makers and 
managers in their attempts to create effective cyber security solutions.  In the following 
three sections, I offer arguments as to the attainment of those objectives. 
9.1.1 Theory 
This study examined the relationship between policy governance and policy 
through an examination of structure.  Precision is enhanced by categorizing 






method to identify and classify governance and information security policy structure 
builds upon studies by Knapp, Doherty, Baskerville, and others in the following ways. 
9.1.1.1 Standard Policy Structure Defined  
I expanded the classification of policy structure offered by Doherty, et al (2009).  
Their study identified structure by policy types and the number of documents that 
describe standards and procedures.  Information security research describes policy 
structure as a count of documents prescribed for a set of problems.  The 
conceptualization is not a concise, nor precise, means of describing the interaction of 
actors and institutions assigned to mitigate the problem.  For example, analysis of 
documents for this study identified examples where many policies (defined by area and 
component) are found in a single document.  This study defined structure by terms that 
include configurations of policy components designed to affect specific policy areas for a 
given set of actors.  This method is not-specific to information security and can be 
applied, has been applied, to other policy areas (Lubell 2015; Raab, Mannak, and 
Cambré 2015; Weible and Carter 2015; Feiock et al. 2014). 
9.1.1.2 Network of Statements 
 Statements found in a document may be linked to other policy statements 
scattered across the legacy of documents for a given organization.  This study’s 
framework improves analysis by standardizing the unit of observation on the sentences 
within each document and then allowing the analysis to place those observations within 
the appropriate action situation.  As theorists from many disciplines have written, it is 






organizational behavior (Watkins and Westphal 2015; Bryson, Crosby, and Stone 2015; 
Heikkila 2015; McGinnis and Ostrom 2014; Cole, Epstein, and McGinnis 2014; Weick 
1976; Laurence J. O’Toole and Meier 2004).   
The disaggregation of the Knapp Action Situations into ACUPA steps offers an 
opportunity to increase the precision and reliability of analysis of the Knapp model.  The 
ACUPA steps break down the Development box into several action situations connected 
by their respective outcomes.  The aggregation of those outcomes creates policy.  
Reliability is improved as the ACUPA model is referenced by the USG units.  Mapping 
their instructions into the ACUPA stages allows the analyst to rely on the original text for 
direction – rather than translating text into the likely categories identified by Knapp (See 
Table 5-10).  Precision of analysis is improved as the analyst can categorize statements 
into smaller sets of actions containing fewer observations.  In addition, the aggregation 
of observations within categories of activities understood by the managers and policy 
makers enables validation and application of the results by those who practice what we 
study.   
Future research is needed to validate the incorporation of the sub-processes by 
surveying practitioners, repeating the original Knapp research design (Knapp et al. 
2009).  Mapping can identify relationships among stakeholders, the institutions that 
regulate those relationships and can help managers create coalitions and understanding 
for policies to be implemented (Aligica 2006).  The data from the surveys and the 
observations from published policies can contribute to the mapping exercise that can 






9.1.1.3 Policy Component  
The ordinal ranking of Policy Components created for this study a means to 
examine observations of institutional statements in categories that describe the roles or 
particular groups of actors who are responsible for the action or objective of the 
statement.  A component describes the level of action intended.  For example, an 
individual user may be aware of a policy statement that defines an individual’s 
responsibility for securing IT resources but the individual employs a set of procedures to 
fulfil that responsibility.  Management responsibilities for implementing, managing and 
monitoring policies are found in standards.  The rank order of these components is 
consistent with the instructions and expectations of policies and guidelines published by 
the Board of Regents, and is consistent with the ontology described within the literature 
(Neil Francis Doherty, Anastasakis, and Fulford 2009; Baskerville and Siponen 2002; 
Moule and Giavara 1995).  The relative levels of importance correlated nicely with the 
focus of the research question.  However, the study identified some “overlapping” of 
the categories, particularly at the USG level of policy.  These “errors” may contribute to 
the difficulty of improving policy awareness for all roles across the USG.  Confirming and 
measuring this contribution will be an objective of future research. 
9.1.2 Method 
Baskerville and Siponen made a cogent argument of the importance of meta-
policy to guide emergent organizations in the policy making exercise as they struggle 
with the challenges of ever-changing context in the form of evolving threats, economic 






grounded exploration of the application of a meta-theory to explain differences in the 
outcomes of policy processes among four organizations.   
The concept of mapping, and its application, while initially not a focus of the 
study, developed into perhaps one of the more significant findings.  Aligica argues that 
the IAD framework is a map-making instrument(2006, 75).  The IAD framework, in his 
view, is a meta-theory of institutional mapping.  He defines the procedure in three 
steps: (1) identify and map the action situation and actors; (2) identify factors 
(environmental and organizational) that affect the action situation; (3) elaborate how 
the two sets of data found via steps 1 and 2 generate “patterns of interaction and 
specific outcomes” (p. 89).  Those are the steps followed by the design of this study 
which produced the findings discussed. 
Algorithms developed for text analysis can be employed to automate the data 
gathering from large sets of documents.  Analysis similar to that applied in this study can 
be generated to create the data sets Aligica prescribes.  A “big data” project can then 
look at these patterns over many sets of action situations, with varying degrees of 
organizational and environmental factors. 
9.1.3 Some thoughts regarding application of IGT 
This study observed some of the some challenges described by prior research.  I 






9.1.3.1 oBject – Adding to the discussion 
The creation of the concept of oBject, the receiver of the aIm, does indeed assist 
the analyst (Siddiki, et al 2010).  I found clarity in resolving the meaning of the Attribute 
component and in identifying the aIm verb.  Classifying what or whom received the 
prescribed action helps to identify the proper action situation within the ACUPA/Knapp 
model. 
9.1.3.2 Distinguishing between aIms and Conditions 
Basurto, et al (2010) called for a better understanding of when the description of 
the action shifts to qualifiers of the action.  I found that limiting the aIm to an action 
verb as helpful in my analysis.  The qualifiers of the aIm are then identified as conditions 
as suggested by Siddiki, et al (2010).  The simpler form of aIm offers a more elegant path 
to classifying the objectives or goals of the statement and to creating subclasses of the 
goal by analysis of the conditions that limit the scope of the goal or action. 
9.1.3.3 Accounting for implicit effect of Or/Else statements 
Studies applying IGT to analysis of institutions note the challenges of implicitly 
acknowledging sanctions should a norm be violated.  For example, Georgia Southern’s 
AUP document has a section that explicitly defines sanctions and how they may be 
applied should the policy be violated.  As the sanctions are part of the document, it is 
not difficult for the analyst to presume that all norms found in the document are 
actually rules.  I did not resolve this conundrum for this study.  But, further application 






9.1.3.4 Accounting for implicit statements 
The difficulty of reliably analyzing statements has been discussed by a number of 
articles (Basurto et al. 2009; S. Siddiki et al. 2011; Carter et al. 2013).  There is a need for 
consensus regarding the idea of using observations of implicit statements found within 
formal institutional statements.  Research tends to take the conservative approach to 
using only what is written.  However, there are times when the position, boundary, and 
scope statements are implicit and can be attributed to formal statements.  I believe one 
can validate these implicit statements by seeking the concurrence of actors that these 
statements are practiced.  For example: 
336:3 Policy issues can be identified by anyone within the University community 
context. 
 
Using the basic AIM verb of the statement, “Identify”, this is a Choice statement.  
However, the statement implicitly creates the position of “issue identifier” assigned to 
the attribute “anyone within the University community context”.  The attribute - 
“anyone within the University community context” – sets the boundary for who is 
eligible to hold the position of identifier.  Finally, the statement specifies that a single 
individual may identify a need – and can be classified as an Aggregation statement.  The 
implicit statements “fill in the blanks” by describing the structure of the action situation 






9.1.3.5 Accounting for statements present across multiple action situations 
I found a number of observations that can be coded for multiple action 
situations.  For example, within the Information Security Management System (Doc 
367), GSU has a rule that says: 
When a new procedure, or version of a procedure, is issued for inclusion in the 
University's Information Security Management System it will include:… (Ref 
367:13) 
 
The Condition “when a new procedure” applies to the Knapp Development 
situation.  The Condition “or version of a procedure” implies a revision of existing policy 
and applies to the Knapp Review situation.  One can code the same observation as a 
member of those two sets.  Or, one can create two separate observations, one for each 
relevant situation.  Clearly, a standard is required to assure the reliability of the “count” 
of observations included in the structure of each situation. 
9.1.4  Policy and Practice 
Those working in the information security discipline (Baskerville and Mikko 
Siponen 2002; Dhillon and Backhouse 2001; Kolkowska and Dhillon 2013; M. Siponen, 
Pahnila, and Mahmood 2010;), as well as the public policy discipline (Hicklin and Godwin 
2009; O’Toole Jr. 2000; L. J. O’Toole 2004; Robichau and Lynn Jr. 2009; Simon 1973) 
have opined as to the need for research to be relevant to practitioners.  I offer four 
suggestions that, while not exhaustive, do demonstrate contributions to meeting that 
need. 
First, the research model provides some insight as to components critical to 






“organized anarchies” or  garbage cans (Cohen, March, and Olsen 1972).  I believe the 
model is, in reality, a dynamic example of polycentrism.  Within the limited domain of a 
university, approaches to managing access and availability of critical resources such as 
information technology are not too dissimilar to the efforts of fisherman or foresters 
who seek to maintain the sustainability of the enterprises through cooperation and 
information exchange.  The two strong examples of Georgia Tech and Georgia Southern 
demonstrate how a consensus driven approach that emphasizes access to relevant 
information can be successful in changing organizational culture towards solutions for 
cybersecurity.  The dynamics of security require a flexible approach that is welcomed by 
the entire organization rather than an approach emphasizing security as a “technical 
issue” that must be implemented via the authority possessed by those in “positions” of 
authority. 
Second, the IAD framework reminds the managers of the multi-level nature of 
the security policy process.  The interaction of governing organizations at the 
constitutional level with the policy organization of the university must be 
accommodated if external conditions to success are to be assured.  And, the 
relationship between the policy as written and the policy as implemented must be 
acknowledged.  The inclusion of actors from the operational level of policy, where the 
policy is implemented, within the process of creating policy statements and 
management practices may improve the flow of information that assures operational 
level knowledge of payoffs, for good and bad behavior, incentives for top management 






information flow to assure better policy decisions.  In sum, the framework points out 
the necessity of a “feedback loop”, long ago acknowledged within the policy stages 
heuristic, and the cybernetic learning models advanced in the 1940’s (Wiener 1948).  
Such feedback is presented within the ACUPA steps integrated into the research 
framework and thus provides a structure to assist managers modifying or implementing 
governance to secure their information technology assets. 
Third, the grammar tool, and analysis that follows, offers some applications 
practical to the managers that draft and implement security policy.  Chief among these 
applications is sensitivity to keeping the structure of the institutions developed to create 
the policy structure simple.  For example, observation [332:15] is a statement found in 
the AUP policy of Georgia Southern.  I originally coded as an Aggregation rule type upon 
my judgement that “responsible” gives the user control for the action taken in terms of 
using that resource. 
Each user of a university IT resource [A] is [D] responsible [I] resource [B] 
ultimately for the use of that resource [C] 
 
The phrase “is responsible” can be argued is equivalent to “shall be” – (is – a form of the 
phrase ‘to be’) – making this a position verb by definition.  The statement could be re-
written as: 
Each use of a university IT resource [A] shall [D] be [I] responsible for the use of 
that resource 
Or could be written as; 








This sentence is a Choice statement – “responsibly” is a Condition as it describes 
“how” the user will use the resource.  Given the level of analysis is “Operational”- 
reducing the statement to a straightforward institution of Rule Type Choice provides the 
user with clear instructions.   
Another example of improving the comprehension of statements by the 
intended actors is the statement [332:18]: 
In the event that misuse of IT resources threatens to compromise the integrity or 
jeopardize the security of university resources or harm authorized users of those 
resources, the University's Chief Information Officer, or his or her designee, is 
authorized to take any and all necessary actions, including the immediate 
confiscation and/or disabling of a university resource or the temporary or 
permanent termination of user access credentials, to protect, investigate, and 
ensure the security and proper use of IT resources. 
 
The statement is constructed of 80 words and scores a Flesch-Kincaid Reading level of 
39 (as in years of education).  The statement is grammatically challenged, and presents 
the reader with confusion as to what verb applies to which phrase and condition.  
Coding the statement using IGT, the statement decomposes to: 
Table 9-1 Example Decomposed Statement 





Condition to protect, investigate, and ensure the security and proper use of IT resources; In 
the event that misuse of IT resources threatens to compromise the integrity or 
jeopardize the security of university resources or harm authorized users of those 
resources, 
Or Else  
Object any and all necessary actions, including the immediate confiscation and/or 
disabling of a university resource or the temporary or permanent termination of 
user access credentials 
 
Rather than speak in terms of “authority” [if authority is the AIM, then the attribute 






(Conditions) – which does not make the user the object of the policy] – we reduce the 
statement to: 
Table 9-2 Example Reduced Statement 





Condition to protect, investigate, and ensure the security and proper use of IT resources; In 
the event that misuse of IT resources threatens to compromise the integrity or 
jeopardize the security of university resources or harm authorized users of those 
resources, 
Or Else  
Object any and all necessary actions, including the immediate confiscation and/or 
disabling of a university resource or the temporary or permanent termination of 
user access credentials 
 
 
Further simplification leads to: 
The University’s Chief Information Office, or his or her designee, may take any 
and all necessary actions to protect --- etc. 
In general, refined rules for following the grammar and the ideal structure of a 
policy action situation may lead to policy structures that are less ambiguous to read and 
the outcomes of which are more clearly understood by the participants. 
Finally, the model presents a structured approach to link contributions of theory 
to the structure of policy governance and policy.  For example. deterrence theory forms 
the foundation of much research that emphasizes the awareness of “penalties” of 
individuals who choose not to follow policy statements.  Clearly, without well-structured 
awareness activities, reliable compliance procedures and enforcement procedures that 
produce outcomes consistent with the “or else” component of the policy, the expected 
outcomes predicted by deterrence theory will not be observed.  The model provides the 






frustrated by organizational norms, and how those norms may be adapted to assure 
future success.  Of course, future research can help by providing models and simulation 
tools that help the manager anticipate challenges in the governance of policy, as well as 
the operationalization of policy. 
9.2 Future Research 
A research design for analysis of “the design of city charters” used many of the 
methods found in my study of university policy governance (Feiock et al. 2014).  The 
objective of the Feiock study was to identify certain configurations of institutions 
aligned with types of charter structure.  The research agenda prescribed by the authors 
is one which the authors argue “could generate a more precise and rigorous 
understanding of the relationship between the difference configurations of institutions 
of city charters and the politics, governance, and performance of municipalities” (p. 1).  
Among the agenda items are topics including: examining differences across different 
forms of government; linking configurations of institutions to government performance; 
examination of structures as they evolve over time; and analysis of participation of 
citizens across different structures.   
Perhaps the most compelling feature of the research model employed in this 
study is the capability of the model to support research at many different levels of 
analysis, yet provide a path so that one may aggregate findings across topics and 






many levels of analysis.  The feature was demonstrated in this study via the application 
of the ACUPA model within the Knapp model, as I discussed earlier.   
Such an approach can be employed to explore alternative decision models.  For 
example, one could design a research project that would analyze how decisions 
regarding the content and scope of cybersecurity policy are constrained by the network 
of policy influencing units and rules within a particular organization.  At a department 
(operational) level, why would any department feel compelled to comply with enforcing 
acceptable use policies when the university budget office will not supply funds to 
support such an activity?  Why would such a policy be created given the same payoff 
rule (no resources for implementation) is known?  Why would the university president 
accept such a policy?  Why would the governing body (i.e. university board or system 
board) create a compliance rule that will not be enforced?  And, how does the 
knowledge that such “paper tigers” are the norm, affect the individual’s decision to 
comply, or not, given the risk of enforcement is almost zero?  
To take another extreme, at what point are rules so numerous that at both the 
operational and collective levels, those rules simply “overwhelm” the managers and 
individuals making payoff rules ineffective?  Or, is there a level of information flow that 
can be identified as a “tipping point” where the linkages between decisions and 
outcomes are impossible to discern?  And, if those linkages are not known, or cannot be 
measured, is there any structural change that can be made to the policymaking 






9.2.1 Structure of Workflow and Support 
The institutional grammar tool has been applied to test whether individuals 
perceive policy designs as appropriate or too coercive (S. N. Siddiki 2013).  The effects of 
rules must be considered in context of all other rules and norms that structure 
organizational behavior (Werlinger et al. 2009; Hawkey et al. 2008; O’Toole and Meier 
2015).  Essentially, new rules must compete with old rules for the scarce resources of 
each individual, or team of individuals, that the rule is targeted to affect.  Competition 
creates opportunities for choices to be made by the individual, or team, as to which 
rule/outcome is important to their success.  In sum, a decision is made weighing the 
benefits of compliance with one rule while accepting possible costs of not complying 
with others.  How do organizational structures affect the operational level decisions to 
make these choices?  How much influence may education programs have on these 
choices?  Is it possible to identify the point of “overload” (i.e. too many policies and too 
few resources) as a function of policy structure at the operational level?  I am 
particularly interested in how we might model these situations, then test the key model 
parameters with field research. 
9.2.2 Well Structured Policy Systems 
The idea that a well-structured policy system has an appropriate mix of 
components supports concepts important to polycentric governance, an idea espoused 
by Ostrom as an effective means of local response to global issues (Andersson and 






1961).  One can expect and accept institutional diversity at the level of procedures and 
guidelines so long as the policy objectives are maintained.  Are there institutional 
configurations within those components that perform better than others?  Are those 
configurations a product of identifiable configurations of organizational factors, 
environmental factors, or a combination of both?  Are there key indicators, “marker 
genes”, that suggest an increased likelihood that policy-making will be more or less 
effective than similarly situated organizations? 
Part of my research agenda is to continue to explore the structure of policy-
making procedures across a number of universities, analyzing the structural differences 
in the context of organizational factors but expand to include efforts to map the 
structure of processes that create outcomes including budget decisions, departmental 
planning, and personnel management.  Do job descriptions, personnel hiring decisions, 
and inter-personal relations (i.e. social networks) provide more detail on the position 
and aggregation rules that may lead to a better understanding of the dynamics of 
decisions made at both the collective and operational levels?  In short, if the hiring 
manager hires a CIO or CISO with strong technical skills, but weak organizational and 
people skills, should we expect the new hire to guide a policy process that produces a 
well-balanced policy structure that can incent both individuals and organizational units 
to achieve the desired policy outcomes?  Can you correct such a feature with different 







9.2.3 Mapping Key Features 
Of the many limitations that accompany this study, the focus on a discrete set of 
institutions representing external and organizational conditions perhaps constrains the 
application of findings the most.  If we are to understand how to design institutions that 
are tailored to fit each organization’s institutional, social, and ecological context then we 
must understand “how various institutions (and sets of institutions) affecting resources 
interact with each other”(Cole, Epstein, and McGinnis 2014).  In other words, as Cole, et 
al., surmise: fit is “how rules fit with other rules”.  Aligica suggests that the most 
strategic important contribution of the IAD analysis may be mapping such concepts as 
features within the structure of governance and policy (Aligica 2006).   
I discussed how a number of external standards published by the federal 
government (FISMA and NIST 800), ACUPA (policy governance), ISO 27002, PCI, etc., are 
offered as guidelines to help USG units construct their individual information security 
plans.  Applying a structured analysis using the framework for this study can aid 
managers and policy analysts by helping them to a) map the requirements with actors 
and outcomes; b) understand how internal and external conditions may require tailoring 
of those standards in order to optimize effectiveness; and c) structure their analysis of 
post development and implementation of those policies so that the data informs 
longitudinal studies.  Such an analysis helps that organization monitor progress towards 
security objectives, and cross-sectional studies, by facilitating the analysis of similar and 
disparate efforts across organizations solving like problems.  Understanding the 






inform practitioners and scholars alike of ways to improve the policy process measured 
by improved likelihood of attaining the desired goals.  Mapping the situations may also 
help managers predict and mitigate potential “negative” interactions among 
organizational actors.   
9.2.4 Social Network Analysis 
Collaborative governance and policy networks refer to similar phenomena 
(Ansell and Gash 2008; Giest and Howlett 2014; Agrawal 2014).  We may be observing a 
shift away from organizations and to networks (Raab, Mannak, and Cambré 2015).  
Much work has been done on the subject of policy networks, structure and 
effectiveness (Provan and Kenis 2008).  And, the IAD framework has been suggested as 
an elegant means of advancing research to “more discussion of the relationships of 
administrative systems to structures and processes beyond rules” (Robichau and Lynn 
Jr. 2009).  Social Network Analysis has been advocated as a means of advancing the 
study of such phenomena (Sandstrom and Carlsson 2008).   
One can approach the topic by mapping the positions described by Attributes to 
the positions found in the statement Object.  Grouping of statements by the aIm (goal) 
may reveal priorities of concern.  Analysis of information rules use concepts such as 
channels of flow, frequency, and accuracy may add to the discussion (E. Ostrom and 
Crawford 2005b).  Relating these flows as “connectors’, thereby establishing the 
relationships between processes/decisions and the strength of information flow, is 






applying concepts from social network analysis to understand the “structure” of policy 
processes and the relationship to policy outcomes.  The overlap of these approaches 
contain much in common that deserves further thought. 
9.2.5 Towards “Big Data” Research 
A common criticism of the analysis generated by use of the IAD framework and 
grammar tools is that such work consumes significant human resources.  I believe that 
tools and methods used to mine text offer an opportunity to analyze documents and 
interview transcripts that will provide an enormous wealth of data that represents 
organizations across and within sectors such as higher education.  Text mining software 
is available for packages such as R, used in this study, SPSSX, and database packages like 
MySQL.  Moreover, IAD research published within the last 2 years indicates an evolution 
of the algorithms employed to identify statement types and categories and to further 
dissect policy statements into the grammatical components.  As the reliability and 
validity of these algorithms are substantiated, these procedures can be coded and 
shared to expand both the quantity and scope of data available.  Simple comparisons of 
grammatical structure, statement form (i.e. readability), and choice of words used to 
define attributes, conditions, and objects can be made within an organization by 
comparing these concepts found in policy documents from significant university or 
organizational divisions (i.e. academic affairs, technology, business affairs, etc.).  And, 
comparisons can be made across organizations.  Initially, findings of a “big data” project 






I think of this opportunity to be the equivalent of building an “atom-smasher”.  
Theory should predict the types of structure that erupt when policy documents are 
“busted” into the many statements and grammatical components that compose those 
documents.  Field research can validate and verify the findings.  Data technology can 
improve the reliability of coding, the scale of data sources, and the sharing of knowledge 
gained. 
9.3 Limitations 
Ability to draw inferences from this study is constrained by the small sample and 
the focus on research universities.  Such limitations are the nature of a dissertation and, 
more practically, of the resource limits for most studies of this type.  The case study 
method provided confirmation of prior research as to the direction of effects of 
concepts like Top Management Support, autonomy, and collaboration.  The tools 
employed did demonstrate utility in understanding diversity of institutions and how 
those institutions are configured to reflect the external and organizational conditions 
that constrain policy making and policy implementation in these cases. 
One intended outcome of the study was to create sets of rule configurations that 
correlated with individual organizational conditions.  I was unable to create that 
outcome.  The potential of the framework and tools is apparent, however, to create a 
field of data supportive of mapping such configurations.  A larger set of cases is required 
in order for that to be so.  Calls for larger and more diverse data sets are found from 






Implicit assumptions about rules were most important in understanding the 
processes.  Ostrom and Crawford found that implicit assumptions “might have been the 
most important drivers of results in earlier analyses of institutional arrangements” 
(Ostrom and Crawford 2005, 206).  However, such assumptions are prone to the bias of 
the researcher.  Replication of the results of this study is needed to affirm or deny the 
effects of such bias. 
The study is also limited by the nature of interpreting linguistic statements 
representing institutions (Crawford and Ostrom 1995).  Whether written or spoken, 
these statements represent the biases and understandings of those that speak and write 
them.  The interpretation of those statements by individuals whose behavior is to be 
affected is a significant research challenge long noted in the application of institutional 
and systems analysis to policy problems.  The same limitations apply here   
Challenges and limitations derived from my ability to comprehend and 
accurately apply the IAD framework and its tools are plentiful.  Maintaining focus on 
both the appropriate units of analysis and the correct level of analysis is a terrific 
challenge in institutional research.  Policy documents reflect statements that operate at 
all three levels of analysis – constitutional, collective, and operational.  Discernment of 
the appropriate level needs a test of reliability. 
The focus of this research was at the collective level – separating operational 
level rules (which are outcomes of collective level decisions) is not easy.  All of these 
levels are “nested” within the larger systems of which the primary organizational unit is 






of analysis is the institutions governing policy, those institutions are regulated by other 
institutions created in separate areas of the organization.  This web of interlinked 
institutions and action situations operationalize both the culture and the governance 
structure, at nested levels, that affect the creation of norms and rules. 
The validity and reliability of coding statements as policy components (Meta 
policy, policy, standards, etc.) needs further investigation.  A simple test employing 
multiple coders would certainly suggest problems regarding reliability.  The validity of 
the concept needs further examination as well.  The difference between a meta-policy, 
policy, and standard can be made with the choice of a word or two.     
Of course, some of the errors of the study attributed to my individual biases and 
weaknesses can, of course, be mitigated via replication and the use of multiple coders in 
future studies. 
9.4 Conclusions 
The topic of this study is one that has origins from my time spent as the assistant 
to the CIO for the University System of Georgia.  I observed a tremendous effort by the 
Board of Regents, system staff, and more than 60 college and university CIO’s and 
CISO’s, to create policy to secure tens of thousands of networked devices, terabytes of 
data, and millions of dollars in large computing and networking resources.  Despite the 
strong collaborative efforts, a diverse universe of policy documents were found among 






My simple question of “why” such a diversity of security policies existed led 
directly to the effort documented by this exercise.  The importance of understanding 
“why” is one that is explained by decades of security research, both academic and 
practical, and is indirectly supported by the investment of public and private funds into 
organizations such as the Cybersecurity Division of the Department of Homeland 
Security, The United States Cyber Command within the U.S. Department of Defense, the 
International Standards Organization (ISO), and the Payment Card Industry (PCI), to 
name a few.  Numerous studies continue to call for an understanding as to how policy 
goals may be achieved while preserving autonomy and integrity of the organizations the 
policies are designed to protect. 
While the limitations of this study are substantial, the promise of the approach is 
one that is confirmed by the findings discussed in chapter 8, several related research 
publications that are referenced, and the suggestions for future research provided in 
this chapter.  The research framework and tools employed suggest that a reliable and 
valid means of coordinating such future research can address the high-level need to 
contextualize policy solutions to local factors while preserving the intended goals and 
outcomes of policy design.  The potential of the method to create “big data” suggests 
that models can be suggested for a range of organizational factors, thus providing 
guidance to practitioners of policy so those practitioners may achieve measured 
progress towards their security goals. 
The problem of securing cyber space is one that cannot be isolated from the 






organizations attempting to secure information resources from harm.  Studies involving 
institutions and the governance of shared resources often reference Garrett Hardin’s 
“Tragedy of the Commons”.  The idea of how to prevent the “over grazing” of a public 
commons is often described as a simple, straight-forward discussion of how private 
behaviors may best be incented to avoid an outcome that negatively affects everyone.  
A re-examination of the premise of the 1968 article claims that prior approaches to the 
commons problem are grossly over-simplified (Cole, Epstein, and McGinnis 2014).  The 
concluding paragraph of this award-winning article47 also sums up the strategy 
expressed by many information security researchers and analysts that must be 
considered as we are strive to secure our information assets. 
The open-access pasture does not exist in splendid isolation but operates within 
a larger universe of interacting resources and institutions.  Hardin’s ‘tragedy of 
the commons’ is not just about the pasture; it is equally about the grass, the 





                                                     
47 The article won the 2015 Elinor Ostrom Prize for the best full-length article published during the 




 Summary Case Data 





Abraham Baldwin Agricultural 
College 
ABAC 4 3002 AA Assoc/Pub4 
Gainesville State College GSC 6 7919 AA Assoc/Pub4 
Gordon College Gordon 5 4245 AA Assoc/Pub4 
Middle Georgia College MGC 2 2985 AA Assoc/Pub4 
Georgia Perimeter College GPC 9 25616 AA Assoc/Pub-M-Sc 
Bainbridge College Bainbridge 3 3681 AA Assoc/Pub-R-M 
College of Coastal Georgia CCGA 2 3063 AA Assoc/Pub-R-M 
Darton College Darton 3 5899 AA Assoc/Pub-R-M 
Georgia Highlands College GHC 8 5462 AA Assoc/Pub-R-M 
East Georgia College EGA 5 3130 AA Assoc/Pub-R-S 
South Georgia College SGC 1 2090 AA Assoc/Pub-R-S 
Waycross College Waycross 6 993 AA Assoc/Pub-R-S 
Atlanta Metropolitan ATLM  2765 AA Assoc/Pub-U-SC 
Savannah State University SSU 12 4134 BA BAC/A&S 
Dalton State College DSC 7 4978 BA Bac/Assoc 
Clayton State University Clayton 4 6872 BA Bac/Diverse 
Fort Valley State University FVSU 5 3674 BA Bac/Diverse 
Georgia Gwinnett College GGC  8047 BA Bac/Diverse 
Macon State College MSC 5 5569 BA Bac/Diverse 
Armstrong Atlantic State 
University 
AASU 4 7013 MA Masters L 
Augusta State University AUG 3 6381 MA Masters L 
Columbus State University CSU 6 7803 MA Masters L 
Georgia College & State 
University 
GCSU 10 6266 MA Masters L 
Kennesaw State University KSU 8 23103 MA Masters L 
North Georgia College and State 
University 
NGCSU 8 5934 MA Masters L 
University of West Georgia UWG 5 10933 MA Masters L 
Valdosta State University VSU 3 12277 MA Masters L 
Albany State University ASURAMS 6 4360 MA Masters M 
Southern Polytechnic State 
University 
SPSU 3 5530 MA Masters M 
Georgia Southwestern State 
University 
GSW 3 2916 MA Masters S 
Georgia Southern University GaSou 7 19150 RU RU/D 
Georgia Institute of Technology GT 8 19431 RU RU/VH 
Georgia State University GSU 8 30606 RU RU/VH 
University of Georgia UGA 8 33367 RU RU/VH 
Georgia Health Sciences 
University (GRU) 




 Policy Inventory 








































































































































































































































































ABAC 4                       
Gainesville 
State College 
GSC 6                    
Gordon 
College 








GPC 9                  
Bainbridge 
College 




CCGA 2                         
Darton 
College 




GHC 8                   
East Georgia 
College 


















































































































































































































































































SGC 1                          
Waycross 
College 
Waycross 6                    
Atlanta 
Metropolitan 




SSU 12              
Dalton State 
College 
DSC 7                   
Clayton State 
University 








GGC                             
Macon State 
College 








































































































































































































































































































NGCSU 8                  
University of 
West Georgia 




VSU 3                       
Albany State 
University 
ASURAMS 6                     
































































































































































































































































































GT 8                  
Georgia State 
University 
GSU 8                   
University of 
Georgia 












 Document Protocol 
 
1. Policy  Inventory 
a. Every policy document found on a USG unit site receives a unique id 
number, serialized, to serve as a reference throughout the database 
b. The following data is contained in the table called ‘Document’ 
Table C-1 Document Data Table Layout 
Variable Name Description 
DocID Primary key – id number unique to each policy 
document 
DocName The title of the policy document, will most likely 
reflect the policy issue addressed by the 
document 
Policy Scope Details which type of policy per the Table 4-4 
Taxonomy 
Event/Contact Where the document was located – usually from 
the website of the case  
Significance Why the document is important 
Summary Summarizes purpose of the document 
Organization The unit which owns the document 
Case_id The key for the organization as inventoried in 
the case protocol 
e-location The url where the document was located when 
catalogued 
Date received When the document was catalogued 
Date Effective When policy took effect 
Date Revised Notes latest revision of document 
Date_last_accessed When last seen on web 
Misc Place for analyst notes 
Policy 
Administration 
Who/What department responsible for creation, 







2. Code Document Meta Data 
Table C-2 Meta Data Variables 
Step Variable Action 
1 Acquire Document 
 
 
Acquire the document -- If the document is not in a pdf, 
convert to one so that Adobe edit tools can be used to 
ascribe notes to the document for later review. 
Name the pdf with the following bits of information 
Unit Name 
Policy Doc Name (e.g. Acceptable Use, Malware, etc) 
Blank if original – “Analysis” if this is copy with notes 
from researchers 
2 Doc Name; Policy 
Title 
Take the Document name explicitly given the document – 
if none provided, name and reflect how the name was 
conceived.  Other variable reference – Policy Title 




Date Received – indicate the date you accessed policy via 
web, or received otherwise (mail, etc) 
Date Effective, Date_Revise – take dates as found in 
policy document.  If blank, then no dates were found. 
 
 Date Last Accessed Most recent date that researcher accessed the file 
 Responsible Official Name of official responsible for administering the policy 
– as found in the document 




Who or what department is responsible for creation, 
management, maintenance of the document -i.e. primary 
office responsible 
4 e-location Identify Policy URL 
5 USG Unit, Unit ID Identify USG Unit and Unit ID 
6 Objectives Take from stated purpose of policy -- the stated aims of 
the policy.  These were found by the Doherty study in the 
introductory statements.  A clear reference to objectives 
is considered a best practice. 
 Summary   
 Policy Class Categories: Policy, Standard, Guideline – definitions 
found (seek reference) 
7 Policy Scope Doherty names this “Policy Coverage” – records policy 
areas covered…  While objectives indicate scope (Doherty 
2011), the coverage of issues identified by best practice 
studies will be used to measure scope.  Each policy 
document is reviewed to identify the explicit policy issues 
or areas covered.  References to external policies are not 
considered in this analysis.  A pattern of missing areas 
will document “defective” policy 
8 Policy Focus Individual – focuses on behavior management 
 
Table C-2 Meta Data Variables (continued) 
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Process – focuses on procedures, organizational behavior 
Technology – focuses on management of technical issues 
such as bots, filtering, etc. 
9 Policy References List all external policies, laws, regulations referenced  
explicitly in the document 
10 Policy 
Administration 
Id individuals responsible for managing policy and 
references to procedures to update policy 
11 Policy Structure Doherty observed the following variables:  
Which types of policy are available? 
How many policies compose the policy?  How do they 
relate to each other?  How do they relate to lower level 
standards and procedures? 
12 Form – Flesch 
Kincaid Score 
Calculated by Microsoft Word Review function –score 
indicates the grade level for reading skills necessary to 
comprehend the document 
13 Form – Flesh 
Reading Ease 
Calculated by Microsoft Word Review function – score 
indicates the readability of the document.  Long words 
affect this score significantly more than they do the grade 
level score.  See Wikipedia entry 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flesch%E2%80%93Kincaid_
readability_test#Flesch_Reading_Ease) for excellent 
summary 
 Length Number of words in document – calculated by MS Word 
Review 
 Length-statements Number of sentences – calculated by MS Word Review 
 USG Policy Link Meeting critieria of this USG policy(s) 
   
 
Comments: 
Documents are linked to cases (e.g USG Unit)  
1. Policy Objectives – the stated aims of the policy.  These were found by the 
Doherty study in the introductory statements.  A clear reference to objectives is 
considered a best practice.  Objectives must be clearly stated within the 
document (2011. 203). 
2. Policy Scope – Doherty names this “Policy Coverage” – records policy areas 
covered…  While objectives indicate scope (Doherty 2011), the specific policy 
areas, are identified by studying the content of the policy and comparing to the 
isses that best practice studies  indicate should be present (2011, 204).  Each 




covered.  References to external policies are not considered in this analysis.  A 
pattern of missing areas will document “defective” policy.   
 
Determination of coverage will occur after the IGT tool has parsed the individual 
units of observation.  The units of observation, or individual policy statements, 
will be assessed using the Taxonomy of Security issues developed by Doherty, et 
al. 
3. Policy Structure – Doherty relies on the title of the policy – he is building a 
portfolio – and calling that structure – with some support from the literature. – 
the crosstab works for this exercise. 
A) Which types of policy are available; 
Method 
a. Capture policy title 
b. Review objective for the policy – identify Policy type based upon 
the Doherty Table 4-3 
c. Code for each type the policy explicitly mentions 
 
B) How many policies compose the entire policy? 
a. A count of the policy documents related to the types of the 
security policies 
C) Policy References – details of links to internal ancillary policies, external 
policies, legal mandates, etc – A xtab of policy document vs policy 





 Data Dictionary – Case Summary Data 
Variable Description 
Case ID Identifying number 
Case Official Name of Campus 
Case_initials Abbreviation 
Mission Carnegie Class of AA (Associate Degrees), BA (Bachelors), 
MA (Masters and some limited doctoral degrees, RU –
(Research University) 
Student Pop Enrollment as of 2012 
URL Web page locator for main campus page 
 
Case_Cysec Primary URL for Page with links to cyber security policy 
Case_Contact Individual that served as main liaison between the 
campus and investigator 
Case_Phone Identity of person used as key contact for the unit 
ISO Reference URL page link for Information Security Office page (if 
available) 
Policies Reference URL page link for cyber security policies page  
Contact Email Email address 
Security Officer Individual accountable for enforcing cyber security 
Security Officer title  
Carnegie_Classification_ID Link to Carnegie reference information 
USG_Classification_ID Link to USG Classification 














 Survey Instrument 
 
Q33 Thank you for taking time to answer this survey.  The survey has 28 
statements.  You will be asked to register your opinion on a scale of "Strongly Agree" to 
"Strongly Disagree".  I estimate 15 minutes is required to complete the survey. If you 
should have to interrupt answering the survey, you may resume by clicking the link in 
the email which invited you to participate.  You will have an opportunity to check your 
work when you finish. If you have any questions, please email JimFlowers@gsu.edu or 
call him at 678 466 4316.  
 
TM1 On the campus, deans, vice presidents, department chairs, and unit 
managers consider information security an important organizational priority. 
 Strongly Disagree (1) 
 Disagree (2) 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 
 Agree (4) 
 Strongly Agree (5) 
 
TM2 The institution's cabinet members are interested in security issues. 
 Strongly Disagree (1) 
 Disagree (2) 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 
 Agree (4) 





TM3 University management takes security issues into account when planning 
university strategies 
 Strongly Disagree (1) 
 Disagree (2) 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 
 Agree (4) 
 Strongly Agree (5) 
 
TM4 The words and actions of senior management demonstrate that security is a top 
priority 
 Strongly Disagree (1) 
 Disagree (2) 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 
 Agree (4) 
 Strongly Agree (5) 
 
TM5 Visible support for security goals by senior management is obvious 
 Strongly Disagree (1) 
 Disagree (2) 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 
 Agree (4) 





TM6 Senior management gives strong and consistent support to the security program. 
 Strongly Disagree (1) 
 Disagree (2) 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 
 Agree (4) 
 Strongly Agree (5) 
 
UT1 Necessary efforts are made to educate employees/students about new security 
policies 
 Strongly Disagree (1) 
 Disagree (2) 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 
 Agree (4) 
 Strongly Agree (5) 
 
UT2 On the campus, information security awareness is communicated well 
 Strongly Disagree (1) 
 Disagree (2) 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 
 Agree (4) 





UT3 On the campus, a variety of communication media (notices, posters, newsletters, 
etc.) are used to promote security awareness 
 Strongly Disagree (1) 
 Disagree (2) 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 
 Agree (4) 
 Strongly Agree (5) 
 
UT4 On the campus, an effective security awareness program exists 
 Strongly Disagree (1) 
 Disagree (2) 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 
 Agree (4) 
 Strongly Agree (5) 
 
UT5 On the campus, a continuous, ongoing security awareness program exists 
 Strongly Disagree (1) 
 Disagree (2) 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 
 Agree (4) 





UT6 On the campus, Users receive adequate security refresher training appropriate for 
their position (student, faculty, staff, etc). 
 Strongly Disagree (1) 
 Disagree (2) 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 
 Agree (4) 
 Strongly Agree (5) 
 
SC1 On the campus, employees/students value the importance of security 
 Strongly Disagree (1) 
 Disagree (2) 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 
 Agree (4) 
 Strongly Agree (5) 
 
SC2 On the campus, a culture exists that promotes good security practices 
 Strongly Disagree (1) 
 Disagree (2) 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 
 Agree (4) 





SC3 On the campus, security has traditionally been conisdered an important 
organizational value 
 Strongly Disagree (1) 
 Disagree (2) 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 
 Agree (4) 
 Strongly Agree (5) 
 
SC4 On the campus, practicing good security is the accepted way of doing business 
 Strongly Disagree (1) 
 Disagree (2) 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 
 Agree (4) 
 Strongly Agree (5) 
 
SC5 On the campus, the overall environment fosters security minded thinking 
 Strongly Disagree (1) 
 Disagree (2) 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 
 Agree (4) 





SC6 On the campus, information security is a key norm shared by the universlty/college 
community 
 Strongly Disagree (1) 
 Disagree (2) 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 
 Agree (4) 
 Strongly Agree (5) 
 
PR1 On the campus, information security policy is consistently updated on a periodic 
basis 
 Strongly Disagree (1) 
 Disagree (2) 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 
 Agree (4) 
 Strongly Agree (5) 
 
PR2 On the campus, Information security policy is updated when technology changes 
require it 
 Strongly Disagree (1) 
 Disagree (2) 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 
 Agree (4) 





PR3 On the campus, policy is updated when legal & regulatory changes require it 
 Strongly Disagree (1) 
 Disagree (2) 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 
 Agree (4) 
 Strongly Agree (5) 
 
PR4 On the campus, an established information security policy review and update 
process exists 
 Strongly Disagree (1) 
 Disagree (2) 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 
 Agree (4) 
 Strongly Agree (5) 
 
PR5 On the cap,us, security policy is updated on a regular basis 
 Strongly Disagree (1) 
 Disagree (2) 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 
 Agree (4) 





PR6 On the campus, information security policies are aligned with university/college 
goals 
 Strongly Disagree (1) 
 Disagree (2) 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 
 Agree (4) 
 Strongly Agree (5) 
 
PR7 On the campus, information security policies reflect the objectives of the 
university/college 
 Strongly Disagree (1) 
 Disagree (2) 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 
 Agree (4) 
 Strongly Agree (5) 
 
PR8 On the campus, risk assessments are conducted prior to writing new security 
policies 
 Strongly Disagree (1) 
 Disagree (2) 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 
 Agree (4) 





PE1 On the campus, employees/students caught violating important security policies are 
appropriately corrected 
 Strongly Disagree (1) 
 Disagree (2) 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 
 Agree (4) 
 Strongly Agree (5) 
 
PE2 On the campus, information security rules are enforced by sanctioning the 
employees/students who break them 
 Strongly Disagree (1) 
 Disagree (2) 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree (3) 
 Agree (4) 
 Strongly Agree (5) 
 
Q32 You have complete the survey. If you wish to review your answers -- click the back 
button (<<).  If you are done, click (>>).You may contact Jim Flowers at 678-466-4316 or 






 Interview Protocol 
Interview Protocol 
Below is a list of positions of interest in this study.  Interview subjects will be selected on 
two criteria: a) basis of position within the primary action situation, or b) identified by 
an actor in the primary action situation as a primary actor within a networked adjacent 
action situation.  Given that actors in adjacent action situations are likely non-technical, 
the interview protocol will be adjusted to reflect the role their actions played in the 
decision process.   
As individuals note participants relative to decision making regarding the policy process, 
those participants may be added to the list to be interviewed.  The method is a modified 
structured snowball approach.  It is structured by the requirement that a participant will 
be interviewed only if they contribute directly to the outcome of a network adjacent 
action situation which has direct effect upon the outcome of the action situation which 
governs implementation of security policy. 
Likely Actors to be Interviewed 
 Chief Information Officers 
 Chief Information Security Officers 
 Finance and Administration 
 Executives (Deans, Provosts, Presidents) – if identified as participants by 
implementation group 
 Audits 
 Risk Management Project Managers 
Scope of this version of the Instrument 
This interview protocol contains most of the themes we may be interested in when 





1. Before conducting interviews, read our research purpose and research questions 
again.  
a) Research Question 
This study proposes to how the rule governing the decision making process for 
cyber security vary from one institution to another.  .  
2. Don’t need to follow the sequence of questions outlined in the protocol. Adjust your 
order of questions based on the answers of interviewees.   
3. Pay particular attention to those important questions (***) in the protocol. Try to 
use different ways to get the answers to them.  
4. Adjust your interviewing style and questions to keep the conversation going in a way 
that keeps the attention and interest of the interviewees on the topic of the 
question. But  
5. If the interview is terminated early, ask for call back privileges.  





Interview Data Form 
Background Information on Interviewee 
Date and Time of Interview: 









i. Request interviewee to sign IRB informed consent form 
ii. Request to tape record 
iii. Explain role of second interviewer (if present) 
iv. Exchange business cards 





Semi-structured interview Protocol for Actors in primary Action Situation 
Part I Identification 
These questions will identify the participant, and “warm up” the interview 
1) Contact info : Name, Phone, email 
2) Title 
3) To what position and whom do you report? 
4) What was your prior position/institution? 
5) What is your role in implementing cyber security policy? 
6) What is your position in creating/adopting cyber security policy? 
Part II Exogenous Data 
Questions will validate some survey elements, and “warm up” the interview 
Environmental  
Do you have a budget for cyber security?   
 If so, how much? 
What kind of technology do you use to monitor and enforce security policies? 
i. Are there allocations for security in other budgets within your 
organization? 
ii.  What are the requirements for admitting someone to the 
decision making process for cyber security?  Who set those 
requirements? 
Community 
Is there an awareness regarding security?   
How does the community respond to security policies? 
What is the biggest challenge you face in implementing cyber security policy? 





Part III Action Situation Data 
Policy Process  
2. How are cyber security policies created?   
a. (Actors) Who must review new/modified/deleted policies?   
i. What are their titles? 
ii. What position do they usually advocate? (enforcement, 
standards, more tech, etc) 
iii. Do they participate in all of the discussions? 
iv. What are the requirements for admitting someone to the decision 
making process for cyber security?  Who set those requirements? 
v.  
b. Rules 
i. Is there a formal process for reviewing, developing, adopting 
security policy?  (If so, are those rules available in written form?) 
3. Were there policies you wished to implement, but were unable to do so?  
(Probe: discover who, what, when) If so, why were you unable to implement?  
Probe: Did you learn about this policy from another source(s)? 
 
Boundary 
1. Who decided the make-up of the decision/implementing group? 
2. Who participated in this group? 
3. Was there a time when others joined the implementation group?  If so, when?  
Who made the decisions as to who might leave or enter the group? 
Position 
4. What position did you occupy in the decision making for implementation? (e.g. 
chair, leader) 
5. What were the other positions/what was the structure of the decision 
making/implementing group?  Who occupied those positions? 
Information 
6. What were the sources of information?  Who provided the information? 
7. Were there external organizations that influenced the policies implemented 





8. Who set the agenda?  How was the agenda determined?  Could anyone affect 
that agenda? 
9. When was the current version of security policy implemented? 
10. Were there limits placed as to what could be implemented?  By whom? 
11. What were the budgetary constraints?  Who decided the level of those 
constraints? 
Aggregation 
12. How did the decision-making process work with regards to the policy 
creation/adoption decisions? (probe here – let the interviewee tell the story.  
Follow up for data per questions below) 
13. What are the rules used to decide what and how to implement security policy? 
14. Who /what positions were needed at the table to make those decisions? 
15. Did any one position or person have more weight than another in the process? 
Scope 
16.  What was the initial scope of the policy?   
17. Are there areas of the campus where these security policies may not apply?  If 
so, who makes those policies? 
18. Were there any ground rules, written/informal, that were used as criteria for 
determining to whom/what the policy would be applied/enforced?  Who set 
those criteria? 
Payoff 
19. Was the incentive/mandate from an outside group?  If so, whom? 
20. How were costs/benefits calculated?  Were they calculated? 
21. Did anyone require costs/benefits analysis as part of their support for policy 
change?  If so, whom? 
 
Ending the Interview 
If you could make any changes in the process for implementing/deciding security policy, 
what would those changes be? 
Is there anything else you would like to say? 




 Institutional Analysis Protocol 
Summary 
When all of the case data is collected, and the meta-data summarizing each 
document is complete, then we may begin identifying the statements and assigning 
values to the variables of interest.  The data entry process is supported by a script 
written in Microsoft Access.  A screenshot (Figure H-1) illustrates what a “disassembled” 
statement will look like when the process is complete. 
 
 
Figure H-1 Data Entry of Disassembled Statement 
 
 
Identifying institutional statements 
Treat each sentence of a policy document as a unit of observation.  The sentence 
is given a unique identity number.  The statement seen in Figure H-1 is assigned the 
identifier 376:32.  Simply interpreted, the statement is the 32nd observation found in 
document number 376 (UGA’s Data Access Policy). 
 
Each statement is broken into its distinct components using the process adapted 
from Basurto, et al (2009, pp. 4-6) and Siddiki, et al (2011).  The process differs from 
that of prior studies as it maintains all statements, including titles, preambles and 




statements, they are coded as “O” for an Outline indicator per suggestions found in 
Basurto, et al (2010). 
 
The analysis requires the following steps: 
1. Subdivide all initial section or subsection units from step 2 that have multiple 
sentences into sentence-based units of observation.  If a section of subsection does 
not have a complete sentence ending in a period, code the entire section or 
subsection as one unit of observation.  If there are multiple sentences in the section 
of subsection, code each sentence as units of observation. 
2. Break the unit of observation into the components defined by the ADICO syntax. 
3. Code the Attribute Category as an Organization, Individual, Top Management, or 
vendor.  These values categorize the responsible entity for following the direction of 
the institutional statement (Table H-1).  Values are used to summarize who 




Category Code Definition 
Individual I A student, staff member, or faculty member.  Also visitors 
and other persons referenced as themselves and not as a 
paid position within the organization. 
Organization O Attribute refers to the organization, or any of its subunits 
Top 
Management 
T In the context of USG, top management is a position of 
director or above.  Includes CIO, IT Director, security officer, 
Assoc. Vice Presidents, VP’s, President 




4. Assign the statement to a policy component. 
Policy Type is discussed as policy components in chapter 3.  Policy type is the 






Table H-2 Policy Components 
Components of Technology Plans 
Policy Level Policy Component Definition 
0 Ancillary A placeholder for any statement that does not fit other 
definitions 
1 Guideline suggestion, approach, or issue that the attribute should 
consider when undertaking a defined activity (policy 
making, implementing) 
2 Procedure a specific instruction which must be followed in order 
to comply with prescribed policies and practices 
(Moule & Giavara, 1995) 
3 Standard Lower level policy - Established rules or requirements 
that must be observed in execution of procedures 
(Baskerville & Siponen 2002) 
4 Policy High level info sec policy - defines mgt and employee 
responsibility to preserve resources ( Baskerville & 
Siponen 2002) 
5 Metapolicy Establishes how info sec policies are created, 
implemented, enforced (Baskerville & Siponen 2002) 
 
 
5. Assign the Deontic Class. The institutional statements are coded for Deontic Class as 
defined by Crawford and Ostrom (2005a; 1995).  The aIm verb served as the key 
means of identification.   
To make comparison easier and more reliable, the observed deontics were 
categorized into classes defined as permissive (P), required (R), and forbidden 
(F).  Normative statements using a form of the verb should are coded as (S).  This 
coding scheme is consistent with that employed by Ostrom and Basurto (2011) 
and aids in the construction of tables displaying rule configurations 
 
Table H-3 Deontic Classification 
Value Code Definition 
Required R Verb forms of Shall, Must, will – indicate a required actions 
Permitted P Verb forms of may, should, can – indicate an action is 
permitted, but not required. 







6. If the Policy Type = 5 (A Meta-policy) - Assign the statement to the appropriate 
ACUPA Step. 
 
Several IAD researchers have proposed a “nested analysis” approach to analyzing 
the structure of action situations (Basurto et al. 2010a; S. Siddiki, Basurto, and Weible 
2010).  Basurto, Kingsley, et al., suggested that a research could sort their observations 
into “common sections and subsections that share the same broad aim” (2010a, 528).  
The ACUPA model is a practical guide to link the observations as the cases studied relied 
on the ACUPA steps to inform their practices.  With the data divided, I applied the 
configuration method (E. Ostrom and Basurto 2011) to analyze the structure within each 
ACUPA action set. 
ACUPA steps are meta-policy processes.  This code applies only to statements of the 
policy type (class) “Meta-Policy”, value of (5).  Align the action of each statement within 





Table H-4 Alignment of ACUPA Steps to Knapp Action Situations 




1. Identify Issues 
 
.01 Scans for changes in law, threat, best 
practices, organizational change, 
technology change, need to control risky 
behavior 
Risk 
.02 may identify need/issue Development 
2. Conduct Analysis 
 
.01 Identify Owners Development 
.02 Determine Path (Policy Plan – Scope 
Definition) 
Development 
.03 Assemble Team Development 
.04 Gather Data Development 
.05 Id deadlines Development 
.06 Determine Risks Risk 
.07 Determine Stakeholders Development 
.08 Determine solutions for the 
problem/need 
Development 
.09 Determine if present policy can be 
revised 
Development 
.10 Determine need for new policy Development 
3. Draft Policy 
.01 Agree on Definitions Development 
.02 Drafts Policy -Use Common Format Development 
.03 presents drafts to stakeholders Development 
.04 review and vet proposals Development 
.05 presents to policy advisory Committee Development 
4. Get Approvals 




.02 Considers/approves/modifies proposals Approval 
 
.03 collects comments/revises as needed Approval 
 
.04 Obtain Approvals Approval 
5. Education (Awareness) 
.01 Plan Communications Awareness 
.02 Put online Awareness 
.03 Provide searches Awareness 
.04 Communicates policy to appropriate 
audiences 
Awareness 
6. Plan Maintenance 
(Review/Risk Assessment) 
 
.01 Versions new policy Maintain 
.02 Archives old poicy Retirement 
.03 Establishes schedule for review Review 
.04 Determines review procedures Review 
.05 solicits feedback Review 
.06 Reviews risk and Cost Risk 
.07 Recommends whether policy still needed Review 
7. Measurement & Compliance 
.01 Measures/monitors outcomes Monitor 





Enter the ADICOB2 sequence represented by the grammatical components 
observed in the statement. The coding scheme offered by Basurto et al. (2010) is used 
to identify institutions by type (Strategy, Norm, Rule) within a policy and to investigate 
the effects of the institutional type on policy outcomes (Nowlin 2011)48.  The statements 
are coded based upon the presence of ADICO elements as follows: 
 AIC  Strategies 
 ADIC  Norms 
 ADICO  Rules 
Ex: If no deontic is present, but an Attribute, aIm, and Condition are present – code 
is AIC.  If a deontic were present – ADIC. 
 
An institutional statement is composed of: 
 




Attributes  a variable which identifies the actor, or position, to whom the 
statement applies 
Deontic  a variable which contains the modal verb defining what may be 
permitted, required, or forbidden. 
aIm  variable describing the actions or outcomes to which the deontic is 
assigned.  The action or outcome must be physically possible.  The 
negation of the action or outcome must be possible as well. 
Conditions  a variable defining when, where, how and to what extent the aIm 
is allowed per the Deontic 
Or else  a variable defining the sanctions to be imposed for not following 
the rule. 
oBject  separates those responsible for carrying out the aIm from those 
receiving the aIm (S. Siddiki et al. 2011, 87) 
 
 
                                                     
48 There are challenges in determining the type of institution being observed by the analyst.  
(See notes on Schluter, and Basurto, and Crawford and Ostrom).   This study employs a strategy 
used by Siddiki et al. (2010): 
 
In the original grammar tool (Crawford and Ostrom, 1995), this increasingly stringent ordering of 
categories of institutional statements corresponded with “strategies” (AIC), “norms” (ADIC), and 
“rules” (ADICO). In this paper, we recognize the underlying logic of ordering the statement 
categories by stringency from strategies to rules. But we avoid using the conceptual language of 
strategies, norms, and rules because all statements in formal institutions could be interpreted as 
rules. More important than the actual label applied is the relative frequency of each 







7. Assign an institutional statement type.  Code the observation as rules, norms or 
strategies (Table H-6).  A rule has all ADICO components.  A norm has ADIC 
components.  And a strategy has AIC components.  If not an institutional statement, 
code the statement as appropriate. 
 
 
Table H-6 Statement Type Definitions 
ID Statement 
Type 
Statement Name Description 
1 S Strategy Has AIC components 
2 N Norm Has only ADIC components 
3 R Rule Has all ADICO components 
4 D Definition Statement defines a term, 
attrrbute, or AIM 
5 E External Policy Reference references or provides a 
reference to an external 
policy document 
6 O Outline Indicator A section title 
7 B Objective = defines the objective 
of the policy 




Coding the institutional statements is essential to efficiently analyzing the data.  
However, many “non-institutional” statements (NI), provide important meaning for 
institutional statements.  I chose to catalog these statements for the following 
reasons.  First, by identifying and classifying the observations as NI, the reliability of 
the coding process may be enhanced as each statement is included in the inventory.  
Researchers may understand why a statement was included, and why a statement 
was not included.  Second, some definitions and external document references are 
important to understand the “combinatorial” effects of institutions thought 
important by Ostrom.  These effects are confirmed by authors who observe that 
cyber security policies must be consistent with organizational culture and business 
objectives (Knapp et al. 2009).  An effective combination of institutions regarding 
the identification of risk, the assessment of policy effectiveness, and the means of 
making users aware of policies is needed (Baskerville & Siponen, 2002).    
 
Third, within institutional statements, some components are implied, or referenced.  
I enclosed implied/referenced text with square brackets [example text].  The NI 
statements also provide both meaning and context to these implied components. 
Crawford and Ostrom note that the existence of single institutional statements, 
independent of all other statements relevant to a policy document, is not easily 
found in the real world (1995, 596).   NI statements provide links to other stated 
deontics, conditions, and sanctions (Or Else components).  Such links are observed 
by Basurto, et al (2009) and deemed important to understanding the correct 





For example, Georgia State University publishes a policy document (ID 361) entitled 
“University Information Systems Use Policies”.  The meta-data for the document 
indicate that it is a Policy, of type “Acceptable Use” containing 587 words broken 
into 22 sentences.  Applying the IGT to the document, we discover only one rule and 
8 norms leaving 13 Non-Institutional statements (Table H-7).   
 
Table H-7 Sample Analysis of Statement Types 












A display of the institutional statements is found in Table H-8.  Examination of these few 
statements demonstrates the importance of implicit links to sanctions, conditions, and 
attributes which are contained in other institutions within the organization’s policy 
apparatus. 
 
Observation 18 says that disciplinary procedures and sanctions are described in detail in 
the “Faculty Handbook, the Student Code of Conduct, and other applicable policies and 
procedures.”  These references to policy documents external to this particular policy is a 
good example of the combinatorial nature of institutions of which studies like this one 
must be aware.   When an observation makes such a reference, the references are 
recorded and the components of security governance documented.  The referenced 
documents’ meta data are captured in the same manner as meta data for the cyber 















13 Violations of these policies may result in the discipline of an individual in 
accordance with applicable University policies or state or federal law, including 
criminal prosecution. 
P R 
14 The university may temporarily suspend, block or restrict access to Information 
Systems when it reasonably appears necessary to do so in order to protect the 
integrity, security, or functionality of Information Systems or to protect the 
university from liability 
P N 
15 Alleged violations of the policies should be reported to the appropriate 
university disciplinary and/or law enforcement authorities 
O N 
16 If the alleged violation could pose a security hazard to the university's 
technology resources, the alleged violation should also be reported to the 
university's Information Security Officer for appropriate action to secure the 
affected technology resources 
O N 
17 When appropriate, the university disciplinary and/or law enforcement 
authorities will coordinate with the university's Information Security Officer to 
investigate and respond to alleged violations. 
O N 
18 Alleged violations of policies will be pursued in accordance with the appropriate 
disciplinary procedures for faculty, staff and students, as outlined in the Faculty 
Handbook, the Student Code of Conduct, and other applicable policies and 
procedures 
O N 
19 Users found in violation of any of the catalogued policies may appeal any 
imposed disciplinary action in accordance with the appeals provisions of the 
relevant disciplinary procedures. 
P N 
20 This document and any of the catalogued policies may be changed by the 
Information Technology Senate Sub-Committee (ITSS), with such changes being 
reviewed and recommended through the Senate Information Systems and 
Technology Committee (ISAT). 
P N 
21 Information Systems and Technology (IS&T) will prepare, coordinate and 











Table H-9 Rule Type Definitions 
Rule 
Type 
Description Component Basic Aim 
Verb 
Position Create the positions that actors hold.  Title of position; Number of actors in a 
position; quorum level; 
Position Be 
Boundary Define (1) who is eligible to enter a position, (2) the process that determines which 
participants may/must enter positions, and (3) how a participant may/must leave.  
Some rules may spell out eligibility for participants 
Actor Enter or 
leave 
Choice what an actor must, must not, may, may not do based upon Conditions at the time 
of decision - Choice rules affect the total power created in an action situation 




whether one individual decides, or votes of several aggregate to decide 
Determines the level of control an actor given a position may exercise over the 




Affects level of information available to participants; limits topics to be considered; 
frequency and accuracy of communication, legitimate channels of communication, 
language 
Information Send or 
Receive 
Payoff Assigns external payoff/sanctions to particular actions 





Scope Defines the range of acceptable outcomes permitted. 
Also limits actions linked to the outcomes. 
Outcomes Occur 






9. Assign the statement to a governance action situation using the Knapp processes as 
categories. The statements were coded as to which stage, action situation, of the 
Knapp model the statement was assigned.  Again, the aIm verbs, with assistance 
from the oBject, helped to determine the proper action situation.  In addition, the 
policy documents often declared the intended action situation with the statements 
that served as outline indicators.   
 
 
Table H-10 Knapp Action Situation Definitions 
Action Situation Description 
Approval Actions required to approve policy; to operationalize the 
policy 
Awareness and Training Efforts to communicate to the campus community and to train 
them in the issues related to the policy in question 
Development Activities include issue identification, definition of scope, 
research and analysis and stakeholder input 
Enforcement Judgment of whether a violation of policy occurred; 
application of sanctions 
Implementation Operational level application of the rules and norms contained 
within the policy document 
Monitoring Observation of policy compliance, audits of systems, use of 
automated tools to scan for behaviors not allowed 
Retirement Removal of policy from active service 
Review Management review of policy performance, alignment with 
business objectives, and effectiveness given other emerging 
technologies and security issues 
Risk Assessment Identification of organizational values, policies that may be 
compromised if certain behaviors are allowed to occur 
 
 
Observations are attached to specific Knapp processes by a combination of the context 
of the observation (document type and section heading) and the intent of the aIm verb 
and conditions.   
 
 
10. Assign the statement to the CyberSec Action per the USG policy area identified. The 
requirement represents another level of analysis which can include many of the 





Table H-11 USG Cyber Security Action Situations 
ID Action Situation Description References 
1 Information Security 
Program 
the USO, all USG institutions, and the GPLS shall create and maintain 
an internal information security technology infrastructure consisting of 
an information security organization and program that ensures the 
confidentiality, availability, and integrity of all USG information 
assets. 
USG Info Sec 
Policy Section 11 
2 HIPAA To meet the requirements of the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules, 
the University System of Georgia, it’s institutions; hospitals, GPLS 
and benefit plans will develop policies, which govern the use and 




and Security Policy 
Statement 
3 Password It is the responsibility of every Institution and the University System 
Office to implement authentication mechanisms such as passwords to 
access sensitive data and the responsibility of the user to appropriately 




4 AUP The USG expects all institutions and their users to use IT resources in 
a responsible manner, respecting the public trust through which these 
resources have been provided, the rights and privacy of others, the 
integrity of facilities and controls, state and Federal laws, and USG 
policies and standards. 
USG Appropriate 
Use Policy 
5 Risk Mgt University System of Georgia (USG) Institutions must ensure the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of information and 
information systems resources and assets by protecting them from 
unauthorized access, modification, destruction, or disclosure and 




6 Continuity This policy shall establish a requirement to develop a formal program 
to develop, maintain, and evaluate plans to appropriately respond to a 
wide range of contingencies and disasters that may occur at all of the 
USG institutions, System Office and Georgia Public Library Service. 
USG Continuity of 
Operations Plan 
7 Data Handling This policy is intended to ensure that the information is uniformly 
used and disclosed in accordance with all USG policies and applicable 




8 Incident This policy establishes the requirement for each University System of 
Georgia (USG) institution and the University System Office (USO) to 






9 Cryptography This policy establishes the requirement to use cryptographic controls 
on University System Office (USO) and University System of Georgia 
(USG) Institution information systems as necessary. 
Use of 
Cryptography 
10 Privacy This Privacy Policy sets forth the University System of Georgia's 
(“USG”) policy with respect to the gathering and dissemination of 
information we obtain from you on the web site for the University 
System of Georgia located at www.usg.edu (“Site”). 
Privacy Policy for 
www.usg.edu 
11 Awareness The USG’s employees (full/part-time employees and contractors) 
shall be made aware of their basic information security responsibilities 




12 Electronic Data Disposal All computer systems, electronic devices and electronic media must 
be properly cleaned of sensitive data and software before being 
transferred outside of the University System or GPLS, either as 
surplus property or as trash. 
Electronic Data 
Disposal 
13 Copyright The purpose of this guideline is to establish acceptable practices that 












11. Comments: Coder should assign any comments. If the statement is one of multiple 
statements disaggregated from one sentence, coder should note that the 
observation is the x statement of Y statements observed.  In other words if 3 
observations are found in one sentence and this observation is the second – note “2 
of 3 observations”.   
 
Code institutional statements as strategies, norms, and rules 
The coding scheme offered by Basurto et al. (2010) is used to identify institutions 
by type (Strategy, Norm, Rule) within a policy and to investigate the effects of the 
institutional type on policy outcomes (Nowlin 2011)49.  The statements are coded based 
upon the presence of ADICO elements as follows: 
 AIC  Strategies 
 ADIC  Norms 
 ADICO  Rules 
 
Coding the institutional statements is essential to efficiently analyzing the data.  
However, many “non-institutional” statements (NI), provide important meaning for 
institutional statements.  I chose to catalog these statements for the following reasons.  
First, by identifying and classifying the observations as NI, the reliability of the coding 
                                                     
49 There are challenges in determining the type of institution being observed by the analyst.  
(See notes on Schluter, and Basurto, and Crawford and Ostrom).   This study employs a strategy 
used by Siddiki et al. (2010): 
 
In the original grammar tool (Crawford and Ostrom, 1995), this increasingly stringent ordering of 
categories of institutional statements corresponded with “strategies” (AIC), “norms” (ADIC), and 
“rules” (ADICO). In this paper, we recognize the underlying logic of ordering the statement 
categories by stringency from strategies to rules. But we avoid using the conceptual language of 
strategies, norms, and rules because all statements in formal institutions could be interpreted as 
rules. More important than the actual label applied is the relative frequency of each 







process may be enhanced as each statement is included in the inventory.  Researchers 
may understand why a statement was included, and why a statement was not included.  
Second, some definitions and external document references are important to 
understand the “combinatorial” effects of institutions thought important by Ostrom.  
These effects are confirmed by authors who observe that cyber security policies must be 
consistent with organizational culture and business objectives (Knapp et al. 2009).  An 
effective combination of institutions regarding the identification of risk, the assessment 
of policy effectiveness, and the means of making users aware of policies is needed 
(Baskerville & Siponen, 2002).    
Third, within institutional statements, some components are implied, or 
referenced.  I enclosed implied/referenced text with square brackets [example text].  
The NI statements also provide both meaning and context to these implied components. 
Crawford and Ostrom note that the existence of single institutional statements, 
independent of all other statements relevant to a policy document, is not easily found in 
the real world (1995, 596).   NI statements provide links to other stated deontics, 
conditions, and sanctions (Or Else components).  Such links are observed by Basurto, et 
al (2009) and deemed important to understanding the correct meaning of policy 
documents (p. 14).    
 For example, Georgia State University publishes a policy document (ID 361) 
entitled “University Information Systems Use Policies”.  The meta-data for the 




broken into 22 sentences.  Applying the IGT to the document, we discover only one rule 
and 8 norms leaving 13 Non-Institutional statements (Table H-12 UGA Rule Types).   
Table H-12 Sample UGA Rule Types 
















 Source Documents for Meta Policy Observations 





GS 332 AUP 2 2.9%  11-Nov-10 This Information 
Technology Appropriate 
Use Policy is authorized 
by the Board of Regents, 
Appropriate Use Policy 
(2009-014) which charges 
each University System of 
Georgia institution to 
develop policy that, at 
minimum, includes the 
Board policy guidelines. 
These guidelines establish 
that the institution and its 
users have an obligation 
to abide by the following 
standards of appropriate 
and ethical use: 




45 66.2%  1-May-10 This document describes 
the process and 
guidelines for developing 
and managing 
information technology 
related policies at Georgia 
Southern University. 
GS 473 AGILE 
Development 
Principles 
11 16.2%    
GS 474 GS Interview 
Analysis 
10 14.7%    
  Total GS 
MetaPolicy 
Observations 
   68   
        
GSU 361 AUP 1 1.3%  24-Mar-06 A single location of 
approved policies aimed 
at ensuring that the 
access, use and 
protection of the 
Information Systems 
promote the university's 
objectives 
GSU 367 InfoSec Mgt 
Security Policy 
(Meta) 





systems - Requirements 





improving an Information 
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System (ISMS).   
GSU 368 Network 
Security 
Standards 
4 5.1%  6-Jan-04 The basic standards and 
guidelines described in 
this policy provide for the 
minimum acceptable 
environment for 
operating and accessing 
information systems. 
GSU 371 Security 
Review Policy 
4 5.1%  2-Nov-05 Where appropriate, 
information security 
personnel will conduct 
risk assessments of 
technologies/processes 
that are being evaluated 
and/or used at Georgia 
State University. The 
purpose of these 
assessments is to quantify 
the impact and 
probability of potential 
threats and 
vulnerabilities.  Fu 
GSU 470 GSU Interview 14 17.7%    




35 44.3%  7-May-08 This policy explains how 
policies that pertain to 
the whole university 
community are 
developed, approved and 
managed. The University 
Policy on University-Wide 
Policies is not binding on 
policies developed by 
individual colleges, 
schools, divisions or 
departments to govern 
their internal operations 
  Total GSU 
MetaPolicy 
Observations 
   79   
        
GT 343 AUP 6 7.9%  1-Jul-05 It is the policy of the 
Institute that its IT 
resources be used 
ethically and legally, in 
accord with applicable 
licenses and contracts, 
and according to their 
intended use in support 
of the Institute's mission. 
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GT 344 Data Access 
Policy 
4 5.3%  2-Nov-05 The purpose of this policy 
is to provide a structured 
and consistent process for 
employees to obtain 
necessary data access for 
conducting Georgia Tech 
operations, defining the 
relevant mechanisms for 
delegating authority to 
accommodate this 
process at the unit level 
while adhering to 
segregation of duties and 
other best practices, as 
well as defining data 
classification and related 
safeguards. 
GT 348 Credit Card 
Processing 
2 2.6%  31-Jul-03 This policy provides 
requirements and 
guidance for all credit 
card processing activities 
for the Georgia Institute 
of Technology.  At this 
initial publication of this 
policy the following 
sources were consulted 
and provided the basis for 
this program: ISO 17799, 
Visa CISP, MasterCard 
SDP 
GT 353 InfoSec 
Exception 
Policy 
18 23.7%  1-Jul-10 There will be times when 
business processes can 
and should take 
precedence over these 
policies. A review process 
is provided to approve 
and document requests 
for exemptions to Georgia 
Tech’s security policies 
GT 359 Policy 
Exception 
Procedure 
1 1.3%  1-Jul-10 The process allows unit 
heads and Institute 
leadership to make an 
informed decision on 
whether or not to request 
an exception to a 
particular IT policy by 
understanding the risk 
and alternatives involved 
GT 360 Policy Review 
Process (Meta) 
34 44.7%  16-Jan-08 This document describes 
the process, also known 
as the Security Policy 
Review (SPR), which will 
be followed by OIT-IS 
when writing/revising 
security policies which 
will affect OIT and/or 
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Georgia Tech as a whole. 
This document is needed 
to provide the necessary 
guidance to write, review, 
and publish Security 
Policies, Standards, and 
Procedures in a timely 
and efficient manner. 
GT 476 GT Interview 
Analysis 
11 14.5%    
  Total GT 
MetaPolicy 
Observations 
   76   
        
UGA 376 Data Access 
Policy 
1 1.4%  1-Jun-11 The University of Georgia 
(UGA) shall approve 
access to Sensitive 
Institutional Data in order 
to ensure that access to 
sensitive data is 
authorized, that sensitive 
data with a need for 
protection are used 
appropriately and that 
authorized access 
complies with the UGA 
Privacy Policy and 
relevant state and federal 
laws. 
UGA 378 UGA Privacy 
Policy 
1 1.4%  7-Jan-09 The purpose of this policy 
is to protect the privacy 
of individuals who have 
sensitive information 
stored (either in 
electronic or paper form) 
on assets owned by The 
University of Georgia, 
while at the same time 
providing the University 
the ability to share this 
information with 
authorized entities as 
required by policy or law. 
UGA 380 Credit Card 
Processing 
1 1.4%  22-Apr-11 This policy provides 
requirements and 
guidance for all credit and 
debit card processing 
activities for the 
University of Georgia, 
including UGA Athletic 
Department, Arch 
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UGA 381 Network 
Security 
Standards 
8 10.8%  1-May-05 This policy requires 
compliance with 
minimum security 
standards in order to help 
protect both individual 
devices and other devices 
connected to the UGA 
Network. Additionally, 
the policy is intended to 
prevent exploitation of 
university resources by 
unauthorized individuals 
UGA 382 Password 
Policy 
15 20.3%  N.A. All UGA computing 
accounts shall be 
protected by strong 
passwords. Account 
holders and system 
administrators shall 
protect the security of 
those passwords by 
managing passwords in a 
responsible fashion 
UGA 466 SecureGA Plan 4 5.4%  2-Apr-08 In 2007, Provost Mace 
and the Executive 
Management Team 
approved the campus-
wide role based 
accountability model for 
protecting sensitive and 
critical data.  The model is 
built on Process, People, 
and Technology. Only 
with sound best practices 
in each area can 
information security be 
truly effective. 
UGA 471 Interview 
Analysis 
23 31.1%    
UGA 472 UGA Security 
Committee 
Charter 
21 28.4%  N.A. Make recommendations 
to the Director of 
University Information 
Security and the Office of 
the CIO regarding 
information security 
strategy, policy, and the 
awareness and training 
program. 
  Total UGA 
MetaPolicy 
Observations 
   74   
        
  Grand Total 
Observations 










 Georgia State Collective Level Observations  
ACUPA A I B C RULE TYPE REF DEONTIC 
1.01 CISO identify need for policy [at all times] Choice 470 : 1 P 
1.01 Data owners identify need for policy [at all times] Choice 470 : 2 P 
1.02 Any member of 
the university 
community 
initiate the policy 
development process 
although this role is typically performed by an administrative 
office,a Senate or Staff Council committee, a 
StudentGovernment Association committee,or an executive 
officer of the university. 








be the Responsible Office. [at all times] Position 475 : 3 R 









develop university information 
security policies 
[at all times] Position 368 : 50 R 
2.02 University impleme
nt 
ISMS incrementally and scaled in accordance with University 
requirements 
Choice 367 : 3 R 
2.03 CISO select team to determine need for policy. Choice 470 : 5 R 
2.03 Policy owner include all relevant parties in discussions and formulations. Choice 475 : 2 P 
2.03 The team include the Responsible Office.  Boundary 475 : 4 P 




administer access to 
university information 
resources] 
to develop in conjunction with information resource owners, the 
university data administrators and functional users 












ACUPA A I B C RULE TYPE REF DEONTIC 
2.06  information 
security 
personnel 
conduct risk assessments Where appropriate, of technologies/processes that are being 
evaluated and/or used at Georgia State University 
Choice 371 : 1 R 
2.06 CISO and team determin
e 






security controls which, if any, are commensurate with the risks to which the 
university would be exposed. 
Choice 371 : 3 P 
2.09 Office of Legal 
Affairs 
approve the new policy if umbrella policies cover the need. Choice 470 : 7 F 
2.09 [University] develop 
and 
enact 
an interim policy (and 
or procedures) 
Where legal or compliance imperatives demand an immediate 
modification (or suspension) of policy (and practice), pending 
formal review and approval. 
Choice 367 : 6 R 
2.10 Office of Legal 
Affairs 
approve the draft [at all times] Aggregation 470 : 6 R 
        
3.02 CISO draft draft policy using approved format Choice 470 : 13 R 
3.02 Team draft policy to present to key stakeholders Choice 470 : 4 R 
3.02 Team use the Policy Template for all new policies and policy revisions Choice 475 : 5 R 
3.02 Office of Internal 
Audits 
draft policy [at all times] Choice 470 : 3 F 
3.03 CISO present draft to Internal Audits for comments Information 470 : 9 R 
3.03 CISO present draft policy to CIO Information 470 : 10 R 
3.03 Team revise  draft policy accomodating comments by Office of Legal affairs Choice 470 : 8 R 
3.04 CIO present draft policy to ISAT for examination and discussion if Legal approves and CIO 
approves 
Choice 470 : 11 R 
4.01 CIO present draft policy to Admin Council Information 470 : 12 R 
4.01 [Team] submit policy drafts to the Office of Institutional Effectiveness Information 475 : 6 R 
4.01 the Office of 
Institutional 
Effectiveness 
arrange the policy draft to be reviewed by the Policy Advisory Group. Choice 475 : 7 R 
4.01 The Policy 
Advisory Group 
(PAG) 
evaluate proposed policy (at all times) Choice 475 : 9 F 
4.01 The Policy 
Advisory Group 
(PAG) 
review drafts of policies to ensure that all mandatory elements are completed, that 
format is consistent, and that any overlaps with policies or 

















ACUPA A I B C RULE TYPE REF DEONTIC 
conflicts with other policies  or federal, state, or Board of 
Regents regulations are identified prior to its final approval. 
4.01 The provost appoint members of the Policy Advisory Group Boundary 475 : 10 R 
4.02 Administrative 
Council 
approve new policies or 
revisions to existing 
policies 




discuss the proposed policy if introduced to the council Choice 475 : 30 R 
4.02 the chair of that 
committee 
be sponsor of the 
proposed policy 
when the policy is introduced in the Senate, If the drafted policy 
comes under the purview of the Senate Committee 
Position 475 : 18 R 
4.02 The Office of 
Institutional 
Effectiveness 
be [responsible office] for overseeing the policy management process Position 475 : 12 R 
4.02 The Policy 
Advisory Group 
review drafts of new or  
revised policy 
to (a) ensure that all mandatory elements are completed and 
consistency of format, and (b) identify any overlap with other 
policies or conflict with other policies or federal, state, and 
Board of Regents regulations. 
Choice 475 : 15 R 
4.02 The Policy 
Advisory Group 
complete reviews  in a maximum of 5 working days (urgent issues will be 
expedited). 
Choice 475 : 16 R 
4.02 The Policy 
Advisory Group 
review drafts of new or 
revised policy 
to (a) ensure that all mandatory elements are completed and 
consistency of format, and (b) identify any overlap with other 
policies or conflict with other policies or federal, state, and 
Board of Regents regulations. 
Choice 475 : 26 R 
4.02 The Policy 
Advisory Group 
complete reviews in a maximum of 5 working days (urgent issues will be 
expedited). 
Choice 475 : 27 R 
4.02 the relevant 
associate provost 
or vice president 
be sponsor of the 
proposed policy 
if not [under the purview of the Senate] Position 475 : 19 R 
4.02 The Responsible 
Executive 
[be] sponsor of the proposed policy when the policy is introduced in the 
Administrative Council. 
Position 475 : 29 R 
4.02 The Senate pass or 
deny 
the motion to approve [at all times] Aggregation 475 : 20 R 
4.02 The Senate discuss the policy when introduced Choice 475 : 19 R 
4.02 University Senate approve new policies or 
revisions to existing 
policies 












ACUPA A I B C RULE TYPE REF DEONTIC 
4.03 The Policy 
Advisory Group 
return the draft policy 
documents 
to the Responsible Executive (e.g. vice president, associate 
provost) for introduction to the Administrative Council. 
Choice 475 : 28 R 
4.03 The Policy 
Advisory Group 
return draft policy document to the Responsible Office/Senate Committee for scheduling the 
discussion of the policy on the University Senate Agenda. 
Information 475 : 17 R 
4.03 the Responsible 
Office 
draft the new policy or 
revision of existing 
policy. 
With input from any interested parties and the relevant vice 
president or associate provost, 
Choice 475 : 25 R 
4.03 the Responsible 
Office and/or the 
relevant Senate 
Committee 
draft  document containing 
the new policy or 
revises an existing 
policy. 






approval or denial to the President Aggregation 475 : 31 R 
4.04 The President concur or 
vetoe 
the motion of the 
Senate 
[at all times] Aggregation 475 : 21 R 
4.04 The President deny or 
approve 
the proposed policy. when presented proposal by Administrative Council Aggregation 475 : 32 R 









approve All university-wide 
policies 
prior to final approval by the President, as set forth in University 
Statutes. 
Aggregation 475 : 13 R 
5.02 [University] make 
available 
applicable documents at points of use relevant versions Information 367 : 9 R 
5.02 The Associate 
Provost 
post the approved policy  on the University's policy website. Choice 475 : 23 R 
5.02 The Associate 
Provost 






All relevant personnel of the relevance and importance of their information security 
activities and how they contribute to the achievement of the 
ISMS objectives 












ACUPA A I B C RULE TYPE REF DEONTIC 
5.04 The Responsible 
Office or Senate 
Committee 
notify relevant individuals 
and departments 
of the policy change. Information 475 : 24 R 
5.04 The Responsible 
Ofice 
notify relevant individuals 
and departments 




include  A revision level 
showing the new 
document(s)/version(s) 
When a new procedure, or version of a procedure, is issued for 
inclusion in the University's Information Security Management 
System 




include Point(s) of contact for 
questions or 
comments 
When a new procedure, or version of a procedure, is issued for 
inclusion in the University's Information Security Management 
System 




include  Date of last update or 
issuance 
When a new procedure, or version of a procedure, is issued for 
inclusion in the University's Information Security Management 
System 




include Data classification (if 
sensitive or 
confidential) 
When a new procedure, or version of a procedure, is issued for 
inclusion in the University's Information Security Management 
System 




hold meetings for management reviews semiannually Information 367 : 18 R 
6.04  information 
security 
personnel 
perform security reviews In these situations; to determine the threats,  the likelihood of 
such events taking place, the estimated impact if they were to 
occur and recommend controls. 
Choice 371 : 6 S 
6.04  information 
security 
personnel 
perform security reviews In these situations; to determine the threats,  the likelihood of 
such events taking place, the estimated impact if they were to 
occur and recommend controls. 




include  Results of ISMS audits 
and reviews 




include Feedback from 
interested parties 




include Techniques, products 
or procedures, which 
could be used at the 
University to improve 
the ISMS's 


















include Status of preventive 
and corrective actions 




include Vulnerabilities or 
threats not adequately 
addressed in the 
previous risk 
assessments 




include Results from 
effectiveness 
measurements 




include Follow-up actions from 
previous management 
reviews 
in the management reviews Information 367 : 25 R 




change This document and any 
of the catalogued 
policies 
with such changes being reviewed and recommended through 
the Senate Information Systems and Technology Committee 
(ISAT) 
Aggregation 361 : 20 P 
6.07 Organizations 
that are within 
the scope of the 
University's ISMS 
ensure appropriateness of 
safeguards against 
security threats 
[at all times] Choice 367 : 
29.2 
R 




maintain ISMS records unless specified othewise, in the department or college in which 
they were produced for a minimum of 30 days. 
Choice 367 : 26 R 




























administer access to 
university information 
resources. 
[at all times] Aggregation 368 : 52 R 









monitor compliance with those 
policies and all 
applicable laws, rules 
and regulations 











 GS Collective Level Observations  
ACUPA A I B C RULE TYPE REF DEONTIC 
1.02 Anyone within the University 
community context 
identify Policy issues [at all times] Boundary 336 : 
3 
P 
2.01 [an IT director] be Officer(s) of Coordinating 
Responsibility (OCR) 
most of the time Boundary 336 : 
9 
R 
2.01 [an IT director] be Officer(s) of Coordinating 
Responsibility (OCR) 
most of the time Position 336 : 
9 
R 
2.01 [CIO be Officer(s) of Primary 
Responsibility (OPR) 
most of the time Boundary 336 : 
8 
R 
2.01 [CIO be Officer(s) of Primary 
Responsibility (OPR) 
most of the time Position 336 : 
8 
R 
2.02 IT Directors define scope of the issue [at all times] Choice 336 : 
5 
R 
2.02 Team manage the process as the team decides Choice 473 : 
10 
R 
2.02 Team and stakeholders receive commendation  for maintaining pace of development Payoff 473 : 
8 
R 
2.03 CIO invite individuals to become members of TASC Boundary 474 : 
6 
R 
2.03 Officer of Primary Responsibility involve subject-matter experts 
(SME’s) 
Once the Statement of Policy Need is 
created, as necessary 
Boundary 336 : 
13 
R 
2.03 Officer of Primary Responsibility involve Office of Legal Affairs and 
Internal Audit 
Once the Statement of Policy Need is 
created, as necessary 
Boundary 336 : 
16 
R 
2.04 Officer of Primary Responsibility gather  necessary information on 
the issue(s) 
Once the Statement of Policy Need is 
created, 
Choice 336 : 
12 
R 
2.06 CISO, Legal Affairs, and office of 
internal audit 
perform risk assessment on proposed policies and policy changes Choice 474 : 
9 
R 
2.07 Policy Owners engage stakeholders committed to 
sound policy development. 
[at all times] Boundary 473 : 
5 
R 
2.07 IT Directors determine who is or should be affected 
by policy issue 
[at all times] Boundary 336 : 
4 
R 
2.07 Stakeholders include [be]  technical, management, 
and operational actors. 
[at all times] Position 473 : 
4 
R 
2.09 IT Directors determine existence of policy if policy exists Choice 336 : 
6 
R 
2.09 Officer of Primary Responsibility review related (pre-existing 
Georgia Southern) policies 
Once the Statement of Policy Need is 
created, 














ACUPA A I B C RULE TYPE REF DEONTIC 
 
2.09 Officer of Primary Responsibility review analogous policy(s) Once the Statement of Policy Need is 
created, from peer institutions and/or 
best practices 
Choice 336 : 
15 
R 
2.10 each University System of 
Georgia institution 
develop policy authorized by BOR Appropriate Use 
Policy (2009-14) that, at minimum, 
includes the Board policy guidelines. 
Scope 332 : 
3 
R 
2.10 IT Directors deliver Memoranda regarding Statement of Policy Need Information 336 : 
10 
R 
2.10 Officer of Primary Responsibility draft Policy Concept Document [once all the actions are completed] Choice 336 : 
17 
R 
3.01 CIO determine the period (time and 
frequency) 
for students, employees, and service 
providers to re-affirm their recognition of 
this policy. 
Aggregation 332 : 
23.2 
R 
3.01 Team simplify policy to minimize effort required to comply. Choice 473 : 
9 
R 
3.02 OCR develop initial draft policy and 
accompanying procedures 
once input on the concept document has 
been obtained,utilizing the IT Policy 
templates to ensure consistency 
Choice 336 : 
28 
R 
3.02 Officer(s) of Coordinating 
Responsibility (OCR) 
write draft of the policy and 
operational procedures 
Once input on the concept document has 
been obtained 
Choice 336 : 
24 
P 
3.02 OPR determine who will be responsible  for 
drafting the policy and 
procedures 
once input on the concept document has 
been obtained 
Aggregation 336 : 
27.1 
R 
3.02 OPR determine who will be responsible  for 
drafting the policy and 
procedures 
once input on the concept document has 
been obtained 
Boundary 336 : 
27.1 
R 
3.03 Officer(s) of Primary 
Responsibility (OPR) / Officer(s) 
of Coordinating Responsibility 
(OCR) 
distribute policy concept document to all stakeholders Information 336 : 
19 
R 
3.03 Officer(s) of Primary 
Responsibility (OPR) / Officer(s) 
of Coordinating Responsibility 
(OCR) 
solicit input from all stakeholders [regarding draft 
policy concept document] 














ACUPA A I B C RULE TYPE REF DEONTIC 
3.03 Officer(s) of Primary 
Responsibility (OPR) / Officer(s) 
of Coordinating Responsibility 
(OCR) 
inform stakeholders [when distributing policy concept 
document] of possible changes to policies 
Information 336 : 
21 
R 
3.03 Officer(s) of Primary 
Responsibility (OPR) / Officer(s) 
of Coordinating Responsibility 
(OCR) 
inform stakeholders [when distributing policy concept 
document] how it affects them 
Information 336 : 
22 
R 
3.03 Team exchange information in face-to-face meetings as much as 
possible 
Information 473 : 
6 
R 
3.04 Information Technology 
Advisory Council 
provide feedback  on issues regarding instructional 
technologies 
Choice 474 : 
8 
R 
3.05 Team receive commendation for maintaining progress by delivery of 
working policies 
Payoff 473 : 
7 
R 
4.01 Officer(s) of Primary 
Responsibility (OPR) / Officer(s) 
of Coordinating Responsibility 
(OCR) 
present draft policy typically 30 days for consideration by 
President's Cabinet and relevant 
audiences 
Information 336 : 
31 
R 
4.01 Officer(s) of Primary 
Responsibility (OPR) / Officer(s) 
of Coordinating Responsibility 
(OCR) 
present draft policy typically 30 days for consideration by 
President's Cabinet and relevant 
audiences 
Information 336 : 
31 
R 
4.03 Policy Owners accept stakeholder input anytime in the cycle Information 473 : 
2 
R 
4.03 Policy Owners satisfy the stakeholders through timely and continuous policy 
actions 
Scope 473 : 
1 
R 
4.03 Officer(s) of Primary 
Responsibility (OPR) / Officer(s) 
of Coordinating Responsibility 
(OCR) 
make revisions as necessary, to draft policy Choice 336 : 
33 
R 
4.03 Officer(s) of Primary 
Responsibility (OPR) / Officer(s) 
of Coordinating Responsibility 
(OCR) 
address requests  for additional information, clarifications, 
objections, recommendations, etc. 
Information 336 : 
32 
R 
4.03 Policy Owner revise documents documents upon feedback from advisory 
committees within 24-48 hours of 
feedback. 














ACUPA A I B C RULE TYPE REF DEONTIC 
4.03 Team deliver viable policy drafts frequently during the development 
process. 
Information 473 : 
3 
R 
4.04 OPR (CIO) seek policy approval  from President's Cabinet by submitting 
amended draft with date and version 
accordingly 
Information 336 : 
35 
R 
5.01 CISO develop awareness and training 
program 
(at all times) Choice 474 : 
10 
R 
5.01 OCR Develop  a communication plan / 
matrix 
once input on the concept document has 
been obtained,for introducing the new 
policy 
Choice 336 : 
29 
R 
5.02 Officer(s) of Coordinating 
Responsibility (OCR) 
post the policy and procedures to VPIT policy website Once approved, Information 336 : 
37 
R 
5.03 Officer(s) of Coordinating 
Responsibility (OCR) 
post approved policy in master repository ensuring proper 
classification for easy reference 
Information 336 : 
40 
R 
5.04 Officer(s) of Coordinating 
Responsibility (OCR) 
distribute the policy and procedures Once approved,  according to the 
established communication plan 
Information 336 : 
39 
R 
5.04 Officer(s) of Coordinating 
Responsibility (OCR) 
distribute the policy and procedures Once approved,  according to the 
established communication plan 
Information 336 : 
39 
R 
5.04 Officer(s) of Coordinating 
Responsibility (OCR) 
distribute policy document as per communication plan Information 336 : 
41 
R 




[amended policy] [at all times] Choice 336 : 
50 
R 
6.02 Officer(s) of Coordinating 
Responsibility (OCR) 
create a master backup Once approved, Choice 336 : 
38 
R 
6.02 Officer(s) of Coordinating 
Responsibility (OCR) 
Move Retired/obsolete policy 
document 
to a Policy Archive, ensuring correct 
classification to enable future reference 
Choice 336 : 
53 
R 
6.02 Officer(s) of Coordinating 
Responsibility (OCR) 
Communicate policy retirement as per Communication Plan Information 336 : 
54 
R 
6.03 Officer(s) of Coordinating 
Responsibility (OCR) 
review the policy periodically Choice 336 : 
44 
R 
6.04 CISO and Procurement collaborate  in some instances to review policy Choice 474 : 
3 
R 
6.04 Officer(s) of Coordinating 
Responsibility (OCR) 
oversee policy implementation [at all times] Choice 336 : 
42 
R 














ACUPA A I B C RULE TYPE REF DEONTIC 
6.04 Team review the Policy Process for effectiveness on a regular basis Choice 473 : 
11 
R 
6.06 CISO and Internal Audit Office collaborate  to review risk Choice 474 : 
1 
R 
6.06 CISO and legal affairs office collaborate  to review risk Choice 474 : 
2 
R 
6.06 Office of legal affairs vet policies from a legal risk management 
perspective most of the time 
Choice 474 : 
4 
R 
6.06 Officer(s) of Coordinating 
Responsibility (OCR) 
evaluate policy as per the review schedule specified in 
the policy itself 
Choice 336 : 
45 
R 
6.07 Officer(s) of Coordinating 
Responsibility (OCR) 
determine  if policy ist still needed/applicable Aggregation 336 : 
46 
R 
6.07 Officer(s) of Coordinating 
Responsibility (OCR) 
[determine] new policy due to extensive changes necessary? Is a 
new policy required 
Aggregation 336 : 
48 
R 




[policy] as necessary Choice 336 : 
47 
R 
6.07 Officer(s) of Coordinating 
Responsibility (OCR) 













  Georgia Tech Collective Level Observations  
ACUPA A I B C RULE TYPE REF DEONTIC 
1.01 Information Security 
Office 
meet data stewards and/or policy 
owners 
to scan for issues that need to be addressed 
by policy change 
Information 476 : 3 R 
2.00 PRC provide feedback and constructive 
criticism 
for proposed OIT and GT Security Policies 
based on their respective functional areas. 
Information 360 : 
13 
R 
2.01  IS Policy and Compliance 
Manager (PCM) 
kick off process when the IS Policy and Compliance Manager 
(PCM) receives the request to review a policy 
or write a new policy 
Aggregation 360 : 
22 
R 
2.01  IS Policy and Compliance 
Manager (PCM) 
kick off policy process when the IS Policy and Compliance Manager 
(PCM) receives the request to review a policy 
or write a new policy. 
Information 360 : 
21 
S 
2.01 Georgia Tech's OIT 
Information Security 
(OIT-IS) group 
develop this policy [at all times] Choice 353 : 
24 
R 
2.02 OIT-IS follow this process, known as Security 
Policy Review 
when writing/revising security policies which 
will affect OIT and/or Georgia Tech as a 
whole. 
Choice 360 : 2 R 
2.03 GT Internal Audit comprise PRC [at all times] Boundary 360 : 
10 
R 
2.03 GT Legal comprise PRC [at all times] Boundary 360 : 9 R 
2.03 GT Registrar comprise PRC [at all times] Boundary 360 : 
11 
R 
2.03 members from GT Legal, 
HR, OIT, Internal Audit, 
and Registrar 
comprise PRC  Boundary 360 : 5 R 
2.03 OIT-ED comprise PRC [at all times] Boundary 360 : 7 r 
2.03 OIT-EIS comprise PRC [at all times] Boundary 360 : 8 r 
2.03 OIT-IS comprise PRC [at all times] Boundary 360 : 6 R 
2.03 Technology/Service SME comprise PRC [at all times] based on policy/standard Boundary 360 : 
12 
R 
2.07 PCM seek input from the various technical communities on 
campus (GTITC, CSS, CSR’s, while writing the 
new policy or updating existing policies 
Information 360 : 
27 
R 














ACUPA A I B C RULE TYPE REF DEONTIC 
2.08 PCM document changes proposed (if a review) or proposed language 
(if a new request) 
Choice 360 : 
24 
R 
2.09 PCM  forward information to the OIT IS Director for preliminary 
approval to proceed. 
Information 360 : 
25 
R 
2.10 [GT organizations] reduce minimum requirements 
established in this policy 
[in] Other policies, standards, procedures, 
and safeguards documents 
Scope 343 : 
14 
F 
2.10 [GT organizations] augment  restrictions  for the sake of security [in] Other policies, 
standards, procedures, and safeguards 
documents 
Scope 343 : 
13 
P 
2.10 [GT] submit policy to applicable federal and State statutes and 
regulations that guarantee either protection 
or accessibility of Institute records [will take 
precedence over this policy] 
Scope 344 : 5 R 
2.10 [GT] submit policy to applicable federal and State statutes and 
regulations that guarantee either protection 
or accessibility of Institute records [will take 
precedence over this policy] 
Scope 344 : 5 R 
3.02 PCM write initial draft Once approval from the OIT IS Director has 
been received,  taking into account the edits 
from the OIT IS Director. 
Choice 360 : 
26 
R 
3.02 PCM include summary of proposed changes 
or new policy highlights 
with the draft. Information 360 : 
29 
R 
3.03 PCM send initial draft to the PRC for review. Information 360 : 
28 
R 
3.03 PCM socialize draft with various groups (e.g. SGA, Faculty and 
Technical Leads) for feedback where 
appropriate 
Information 360 : 
30 
R 
3.04 CIO vet proposal with executive leadership team Information 476 : 1 P 
3.04 Information Security 
Office 
vet proposal with faculty excutive board, faculty senate, 
and all units of the campus 
Information 476 : 2 R 
3.04 Information Security 
Office 
solicit information from campus units after proposal/need 
vetted with executive leadership 
Information 476 : 4 R 
3.04 Information Security 
Office 
meet associate dean and IT director 
for a campus unit 
to discuss changes Information 476 : 6 R 
3.04 Information Security 
Office 
vet policy proposal with HR, Legal Affairs prior to vetting with 
campus units 














ACUPA A I B C RULE TYPE REF DEONTIC 
3.05 PRC review proposed changes over a period not to exceed 1 month. Choice 360 : 
31 
R 
3.05 PRC handle initial discussion During this time,  over email with weekly 
face-face meetings as needed. 
Information 360 : 
32 
R 
3.05 PRC Members are input expected to provide input based on their 
functional areas. 
Information 360 : 
33 
S 
4.01 PCM keep 
apprised (or 
apprise) 
PRC of the discussions with the CIO and any 
changes that are proposed 
Information 360 : 
37 
R 
4.02 PRC review changes Grammatical, format, or minor (e.g. contact 
information) 
Scope 360 : 
16 
F 
4.02 PRC review new policies, which will be 
written by OIT-IS 
prior to CIO approval and policy publication Choice 360 : 
15 
R 
4.02 PRC Members compile final draft At the end of 1 month, taking into account 
the various inputs and recommendations. 
Choice 360 : 
34 
R 
4.03 Information Security 
Office 
meet faculty senate committee to review draft Information 476 : 7 R 
4.03 Information Security 
Office 
present final draft to Faculty Executive Board prior to seeking 
approval. 
Information 476 : 8 R 
4.03 PCM pass approved PRC draft to the CIO for approval. Information 360 : 
35 
R 
4.03 PCM brief CIO on the proposed changes or new policy Information 360 : 
36 
R 
4.03 PCM take recommendations the CIO has into account Information 360 : 
36.1 
R 
4.04 President of the Georgia 
Institute of Technology 
[provide] final approval of this policy based on a review by the Information 
Security Policy Committee 
Aggregation 348 : 8 R 





associate vice provosts; deans, 
associate vice presidents, unit 
heads, internal auditing, office 
of legal affairs, OIT information 
security, technical leads 
upon approval of the policy and upon any 
subsequent revisions or amendments made 
to the original document 
Information 343 : 
187 
R 
5.02 [Institute] publish this policy upon approval on the Georgia Tech website Information 344 : 
71 
O 
5.02 PCM communicate final document via email to the campus, once the draft or 
changes have been approved 














ACUPA A I B C RULE TYPE REF DEONTIC 
5.02 PCM update and 
post 
final draft to the OIT Policy Website, once the CIO has 
approved the final draft 
Information 360 : 
39 
R 





this policy upon approval Information 343 : 
186 
R 
5.04 Georgia Tech Academic 
and Administrative units, 
including OIT, 
communicate this policy to their users Information 353 : 
26 
R 
5.04 OIT-IS notify CIO  of the changes [grammatical, format, or 
minor] and publish them as necessary. 
Information 360 : 
17 
R 
5.04 OIT-IS publish this policy upon approval Information 353 : 
29 
R 
6.01 Georgia Tech's OIT 
Information Security 
(OIT-IS) group 
maintain this policy [at all times] Choice 353 : 
25 
R 
6.01 Georgia Tech's OIT 
Information Security 
(OIT-IS) group 
maintain this policy [at all times] Choice 353 : 
25 
R 
6.03 OIT-IS, Internal Audit, 
and the Unit 
review approved exceptions periodically Choice 353 : 
16 
R 
6.03 PRC review Security 
Policies/Standards/Procedures 
on an annual basis, based on the initial 
publication date. 
Choice 360 : 
14 
R 
6.04 Georgia Tech Academic 
and Administrative units, 
including OIT, 
submit risk exception requests via the approved process Information 353 : 
27 
R 
6.04 Georgia Tech Academic 
and Administrative units, 
including OIT, 
submit risk exception requests via the approved process Information 353 : 
27 
R 
6.04 OIT-IS, Internal Audit, 
and the Unit 
review Any deviation from security 
policies and standards 
via the Information Security Exception 
Review Process 
Choice 353 : 
13 
R 
6.04 the Georgia Tech 
Associate Vice President 
and Associate Vice-
Provost for Information 
Technology. 
change The Computer & Network 
Security Policy and Procedures 
by directive Aggregation 343 : 
184 
P 
6.04 The responsible 
university officer 














ACUPA A I B C RULE TYPE REF DEONTIC 
6.05 OIT-IS notify the following groups: OIT, 
Campus Deans and Chairs, Unit 
Business/Administrative Leads, 
Georgia Tech IT directors, ITAC, 
Campus CSR's, Internal Audit 
via email and/or in writing upon approval of 
the standard and upon subsequent revision 
or amendments made to the original 
document 
Information 353 : 
30 
R 
6.05 OIT-IS, Internal Audit, 
and the Unit 
require  the Unit Head, CIO, EVP, or 
Provost. 
to approve exemption requests involving 
potentially significant risk to the Unit 
Choice 353 : 
17 
P 
6.05 OIT-IS, Internal Audit, 
and the Unit 
involve qualified information security 
professionals 
in the exception review process Boundary 353 : 
14 
R 
6.05 OIT-IS, Internal Audit, 
and the Unit 
log all findings and results in a central repository that is accessible to all 
Georgia Tech staff involved in the 
assessment of the exception request. 
Choice 353 : 
15 
R 
6.05 The responsible 
university officer 
communicate Any changes to the policy or 
procedures 
promptly to the individuals and offices noted 
in section 8 
Information 343 : 
185 
R 
6.06 business processs take 
precedence 
over 
these policies [security policies 
and standards] 
when there will be times Choice 353 : 5 S 
6.06 Information Security 
Office 
do internal risk assessments annually Choice 476 : 9 R 
6.06 Information Security 
Office 
contract external risk assessments every three years Choice 476 : 
10 
R 
6.06 OIT-IS, Internal Audit, 
and the Unit 
approve exception requests that create significant risks without 
compensating controls 
Choice 353 : 
20 
F 
6.06 OIT-IS, Internal Audit, 
and the Unit 
take into 
account 
what value the exception will 
bring 
to the Unit requesting the exception Choice 353 : 
19 
R 
6.06 OIT-IS, Internal Audit, 
and the Unit 
evaluate exception requests consistently in accordance with Georgia 
Tech's risk acceptance practice 
Choice 353 : 
21 
R 
6.06 Unit consider what risks they may face by 
not adhering to the policy as 
well as the benefit gained by 
requesting the exception. 
before doing so [requesting an exception] Choice 359 : 2 S 
6.06 we consider the security of Georgia Tech's 
infrastructure and data. 
still Choice 353 : 6 R 
6.07 OIT-IS, Internal Audit, 
and the Unit 
evaluate exception requests in the context of potential risk to the Unit 
and Georgia Tech as a whole 














ACUPA A I B C RULE TYPE REF DEONTIC 
6.07 Only he President of the 
Georgia Institute of 
Technology. 
revise this policy by signature Aggregation 348 : 
78 
P 










 UGA Collective Level Observations 
ACUPA A I B C RULE TYPE REF DEONTIC 
2.01 Information Technology 
Security Advisory Council 
Develop policy when necessary, in accordance with Guidelines and 
Procedures for Blocking Network Access." 
Choice 381 : 
27 
R 
2.01 ITSAC develop  [at all times] Choice 382 : 
26 
R 
2.01 Office of Information 
Security 
write minimum security 
standards for 
networked devices 
[at all times] Choice 381 : 
23 
R 
2.01 The CIO and CISO participate in 
development 
policy [at all times] Boundary 382 : 
28 
R 
2.01 CIO or CISO identify policy owners for particular areas of concern Boundary 471 : 
1 
R 
2.01 the University of Georgia 
Information Security 
Committee 
be the name of the committee Position 472 : 
3 
R 
2.02 Departments, units, or 
service providers 
develop stricter standards for themselves with or without the advice or 
assistance of the CIO and CISO. 
Scope 381 : 
11 
P 
2.02 The CIO and CISO produce the policy plan collaboratively Choice 471 : 
15.1 
R 
2.02 CISO determine likely path in consultation with the CIO Aggregation 471 : 
2 
P 
2.02 The CISO and CIO set the agenda and scope for policy development upon consultation with 
stakeholders. 
Aggregation 471 : 
14 
R 
2.03 Bursar’s Office –  [be] a member of the University of Georgia Information Security 
Committee 
Position 472 : 
20 
R 
2.03 CISO refine the path, or strategies, 
taken to achieve policy 
change 
in consultation with team members Choice 471 : 
3 
p 
2.03 Extended Campuses  [be] a member of the University of Georgia Information Security 
Committee 
Position 472 : 
17 
R 
2.03 Faculty & Research –TBD [be] a member of the University of Georgia Information Security 
Committee 
Position 472 : 
16 
R 
2.03 Human Resources –  [be] a member of the University of Georgia Information Security 
Committee 
Position 472 : 
18 
R 
2.03 Internal Audit - [be] a member of the University of Georgia Information Security 
Committee 














ACUPA A I B C RULE TYPE REF DEONTIC 
2.03 ITMF - [be] a member of the University of Georgia Information Security 
Committee 
Position 472 : 
15 
R 
2.03 Legal Affairs [be] a member of the University of Georgia Information Security 
Committee 
Position 472 : 
13 
R 
2.03 Policy owners be individuals responsible 
for a business process, 
system or unit of the 
organization. 
[at all times] Position 471 : 
1.1 
P 
2.03 Public Affairs [be] a member of the University of Georgia Information Security 
Committee 
Position 472 : 
14 
R 
2.03 Team members be selected individuals based on the issues and the areas of the university 
that are affected. 
Position 471 : 
4 
p 
2.03 the CIO, CISO, Office of 
Legal Affairs, the internal 
auditor, business process 
owners, and  stakeholders 
selected by the CISO or CIO 
be members of the team Position 471 : 
4 
R 
2.03 The CISO and CIO select managers whose area 
of authority is affected 
. 
as team members Boundary 471 : 
9 
P 
2.03 The CISO and CIO select owners of a process or 
a system, affected by a 
perceived policy gap 
need 
as team members Boundary 471 : 
8 
R 
2.03 The Office of Legal Affairs, 
Office of Internal Audit, 
Office of Finance, Office of 
Human Resources, Office of 
Public Affairs, and others 
named by the CISO 
be members of the University Security Committee. Boundary 471 : 
20 
R 
2.04 Office of Legal Affairs research the legal obligations 
and risks posed to the 
university 
as a liability or compliance issue, most of the time Choice 471 : 
11 
R 
2.04 team gather data from subject matter expert(s), peer institutions that 
have similar policies, organizations like Educause, and 
other appropriate resources. 














ACUPA A I B C RULE TYPE REF DEONTIC 
2.06 UGA employ the ISO 31000 risk 
management 
framework 
 to analyze the risks, costs, and benefits Choice 471 : 
12 
R 
2.07 Management identify stakeholders ad hoc Boundary 471 : 
7 
P 
2.07 stakeholders be groups that exist within 
the university 
organization 
 Position 471 : 
5 
P 
2.07 stakeholders be individuals with an 
interest in the policy 
if no formal organization responsible for that policy 
exists 
Position 471 : 
6 
P 
2.08 Departments, units, or 
service providers 
develop stricter standards as needed Choice 382 : 
12 
P 
2.08 University of Georgia 
Information Security 
Committee 
make recommendations to the Director of University Information Security and 
the Office of the CIO regarding information security 
strategy, policy, and the awareness and training 
program. 
Choice 472 : 
5 
R 
2.09 UGA decide to write or revise a new 
policy 
only after examining the alternatives carefully. Choice 471 : 
13 
R 
2.10 UGA develop policy documents that 
may replicate the 
mandated policy 
If a policy is required by an external organization Choice 471 : 
16 
F 
2.10 The CISO make final decision as to scope and agenda for policy development 
activities. 
Aggregation 471 : 
15 
R 
2.10 the university establish policy that defines responsibility of what needs to be done Choice 472 : 
27 
R 
3.01  ITSAC and OIS responsible  for the accuracy of the subject matter Aggregation 381 : 
35 
R 
3.03 the CISO socialize  the policy/issue and 
plan 
with most of the affected parties during the drafting 
to help gain support for the policy change 
Information 472 : 
21 
R 
3.04 The Information Technology 
Management Forum (ITMF) 
Security Committee 
provide input on “standards and policy development … involving 
the campus as a whole” . 
Choice 472 : 
22 
R 




to the CIO and CISO Choice 471 : 
18 
R 
4.02 Office of Information 
Security 
approve  exceptions to 
minimum security 
standards 














ACUPA A I B C RULE TYPE REF DEONTIC 








exemption if unable to comply with the UGA Password Standard Choice 382 : 
13 
R 
4.04 ITSAC and the Offices of the 






 [at all times] Aggregation 382 : 
37 
R 
4.04 ITSAC and the Offices of the 






 [at all times] Aggregation 382 : 
37 
R 
4.04 Office of the CIO and the 




 for policy exception review Aggregation 381 : 
29 
R 









the request for final 
approval 
[at all times] Choice 382 : 
14 
R 
4.04 CIO approve draft policy [at all times] Aggregation 472 : 
24 
R 
4.04 the President approve draft policy [at all times] Aggregation 472 : 
25 
R 
4.04 the presidents cabinet approve draft policy [at all times] Aggregation 472 : 
23 
R 
5.01 Policy Owners develop awareness activities to inform stakeholders who will place the 
requirements into practice. 
Choice 471 : 
17 
R 
5.04 The Office of Information 
Security 














ACUPA A I B C RULE TYPE REF DEONTIC 
6.03  ITSAC and OIS review policy on an annual basis Choice 381 : 
34 
R 
6.03 [UGA} update this policy as needed as card association regulations change Choice 380 : 
3 
R 
6.03 CISO, in cooperation with 
the ITMF-SECCOMM 
review the policy and 
standards 
on an annual basis Choice 378 : 
45 
R 
6.03 CISO, in cooperation with 
the ITSAC 
review policy and standards on an annual basis Choice 382 : 
35 
R 
6.03 CISO, in cooperation with 
the ITSAC 
review policy and standards on an annual basis Choice 382 : 
35 
R 




this policy on a regular basis Choice 382 : 
24 
R 
6.03 The Office of the Chief 
Information Officer, in 
cooperation with the 
University Security 
Committee 
review this policy on an annual basis Choice 376 : 
32 
O 




 [at all times] Boundary 382 : 
27 
R 






policy and procedures 
[at all times] Choice 381 : 
22 
R 
6.04 The CIO and CISO review policy [at all times] Aggregation 382 : 
29 
R 
6.04 The CIO and CISO review policy [at all times] Aggregation 382 : 
29 
R 
6.04 The CIO and CISO serve as the 
final 
arbitrators 
 in policy exception review Aggregation 382 : 
30 
R 
6.04 The CIO and CISO serve as the 
final 
arbitrators 
 in policy exception review Aggregation 382 : 
30 
R 














ACUPA A I B C RULE TYPE REF DEONTIC 
6.04 The CIO and CISO review policy [at all times] Choice 382 : 
29 
R 






 [at all times] Boundary 382 : 
25 
R 
6.04 [President] review development, 
execution and 
maintenance of UGA 
Security Plan 
in concert with requirements of USG, state and 
federal mandates 
Choice 466 : 
27 
R 
6.04 The University Security 
Committee 
review policy as needed Choice 471 : 
19 
R 
6.05 University of Georgia 
Information Security 
Committee 
provide critical analysis and 
feedback 
on existing or proposed policies and initiatives related 
to information security and privacy to the Director of 
University Information Security and the Office of the 
CIO. 
Choice 472 : 
7 
R 
6.05 University of Georgia 
Information Security 
Committee 
[provide] Feedback and guidance on development of a comprehensive IT Security 
Strategy encompassing people, processes and 
technology 
Choice 472 : 
9 
R 
6.05 University of Georgia 
Information Security 
Committee 
[provide] Recommendation for improvement of Role-Based Accountability model 
and the University’s information security training and 
awareness program 
Choice 472 : 
11 
R 
7.01 Departments determine how to comply with 
policy 
 in some cases. Choice 472 : 
28 
P 
7.02 [President] [have] 
ultimate 
responsibility 
for UGA Security Plan, 
policies, standards, and 
best practice 
that meet requirements of USG, state and federal 
mandates 
Aggregation 466 : 
26 
R 
7.02 [President] [have] 
ultimate 
responsibility 
for UGA Security Plan, 
policies, standards, and 
best practice 
that meet requirements of USG, state and federal 
mandates 
Aggregation 466 : 
26 
R 
7.02 [President] interpret UGA Policies [at all times] Aggregation 466 : 
28 
R 
7.02 audit office enforce compliance with UGA 
security policy 













 “Conduct Analysis” 
ACUPA A I  B C RULE.TYPE DEONTIC ORG REF 
2.02 CISO determine  likely path in consultation with the CIO Aggregation P UGA 471 : 
2 
2.02 The CISO and CIO set  the agenda and scope for policy development upon 
consultation with stakeholders. 
Aggregation R UGA 471 : 
14 
2.10 The CIO make  final decision as to scope and agenda for policy 
development activities. 
Aggregation R UGA 471 : 
15 
2.01 The CIO and CISO participate in 
development 
 policy [at all times] Boundary R UGA 382 : 
28 
2.01 CIO or CISO identify  policy owners for particular areas of concern Boundary R UGA 471 : 
1 
2.03 The CISO and CIO select  owners of a process or a 
system, affected by a 
perceived policy gap need 
as team members Boundary R UGA 471 : 
8 
2.03 The CISO and CIO select  managers whose area of 
authority is affected . 
as team members Boundary P UGA 471 : 
9 
2.03 The Office of Legal Affairs, 
Office of Internal Audit, 
Office of Finance, Office of 
Human Resources, Office of 
Public Affairs, and others 
named by the CISO 
be  members of the University Security 
Committee. 
Boundary R UGA 471 : 
20 
2.07 Management identify  stakeholders ad hoc Boundary P UGA 471 : 
7 
2.01 Information Technology 
Security Advisory Council 
Develop  policy when necessary, in accordance 
with Guidelines and Procedures 
for Blocking Network Access." 
Choice R UGA 381 : 
27 
2.01 ITSAC develop   [at all times] Choice R UGA 382 : 
26 
2.01 Office of Information Security write  minimum security 
standards for networked 
devices 
[at all times] Choice R UGA 381 : 
23 
2.02 The CIO and CISO produce  the policy plan collaboratively Choice R UGA 471 : 
15.1 
2.03 CISO refine  the path, or strategies, 
taken to achieve policy 
change 
in consultation with team 
members 













ACUPA A I  B C RULE.TYPE DEONTIC ORG REF 
2.04 Office of Legal Affairs research  the legal obligations and 
risks posed to the 
university 
as a liability or compliance issue, 
most of the time 
Choice R UGA 471 : 
11 
2.04 team gather  data from subject matter expert(s), 
peer institutions that have similar 
policies, organizations like 
Educause, and other appropriate 
resources. 
Choice R UGA 471 : 
10 
2.06 UGA employ  the ISO 31000 risk 
management framework 
 to analyze the risks, costs, and 
benefits 
Choice R UGA 471 : 
12 
2.08 Departments, units, or 
service providers 
develop  stricter standards as needed Choice P UGA 382 : 
12 
2.08 University of Georgia 
Information Security 
Committee 
make  recommendations to the Director of University 
Information Security and the 
Office of the CIO regarding 
information security strategy, 
policy, and the awareness and 
training program. 
Choice R UGA 472 : 
5 
2.09 UGA decide  to write or revise a new 
policy 
only after examining the 
alternatives carefully. 
Choice R UGA 471 : 
13 
2.10 UGA develop  policy documents that 
may replicate the 
mandated policy 
If a policy is required by an 
external organization 
Choice F UGA 471 : 
16 
2.10 the university establish  policy that defines responsibility of what 
needs to be done 
Choice R UGA 472 : 
27 
2.01 the University of Georgia 
Information Security 
Committee 
be  the name of the committee Position R UGA 472 : 
3 
2.03 Bursar’s Office – Elizabeth 
Quillian 
[be]  a member of the University of Georgia 
Information Security Committee 
Position R UGA 472 : 
20 
2.03 Extended Campuses - Chris 
Adcock 
[be]  a member of the University of Georgia 
Information Security Committee 
Position R UGA 472 : 
17 
2.03 Faculty & Research –TBD [be]  a member of the University of Georgia 
Information Security Committee 
Position R UGA 472 : 
16 
2.03 Human Resources – Duane 
Ritter 
[be]  a member of the University of Georgia 
Information Security Committee 













ACUPA A I  B C RULE.TYPE DEONTIC ORG REF 
2.03 Internal Audit - Will Laney [be]  a member of the University of Georgia 
Information Security Committee 
Position R UGA 472 : 
19 
2.03 ITMF - Chris Adcock [be]  a member of the University of Georgia 
Information Security Committee 
Position R UGA 472 : 
15 
2.03 Legal Affairs- Tim Kelly [be]  a member of the University of Georgia 
Information Security Committee 
Position R UGA 472 : 
13 
2.03 Policy owners be  individuals responsible 
for a business process, 
system or unit of the 
organization. 
[at all times] Position P UGA 471 : 
1.1 
2.03 Public Affairs- Mitch Clayton [be]  a member of the University of Georgia 
Information Security Committee 
Position R UGA 472 : 
14 
2.03 Team members be  selected individuals based on the issues and the areas 
of the university that are affected. 
Position P UGA 471 : 
4 
2.03 the CIO, CISO, Office of Legal 
Affairs, the internal auditor, 
business process owners, and  
stakeholders selected by the 
CISO or CIO 
be  members of the team Position R UGA 471 : 
4 
2.07 stakeholders be  groups that exist within 
the university 
organization 
 Position P UGA 471 : 
5 
2.07 stakeholders be  individuals with an 
interest in the policy 
if no formal organization 
responsible for that policy exists 
Position P UGA 471 : 
6 
2.02 Departments, units, or 
service providers 
develop  stricter standards for themselves with or without 
the advice or assistance of the CIO 
and CISO. 
Scope P UGA 381 : 
11 
2.01 [an IT director] be  Officer(s) of Coordinating 
Responsibility (OCR) 





2.01 [CIO be  Officer(s) of Primary 
Responsibility (OPR) 





















ACUPA A I  B C RULE.TYPE DEONTIC ORG REF 
2.03 Officer of Primary 
Responsibility 
involve  Office of Legal Affairs and 
Internal Audit 
Once the Statement of Policy 
Need is created, as necessary 





2.03 Officer of Primary 
Responsibility 
involve  subject-matter experts 
(SME’s) 
Once the Statement of Policy 
Need is created, as necessary 





2.07 Policy Owners engage  stakeholders committed 
to sound policy 
development. 





2.07 IT Directors determine  who is or should be 
affected by policy issue 















2.04 Officer of Primary 
Responsibility 
gather   necessary information on 
the issue(s) 
Once the Statement of Policy 
Need is created, 





2.06 CISO, Legal Affairs, and office 
of internal audit 
perform  risk assessment on proposed policies and policy 
changes 










2.09 Officer of Primary 
Responsibility 
review  analogous policy(s) Once the Statement of Policy 
Need is created, from peer 
institutions and/or best practices 





2.09 Officer of Primary 
Responsibility 
review  related (pre-existing 
Georgia Southern) 
policies 
Once the Statement of Policy 
Need is created, 





2.10 Officer of Primary 
Responsibility 
draft  Policy Concept Document [once all the actions are 
completed] 
















ACUPA A I  B C RULE.TYPE DEONTIC ORG REF 
2.10 IT Directors deliver  Memoranda regarding Statement of Policy 
Need 





2.02 Team and stakeholders receive  commendation for maintaining pace of 
development 





2.01 [an IT director] be  Officer(s) of Coordinating 
Responsibility (OCR) 





2.01 [CIO be  Officer(s) of Primary 
Responsibility (OPR) 





2.07 Stakeholders include [be]   technical, management, 
and operational actors. 





2.10 each University System of 
Georgia institution 
develop  policy authorized by BOR Appropriate 
Use Policy (2009-14) that, at 
minimum, includes the Board 
policy guidelines. 





2.04 ISO works  this material [ standards, 
procedures and 
guidelines necessary to 
administer access to 
university information 
resources] 
to develop in conjunction with 
information resource owners, the 
university data administrators and 
functional users 
Aggregation R GSU 368 : 
53 
2.10 Office of Legal Affairs approve  the draft [at all times] Aggregation R GSU 470 : 
6 
2.03 The team include  the Responsible Office.  Boundary P GSU 475 : 
4 
2.02 University implement  ISMS incrementally and scaled in 
accordance with University 
requirements 
Choice R GSU 367 : 
3 
2.03 CISO select  team to determine need for policy. Choice R GSU 470 : 
5 













ACUPA A I  B C RULE.TYPE DEONTIC ORG REF 
2.06  information security 
personnel 
conduct  risk assessments Where appropriate, of 
technologies/processes that are 
being evaluated and/or used at 
Georgia State University 
Choice R GSU 371 : 
1 
2.06 CISO and team determine  costs of implementing new policy Choice R GSU 470 : 
14 
2.08 information security 
personnel 
recommend  security controls which, if any, are commensurate 
with the risks to which the 
university would be exposed. 
Choice P GSU 371 : 
3 
2.09 Office of Legal Affairs approve  the new policy if umbrella policies cover the 
need. 
Choice F GSU 470 : 
7 
2.09 [University] develop and 
enact 
 an interim policy (and or 
procedures) 
Where legal or compliance 
imperatives demand an 
immediate modification (or 
suspension) of policy (and 
practice), pending formal review 
and approval. 
Choice R GSU 367 : 
6 
2.10 Organizations that are within 
the scope of the University's 
ISMS 
establish  safeguards against 
security threats 
[at all times] Choice R GSU 367 : 
29 
2.01 The administrative office 
charged with implementing 
and overseeing the policy 
be  the Responsible Office. [at all times] Position R GSU 475 : 
3 
2.01 The Information Security 
Officer (ISO), as designated 
by the Associate Provost for 
Information Systems and 
Technology, 
develop  university information 
security policies 
[at all times] Position R GSU 368 : 
50 
2.01  IS Policy and Compliance 
Manager (PCM) 
kick off  process when the IS Policy and 
Compliance Manager (PCM) 
receives the request to review a 
policy or write a new policy 
Aggregation R GT 360 : 
22 
2.03 GT Internal Audit comprise  PRC [at all times] Boundary R GT 360 : 
10 













ACUPA A I  B C RULE.TYPE DEONTIC ORG REF 
2.03 GT Registrar comprise  PRC [at all times] Boundary R GT 360 : 
11 
2.03 members from GT Legal, HR, 
OIT, Internal Audit, and 
Registrar 
comprise  PRC  Boundary R GT 360 : 
5 
2.03 OIT-ED comprise  PRC [at all times] Boundary R GT 360 : 
7 
2.03 OIT-EIS comprise  PRC [at all times] Boundary R GT 360 : 
8 
2.03 OIT-IS comprise  PRC [at all times] Boundary R GT 360 : 
6 
2.03 Technology/Service SME comprise  PRC [at all times] based on 
policy/standard 
Boundary R GT 360 : 
12 
2.01 Georgia Tech's OIT 
Information Security (OIT-IS) 
group 
develop  this policy [at all times] Choice R GT 353 : 
24 
2.02 OIT-IS follow  this process, known as 
Security Policy Review 
when writing/revising security 
policies which will affect OIT 
and/or Georgia Tech as a whole. 
Choice R GT 360 : 
2 
2.08 PCM document  changes proposed (if a review) or 
proposed language (if a new 
request) 
Choice R GT 360 : 
24 
2.08 PCM perform  analysis initial of the request Choice R GT 360 : 
23 
2.00 PRC provide  feedback and 
constructive criticism 
for proposed OIT and GT Security 
Policies based on their respective 
functional areas. 
Information R GT 360 : 
13 
2.01  IS Policy and Compliance 
Manager (PCM) 
kick off  policy process when the IS Policy and 
Compliance Manager (PCM) 
receives the request to review a 
policy or write a new policy. 
Information S GT 360 : 
21 
2.07 PCM seek  input from the various technical 
communities on campus (GTITC, 
CSS, CSR’s, while writing the new 
policy or updating existing policies 
Information R GT 360 : 
27 
2.09 PCM forward  information to the OIT IS Director for 
preliminary approval to proceed. 













ACUPA A I  B C RULE.TYPE DEONTIC ORG REF 
2.10 [GT organizations] reduce  minimum requirements 
established in this policy 
[in] Other policies, standards, 
procedures, and safeguards 
documents 
Scope F GT 344 : 
14 
2.10 [GT organizations] augment   restrictions  for the sake of security [in] Other 
policies, standards, procedures, 
and safeguards documents 
Scope P GT 343 : 
13 
2.10 [GT] submit  policy to applicable federal and State 
statutes and regulations that 
guarantee either protection or 
accessibility of Institute records] 
Scope R GT 344 : 
5 
2.10 [GT] submit  policy to applicable federal and State 
statutes and regulations that 
guarantee either protection or 
accessibility of Institute records 
[will take precedence over this 
policy] 











  “Draft Policy” 
ACUPA A I B C RULE.TYPE DEONTIC ORGANIZATION REF 
3.01  ITSAC and OIS responsible  for the accuracy of the subject 
matter 
Aggregation R UGA 381 : 
35 
3.04 The Information 
Technology Management 
Forum (ITMF) Security 
Committee 
provide input on “standards and policy 
development … involving the 
campus as a whole” . 
Choice R UGA 472 : 
22 
3.04 The University Security 
Committee 
make policy recommendations to the CIO and CISO Choice R UGA 471 : 
18 
3.03 the CISO socialize  the policy/issue and plan with most of the affected parties 
during the drafting to help gain 
support for the policy change 
Information R UGA 472 : 
21 
3.01 CIO determine the period (time and 
frequency) 
for students, employees, and 
service providers to re-affirm their 
recognition of this policy. 
Aggregation R Ga Southern 332 : 
23.2 
3.02 OPR determine who will be responsible  
for drafting the policy and 
procedures 
once input on the concept 
document has been obtained 
Aggregation R Ga Southern 336 : 
27.1 
3.02 OPR determine who will be responsible  
for drafting the policy and 
procedures 
once input on the concept 
document has been obtained 
Boundary R Ga Southern 336 : 
27.1 
3.01 Team simplify policy to minimize effort required to 
comply. 
Choice R Ga Southern 473 : 
9 
3.02 OCR develop initial draft policy and 
accompanying procedures 
once input on the concept 
document has been 
obtained,utilizing the IT Policy 
templates to ensure consistency 
Choice R Ga Southern 336 : 
28 
3.02 Officer(s) of Coordinating 
Responsibility (OCR) 
write draft of the policy and 
operational procedures 
Once input on the concept 
document has been obtained 
Choice P Ga Southern 336 : 
24 
3.04 Information Technology 
Advisory Council 
provide feedback  on issues regarding instructional 
technologies 
Choice R Ga Southern 474 : 
8 
3.03 Officer(s) of Primary 
Responsibility (OPR) / 
Officer(s) of Coordinating 
Responsibility (OCR) 
inform stakeholders [when distributing policy concept 
document] of possible changes to 
policies 
Information R Ga Southern 336 : 
21 
3.03 Officer(s) of Primary 
Responsibility (OPR) / 
solicit input from all stakeholders [regarding 
draft policy concept document] 












Officer(s) of Coordinating 
Responsibility (OCR) 
3.03 Officer(s) of Primary 
Responsibility (OPR) / 
Officer(s) of Coordinating 
Responsibility (OCR) 
distribute policy concept document to all stakeholders Information R Ga Southern 336 : 
19 
3.03 Officer(s) of Primary 
Responsibility (OPR) / 
Officer(s) of Coordinating 
Responsibility (OCR) 
inform stakeholders [when distributing policy concept 
document] how it affects them 
Information R Ga Southern 336 : 
22 
3.03 Team exchange information in face-to-face meetings as much 
as possible 
Information R Ga Southern 473 : 
6 
3.05 Team receive commendation for maintaining progress by 
delivery of working policies 
Payoff R Ga Southern 473 : 
7 
3.02 CISO draft draft policy using approved format Choice R GSU 470 : 
13 
3.02 Team draft policy to present to key stakeholders Choice R GSU 470 : 
4 
3.02 Team use the Policy Template for all new policies and policy 
revisions 
Choice R GSU 475 : 
5 
3.02 Office of Internal Audits draft policy [at all times] Choice F GSU 470 : 
3 
3.03 Team revise  draft policy accomodating comments by Office 
of Legal affairs 
Choice R GSU 470 : 
8 
3.04 CIO present draft policy to ISAT for examination and 
discussion if Legal approves and 
CIO approves 
Choice R GSU 470 : 
11 
3.03 CISO present draft to Internal Audits for comments Information R GSU 470 : 
9 
3.03 CISO present draft policy to CIO Information R GSU 470 : 
10 
3.02 PCM write initial draft Once approval from the OIT IS 
Director has been received,  taking 
into account the edits from the 
OIT IS Director. 
Choice R GT 360 : 
26 
3.05 PRC review proposed changes over a period not to exceed 1 
month. 












3.02 PCM include summary of proposed 
changes or new policy 
highlights 
with the draft. Information R GT 360 : 
29 
3.03 PCM socialize draft with various groups (e.g. SGA, 
Faculty and Technical Leads) for 
feedback where appropriate 
Information R GT 360 : 
30 
3.03 PCM send initial draft to the PRC for review. Information R GT 360 : 
28 
3.04 CIO vet proposal with executive leadership team Information P GT 476 : 
1 
3.04 Information Security Office vet policy proposal with HR, Legal Affairs prior to 
vetting with campus units 
Information R GT 476 : 
11 
3.04 Information Security Office vet proposal with faculty excutive board, 
faculty senate, and all units of the 
campus 
Information R GT 476 : 
2 
3.04 Information Security Office solicit information from campus units after 
proposal/need vetted with 
executive leadership 
Information R GT 476 : 
4 
3.04 Information Security Office meet associate dean and IT 
director for a campus unit 
to discuss changes Information R GT 476 : 
6 
3.05 PRC handle initial discussion During this time,  over email with 
weekly face-face meetings as 
needed. 
Information R GT 360 : 
32 
3.05 PRC Members are input expected to provide input based 
on their functional areas. 











Appendix P  “Get Approvals” 
ACUPA A I B C RULE TYPE DEONTIC ORG REF 
4.02 
Office of Information 
Security approve 
 exceptions to 
minimum security 




ITSAC and the Offices of 
the CIO and CISO 
approve changes 
to the UGA 
Password 




Office of the CIO and 
the Chief Information 
Security Officer final arbitration  for policy exception review Aggregation R UGA 
381 
: 29 
4.04 CIO approve draft policy [at all times] Aggregation R UGA 
472 
: 24 
4.04 the President approve draft policy [at all times] Aggregation R UGA 
472 
: 25 




Departments, units, and 
individuals 




if unable to comply with the UGA 











the request for final 




Officer(s) of Primary 
Responsibility (OPR) / 
Officer(s) of 
Coordinating 





4.03 Policy Owner revise documents 
documents upon feedback from advisory 
committees within 24-48 hours of 






Officer(s) of Primary 
Responsibility (OPR) / 
Officer(s) of present draft policy 
typically 30 days for consideration by 
President's Cabinet and relevant 



















Officer(s) of Primary 
Responsibility (OPR) / 
Officer(s) of 
Coordinating 
Responsibility (OCR) present draft policy 
typically 30 days for consideration by 
President's Cabinet and relevant 











Officer(s) of Primary 
Responsibility (OPR) / 
Officer(s) of 
Coordinating 
Responsibility (OCR) address requests 
 for additional information, clarifications, 





4.03 Team deliver viable policy drafts 
frequently during the development 





4.04 OPR (CIO) seek policy approval 
 from President's Cabinet by submitting 
amended draft with date and version 





4.03 Policy Owners satisfy the stakeholders 
through timely and continuous policy 










Council recommend approval or denial to the President Aggregation R GSU 
475 
: 31 
4.04 The President deny or approve the proposed policy. 
when presented proposal by 
Administrative Council Aggregation R GSU 
475 
: 32 
4.04 The President concur or veto 
the motion of the 




the University Senate 
(academic and Student 
Policies) or the 
Administrative Council 
(administrative policies) approve 
All university-wide 
policies 
prior to final approval by the President, 
as set forth in University Statutes. Aggregation R GSU 
475 
: 13 













ACUPA A I B C RULE TYPE DEONTIC ORG REF 
4.01 
the Office of 
Institutional 
Effectiveness arrange the policy draft 
to be reviewed by the Policy Advisory 




The Policy Advisory 
Group (PAG) review drafts of policies 
to ensure that all mandatory elements 
are completed, that format is consistent, 
and that any overlaps with policies or 
conflicts with other policies  or federal, 
state, or Board of Regents regulations 




The Policy Advisory 
Group (PAG) evaluate proposed policy (at all times) Choice F GSU 
475 
: 9 
4.02 Administrative Council approve 
new policies or 
revisions to existing 









The Policy Advisory 
Group review 
drafts of new or 
revised policy 
to (a) ensure that all mandatory 
elements are completed and consistency 
of format, and (b) identify any overlap 
with other policies or conflict with other 
policies or federal, state, and Board of 




The Policy Advisory 
Group complete reviews 
 in a maximum of 5 working days (urgent 




The Policy Advisory 
Group complete reviews 
in a maximum of 5 working days (urgent 




The Policy Advisory 
Group review 
drafts of new or  
revised policy 
to (a) ensure that all mandatory 
elements are completed and consistency 
of format, and (b) identify any overlap 
with other policies or conflict with other 
policies or federal, state, and Board of 
Regents regulations. Choice R GSU 
475 
: 15 
4.02 The Senate discuss the policy when introduced Choice R GSU 
475 
: 19 
4.02 University Senate approve 
new policies or 
revisions to existing 













ACUPA A I B C RULE TYPE DEONTIC ORG REF 
4.03 
The Policy Advisory 
Group return 
the draft policy 
documents 
to the Responsible Executive (e.g. vice 
president, associate provost) for 
introduction to the Administrative 
Council. Choice R GSU 
475 
: 28 
4.03 the Responsible Office draft 
the new policy or 
revision of existing 
policy. 
With input from any interested parties 
and the relevant vice president or 




the Responsible Office 
and/or the relevant 
Senate Committee draft 
 document containing 
the new policy or 
revises an existing 
policy. 
With input from the relevant associate 
provost or vice president, Choice R GSU 
475 
: 14 
4.01 CIO present draft policy to Admin Council Information R GSU 
470 
: 12 
4.01 [Team] submit policy drafts 
to the Office of Institutional 




The Policy Advisory 
Group return draft policy document 
to the Responsible Office/Senate 
Committee for scheduling the discussion 
of the policy on the University Senate 




the chair of that 
committee be 
sponsor of the 
proposed policy 
when the policy is introduced in the 
Senate, If the drafted policy comes under 




The Office of 
Institutional 
Effectiveness be [responsible office] 
for overseeing the policy management 




the relevant associate 
provost or vice 
president be 
sponsor of the 





Executive [be] sponsor 
of the proposed policy when the policy is 




President of the Georgia 
Institute of Technology [provide] 
final approval of this 
policy 
based on a review by the Information 
Security Policy Committee Aggregation R GT 
348 
: 8 
4.02 PRC review 
new policies, which 
will be written by OIT-
IS 
prior to CIO approval and policy 













ACUPA A I B C RULE TYPE DEONTIC ORG REF 
4.02 PRC Members compile final draft 
At the end of 1 month, taking into 
account the various inputs and 




keep apprised (or 
apprise) PRC 
of the discussions with the CIO and any 





Office present final draft 
to Faculty Executive Board prior to 







committee to review draft Information R GT 
476 
: 7 
4.03 PCM pass approved PRC draft to the CIO for approval. Information R GT 
360 
: 35 
4.03 PCM brief CIO on the proposed changes or new policy Information R GT 
360 
: 36 
4.03 PCM take 
recommendations the 




4.02 PRC review changes 
Grammatical, format, or minor (e.g. 













  “Education (Awareness)” 
ACUPA A I B C RULE TYPE DEONTIC ORG REF 
5.01 Policy Owners develop awareness activities to inform stakeholders who will 
place the requirements into 
practice. 
Choice R UGA 471 
: 17 
5.04 The Office of 
Information Security 
provide training [at all times] Choice R UGA 382 
: 22 




5.01 OCR Develop  a communication plan / matrix once input on the concept 
document has been obtained,for 
introducing the new policy 




5.02 Officer(s) of 
Coordinating 
Responsibility (OCR) 
post the policy and procedures to VPIT policy website Once 
approved, 




5.03 Officer(s) of 
Coordinating 
Responsibility (OCR) 
post approved policy in master repository ensuring 
proper classification for easy 
reference 




5.04 Officer(s) of 
Coordinating 
Responsibility (OCR) 




5.04 Officer(s) of 
Coordinating 
Responsibility (OCR) 
distribute the policy and procedures Once approved,  according to the 
established communication plan 




5.04 Officer(s) of 
Coordinating 
Responsibility (OCR) 
distribute the policy and procedures Once approved,  according to the 
established communication plan 




5.02 The Associate 
Provost 
post the approved policy  on the University's policy 
website. 
Choice R GSU 475 
: 23 
5.02 [University] make available applicable documents at points of use relevant versions Information R GSU 367 
: 9 
5.02 The Associate 
Provost 
post the approved policy. on the University Website Information R GSU 475 
: 33 
5.04 [Information Security 
Department] 
make aware All relevant personnel of the relevance and importance 
of their information security 
activities and how they 
contribute to the achievement of 
the ISMS objectives 













ACUPA A I B C RULE TYPE DEONTIC ORG REF 
5.04 The Responsible 
Office or Senate 
Committee 
notify relevant individuals and 
departments 
of the policy change. Information R GSU 475 
: 24 
5.04 The Responsible 
Ofice 
notify relevant individuals and 
departments 
of the policy change Information R GSU 475 
: 34 
5.01 The responsible 
university officer 
notify via email 
and/or in writing 
associate vice provosts; deans, 
associate vice presidents, unit 
heads, internal auditing, office of 
legal affairs, OIT information 
security, technical leads 
upon approval of the policy and 
upon any subsequent revisions or 
amendments made to the 
original document 
Information R GT 343 
: 
187 
5.02 [Institute] publish this policy upon approval on the Georgia 
Tech website 
Information O GT 344 
: 71 
5.02 PCM update and post final draft to the OIT Policy Website, once 
the CIO has approved the final 
draft 
Information R GT 360 
: 39 
5.02 PCM communicate final document via email to the campus, once the 
draft or changes have been 
approved 
Information R GT 360 
: 38 
5.02 The responsible 
university officer 
publish on the 
Georgia Tech 
website 
this policy upon approval Information R GT 343 
: 
186 




communicate this policy to their users Information R GT 353 
: 26 
5.04 OIT-IS publish this policy upon approval Information R GT 353 
: 29 
5.04 OIT-IS notify CIO  of the changes [grammatical, 
format, or minor] and publish 
them as necessary. 











  “Plan Maintenance” 
ACUPA A I B C RULE TYPE DEONTIC ORG REF 




s  in policy exception review Aggregation R UGA 
382 
: 30 









e in policy 
exception 




The Office of 
Information Security 
participat
e in policy 
exception
s review  [at all times] Boundary R UGA 
382 
: 25 
6.03  ITSAC and OIS review policy on an annual basis Choice R UGA 
381 
: 34 
6.03 [UGA} update this policy 
as needed as card association regulations 




CISO, in cooperation 
with the ITMF-




CISO, in cooperation 




CISO, in cooperation 












The Office of the 
Chief Information 
Officer, in 
cooperation with the 
University Security 














ACUPA A I B C RULE TYPE DEONTIC ORG REF 
6.04 





 university-wide information 
security policy and procedures [at all times] Choice R UGA 
381 
: 22 
6.04 The CIO and CISO review policy [at all times] Choice R UGA 
382 
: 29 
6.04 [President] review 
development, execution and 
maintenance of UGA Security Plan 
in concert with requirements of USG, 









University of Georgia 
Information Security 
Committee [provide] Recommendation 
for improvement of Role-Based 
Accountability model and the 
University’s information security training 




University of Georgia 
Information Security 
Committee [provide] Feedback and guidance 
on development of a comprehensive IT 
Security Strategy encompassing people, 




University of Georgia 
Information Security 
Committee provide critical analysis and feedback 
on existing or proposed policies and 
initiatives related to information security 
and privacy to the Director of University 
Information Security and the Office of 








e] new policy 
due to extensive changes necessary? Is a 


































Responsibility (OCR) Move Retired/obsolete policy document 
to a Policy Archive, ensuring correct 























































CISO and Internal 
Audit Office 
collaborat






CISO and legal affairs 
office 
collaborat





6.06 Office of legal affairs vet policies 
from a legal risk management 








Responsibility (OCR) evaluate policy 
as per the review schedule specified in 







































This document and any of the 
catalogued policies 
with such changes being reviewed and 
recommended through the Senate 
Information Systems and Technology 




 information security 
personnel perform security reviews 
In these situations; to determine the 
threats,  the likelihood of such events 














ACUPA A I B C RULE TYPE DEONTIC ORG REF 
they were to occur and recommend 
controls. 
6.04 
 information security 
personnel perform security reviews 
In these situations; to determine the 
threats,  the likelihood of such events 
taking place, the estimated impact if 
they were to occur and recommend 





are within the scope 
of the University's 
ISMS ensure 
appropriateness of safeguards 








Point(s) of contact for questions 
or comments 
When a new procedure, or version of a 
procedure, is issued for inclusion in the 
University's Information Security 






Department] include  Date of last update or issuance 
When a new procedure, or version of a 
procedure, is issued for inclusion in the 
University's Information Security 







Data classification (if sensitive or 
confidential) 
When a new procedure, or version of a 
procedure, is issued for inclusion in the 
University's Information Security 







 A revision level showing the new 
document(s)/version(s) 
When a new procedure, or version of a 
procedure, is issued for inclusion in the 
University's Information Security 













Follow-up actions from previous 







Results from effectiveness 



















Vulnerabilities or threats not 
adequately addressed in the 







Status of preventive and 







Techniques, products or 
procedures, which could be used 
at the University to improve the 
ISMS's performance and 







 Results of ISMS audits and 

















The Computer & Network Security 











Only he President of 
the Georgia Institute 





Audit, and the Unit involve 
qualified information security 




Georgia Tech's OIT 
Information Security 














ACUPA A I B C RULE TYPE DEONTIC ORG REF 
6.01 
Georgia Tech's OIT 
Information Security 





Audit, and the Unit review approved exceptions periodically Choice R GT 
353 
: 16 
6.03 PRC review 
Security 
Policies/Standards/Procedures 
on an annual basis, based on the initial 





Audit, and the Unit review 
Any deviation from security 
policies and standards 
ia the Information Security Exception 





Audit, and the Unit require 
 the Unit Head, CIO, EVP, or 
Provost. 
to approve exemption requests involving 





Audit, and the Unit log all findings and results 
in a central repository that is accessible 
to all Georgia Tech staff involved in the 
assessement of the exception request. Choice R GT 
353 
: 15 




these policies [security policies 















Audit, and the Unit approve exception requests 
that create significant risks without 





Audit, and the Unit 
take into 
account 
what value the exception will 





Audit, and the Unit evaluate exception requests 
consistently in accordance with Georgia 
Tech's risk acceptance practice Choice R GT 
353 
: 21 
6.06 Unit consider 
what risks they may face by not 
adhering to the policy as well as 
the benefit gained by requesting 
the exception. 
before doing so [requesting an 
exception] Choice S GT 
359 
: 2 
6.06 we consider 
the security of Georgia Tech's 





Audit, and the Unit evaluate exception requests 
in the context of potential risk to the 



















ACUPA A I B C RULE TYPE DEONTIC ORG REF 
Administrative units, 
including OIT, 
6.05 OIT-IS notify 
the following groups: OIT, Campus 
Deans and Chairs, Unit 
Business/Administrative Leads, 
Georgia Tech IT directors, ITAC, 
Campus CSR's, Internal Audit 
via email and/or in writing upon approval 
of the standard and upon subsequent 
reviewsion or amendmnets made to the 








Any changes to the policy or 
procedures 
promptly to the individuals and offices 












  “Measurement and Compliance” 
ACUPA A I B C RULE TYPE DEONTIC ORG REF 
7.02 [President] [have] ultimate 
responsibility 
for UGA Security Plan, 
policies, standards, and 
best practice 
that meet requirements of 
USG, state and federal 
mandates 
Aggregation R UGA 466 
: 26 
7.02 [President] interpret UGA Policies [at all times] Aggregation R UGA 466 
: 28 
7.02 [President] [have] ultimate 
responsibility 
for UGA Security Plan, 
policies, standards, and 
best practice 
that meet requirements of 
USG, state and federal 
mandates 
Aggregation R UGA 466 
: 26 
7.01 Departments determine how to comply with policy  in some cases. Choice P UGA 472 
: 28 
7.02 audit office enforce compliance with UGA 
security policy 
[at all times] Choice R UGA 472 
: 29 
7.01 ISO coordinates standards, procedures and 
guidelines necessary to 
administer access to 
university information 
resources. 
[at all times] Aggregation R GSU 368 
: 52 
7.01 auditors possess to enable 
them to act in 
accordance with the 
principles of auditing 
 personal attributes [at all times] Boundary R GSU 367 
: 16 
7.01 [University] conduct  Internal audits of the ISMS at planned 
intervals at least annually 
Choice R GSU 367 
: 14 
7.01 [Information Security 
Department] 
maintain ISMS records unless specified othewise, in 
the department or college in 
which they were produced 
for a minimum of 30 days. 
Choice R GSU 367 
: 26 
7.01 The Information Security 
Officer (ISO), as designated by 
the Associate Provost for 
Information Systems and 
Technology, 
monitor compliance with those 
policies and all applicable 
laws, rules and regulations 
[at all times] Choice R GSU 368 
: 51 









  Aggregation Rules 
ACUPA A I B C Org ref Deontic 
2.02 CISO determine likely path in consultation with the CIO UGA 471 : 2 P 
2.02 The CISO and CIO set the agenda and scope 
for policy development upon consultation 
with stakeholders. 
UGA 471 : 14 R 
2.10 The CISO make final decision 
as to scope and agenda for policy 
development activities. 
UGA 471 : 15 R 
3.01  ITSAC and OIS responsible  for the accuracy of the subject matter UGA 381 : 35 R 
4.02 Office of Information Security approve 
 exceptions to minimum 
security standards 
[at all times] UGA 381 : 24 R 
4.04 the presidents cabinet approve draft policy [at all times] UGA 472 : 23 R 
4.04 CIO approve draft policy [at all times] UGA 472 : 24 R 
4.04 the President approve draft policy [at all times] UGA 472 : 25 R 
4.04 
Office of the CIO and the 
Chief Information Security 
Officer 
final arbitration  for policy exception review UGA 381 : 29 R 
4.04 
ITSAC and the Offices of the 
CIO and CISO 
approve changes 
to the UGA 
Password Standard 
 [at all times] UGA 382 : 37 R 
6.04 The CIO and CISO 
serve as the final 
arbitrators 
 in policy exception review UGA 382 : 30 R 
6.04 The CIO and CISO 
serve as the final 
arbitrators 




for UGA Security Plan, 
policies, standards, and best 
practice 
that meet requirements of USG, state 
and federal mandates 




for UGA Security Plan, 
policies, standards, and best 
practice 
that meet requirements of USG, state 
and federal mandates 
UGA 466 : 26 R 
7.02 [President] interpret UGA Policies [at all times] UGA 466 : 28 R 
3.01 CIO determine 
the period (time and 
frequency) 
for students, employees, and service 





332 : 23.2 R 
3.02 OPR determine 
who will be responsible  for 
drafting the policy and 
procedures 


















ACUPA A I B C Org ref Deontic 
6.07 
Officer(s) of Coordinating 
Responsibility (OCR) 




336 : 46 R 
6.07 
Officer(s) of Coordinating 
Responsibility (OCR) 
[determine] new policy 
due to extensive changes necessary? Is a 




336 : 48 R 
2.04 ISO works 
this material [ standards, 
procedures and guidelines 
necessary to administer 
access to university 
information resources] 
to develop in conjunction with 
information resource owners, the 
university data administrators and 
functional users 
GSU 368 : 53 R 
2.10 Office of Legal Affairs approve the draft [at all times] GSU 470 : 6 R 
4.02 The Senate pass or deny the motion to approve [at all times] GSU 475 : 20 R 
4.04 
the University Senate 
(academic and Student 
Policies) or the 
Administrative Council 
(administrative policies) 
approve All university-wide policies 
prior to final approval by the President, 
as set forth in University Statutes. 
GSU 475 : 13 R 
4.04 The President concur or veto the motion of the Senate [at all times] GSU 475 : 21 R 
4.04 The Administrative Council recommend approval or denial to the President GSU 475 : 31 R 
4.04 The President deny or approve the proposed policy. 
when presented proposal by 
Administrative Council 
GSU 475 : 32 R 
6.07 
 Information Technology 
Senate Sub-Committee (ITSS) 
change 
This document and any of the 
catalogued policies 
with such changes being reviewed and 
recommended through the Senate 
Information Systems and Technology 
Committee (ISAT) 
GSU 361 : 20 P 
7.01 ISO coordinates 
standards, procedures and 
guidelines necessary to 
administer access to 
university information 
resources. 
[at all times] GSU 368 : 52 R 
2.01 
 IS Policy and Compliance 
Manager (PCM) 
kick off process 
when the IS Policy and Compliance 
Manager (PCM) receives the request to 
review a policy or write a new policy 













ACUPA A I B C Org ref Deontic 
4.04 
President of the Georgia 
Institute of Technology 
[provide] final approval of this policy 
based on a review by the Information 
Security Policy Committee 
GT 348 : 8 R 
6.04 
The responsible university 
officer 
change this policy [at all times] GT 343 : 183 P 
6.04 
the Georgia Tech Associate 
Vice President and Associate 
Vice-Provost for Information 
Technology. 
change 
The Computer & Network 
Security Policy and 
Procedures 
by directive GT 343 : 184 P 
6.07 
Only the President of the 
Georgia Institute of 
Technology. 










 Get Approval Rules – Filtered 
ACUPA A I B C RULE TYPE DEONTIC ORG REF 
4.02 
Office of Information 
Security approve 
 exceptions to 
minimum security 




ITSAC and the Offices of the 
CIO and CISO 
approve changes to 
the UGA Password 




Office of the CIO and the 
Chief Information Security 




Departments, units, and 
individuals 
request from the Chief 
Information Security 
Officer (CISO) exemption 
if unable to comply with the 




The UGA Office of 
Information Security 




the request for final 




Officer(s) of Primary 
Responsibility (OPR) / 
Officer(s) of Coordinating 





4.03 Policy Owner revise documents 
documents upon feedback from 
advisory committees within 24-






Officer(s) of Primary 
Responsibility (OPR) / 
Officer(s) of Coordinating 
Responsibility (OCR) present draft policy 
typically 30 days for 
consideration by President's 






Officer(s) of Primary 
Responsibility (OPR) / 
Officer(s) of Coordinating 
Responsibility (OCR) present draft policy 
typically 30 days for 
consideration by President's 











Officer(s) of Primary 
Responsibility (OPR) / address requests 
 for additional information, 
clarifications, objections, 














ACUPA A I B C RULE TYPE DEONTIC ORG REF 
Officer(s) of Coordinating 
Responsibility (OCR) 
4.03 Team deliver viable policy drafts 
frequently during the 





4.04 OPR (CIO) seek policy approval 
 from President's Cabinet by 
submitting amended draft with 





4.03 Policy Owners satisfy the stakeholders 
through timely and continuous 






President of the Georgia 
Institute of Technology [provide] 
final approval of this 
policy 
based on a review by the 
Information Security Policy 
Committee Aggregation R GT 
348 : 
8 
4.02 PRC review 
new policies, which 
will be written by OIT-
IS 
prior to CIO approval and policy 
publication Choice R GT 
360 : 
15 
4.02 PRC Members compile final draft 
At the end of 1 month, taking 
into account the various inputs 




keep apprised (or 
apprise) PRC 
of the discussions with the CIO 
and any changes that are 
proposed Information R GT 
360 : 
37 
4.03 Information Security Office present final draft 
to Faculty Executive Board prior 
to seeking approval. Information R GT 
476 : 
8 
4.03 Information Security Office meet 
faculty senate 
committee to review draft Information R GT 
476 : 
7 
4.03 PCM pass approved PRC draft to the CIO for approval. Information R GT 
360 : 
35 
4.03 PCM brief CIO 
on the proposed changes or 
new policy Information R GT 
360 : 
36 
4.03 PCM take 
recommendations the 
CIO has into account Information R GT 
360 : 
36.1 
4.02 PRC review changes 
Grammatical, format, or minor 










 Information Rules 
ACUP
A 
A I B C Organization ref Deontic 
3.03 the CISO socialize 
 the policy/issue 
and plan 
with most of the affected parties during the drafting to help gain 
support for the policy change 
UGA 472 : 21 R 




































[when distributing policy concept document] of possible changes 
to policies 













present draft policy 
typically 30 days for consideration by President's Cabinet and 
relevant audiences 













A I B C Organization ref Deontic 
Responsibility 












present draft policy 
typically 30 days for consideration by President's Cabinet and 
relevant audiences 
Ga Southern 336 : 31 R 
4.03 Policy Owners accept stakeholder input anytime in the cycle Ga Southern 473 : 2 R 
4.03 Team deliver 
viable policy 
drafts 










 for additional information, clarifications, objections, 
recommendations, etc. 
Ga Southern 336 : 32 R 
4.04 OPR (CIO) seek policy approval 
 from President's Cabinet by submitting amended draft with date 
and version accordingly 







the policy and 
procedures 






post approved policy 
in master repository ensuring proper classification for easy 
reference 








the policy and 
procedures 
Once approved,  according to the established communication 
plan 





















the policy and 
procedures 
Once approved,  according to the established communication 
plan 
















policy retirement as per Communication Plan Ga Southern 336 : 54 R 
3.03 CISO present draft to Internal Audits for comments GSU 470 : 9 R 
3.03 CISO present draft policy to CIO GSU 470 : 10 R 
4.01 [Team] submit policy drafts to the Office of Institutional Effectiveness GSU 475 : 6 R 
4.01 CIO present draft policy to Admin Council GSU 470 : 12 R 
4.03 





to the Responsible Office/Senate Committee for scheduling the 
discussion of the policy on the University Senate Agenda. 













on the University Website GSU 475 : 33 R 
5.04 
The Responsible 















of the relevance and importance of their information security 
activities and how they contribute to the achievement of the 
ISMS objectives 














 A revision level 
showing the new 
document(s)/ver
sion(s) 
When a new procedure, or version of a procedure, is issued for 
inclusion in the University's Information Security Management 
System 























When a new procedure, or version of a procedure, is issued for 
inclusion in the University's Information Security Management 
System 






 Date of last 
update or 
issuance 
When a new procedure, or version of a procedure, is issued for 
inclusion in the University's Information Security Management 
System 










When a new procedure, or version of a procedure, is issued for 
inclusion in the University's Information Security Management 
System 











 Results of ISMS 
audits and 
reviews 

















which could be 






































A I B C Organization ref Deontic 





























to scan for issues that need to be addressed by policy change GT 476 : 3 R 




for proposed OIT and GT Security Policies based on their 
respective functional areas. 
GT 360 : 13 R 
2.01 
 IS Policy and 
Compliance 
Manager (PCM) 
kick off policy process 
when the IS Policy and Compliance Manager (PCM) receives the 
request to review a policy or write a new policy. 
GT 360 : 21 S 
2.07 PCM seek input 
from the various technical communities on campus (GTITC, CSS, 
CSR’s, while writing the new policy or updating existing policies 
GT 360 : 27 R 
2.09 PCM forward information to the OIT IS Director for preliminary approval to proceed. GT 360 : 25 R 
3.02 PCM include 
summary of 
proposed 
changes or new 
policy highlights 
with the draft. GT 360 : 29 R 
3.03 PCM send initial draft to the PRC for review. GT 360 : 28 R 
3.03 PCM socialize draft 
with various groups (e.g. SGA, Faculty and Technical Leads) for 
feedback where appropriate 
GT 360 : 30 R 





with faculty excutive board, faculty senate, and all units of the 
campus 





from campus units after proposal/need vetted with executive 
leadership 



















and IT director 
for a campus unit 




vet policy proposal with HR, Legal Affairs prior to vetting with campus units GT 476 : 11 R 
3.05 PRC handle initial discussion 
During this time,  over email with weekly face-face meetings as 
needed. 
GT 360 : 32 R 







of the discussions with the CIO and any changes that are 
proposed 











present final draft to Faculty Executive Board prior to seeking approval. GT 476 : 8 R 
4.03 PCM pass 
approved PRC 
draft 
to the CIO for approval. GT 360 : 35 R 
4.03 PCM brief CIO on the proposed changes or new policy GT 360 : 36 R 
4.03 PCM take 
recommendation
s the CIO has 
















auditing, office of 




upon approval of the policy and upon any subsequent revisions or 
amendments made to the original document 
GT 343 : 187 R 





via email to the campus, once the draft or changes have been 
approved 





to the OIT Policy Website, once the CIO has approved the final 
draft 






















this policy upon approval GT 343 : 186 R 
5.04 OIT-IS notify CIO 
 of the changes [grammatical, format, or minor] and publish them 
as necessary. 





units, including OIT, 
commun
icate 
this policy to their users GT 353 : 26 R 









via the approved process GT 353 : 27 R 




and Chairs, Unit 
Business/Adminis
trative Leads, 




via email and/or in writing upon approval of the standard and 
upon subsequent reviewsion or amendmnets made to the original 
document 






Any changes to 
the policy or 
procedures 









  Scope Rules 
ACUPA A I B C Organization ref Deontic 
2.02 
Departments, units, or 
service providers 
develop stricter standards 







each University System of 
Georgia institution 
develop policy 
authorized by BOR Appropriate Use Policy (2009-14) that, at minimum, 









2.10 [GT organizations] reduce 
minimum requirements 
established in this policy 




2.10 [GT organizations] augment  restrictions 






2.10 [GT] submit policy 
to applicable federal and State statutes and regulations that guarantee 
either protection or accessibility of Institute records [will take precedence 





2.10 [GT] submit policy 
to applicable federal and State statutes and regulations that guarantee 
either protection or accessibility of Institute records [will take precedence 
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